34 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal held that the forex fluctuation loss on the EEFC account balance, representing circulating capital, is a revenue expenditure deductible under Section 37(1). This decision was based on established judicial precedents.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s orders suffered from non-compliance with Rule 46A of the IT Rules and provisions of Section 251(1) and 250(6) of the Act. Therefore, the orders were set aside and remanded to the CIT(A) for de novo adjudication.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's election to participate in the DTVSV 2024 scheme and the subsequent withdrawal of the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn, with the assessee granted the liberty to file an application under Section 254(2) of the Act to recall the order if necessary.
Citing Supreme Court precedents and ITAT Standing Orders, the Tribunal held that the situs of the Assessing Officer is the decisive factor for determining appellate jurisdiction. Since the AO's location fell outside the Panaji Bench's jurisdiction, the appeal was deemed 'not-maintainable' and dismissed in limine, with liberty granted to the assessee to file it before the appropriate jurisdictional bench in Bangalore.
The Tribunal, applying principles of natural justice, set aside the ex-parte order of the CIT(A). It remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing that the assessee be given a further opportunity to present their case and cooperate in submitting necessary information.
The Tribunal, guided by Supreme Court precedent and its own prior rulings, affirmed that the situs of the AO dictates the appellate forum's jurisdiction. Since the AO concerned is located in Sirsi, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Panaji Bench, the appeals were deemed not maintainable before this bench. The appeals were dismissed in limine with leave to file them before the appropriate ITAT Bench in Bengaluru.
The Tribunal, guided by Supreme Court precedent and its own prior rulings, affirmed that the situs of the AO dictates the appellate forum's jurisdiction. Since the AO concerned is located in Sirsi, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Panaji Bench, the appeals were deemed not maintainable before this bench. The appeals were dismissed in limine with leave to file them before the appropriate ITAT Bench in Bengaluru.
The Tribunal, noting the CIT(A)'s ex-parte dismissal and the assessee's claim of having a strong case on merits, decided to set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal, noting the CIT(A)'s ex-parte dismissal and the assessee's claim of having a strong case on merits, decided to set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal, noting the CIT(A)'s ex-parte dismissal and the assessee's claim of having a strong case on merits, decided to set aside the CIT(A)'s order. The case was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to present its case.
The Tribunal ruled that the NFAC erred by dismissing the appeal in limine without considering the manual submissions and the condonation of delay petition. The case was remanded back to the NFAC with directions to consider the condonation of delay afresh and then adjudicate the appeal on merits after providing adequate opportunities.
The Tribunal admitted additional evidence (cash book) filed by the assessee under Rule 29 of ITAT Rules. Given the importance of this evidence, the Tribunal restored the disputed issues back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication on merits, providing the assessee an opportunity to present the additional information.
The Tribunal held that Section 80P(4) applies only to claimant assessees that are co-operative banks as defined in the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which the assessee is not. It clarified that Section 80P(4) is a proviso meant to exclude co-operative banks functioning like commercial banks, and it does not jeopardize the claim of deduction for interest/dividend income received by a co-operative society from another co-operative society. The Tribunal concluded that the denial of deduction was untenable based on factual matrix and binding judicial precedents.
The tribunal set aside the penalty order, finding that the assessee was denied a reasonable opportunity to be heard, with notices providing less than seven days during the COVID-19 pandemic. It also noted the NFAC's failure to address substantive grounds regarding the applicability of Section 269SS or the existence of reasonable cause under Section 273B. The case was remanded to the Jurisdictional AO for de-novo consideration with adequate opportunities.
The Tribunal held that interest income earned by a cooperative society on its deposits with a cooperative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d). Following various judicial precedents, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) erred by overlooking the DVO report, which was submitted by the assessee during appellate proceedings and showed a lower valuation than the stamp duty authority. Citing principles of natural justice, the Tribunal restored the matter to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, instructing the CIT(A) to consider the DVO report and provide the assessee with an adequate opportunity of hearing.
The assessee opted for the 'Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Scheme, 2024' (VSVA Scheme) and submitted a letter requesting the withdrawal of the present appeal. The tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, granting leave to the assessee to revive the appeal if the issue remains unsettled under the VSVA Scheme.
The Tribunal found that the Ld. CIT(A)/NFAC provided only a 'paper opportunity' to the assessee, thereby denying a real and reasonable chance to present evidence. Citing judicial precedents, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the case back for a de-novo assessment, directing the Ld. NFAC to provide at least three effective hearing opportunities to the assessee.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal observed that since the assessee had opted for the DTVSV 2024 and sought to withdraw the appeal, no purpose would be served by keeping the appeal pending. Consequently, the tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, while granting the assessee liberty to move an application under Section 254(2) of the Act to recall the order in accordance with law.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Recognizing the assessee challenged the ex-parte order and the additions, and upholding principles of natural justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, granting the assessee another opportunity to be heard.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Panaji Bench, dismissed the Revenue's appeal as 'not-maintainable', citing lack of territorial jurisdiction. The Tribunal relied on its own Rules, Standing Orders, and a Supreme Court judgment, determining that the 'situs of the assessing officer' is the decisive factor. As the AO is located in Sirsi, which falls outside the Panaji Bench's territorial limits, the appeal should be entertained by the Bangalore Bench.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, considering the principles of natural justice, set aside the order of the CIT(A). The matter was remitted back to the CIT(A) for fresh adjudication, directing that the assessee be provided with adequate opportunity of hearing to substantiate their case.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A)/NFAC failed to conduct independent inquiries, ascertain the correctness of profit estimation, and violated principles of natural justice and Rule 46A of IT-Rules by not providing reasonable opportunity to the assessee. Although the assessee failed to explain the SBN deposits, the NFAC also did not provide adequate opportunity to furnish supporting evidence. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the NFAC's order and remanded the matter for de-novo adjudication, ensuring the assessee gets an effective opportunity.
The Tribunal found that the assessee's inability to reconcile the discrepancy was a curable issue attributable to third-party non-cooperation. Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the specific issue concerning the reconciliation of income/figures and corresponding TDS credit as per Form 26AS back to the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) for de-novo adjudication, allowing the assessee another opportunity.
The Tribunal dismissed the appeal as withdrawn, noting that the Revenue had no objection to the withdrawal. It granted the assessee leave to revive the appeal in accordance with the law if the dispute remains unsettled under the opted VSVA scheme for any reason.
The Tribunal, noting the assessee's decision to resolve the matter via the DTVSV Scheme and the withdrawal application, dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. The assessee was granted liberty to apply u/Section 254(2) of the Act to recall the order if required.