The Tribunal held that Section 43CA applies to the transfer of tangible immovable property (land or building). Transferable Developmental Rights (TDRs) are intangible rights and not land or building per se. Following judicial precedents, the Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order deleting the addition.

The Tribunal held that the assessee was merely a developer acting as an attorney holder for the original landowners, and the land constituted stock-in-trade. The sale deed relied upon by the lower authorities pertained to a different parcel of land and did not establish ownership for the land in question. Therefore, Section 50C, which applies only to capital assets, was not applicable.

The Tribunal held that the land sold was stock-in-trade and not a capital asset, as evidenced by development agreements, Power of Attorney, revenue records, consistent accounting treatment, and the department's acceptance of similar transactions in prior years. Therefore, Section 50C was not applicable, and the addition made on account of long-term capital gains was unsustainable.

The Tribunal held that disallowing the entire contract expense was not justified. The Tribunal decided to set aside the matter to the AO to verify if the contract work was executed and the amount received, and if not satisfied, to estimate profit under Section 44AD.

The Tribunal held that since the sale deed was declared void by the Civil Court due to fraud and non-payment of consideration, and no evidence of receiving sale proceeds was produced, the addition on account of capital gains, even on a protective basis, was not justified. The Tribunal also noted that the Assessing Officer failed to allow deduction for the cost of acquisition.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee failed to provide compliance before both the AO and CIT(A) despite multiple opportunities. However, considering the request for another opportunity, the Tribunal set aside the matter to the CIT(A) with a cost of Rs. 5,000/- to be deposited by the assessee. The assessee was directed to make proper compliance before the CIT(A).

The Tribunal found that disallowing the entire contract expense was not justified, as it led to taxing the entire contract receipt. The Tribunal noted the assessee's submission that no contract work was executed and the amount was not received, supported by bank statements. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the AO for verification.

The Tribunal held that the sale deed was declared void by the Civil Court due to fraud and non-payment of consideration. The Tribunal noted that no inquiry was made by the AO from the buyers, nor was any evidence produced for the receipt of sale consideration by the assessee. The mere pendency of an appeal before the High Court did not justify the addition, especially since the sale transaction was declared void.

The Tribunal held that the original assessment order under Section 147 r.w.s. 144 was set aside by the NFAC to the Assessing Officer for re-examination. Consequently, the subsequent order under Section 154 r.w.s. 147 also ceased to survive and the appeal against it became infructuous.

The Tribunal held that the items on which the assessee claimed higher depreciation did not fall under the category of life-saving medical equipment specified in the Income Tax Rules. Therefore, the AO was justified in rectifying the mistake apparent from the record under section 154. The assessee's reliance on a previous High Court decision was not applicable due to differing facts.

The Tribunal held that Section 50 of the Act creates a limited deeming fiction for computation and does not alter the nature of the asset. The CIT(A) correctly considered the Written Down Value (WDV) as on 31.03.2010 as the cost of acquisition because depreciation had been claimed. The claim for cost of improvement was rejected due to lack of evidence. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the assessee could not claim depreciation benefits and simultaneously seek indexation on the original cost.

The Tribunal held that since the AO did not make any addition related to the cash and time deposits for which the case was reopened, it was not open for the AO to make an addition on a different issue, such as the disallowance of Section 80P deduction. The Tribunal relied on the Gujarat High Court's decision in Mohamed Juned Dadani.

The tribunal held that the reopening was not sustainable as the assessee had fully disclosed material facts during the original assessment, which had previously found that the assessee had advanced loans to M/s Mehta Finance, not vice-versa. The addition was also not sustainable on merits as no evidence was produced by the AO to show the assessee had taken accommodation entries.

The Tribunal held that the AO made the addition of Rs. 59,97,950/- mechanically without verifying facts or controverting the assessee's submissions. The CIT(A) had rightly noted that the assessment order lacked specific details about the transactions and supporting evidence, hence the addition was unsubstantiated.

The Tribunal found merit in the Department's contention that the CIT(A) had not properly examined the facts regarding unsecured loans and capital introduction. The Tribunal noted discrepancies in the CIT(A)'s reasoning about duplication of additions and the lack of proper verification of evidence for these amounts. The Tribunal restored these issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee has opted for the DTVSV Scheme and filed the required forms for withdrawal of the appeal. Therefore, keeping the appeal pending would serve no purpose.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases can be added to the income, not the entire purchase value, especially when sales are not doubted. The Tribunal directed the addition to be restricted to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases can be added to the income, not the entire purchase value. Considering the facts and the existence of sales corresponding to these purchases, the Tribunal directed the addition to be restricted to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases should be added to the total income, not the entire purchase value, as sales were not doubted. The addition was restricted to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases can be added to income, not the entire purchase value, especially when sales are not doubted. The Tribunal restricted the addition to 10% of the total unproved purchases, after considering prior additions.