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The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a non-resident, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the funds used for property purchase, including stamp duty, were remitted from outside India. Therefore, the additions made by the Assessing Officer under Section 69 were not sustainable.
The Tribunal affirmed the Pr.CIT's order, noting that the Assessing Officer failed to conduct any inquiry into the belated payment of employee's contribution to PF and ESI. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Checkmate Services, the Tribunal reiterated that such contributions are deductible only if deposited on or before the due dates mandated by welfare enactments. The lack of inquiry by the AO rendered the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, justifying the Section 263 revision by the Pr.CIT.
The Tribunal held that the transfer of the case was not a transfer under Section 127 as the assessee had initially filed the return with an incorrect jurisdiction. However, it directed the deletion of the addition for credit card payments made through the bank, as it was out of declared income, but sustained the addition for cash payments due to lack of explanation.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a non-resident, provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the funds used for property purchase, including stamp duty, were remitted from outside India. Therefore, the additions made by the Assessing Officer under Section 69 were not sustainable.
The Tribunal found that there was an inordinate delay of 643 days in filing the appeals. Since the assessee neither filed an application for condonation of delay nor provided any sufficient cause for the delay, the appeals were deemed not maintainable as they were barred by limitation.
The Tribunal found that there was an inordinate delay of 643 days in filing the appeals. Since the assessee neither filed an application for condonation of delay nor provided any sufficient cause for the delay, the appeals were deemed not maintainable as they were barred by limitation.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order was in gross contravention of the Tribunal's directions and contrary to the facts on record, as relevant details and submissions were not considered. The Tribunal also noted the assessee's alternative plea to restrict additions to a peak credit.
The Tribunal held that the assessee is not entitled to deduction under Section 80IB of the Act on the amounts received as DEPB and Duty Drawback. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Saraf Exports v. CIT. It reasoned that the Supreme Court, in Saraf Exports, distinguished the case of Meghalaya Steels Limited, clarifying that while subsidies directly affecting manufacturing costs have a nexus, DEPB/Duty Drawback schemes are not directly related to the business of manufacturing or selling products. The entitlement arises after export, making its relation to manufacture or sale one step removed. The object of DEPB is to neutralize customs duty on import content, not profits derived from the industrial undertaking itself. Therefore, the profit from DEPB and Duty Drawback claims cannot be considered as income "derived from" the industrial undertaking. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the grounds raised by the assessee. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice and considering the substantial demand, granted the assessee one final opportunity to present its case and relevant documents before the CIT(A). The case has been remanded back to the CIT(A) for re-adjudication, with the expectation that the assessee will cooperate with the proceedings.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on deposits made with unutilized grants should be offered as income. It also ruled that expenditure incurred due to cyclone damage, though extraordinary, is revenue in nature and allowable under Section 37(1).
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on deposits made with unutilized grants should be offered as income. It also ruled that expenditure incurred due to cyclone damage, though extraordinary, is revenue in nature and allowable under Section 37(1).
The ITAT found the delay of 516 days to be inordinate and unsupported by plausible or justifiable reasons. The explanations provided by the assessee, including opting for the Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme and a mistaken belief about receiving notices by post despite providing an email ID, were deemed unsubstantiated and indicative of casual/lackadaisical conduct. Citing Supreme Court precedents, the tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation.
The tribunal held that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) formally rejected the assessee's books of accounts before making an ad-hoc disallowance or estimating profit, which is a prerequisite as per legal precedents. Since there was no valid reason for the 2% profit estimation, the matter is set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to substantiate purchase claims.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition because the AO did not provide proper documentation or allow the assessee to cross-examine the third parties whose statements formed the basis of the addition.
The Tribunal held that while the assessee failed to substantiate the source of cash deposits from maize trading, the addition should be restricted to the peak credit in the bank account, considering withdrawals as well.
The Tribunal held that the issue of payment of interest on External Commercial Borrowings (ECB) was to be dismissed based on a previous consistent ruling. However, the issue of disallowance of leasehold amortization charges was allowed, also following a previous ruling.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on deposits made with unutilized grants, even if linked to specific projects, is taxable income. The assessee's claim that the interest was not taxable as it was credited to a government deposit account was rejected.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on deposits made with unutilized grants should be offered as income. The claim for TDS credit without offering the income for taxation was contradictory. The expenditure incurred due to cyclone damage was allowed as revenue expenditure.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on deposits made with unutilized grants should be offered as income. It also ruled that expenditure incurred due to cyclone damage, though extraordinary, is revenue in nature and allowable under Section 37(1).
Given that the assessee had obtained registration under Section 12AA, the appeal against the rejection under Section 12AB became superfluous. The assessee sought to withdraw the appeal, and the Departmental Representative did not object. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
The Tribunal condoned the assessee's 21-day delay in filing the appeal before it and remitted the quantum appeal back to the CIT(A) to reconsider the condonation of the original 179-day delay and then adjudicate on merits. Consequently, the penalty appeal under Section 271(1)(c) was also allowed as it was deemed consequential to the quantum appeal.
The Tribunal condoned the 28-day delay in filing the appeal, acknowledging sufficient cause due to address mix-up and grievance resolution. It directed the Ld. CIT(A) to reconsider the assessee's belatedly filed return of income, submitted in response to the Section 148 notice, and to decide the case on merits, also considering any additional evidences. The jurisdictional grounds raised by the assessee were not adjudicated due to the remand.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, acting as a 'kaccha arahtia' (commission agent), is eligible for credit of the entire TDS amount deducted at source. The turnover of a 'kaccha arahtia' includes only the commission charged and not sales made on behalf of principals.
The tribunal, relying on High Court precedents, held that the Pr.CIT exceeded jurisdiction under Section 263 by directing the AO to initiate penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c). It clarified that penalty proceedings are independent of assessment proceedings, and the assessment order is not rendered erroneous or prejudicial merely due to the AO's failure to record an opinion on penalty. Consequently, the Pr.CIT's order was set aside.
The tribunal held that neither the AO nor the CIT(A) formally rejected the assessee's books of accounts before making an ad-hoc disallowance or estimating profit, which is a prerequisite as per legal precedents. Since there was no valid reason for the 2% profit estimation, the matter is set aside to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to substantiate purchase claims.
The Tribunal found that an effective opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the assessee, noting the rapid succession of notices issued by the CIT(A). It set aside the impugned order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication, directing the CIT(A) to provide an appropriate opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The ITAT condoned the 291-day delay, finding sufficient cause and deeming it neither intentional nor deliberate. It set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A) and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, instructing the CIT(A) to consider the assessee's relevant details, records, and evidence after affording a proper opportunity of hearing.
The Tribunal held that the interest earned on deposits made with unutilized grants should be offered as income. It also ruled that expenditure incurred due to cyclone damage, though extraordinary, is revenue expenditure allowable under Section 37(1) if incurred in the ordinary course of business.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 on 06.04.2022 for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation as the six-year period for such notice expired on 31.03.2022 under the unamended provisions of Section 149(1)(b). Furthermore, the Assessing Officer failed to provide the mandatory minimum of "not less than seven days" for the assessee to reply to the show cause notice under Section 148A(b). Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were deemed without jurisdiction and quashed.
The Tribunal condoned the assessee's 21-day delay in filing the appeal before it and remitted the quantum appeal back to the CIT(A) to reconsider the condonation of the original 179-day delay and then adjudicate on merits. Consequently, the penalty appeal under Section 271(1)(c) was also allowed as it was deemed consequential to the quantum appeal.
The ITAT dismissed the assessee's ground challenging the time-barred nature of the Section 148 notice. However, to ensure natural justice, the tribunal remanded the case to the CIT(A), directing the assessee to file a condonation petition for the delayed appeal. The CIT(A) is instructed to consider the petition and, if sufficient cause is shown, adjudicate the appeal on its merits after providing a final opportunity to the assessee.
The ITAT found that the Ld. CIT(E)'s rejection order was non-speaking and did not provide a proper opportunity to the assessee. Therefore, the ITAT set aside the rejection order and remanded the matter back to the Ld. CIT(E) to provide another opportunity to the assessee to furnish details and pass a speaking order on merits.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing Form 10B is a procedural default and should not disentitle the assessee from claiming exemption under section 11 of the Act, provided other conditions are fulfilled. The Tribunal noted that the audit report was filed much before the processing of the return of income under section 143(1) by the CPC and was available on record at that time. The Tribunal referred to the Gujarat High Court's decisions in Sarvodaya Charitable Trust v. ITO(E) and Association of Indian Panel board Manufacturer v. Dy. CIT, which held that a public charitable trust should not be denied exemption merely on the bar of limitation in furnishing the audit report if other conditions are substantially satisfied. The Tribunal further observed that if the audit report is available with the Assessing Officer before the conclusion of assessment proceedings or processing of the return, the requirement of law is satisfied. The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and directed the jurisdictional Assessing Officer to take on record the belatedly filed Form 10B and allow the claim of exemption under section 11 on merits. The Tribunal allowed the ground raised by the assessee for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal, relying on CBDT Circular No. 452 (1986) and previous consistent decisions, held that as a 'kaccha arahtia' (commission agent), the assessee's turnover includes only gross commission and not sales on behalf of principals. It set aside the lower authorities' orders and directed the AO to grant the entire amount of TDS credit for both assessment years.
The Tribunal dismissed both appeals on the grounds of inordinate delay in filing, finding the assessee's explanation for the delay unsubstantiated and concocted. The assessee's claim of blaming an earlier tax consultant and delayed knowledge of the CIT(A)'s order was not accepted due to lack of evidence and inconsistencies. Consequently, the Tribunal declined to condone the delay, and the appeals were dismissed as time-barred without addressing the merits of the disallowance.
The ITAT held that the delay of 32 days was not inordinate and the assessee had provided sufficient cause with supporting medical evidence. The tribunal directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay and adjudicate the appeal on merits.
The tribunal held that the disallowance of section 80P deduction was justified due to the failure to file a valid return of income. However, the issue of cash deposits was remanded to the AO for fresh verification.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal condoned the delay of 402 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A)-NFAC, accepting the assessee's reason of ill health. The Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(A)-NFAC for fresh adjudication on merits, with a direction for the assessee to cooperate.
The Tribunal dismissed both appeals on the grounds of inordinate delay in filing, finding the assessee's explanation for the delay unsubstantiated and concocted. The assessee's claim of blaming an earlier tax consultant and delayed knowledge of the CIT(A)'s order was not accepted due to lack of evidence and inconsistencies. Consequently, the Tribunal declined to condone the delay, and the appeals were dismissed as time-barred without addressing the merits of the disallowance.
The Tribunal held that since the Ld. CIT(A), in the quantum appeal, directed the AO to recompute capital gains, resulting in a Long-Term Capital Loss of Rs.20,00,615/-, the capital gains became non-taxable. Consequently, the foundation for the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) ceased to exist, and thus, the penalty levied by the AO was not sustainable.
The Tribunal observed that the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) fell within the period excluded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision during the COVID-19 pandemic. Condoning the delay, the Tribunal remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law and natural justice.
The Tribunal, relying on CBDT Circular No. 452 (1986) and previous consistent decisions, held that as a 'kaccha arahtia' (commission agent), the assessee's turnover includes only gross commission and not sales on behalf of principals. It set aside the lower authorities' orders and directed the AO to grant the entire amount of TDS credit for both assessment years.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 928 days, finding the assessee's medical reasons as a sufficient cause. It remitted the matter back to the CIT(A)-NFAC to decide the appeal on merits, granting the assessee another opportunity to submit relevant documents, while cautioning the assessee to cooperate promptly.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 271D could not be levied without the Assessing Officer recording satisfaction in the assessment order, as per the Supreme Court's decision in CIT vs. Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City. Therefore, the penalty was unsustainable.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) held that although the assessment order was technically served via email as per the Information Technology Act, the 26-day delay in filing the appeal was not inordinate and due to bonafide reasons. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the ITAT emphasized adopting a justice-oriented and liberal approach for condoning delays. The ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) to condone the delay and decide the appeal on its merits.
The tribunal found the CIT(Exemptions)'s rejection order to be non-speaking and lacking specific findings or objective analysis of documents. It noted that the CIT had failed to elaborate on any deficiencies or record clear findings on the genuineness of activities or compliance with Section 12AB conditions. The tribunal emphasized the requirement for quasi-judicial authorities to pass reasoned orders.
Given that the appeals were duplicates and the assessee's counsel had no objection, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue to withdraw its appeals. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
Given that the appeals were duplicates and the assessee's counsel had no objection, the Tribunal allowed the Revenue to withdraw its appeals. Consequently, both appeals were dismissed as withdrawn.
The Tribunal ruled that rejecting the application based solely on a technical or clerical error in selecting a section code was not justified and violated principles of natural justice. It emphasized that procedural mistakes should not defeat substantive rights, especially for charitable institutions, and restored the matter to the Ld.CIT(E) to reconsider the application on merits after allowing the assessee to rectify the procedural errors.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148 was barred by limitation as it was issued after the expiry of the six-year period prescribed under the unamended Section 149(1)(b). Consequently, the reassessment proceedings were without jurisdiction.