The Tribunal held that the items on which the assessee claimed higher depreciation did not fall under the category of life-saving medical equipment specified in the Income Tax Rules. Therefore, the AO was justified in rectifying the mistake apparent from the record under section 154. The assessee's reliance on a previous High Court decision was not applicable due to differing facts.

The Tribunal held that Section 50 of the Act creates a limited deeming fiction for computation and does not alter the nature of the asset. The CIT(A) correctly considered the Written Down Value (WDV) as on 31.03.2010 as the cost of acquisition because depreciation had been claimed. The claim for cost of improvement was rejected due to lack of evidence. The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the assessee could not claim depreciation benefits and simultaneously seek indexation on the original cost.

The Tribunal held that since the AO did not make any addition related to the cash and time deposits for which the case was reopened, it was not open for the AO to make an addition on a different issue, such as the disallowance of Section 80P deduction. The Tribunal relied on the Gujarat High Court's decision in Mohamed Juned Dadani.

The tribunal held that the reopening was not sustainable as the assessee had fully disclosed material facts during the original assessment, which had previously found that the assessee had advanced loans to M/s Mehta Finance, not vice-versa. The addition was also not sustainable on merits as no evidence was produced by the AO to show the assessee had taken accommodation entries.

The Tribunal held that the AO made the addition of Rs. 59,97,950/- mechanically without verifying facts or controverting the assessee's submissions. The CIT(A) had rightly noted that the assessment order lacked specific details about the transactions and supporting evidence, hence the addition was unsubstantiated.

The Tribunal found merit in the Department's contention that the CIT(A) had not properly examined the facts regarding unsecured loans and capital introduction. The Tribunal noted discrepancies in the CIT(A)'s reasoning about duplication of additions and the lack of proper verification of evidence for these amounts. The Tribunal restored these issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration.

The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A). It was found that the AO's initial addition was not based on clear evidence, and the assessee provided sufficient documentation like cash book, sales registers, and RTO registrations before the CIT(A) to explain the cash deposits as sale proceeds of tractors. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s decision to delete the addition.

The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's failure to comply with notices from both the AO and CIT(A) without providing valid reasons. However, considering the request for another opportunity, the Tribunal decided to set aside the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had provided sufficient explanation and evidence for the cash deposits, including savings from a partnership firm, agricultural income, savings of family members, and previous withdrawals from bank accounts. The AO had wrongly rejected the evidence without proper reasoning.

The Tribunal noted that addition under section 69A requires the assessee to be owner of unexplained money and fail to explain its source. After the assessee furnished evidence, the burden shifted to the AO to rebut. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) correctly held the time deposits to be explained on merits.

The Tribunal held that the reopening of the assessment was invalid because the approval for issuing the notice under section 148 was granted by an authority higher than the one specified by law (Section 151). Therefore, the AO lacked valid jurisdiction to frame the assessment.

The Tribunal condoned the delay, noting the assessee's charitable work and the general confusion surrounding amended provisions. It held that the applications for final approval should be considered after the grant of provisional approval, not from the commencement of activities, and set aside the CIT(E)'s orders.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals, set aside the orders of the CIT(E), and restored the matters back to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal found that the CIT(E)'s interpretation of the time-bar provisions for Section 80G was impractical and clarified that applications for final approval can only be made after provisional approval is granted.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals, set aside the orders of the CIT(E), and restored the matters for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal held that the application for final approval under Section 80G should be considered after provisional approval, not from the date of commencement of activities, acknowledging the confusion surrounding amended provisions.

The tribunal held that since no return was filed voluntarily and the assessment was framed as a best judgment assessment under section 144 due to non-compliance, the mandatory notice under section 143(2) was not required for the validity of the assessment.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals, set aside the CIT(E)'s orders, and restored the matters for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal found that the interpretation of the time limit for 80G approval by the CIT(E) was impractical and that there was confusion regarding the amended provisions.