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The Tribunal held that the assessee is entitled to the exemption of leave encashment as claimed in his return of income. This was based on the revised limit of Rs. 25,00,000/- notified by the CBDT and decisions of coordinate benches.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. Considering the assessee's inability to appear before the CIT(A)/NFAC due to the death of their earlier CA, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision on merits, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer had made inquiries and taken a plausible view, thus the assessment order was not erroneous, even if potentially prejudicial. Therefore, the PCIT's invocation of Section 263 was not justified.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It was held that the assessment order might be bad due to lack of DIN and that the addition for cash deposits was not justified as the assessee had provided sufficient explanation. The treating of declared income as under-reported was also found to be erroneous.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal ex-parte without deciding the grounds on merit. Following the Bombay High Court judgment, it was held that the CIT(A) must decide the appeal on merits and cannot dismiss it for non-prosecution.
The Tribunal held that the Ld. CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on grounds of delay without considering the merits. The Tribunal found that the delay was attributable to circumstances beyond the assessee's control and that the CIT(A) did not properly consider the evidence presented regarding the timely filing of appeal fees and the postal receipt.
The Tribunal held that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) is obliged under section 251(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to decide an appeal on merits and cannot dismiss it in limine merely upon a request for withdrawal by the assessee. The Tribunal relied on the jurisdictional High Court's decision in Premkumar Arjundas Luthra (HUF) and the Madras High Court's decision in M. Loganathan, which clearly state that once an appeal is preferred, the CIT(A) must dispose of it on merits, even if the assessee seeks to withdraw it. The power to set aside an assessment order was also taken away from the CIT(A) by the Finance Act, 2001. Therefore, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal without deciding on merits. Consequently, the impugned order of the CIT(A) was set aside, and the appeal was restored to the file of the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication on all issues raised. The CIT(A) was directed to provide a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) was not justified in refusing approval under Section 80G. It noted that Section 80G(5B) allows for expenditures of a religious nature not exceeding 5% of total income, and the assessee had provided an undertaking to comply with this provision.
The Tribunal held that the addition for unexplained cash was not justified as the assessee provided a list of members and the Assessing Officer failed to disprove the genuineness. The interest income was also held to be eligible for deduction under Section 80P.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s order, dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution without deciding on merits, violated Section 250(6) of the Act. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the matter back for fresh adjudication on merits, providing the assessee one final opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s rejection order and remanded the case back, instructing the CIT(E) to grant the assessee one final opportunity to furnish all required details and evidence for a decision on merits. The Ld. DR did not object to this course of action.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the delay of 741 days in filing the appeal was not condoned. The Tribunal found the reasons provided by the assessee, particularly the auditor forgetting her email password and the consultant's belief that an official email might be fraudulent, to be unbelievable and fanciful. The Tribunal noted that forgetting a password is a vague reason and that there are established methods to verify the genuineness of official communications, including visiting the Income Tax office which was located nearby. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, the Tribunal emphasized that an inordinate delay requires a stricter approach. The Tribunal concluded that the explanation offered showed negligence on the part of the assessee and that no prudent person would wait for over 700 days without acting on official communications. The Tribunal also noted that the assessee did not reply to any notices issued by the CIT(Exemption), further indicating negligence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed due to the non-condonation of the delay.
The Tribunal held that the impugned transaction, as reported by HSBC Bank, occurred on 23.03.2009, pertaining to assessment year 2009-10, not 2010-11. The addition made by the AO for AY 2010-11 was therefore not justified.
The ITAT held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal solely on the ground of a 124-day delay without condoning it. The Tribunal found that the assessee had provided a sufficient and reasonable cause for the delay, citing a medical emergency in the family. The Tribunal emphasized that substantial justice is more important than procedural delay and that the assessee would not gain by consciously delaying the appeal. Therefore, the ITAT directed the CIT(A) to condone the delay of 124 days and decide the appeal on its merits. The order of the CIT(A) was set aside for de novo adjudication, with the direction that the CIT(A) should provide an opportunity to the assessee to present all necessary documents. The grounds of appeal were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(Exemption)'s order, finding that the assessee was operating a school in violation of applicable laws and that some of its stated objects were not charitable under Section 2(15). Therefore, the assessee was not eligible for registration.
The Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s order for de novo adjudication, directing the CIT(E) to provide the Assessee with an opportunity to file necessary documents. This decision was based on factual errors in the CIT(E)'s rejection and the applicability of the amended Section 80G(5).
The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's argument that the TDS was deducted twice on the same sale transaction under different provisions of the Act. The Tribunal held that the reduction of TDS credit by the CPC was not justified.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)/NFAC failed to decide the grounds of appeal as required by Section 250(6) of the Act and dismissed the appeal solely for want of prosecution. The Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A)/NFAC.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)/NFAC failed to decide the grounds of appeal as required by Section 250(6) of the Act and had dismissed the appeal solely for non-prosecution. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the matter back.
The Tribunal observed that ITA No.2117/PUN/2025 was a duplicate appeal. Since the Ld. DR had no objection, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the appeal as infructuous.
The Tribunal noted that a coordinate bench had previously held belated filing of Form 3CFA to be a procedural error and allowed relief. Following this precedent, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer.
The Tribunal held that the delay in filing the Audit Report on Form 10B is directory and can be furnished at the appellate stage. The Tribunal also condoned the delay in filing Form 9A, citing a CBDT circular and acknowledging technical issues during the first year of e-filing.
The Tribunal acknowledged that the assessee failed to file requisite details and documentary evidence before the AO and CIT(A)/NFAC, leading to ex-parte orders. The Ld. AR explained the reasons for non-compliance, attributing it to the assessee's lack of education and reliance on a professional. The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A)/NFAC had also not decided the appeal on merits due to the lack of supporting documents. Considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and restored the matter to his file for adjudication afresh on merits. The assessee was granted one more opportunity to be heard and was directed to provide correct contact details and remain vigilant in filing replies without seeking adjournments. The grounds raised by the assessee were allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, being a senior citizen born in 1941, was exempt from paying advance tax under Section 207(2)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal as not maintainable.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. Considering the assessee's inability to appear before the CIT(A)/NFAC due to the death of their earlier CA, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)/NFAC's order and remanded the matter back for a fresh decision on merits, providing the assessee a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal found that the perquisite amount was already accounted for in the salary income offered to tax. Therefore, adding it again would amount to double taxation. The addition made by the Assessing Officer and sustained by the CIT(A) was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cause for not producing additional evidence before the AO due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The CIT(A) erred in not admitting these additional evidences. Therefore, the case was remanded back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that interest earned from deposits in permitted banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P, following judicial precedents. The character of the income does not change merely because it was deposited in a bank. Therefore, the Assessing Officer was directed to allow the deduction.
The CIT(A) deleted the addition, finding that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence and explanations to reconcile the differences in receipts and TDS, attributing them to transactions with a joint venture company.
The Tribunal noted that the PF and ESIC payments were made before filing the return, and the issue of their allowability was debatable at the time. Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts (P.) Ltd., the Tribunal held that merely claiming an expenditure, which is not accepted by the AO, does not automatically attract penalty. Consequently, the Tribunal directed the deletion of the penalty imposed u/s 270A(9).
The Tribunal held that the original application was filed within the prescribed time limit. The CIT failed to consider the filing of the original application and its subsequent withdrawal due to error. The Tribunal set aside the CIT's order.
The Tribunal held that the order under Section 148A(d) was bad in law because it was passed beyond the three-year limit without the escaped income exceeding Rs. 50 lakhs. Furthermore, the approval for the order was obtained from an authority lacking jurisdiction as per Section 151.
The Tribunal held that the deduction under Section 57(iii) was not allowable as the assessee had not incurred any expenditure. The interest income remained in the assessee's hands, and future anticipation of returning the principal and interest to the developer did not justify the deduction.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution and should have adjudicated the grounds on merit, as per the High Court's ruling in Premkumar Arjundas Luthra. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal restored the issues of determining the nature of income from land transactions, unexplained bank deposits, and the applicability of penalty provisions to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments that the nature of land transactions required further examination and that the grounds for additions and penalties needed re-evaluation.
The Tribunal restored the issues of determining the nature of income from land transactions, unexplained bank deposits, and the applicability of penalty provisions to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication. The Tribunal found merit in the assessee's arguments that the nature of land transactions required further examination and that the grounds for additions and penalties needed re-evaluation.
The Tribunal held that the penalty under Section 270A was not sustainable as the Assessing Officer failed to specify the exact limb of sub-section (9) under which the penalty was levied. The Tribunal relied on previous judicial precedents regarding the 'limb theory' in penalty provisions.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the order of the Ld. CIT, Exemption, Pune. The matter was remanded back to the Ld. CIT with a direction to decide the application afresh after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.
The Tribunal held that the penalty notice issued under section 271(1)(c) was defective because it was in a printed format and did not strike off inapplicable portions, failing to specify the exact charge. Therefore, the penalty is not maintainable.
The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal. On the primary issue concerning the applicability of Section 92BA(1) for AY 2013-14, the Tribunal followed the consistent view of various High Courts and Tribunals, including the Karnataka High Court in PCIT v. Texport Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and the jurisdictional ITAT, Pune in Uttam Energy Ltd. v. ACIT. These decisions held that the omission of Section 92BA(1) by the Finance Act, 2017, without a saving clause, meant that the said clause was to be considered as if it never existed on the statute, even for periods prior to its omission. Consequently, any action initiated under the omitted provision, such as the AO's reference to the TPO, was considered invalid and bad in law. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order holding that the transactions were not covered under Section 92BA(i). Therefore, grounds 1 to 4 raised by the Revenue were dismissed. Regarding grounds 5, 6, and 7, the Revenue's Departmental Representative did not argue them, leading the Tribunal to dismiss these grounds as academic and unadjudicated. The operative direction was to dismiss the Revenue's appeal.
The Tribunal, considering the totality of facts and in the interest of justice, decided to set aside the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC and remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to pass a fresh assessment order after providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee.