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The Tribunal found that the tax effect was below the monetary limit. It ruled that the exception invoked by the Revenue (Clause-(f) of Para No.3.1 of CBDT Circular No. 5/2024, concerning non-quantifiable tax effect for registration cases like Section 12AA) was inapplicable for AY 2017-18, as the assessee's Section 12AA registration was only effective from AY 2018-19. Consequently, the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that since the notice under Section 148 was dispatched after April 1, 2021, it should be construed as a show-cause notice under Section 148A(b) as per Supreme Court rulings. The Assessing Officer failed to comply with the subsequent procedures, rendering the assessment order invalid.
The Tribunal found that the AO's assessment order might be invalid due to procedural issues regarding faceless assessment. On merits, the Tribunal held that some additions were made without proper verification and could lead to double taxation. The matter was remanded to the AO for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that notices and orders issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer outside the faceless mechanism are bad in law. The JAO lacked jurisdiction to issue such notices and orders.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notice issued under Section 274 r.w.s. 271(1)(c) was invalid because it did not specify whether the penalty was for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars. Following the jurisdictional High Court's decision, the penalty was quashed.
The Tribunal held that the AO made a double addition by not reducing the re-characterized commission income from the assessee's declared business income and directed recomputation. It further held that the addition under Section 68 should be taxed at 30% instead of 60%, considering the effective date of the Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Bill, 2016, and various judicial precedents.
The Tribunal held that since the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond three years from the end of the assessment year, the approval should have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner or Principal Director General, not the Principal Commissioner. Therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction by the AO was invalid.
The Tribunal held that the original MOU dated 25.05.2004, pursuant to a chain of events, had lost its existence and was never acted upon by the parties, except for adjusting the advance of Rs. 4.15 crores against the subsequent transfer of 4 Acres - 72 Guntas (22258.6 Sq. Yards) of land. The Tribunal noted that the compromise order dated 23.11.2013 referred to the transfer of 3 Acres - 0 Guntas (14520 Sq. Yards), and the two MOUs dated 12.08.2013 agreed to transfer an aggregate of 4845 Sq. Yards. Thus, the aggregate land covered by these agreements was 19365 Sq. Yards (4 Acres - 0.125 Guntas). The Tribunal found that the transfer of the balance land (2893.60 Sq. Yards) was not based on the compromise or the MOUs. Therefore, for the land covered by the compromise order dated 23.11.2013, the SRO value as on that date was to be adopted. For the land covered by the MOUs dated 12.08.2013, the SRO value as on that date was to be adopted. For the remaining land transferred, the SRO value as applicable on the date of the last sale deeds (16/11/2015 and 18/11/2015) was to be adopted as the deemed sale consideration for computing LTCG under Section 50C. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the AO to recompute LTCG accordingly.
The ITAT, considering new evidence of the assessee's ill-health and the Chartered Accountant's father's demise, found sufficient cause for the delay. It set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the case for fresh consideration of the condonation of delay and the appeal's merits.
The ITAT noted that the assessee submitted fresh evidence (confirmation letters) for the first time, which had not been examined by the lower authorities. Given that the genuineness of transactions and identity of parties were unverified, the Bench decided to remit the issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination after providing an opportunity to the assessee.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) upheld the Ld.CIT(A)'s decision to remand the issues back to the Ld.AO. The Tribunal observed that despite multiple opportunities, the assessee failed to represent herself or provide proper evidence regarding the sources of deposits and capital gains. Consequently, the ITAT dismissed the assessee's appeal, endorsing the need for further investigation by the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was invalid as it was issued by the JAO outside the faceless mechanism, contravening Section 151A of the Act. Consequently, the assessment and penalties were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was invalid as it was issued by the JAO outside the faceless mechanism, contravening Section 151A of the Act. Consequently, the assessment and penalties were quashed.
The Tribunal held that the notices and orders issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) outside the faceless mechanism were bad and illegal, lacking jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal filed by the revenue was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was invalid as it was issued by the JAO outside the faceless mechanism, contravening Section 151A of the Act. Consequently, the assessment and penalties were quashed.
The ITAT condoned the 244-day delay in filing the appeal, accepting the reason of the assessee's counsel's ill-health and unawareness of the CIT(A) order. It found that the CIT(A) improperly served notices via email despite the assessee having opted for physical service in Form-35. The ITAT set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication with a direction to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee.
For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to partly allow the appeal. The Tribunal noted that while the cheque payments for land purchase were documented, the cash payment of Rs.1,22,04,000/- was recorded in the TTD diary. The assessee failed to provide corroborating evidence to prove that these cash payments were for business purposes and not for on-money investment in land. The Tribunal concurred with the AO's reasoning that the cash payment, when considered with cheque payments, indicated on-money payment for the land. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was considered justified. For AY 2019-20, the Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal. The Tribunal agreed with the Ld. CIT(A)'s finding that the cash entries in the impounded document were duly accounted for in the assessee's books and the partnership firm's books. Since the transactions were properly recorded and their sources explained, the amounts could not be considered unsecured loans from third parties. The addition of Rs.88,87,000/- under section 68 was deleted by the Ld. CIT(A) and this deletion was upheld.
The Tribunal admitted the additional ground raised by the assessee concerning the validity of the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act. The Tribunal noted that the notice under Section 148A(b) and the order under Section 148A(d) were issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO), Income Tax Officer, Ward-2(1), Vijayawada, on 13.01.2024 and 11.03.2024, respectively, and the notice under Section 148 was also issued by the JAO on 11.03.2024. However, the assessment was framed by an e-assessment unit, not by the JAO. The Tribunal, respectfully following the judicial precedents of the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Smt. Prameela Pasumarthi v. DCIT and the Hon'ble High Court of Telangana in Deloitte Consulting India (P.) Ltd. v. Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department, National Faceless Assessment Center, New Delhi, and the dismissal of SLP by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ITO v. Prakash Pandurang Patil, held that the notice issued by the JAO was not under the mandatory faceless mechanism as per Section 151A of the Act. Consequently, the re-assessment notice was set aside, and the order passed under Section 147 read with Section 144B was quashed as being without jurisdiction. The legal ground raised by the assessee was allowed. The other grounds raised on merits were left undecided.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the CIT(E) had provided multiple opportunities for the assessee to appear and comply with the notices, but the assessee failed to do so. This non-compliance prevented the CIT(E) from verifying the necessary documents as required under Section 12AB(1)(a) of the Act, thus justifying the rejection of the registration. However, in the interest of natural justice, the Tribunal decided to grant one more opportunity to the assessee. The impugned order of the CIT(E) was set aside, and the matter was restored to the file of the CIT(E). The assessee was directed to fully cooperate and furnish all required documents and information. The CIT(E) was directed to provide this one final opportunity for submission. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that while the CPC correctly rejected the rectification petition under section 154 as there was no mistake apparent on record in the original return, it is a settled principle that an assessee cannot be taxed on income that is subsequently clarified as exempt by the CBDT. Therefore, the Tribunal directed the Ld. CIT(A) to examine the compensation claimed by the assessee under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and allow the exemption in accordance with the law. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes. The issue of whether the intimation under section 143(1) was erroneous was implicitly decided in favor of the assessee by directing the Ld. CIT(A) to allow the exemption.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had submitted a reconciliation statement and bank statements before it, substantiating the renewal of fixed deposits. The primary contention of the assessee's representative (AR) was that renewal amounts credited to bank accounts were incorrectly added back as fresh deposits, necessitating a source for these alleged fresh deposits. The AR argued that fixed deposits were renewed periodically, as demonstrated in the reconciliation statement. The Tribunal, considering these facts and the evidence produced, was of the view that the matter should be remitted back to the Assessing Officer (AO) for verification of the submitted evidence. The Tribunal directed the assessee to cooperate with the remand proceedings by providing relevant documents without seeking unnecessary adjournments. The AO was granted liberty to pass appropriate orders based on available material if the assessee failed to cooperate. The grounds raised by the assessee were considered allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee's appeal is allowed. Regarding the taxability of income, the Tribunal noted that the assessee had a business income in India on account of Significant Economic Presence (SEP) as per Explanation 2A(a) to Section 9(1)(i) of the Act, having crossed the threshold limit. However, the Tribunal then examined Article 14 of the India-UAE DTAA, which defines 'professional services' inclusively. The Tribunal found that the professional services provided by the assessee were covered under Article 14(2) of the DTAA. Consequently, the Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to the benefit of Section 90(2) of the Act, and the income was not taxable in India in the absence of a permanent establishment in India. The Tribunal did not specifically address the grounds related to the assessment order being time-barred or arbitrary, focusing solely on the DTAA applicability.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) exceeded his jurisdiction by setting aside the assessment order, as the assessment was not made under Section 144. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order to be non-speaking and lacking proper adjudication of the legal issues raised.
For AY 2015-16, the Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision to partly allow the appeal. The Tribunal noted that while the cheque payments for land purchase were documented, the cash payment of Rs.1,22,04,000/- was recorded in the TTD diary. The assessee failed to provide corroborating evidence to prove that these cash payments were for business purposes and not for on-money investment in land. The Tribunal concurred with the AO's reasoning that the cash payment, when considered with cheque payments, indicated on-money payment for the land. Therefore, the addition made by the AO was considered justified. For AY 2019-20, the Tribunal dismissed the revenue's appeal. The Tribunal agreed with the Ld. CIT(A)'s finding that the cash entries in the impounded document were duly accounted for in the assessee's books and the partnership firm's books. Since the transactions were properly recorded and their sources explained, the amounts could not be considered unsecured loans from third parties. The addition of Rs.88,87,000/- under section 68 was deleted by the Ld. CIT(A) and this deletion was upheld.
The Tribunal noted that in a previous consolidated order concerning the quantum appeal, the underlying assessment for the cash deposits was set aside and remanded to the AO for re-adjudication, including verifying bank account ownership. As the quantum assessment forming the basis for the penalty is currently under re-adjudication, the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained independently and is also set aside.
The Tribunal held that Section 234E for levying late filing fee could not be enforced prior to June 1, 2015, as the enabling provision in Section 200A was inserted only from that date. Therefore, the levy of late fee for the period before June 1, 2015, was not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that an assessment order passed against a deceased person is a nullity. The matter was remanded to the AO to frame the assessment afresh after impleading the legal heirs of the deceased assessee.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) exceeded his jurisdiction by setting aside the assessment order, as the assessment was not made under Section 144. The Tribunal found the CIT(A)'s order to be non-speaking and lacking proper adjudication of the legal issues raised.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was invalid and barred by limitation as per the Supreme Court's decision in UOI v. Rajeev Bansal. Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the original return was filed correctly, but a fraudulent revised return was processed. Citing the Supreme Court in CIT vs. Kanpur Coal Syndicate, the Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to an appeal when there is a denial of liability. The Ld.CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal as non-appealable.
The tribunal held that filing Form 10B is a procedural requirement, not mandatory for claiming exemption under Section 11 and 12, citing the Gujarat High Court. It remanded the matter back to the Assessing Officer to verify the assessee's claim in accordance with Form 10B and decide the allowability of exemption on merits.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) found that the CIT(A) erred by arbitrarily failing to address and adjudicate the assessee's specific ground of appeal concerning the validity of the Section 148 notice. The assessee contended that the notice, issued on 31/03/2022, was invalid as it was not issued by a Faceless Assessing Officer as mandated by the Faceless Reassessment Scheme effective from 29/03/2022. The ITAT remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication of this crucial legal issue.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that Section 43B(c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, allows for the deduction of bonus payments in the assessment year when the payment is actually made to the employees, irrespective of the previous year in which the liability was incurred. Since the bonus payments were made during the impugned assessment year, they are allowable.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A) erred by not adjudicating the issue on merits, especially regarding the compensation from agricultural land acquisition. It directed the CIT(A) to re-examine the supporting evidences and adjudicate the matter on merits. The case was remitted back to the file of the Ld. CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal noted that in a previous consolidated order concerning the quantum appeal, the underlying assessment for the cash deposits was set aside and remanded to the AO for re-adjudication, including verifying bank account ownership. As the quantum assessment forming the basis for the penalty is currently under re-adjudication, the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained independently and is also set aside.
The Tribunal noted that notices were not properly delivered to the assessee due to a blank recipient ID in emails and that the assessee was not aware of the proceedings. Concluding that the assessee deserved an opportunity, the Tribunal allowed the appeal for statistical purposes, remanding the case to the CIT(A) to allow the assessee to substantiate the cash deposits.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had adequately explained the source of the cash deposits by demonstrating previous large cash withdrawals and a regular pattern of withdrawing and redepositing funds after incurring expenditures. Consequently, the Tribunal ruled that the addition made by the AO was not justified and directed its deletion.
The Tribunal held that the assessee failed to demonstrate the commercial benefit derived from the trademark license agreements. Since the AE did not have a dominant presence in India and the assessee was marketing the foreign brand, the TPO was justified in quantifying the ALP as NIL.
The Tribunal held that the capital gains on the sale of the property must be assessed in the hands of the assessee firm, as it was the owner and vendor. Any capital gains offered by individual partners were to be excluded from their returns, and credit for taxes paid by them would be given to the firm.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to reasonable cause. While upholding the addition made by the AO, the Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal on the applicability of Section 115BBE of the Act.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) had disposed of the appeal prematurely without considering the remand report and adjudicating on the additional evidence. Therefore, the matter was set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the notice under Section 148 and subsequent assessment proceedings initiated by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) were bad and illegal as they were issued outside the faceless mechanism mandated by Section 151A and the E-Assessment Scheme. The JAO lacked the jurisdiction to issue such notices.
The Tribunal held that the notice and order issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer outside the faceless mechanism were bad in law and illegal, as only a Faceless Assessing Officer had the jurisdiction. Consequently, the assessment order was quashed for want of valid jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the notices and orders issued by the JAO outside the faceless mechanism, as per Section 151A and the E-Assessment Scheme, were bad and illegal. The JAO lacked jurisdiction to issue these notices and orders.
The Tribunal held that notices and orders issued by the JAO outside the faceless mechanism, as mandated by Section 144B and the E-Assessment Scheme, are bad in law. The JAO lacked jurisdiction to initiate these proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) failed to pass a speaking order and did not address the specific grounds of appeal, particularly concerning the validity of the notice issued under Section 148. The matter was remanded to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that cotton waste used as raw material by open-ended spinning mills is not 'scrap' as defined under Section 206C. The Tribunal also noted that the failure to file Form 27C could be condoned as a technical breach.
The Tribunal held that the AO's conclusion was based on statements recorded under Section 133A, which do not have evidentiary value. The Tribunal noted that the assessee made payments through banking channels, establishing that purchases were accounted for and payments were made. The AO doubted purchases from M/s. Rajendra Ispat due to non-payment, but the Tribunal stated that outstanding balances alone cannot justify doubting purchases without material evidence. The AO also did not doubt the accounting of purchases, sales, or inventory, only the availment of accommodation entries for certain invoices. Given these facts, the Tribunal found that estimating 8% of bogus purchases in the hands of the assessee was not justified. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and dismissed the grounds raised by the revenue, allowing the grounds raised by the assessee by deleting the additions made by the AO and the estimation of profit made by the Ld. CIT(A). The decision for AY 2015-16 was applied mutatis mutandis to AYs 2016-17 and 2017-18.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) was not due to deliberate intention or gross negligence. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances, and the Supreme Court's direction to exclude periods during COVID-19, the Tribunal directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay of 1049 days and adjudicate the case on merits.
The Tribunal held that cotton waste used as raw material by open-ended spinning mills is not 'scrap' as defined under Section 206C. The Tribunal also noted that the failure to file Form 27C could be condoned as a technical breach.