ITAT Panaji Judgments — March 2025

The Tribunal observed that the income in question was treated differently by the AO and the assessee, and emphasized the fundamental principle against double taxation. To ensure justice and proper verification of facts, the Tribunal restored the issue of taxability of profit on debenture redemption back to the Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to re-examine the claim with supporting evidence and provide the assessee a fair hearing.

The Tribunal admitted additional evidence, including affidavits and bank statements, which could not be presented to lower authorities. It set aside the CIT(A)'s order regarding the sustained addition under section 69A and remanded the issue to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, ensuring the assessee is provided a further opportunity to substantiate the claims.

The Tribunal observed that the CIT(A) confirmed the addition under Section 68 without properly considering the assessee's submissions and providing adequate opportunity. Therefore, the Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, directing that the assessee be given a proper opportunity to be heard.

The Tribunal found a reasonable cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), attributing it to the Covid-19 pandemic, and condoned the delay. Citing Supreme Court pronouncements on the liberal approach to condoning delay, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back for fresh adjudication on merits, providing the assessee another opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal found sufficient reasons for the appellant's inability to prosecute its appeals before the Ld. NFAC, noting that the same reasons prevented timely filing of the current appeals. Consequently, it set aside the ex-parte impugned orders and remitted both cases back to the Ld. NFAC for a de-novo adjudication on merits, providing the assessee another opportunity to present its case.

The Tribunal, noting the assessee's challenge to the AO's addition and considering natural justice principles, set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to present their case.

The tribunal condoned an 89-day delay in filing the appeals, noting that the reasons for the delay also prevented the assessee from prosecuting the appeals before the NFAC. Without commenting on the merits of the case, the tribunal set aside the ex-parte orders and remanded both matters to the Ld. NFAC for de-novo adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to present its case.

The Tribunal observed that the Ld. NFAC did not adjudicate the assessee's legal challenge regarding the non-service of a statutory notice under Section 143(2). Citing legal precedent, the Tribunal ruled that it has limited jurisdiction to decide this issue unless it has been adjudicated by the NFAC/CIT(A) first. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and remitted the file back to the NFAC with a direction to adjudicate the specific legal issue of non-service of notice under Section 143(2) according to law.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's request for withdrawal, which was supported by a letter, and observed that the Revenue had no objections. Consequently, the appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal was treated as withdrawn and dismissed.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Acknowledging the ex-parte order by the CIT(A) and upholding principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the case back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to submit information and evidences.

The Tribunal condoned a 13-day delay in filing the appeal. It restored the disallowance under Section 14A to the CIT(A) for statistical purposes, citing pending appeals in earlier assessment years. Similarly, the non-deduction of TDS issue under Section 194C was remitted to NFAC/CIT(A) due to an appeal for an earlier year being pending. However, the disallowance of Rs. 1,85,400/- related to transportation expenses was deleted, and other grounds of appeal were withdrawn by the assessee.

The Tribunal held that the delayed filing of Form-10B was a procedural lapse, not a fatal one, especially since the audit report itself was obtained before the specified date, indicating substantive compliance. Given it was the assessee's first year of operation and the bona fide belief that filing the audit report with the ITR was sufficient, the delay should be condoned. The Tribunal clarified that the term 'by that date' in Section 12A(b)(ii) refers to the due date for filing the return of income under Section 139(1) read with Section 139(4A) of the Act, which was 07/11/2022, and not the specified date for the audit report (07/10/2022).

The Tribunal found the National Faceless Appeal Centre's order irregular due to conflicting directives: setting aside the ex-parte assessment for fresh assessment while simultaneously dismissing the appeal as infructuous. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the NFAC for a de-novo adjudication, deeming it fit to re-evaluate the case.

The Tribunal clarified that an appeal under Section 253(1)(c)(ii) of the Act is only maintainable against a valid order passed under Section 263, not against a mere notice of hearing. Since no appeal is admissible against such notices under Section 253(1) & (2), the appeals were deemed unadmitted and dismissed.

The Tribunal held that an appeal under Section 253(1)(c)(ii) is maintainable only against a valid order passed under Section 263, and not against mere notices of hearing. As no appeal is admissible against such notices under Section 253(1) and (2) of the Act, the appeals were found to be unadmitted and dismissed accordingly.

The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. It set aside the ex-parte order passed by the CIT(A), stating that the assessee was not provided adequate opportunity of hearing, which violated principles of natural justice. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication of all disputed issues, with the assessee required to cooperate.

The Tribunal condoned the 140-day delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A), citing various Supreme Court principles regarding condonation of delay. It found sufficient cause for the delay and, setting aside the CIT(A)'s order, remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits after providing the assessee an adequate opportunity of hearing.

The Tribunal held that the Ld. NFAC erred in dismissing the assessee's appeal ex-parte without making necessary enquiries or adjudicating on the merits, violating Section 250(6) of the Income-tax Act. Consequently, the impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded to the Ld. NFAC for de-novo adjudication in accordance with the law.

The ITAT determined that the assessee's appeal to the NFAC was, in fact, filed within the prescribed time limit, making NFAC's dismissal unsustainable. Citing a Supreme Court precedent, the ITAT emphasized that quasi-judicial authorities should adopt a justice-oriented approach rather than dismissing appeals on hyper-technical grounds without a hearing. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the NFAC's order and remanded the matter back to the NFAC for a de-novo decision on merits.

The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had passed an ex-parte order. Citing principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee another opportunity to substantiate its case with evidence for fresh adjudication.

The Tribunal held that while the CIT(A) passed an ex-parte order due to non-compliance, principles of natural justice require another opportunity. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication after granting the assessee adequate hearing opportunity, thereby allowing the appeals for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal found a bonafide mistake by the assessee and a violation of natural justice by the CIT(E) for rejecting the application in limine. The issue was remanded back to the CIT(E) for de-novo adjudication, with directions to restore the first application, substitute it with the corrected second application, and treat it as filed within the stipulated time. The benefit of 80G approval, if granted, should be continuous without any break, covering the period between the expiry of provisional approval and the grant of final approval. The CIT(E) is directed to decide the matter within two months.

The Tribunal found that the assessee had sufficient cause for not prosecuting the appeal before the CIT(A), citing the COVID-19 pandemic affecting notice delivery. Consequently, without commenting on the merits, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back for de-novo adjudication, allowing the appeal for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal found that the assessee's mistake was bona fide and that the CIT(E)'s rejection, without considering the subsequent corrected application and due to the online system's inability to amend, violated natural justice. The case was remanded to the CIT(E) for de-novo adjudication, with directions to consider the corrected application and ensure continuity of 80G benefits if final approval is granted.

The Tribunal, after considering judicial precedents from various High Courts and coordinate benches, held that interest income derived by a cooperative society from its investments with other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Act. It set aside the CIT(A)'s order and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction claim.

The Tribunal observed that the assessee deserved another opportunity to present its case and substantiate its claims with evidence. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(E)'s impugned orders and directed the CIT(E) to reconsider the applications de novo, allowing the appeals for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal condoned the 19-day delay in filing the appeal. It set aside the CIT(E)'s order, directing the CIT(E) to reconsider the application de novo after providing the assessee with one more opportunity for hearing, in adherence to the principles of natural justice. The appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

The Tribunal, noting the rejection due to lack of response, applied principles of natural justice. It set aside the CIT(E)'s order and directed a de-novo consideration of the application, granting the assessee another opportunity to present its case and evidence.

The Tribunal, relying on various precedents, held that the situs of the Assessing Officer is the decisive factor for determining the appellate forum's jurisdiction. As the AO's situs was outside the Panaji ITAT's territorial limits, the bench lacked jurisdiction. The appeal was dismissed as 'not-maintainable', with liberty granted to the assessee to file it before the appropriate bench.

The Tribunal observed that principles of natural justice required providing the assessee one more opportunity to substantiate its case with evidence. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the impugned orders of the CIT(E) and directed the CIT(E) to reconsider the applications de novo as per law.

The Tribunal noted the assessee's lack of compliance in prior proceedings but, invoking principles of natural justice, set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee a fresh and adequate opportunity of hearing to substantiate the case with evidence and information.

The ITAT, noting the CIT(A)'s ex-parte dismissal, decided that the assessee should be given another opportunity in adherence to principles of natural justice. Consequently, the ITAT set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, with the assessee granted adequate hearing.

The Tribunal condoned a minor postal delay in filing the appeal. It held that the CIT(A)/NFAC erred in remanding the case to the AO, as assessments framed under Section 143(3) must be conclusively adjudicated by the appellate authority under Section 251, with remand being permissible only for assessments under Section 144. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the case back to the NFAC for a de-novo adjudication on merits.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, recognizing that the assessee had settled the dispute under the Vivad se Vishwas Scheme. The tribunal granted the assessee leave to revive the appeal if future circumstances necessitated it.

The ITAT, applying principles of natural justice, set aside the CIT(A)'s ex-parte order. It remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) to provide the assessee a fresh opportunity to present evidence and for adjudication afresh on the disputed issues.

The Tribunal, relying on various judicial precedents including the Karnataka and Gujarat High Courts, held that interest income earned by a cooperative society from its investments with other cooperative banks is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income Tax Act. The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred in upholding the denial of this deduction and directed the Assessing Officer to allow the claim.

The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred by dismissing the appeal without adjudicating the issues on merits and providing reasons, which is mandated by Section 250(6) even in ex-parte proceedings. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and directed a de-novo adjudication.

The Tribunal found that the NFAC dismissed the appeal for non-prosecution without adjudicating the matter on merits and without ensuring proper communication of notices to the registered email address. Citing Sections 250(6) and 251(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, the Tribunal held that NFAC is obligated to decide issues on merits even in ex-parte proceedings. The impugned order was set aside, and the case was remanded for de-novo adjudication.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, observing that no purpose would be served by keeping it pending as the assessee opted for the DTVSV Scheme. The assessee was granted liberty to apply under Section 254(2) of the Act to recall the order if circumstances require.

The Tribunal held that the NFAC erred in dismissing the appeal in-limine for a trivial typographical error without providing a reasonable opportunity for rectification. It set aside the NFAC's order and remitted the file back to the NFAC. The NFAC is directed to grant the assessee an opportunity to rectify the Form 35 defect and then decide the appeal on merits de-novo.

The ITAT held that the NFAC, as a quasi-judicial authority, should have adopted a justice-oriented approach and not dismissed the appeal on a hyper-technical ground without providing an opportunity to cure the defect of not filing a condonation of delay application. The ITAT set aside the NFAC's order and remitted the matter back for de novo consideration, directing NFAC to pass a speaking order under Section 250(6).