ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PRIVATE LIMITED vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN

2. DESCRIPTION OF OTHER RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS xxx xxx xxx Limitations on Reverse Engineering, Decompilation, and Disassembly - You may not reverse engineer, decompile, or disassemble the SOFTWARE PRODUCT, except and only to the extent that such activity is expressly permitted by applicable law nothwithstanding this limitation.” “4. COPYRIGHT- All title and intellectual property rights in and to the SOFTWARE PRODUCT

COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, HYDERABAD vs. M/S. DETERGENTS INDIA LTD

Bench: Cegat Was Also Dismissed By The Impugned Judgment Dated 22.4.2003. 2

transferred from one company to another; depots of Shaw Wallace and DIL were in the same premises; DIL sends monthly newsletters to Shaw Wallace showing production, despatches, purpose, technical problems, quality problems, details of power consumption etc. - and Shaw Wallace fixes the price of DIL products; and unsecured loans of approximately Rs.55 lakhs were given by Shaw Wallace

COMMNR.,INCOME TAX, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM vs. K. RAVINDRANATHAN NAIR

220 from which an amount of Rs.1,74,13,200 (90%) was deducted in terms of clause (baa) to the Explanation to Section 80HHC to arrive at the Business Profits (See: page 52 of the S.L.P. paper book). 7. Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-assessee, submitted that Section 80HHC

DILIP N. SHROFF vs. JOINT COMMNR. OF INCOME TAX, MUMBAI &ANR

The appeal is allowed

220-Walkeshwar Road, Mumbai-400 006 1 Land Area as per records 5250 sq. yds. = 4389.63 sq. mt. 2 Land rate adopted @ Rs.12842/- sq. mt. (897/- x 1.33 x 10.764) 3 Consideration of land component Rs.5,63,71,628 (A) 4 Built-up Area existing as on 1-4.81 (Gr.+I upper floor bungalow structures

M/S. AMCO BATTERIES LTD., BANGALORE vs. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BANGALORE

In the result, Section 33-B of the Amended Act is held to be

220, 236]. Learned Solicitor General emphatically submitted that in the case of PUCL(supra), equating the right of a voter to exercise his right of franchise to a fundamental right of speech and expression, is clearly in contradiction to the various decisions of equal and larger benches of this court where such a right of voter is only recognised