“Section 154(5)”

For condoning delay, the term 'sufficient cause' must be interpreted liberally and purposively to advance justice. Delay not tainted by mala fides, gross negligence, or recklessness, and based on honestly obtained legal advice, constitutes sufficient cause.

Where a reasonable cause for delay in filing an appeal exists, the period of delay may not be a relevant factor for condonation. The court has condoned even substantial delays, such as nearly 21 years, based on the presence of a reasonable cause.

Interest, sales tax, and purchase tax subsidies received by an assessee are generally considered capital receipts, not revenue income, for income tax purposes.

When substantial justice and procedural technicalities are in conflict, especially in cases involving non-deliberate delay, the cause of substantial justice must be prioritized. The opposing party cannot claim a vested right to benefit from injustice due to such delays.

A delay in filing an appeal cannot be condoned if it is attributable to the assessee's negligence or inaction, such as misplacing and forgetting the Commissioner (Appeals)'s order. The provisions relating to limitation apply with rigour, and a lack of due care and attention is not a sufficient reason for condonation.

The principle of 'sufficient cause' for condoning a delay in filing an appeal should be construed liberally, particularly when the assessee would not have gained from the delay or when the delay arose from reasonable grounds like wrong professional advice.

Procedural law serves as an aid to justice, not an obstruction, and should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory; it is subservient to substantive justice.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal can condone significant delays in filing an appeal, such as 180 days, if the appeal was filed after a Supreme Court judgment clarified the legal position, demonstrating a reasonable cause for the delay.