ITAT Pune Judgments — April 2026

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases can be added, not the entire purchase amount, as without purchases, there would be no sales. The Tribunal modified the CIT(A)'s order by restricting the addition to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee has opted for the DTVSV Scheme and filed the required forms for withdrawal of the appeal. Therefore, keeping the appeal pending would serve no purpose.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases can be added to the income, not the entire purchase value, especially when sales are not doubted. The Tribunal directed the addition to be restricted to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases can be added to the income, not the entire purchase value. Considering the facts and the existence of sales corresponding to these purchases, the Tribunal directed the addition to be restricted to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases should be added to the total income, not the entire purchase value, as sales were not doubted. The addition was restricted to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element embedded in bogus purchases can be added to income, not the entire purchase value, especially when sales are not doubted. The Tribunal restricted the addition to 10% of the total unproved purchases, after considering prior additions.

The Tribunal held that only the profit element in bogus purchases should be added, not the entire amount, as sales against such purchases were not doubted. The Tribunal directed the AO to restrict the addition to 10% of the total unproved purchases.

The Tribunal held that the penalty under section 270A cannot be sustained when the assessee has voluntarily disclosed additional income by filing an updated return under section 139(8A) before the issuance of a notice and has paid the applicable taxes. The Tribunal noted that the intention of section 139(8A) is to promote voluntary tax compliance and reduce litigation.

The Tribunal held that the assessment proceedings were validly initiated under Section 153C as the assessee was not the primary person searched, but his premises were covered in relation to a search of another group. The addition for commission income was reduced, and the addition for cash seized was confirmed due to lack of evidence.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) dismissed the appeal ex-parte due to non-compliance despite opportunities. However, considering principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the issue back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT's rejection was based on a previous order that had been set aside by the ITAT. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the current impugned order and remanded the matter back to the CIT for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that indexed cost of acquisition must be allowed for capital gains and restored the matter to the AO. The enhancement by CIT(A) was quashed due to violation of procedural notice requirements. The claim regarding agricultural land was also restored to the AO for verification.

The Tribunal condoned the delay of 199 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing reasonable cause and a justice-oriented approach. The issues were remitted back to the CIT(A) for denovo adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(1) by the Finance Act, 2015, which enabled the levy of fee under Section 234E, was prospective and effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, the levy of fee under Section 234E for TDS statements processed prior to June 1, 2015, is not permissible, as there was no enabling provision for such levy before that date.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, allowing the levy of fees under Section 234E, was effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, late fees under Section 234E cannot be levied for TDS statements processed prior to this date.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing a liberal and pragmatic approach as per Supreme Court judgments. It also noted that the delay had reasonable cause and was not deliberate. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the issues back to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits.

The Tribunal noted the delay and, considering the larger interest of justice, decided to grant the assessee one more opportunity. The issue was remitted back to the CIT(Exemption) for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal condoned the 13-day delay in filing the appeal, citing sufficient reasons related to personal hardship and administrative processes. It held that the Assessing Officer exceeded the scope of limited scrutiny and that the assessee had sufficient cash in hand from previous savings and withdrawals to explain the cash deposits, including those during the demonetization period.

The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficiently explained the sundry creditors with confirmations and subsequent payments. The additions for opening stock and opening capital were also deemed uncalled for, considering the assessee's business history and explanations for capital accumulation. The Tribunal accepted the tuition fee payment through banking channels as evidence for the s.80C deduction.

The Tribunal noted that the previous order of the CIT, Exemption, which had cancelled the registration, was set aside by the ITAT for fresh consideration. In light of this, the Tribunal set aside the current impugned order and remanded the matter back to the CIT, Exemption, for fresh adjudication of both the registration and approval applications.

The Tribunal observed that the denial of deduction was primarily because the return indicated the assessee was a Partnership Firm, not due to delay in filing. Therefore, the issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication, treating the assessee as a Cooperative Housing Society and examining the 80P deduction claim.

The Tribunal held that Section 200A of the Income-tax Act did not have an enabling provision to levy fees under Section 234E for TDS statements processed prior to June 1, 2015. Therefore, such levies for periods before this date were invalid.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 2015, which empowered the levy of fees under Section 234E, was prospective and effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees under Section 234E could not be levied for TDS statements processed prior to this date.

The Tribunal held that the closing stock was work-in-progress and not finished goods, as construction was not completed. Therefore, the Assessing Officer erred in invoking Section 23(4)(b) of the Act for notional rent.

The Tribunal condoned the significant delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), relying on judicial precedents that emphasize substantial justice over technicalities and that delay should not be condoned only if it is deliberate. The Tribunal noted that the delay was not intentional and occurred due to reasonable cause.

The Tribunal held that the order of the CIT(A) was not a speaking order and failed to adjudicate the crucial legal issue regarding the notice under section 143(2). Therefore, the Tribunal decided to set aside the order.

The Tribunal held that income from transactions with non-members/nominal members is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) as per the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. It also held that interest income earned from investments with other cooperative banks and other banks is eligible for deduction under sections 80P(2)(d) and 80P(2)(a)(i) respectively, following various judicial precedents.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing reasonable cause and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic which was accounted for by the Supreme Court. The Tribunal held that substantial justice should be preferred over technical considerations for non-deliberate delays.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal, adopting a justice-oriented approach. Regarding the ex-gratia payment, the Tribunal found that crucial evidence, such as a certificate from the employer and details on how the payment was treated in the company's accounts, was not placed before the lower authorities.

The Assessing Officer's rectification order resolved the issues raised by the assessee. Consequently, the assessee's authorized representative requested to withdraw the appeal.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E, became effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no such fees could be levied for periods prior to this date, as there was no specific provision to do so while processing TDS statements under Section 200A before the amendment. Judicial precedents, including High Court decisions, support this view.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A, empowering the levy of fees under Section 234E, was effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees under Section 234E could not be levied for TDS statements processed before this date. The levy of fees in this case for periods prior to June 1, 2015, was deemed invalid.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which empowered authorities to levy fees under Section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, the levy of fees under Section 234E for the late filing of TDS statements prior to June 1, 2015, was not permissible.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by the Finance Act, 2015, which empowers the levy of fee under Section 234E, is prospective and effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no fee under Section 234E can be levied for late filing of TDS statements for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision in Section 200A for such levy before that date.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A of the Act, which empowered the levy of fees under Section 234E, became effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, fees under Section 234E cannot be levied for TDS statements processed prior to this date, even though the section itself existed earlier. Consequently, the levy of fees in this case for periods before June 1, 2015, was deemed illegal.

The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a primary credit cooperative society, is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2) on interest income earned from deposits with cooperative banks, following pronouncements by the jurisdictional High Court and the Supreme Court. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A(1)(c) by the Finance Act, 2015, which enabled the levy of fees under Section 234E during the processing of TDS statements, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for periods prior to this date, as there was no enabling provision at that time.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to section 200A, which enabled the levy of fees under section 234E, was prospective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no fee under section 234E could be levied for the delay in filing TDS statements for periods prior to June 1, 2015, as there was no enabling provision before that date.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to section 200A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which enabled the levy of fees under section 234E, was effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for defaults committed prior to this date, as there was no enabling provision in section 200A before June 1, 2015.

The Tribunal held that the amendment to Section 200A by the Finance Act, 2015, which empowered the levy of fees under Section 234E while processing TDS statements, was effective from June 1, 2015. Therefore, no such fee could be levied for periods prior to this date due to the absence of an enabling provision.

The Tribunal held that the CIT(Exemptions) rejected the application without providing an opportunity for a hearing on the specific issue of the incorrect code. The Tribunal, considering the principle of natural justice, decided to grant the assessee another opportunity to substantiate their claim.

The Tribunal noted that the assessee claimed the LTCG of Rs. 2,64,91,594/- was already declared in the return and the addition led to double taxation. The CIT(A) had upheld the addition due to lack of documentation. The Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) to verify the claim after affording the assessee an opportunity to submit necessary documents.

The Tribunal condoned the delay and, considering the submissions that miscommunication led to the non-representation, restored the issue to the CIT(A)/NFAC. The assessee was granted a final opportunity to substantiate their case with requisite details, with liberty to the CIT(A)/NFAC to pass orders as per law if the assessee failed to comply.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's failure to respond to notices from the AO and CIT(A). However, considering the assessee's request for a final opportunity to substantiate their case, the Tribunal restored the issue to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(E) rejected the application primarily on two grounds: inapplicability of section 12A(1)(ac)(vi)(b) due to previous AY exemption claims and violation of Section 36A of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act regarding the loan. The Tribunal referred to earlier decisions where non-obtaining prior permission was considered a procedural lapse.