39 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal noted that the AO's assessment order did not provide specifics about the bogus loss, the entities involved in layering funds, or how the loss was adjusted. The Tribunal found no reason to interfere with the CIT(A)'s order, as the assessment order was sketchy and lacked proper factual support for the addition. The appeal was dismissed.
The Tribunal held that the disallowance of deduction under section 80P while processing the return under section 143(1) was not justified as the amended provisions allowing such adjustments were effective from April 1, 2021, which was subsequent to the assessment year in question. Section 80AC could only be invoked in scrutiny assessments, not in prima facie adjustments under 143(1).
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cause for the delay due to not receiving communications from an erstwhile tax consultant. The CIT(A)'s rejection of the condonation was set aside.
The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing appeals due to the non-receipt of communications from the erstwhile tax consultant. Consequently, the CIT(A)'s rejection of the condonation of delay was set aside. The matters were remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after providing the assessee with an opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) did not cite comparable cases for the 25% profit addition. Considering the assessee is a trader and the audited books of account, the Tribunal allowed 10% of the alleged bogus purchases (Rs. 12,55,270) as extra profit, deleting the rest of the addition.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had a reasonable cause for the delay and condoned it. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for disposal on merits, granting the assessee a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal found that the assessee had not properly complied with the notices from the AO and CIT(A), leading to an ex-parte order by the CIT(A). In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits, ensuring the assessee gets a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A) due to issues with communication and the old email ID. Therefore, the CIT(A) should have condoned the delay and adjudicated the appeal on merits.
The Tribunal held that the explanation for not filing the return was bona fide and reasonable, as the estate could not operate without the probate, which was delayed due to the COVID-19 period. Considering Section 270A(6) and the income being reflected in Form 26AS, the penalty for under-reporting income was not sustainable. The Tribunal directed the AO to delete the penalty.
The Tribunal, relying on High Court decisions from Madras, Karnataka, and Kerala, and a Coordinate Bench decision, held that the enabling provision for levying fee under Section 234E, i.e., Section 200A(1)(c), came into effect from 01.06.2015. Therefore, fees levied prior to this date were not sustainable.
The Tribunal held that the levy of fee under Section 234E prior to June 1, 2015, was not permissible as Section 200A(1)(c) of the Act, which enables such levy, was introduced only from June 1, 2015. This was supported by decisions of various High Courts and Coordinate Benches.
The Tribunal upheld the order of the CIT(A) as the deletion of the addition was based on a remand report from the Assessing Officer himself, which found the assessee's claim to be in order. Therefore, no interference was warranted.
The Tribunal held that the levy of fee under section 234E for periods before June 1, 2015, was not permissible as the enabling provision (section 200A(1)(c)) was introduced later. The Tribunal relied on High Court decisions from Madras, Karnataka, and Kerala, and its own coordinate benches.
The Tribunal noted that while Section 14A and Rule 8D were applicable, the AO's computation was incorrect. Citing the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Principal Commissioner of Income-tax vs. REI Agro Ltd., the Tribunal held that disallowances under Section 14A must be computed considering only the investments that generated the exempt income.
The Tribunal partly allowed the assessee's appeal, directing the AO to verify claims for prior period expenses and allow deductions if substantiated. The Tribunal also remanded the issue of disallowance of interest on loans to the AO for recomputation. The Revenue's cross-objection regarding unexplained cash credits was also partly allowed, directing the AO to decide the issue afresh after considering evidence.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal due to a reasonable cause. It was held that the CIT(A) had dismissed the appeal ex parte without proper adjudication. Therefore, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a decision on merits, ensuring the assessee gets a fair opportunity to present their case.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee, a cooperative society, had obtained its statutory audit report later and the CIT(A) ought to have considered the additional evidence. In the interest of justice, the Tribunal set aside the order of the CIT(A) and remitted the matter back to the AO for de novo assessment.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the additions without allowing the Assessing Officer an opportunity to examine the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transactions. The inability to trace creditors, non-appearance of directors despite summons, and the nature of the creditors as private limited companies warranted further inquiry. The Tribunal also noted discrepancies in the assessment order.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders were passed by the NFAC on March 8, 2022, which was prior to the effective date of March 29, 2022, when the NFAC was empowered to pass such orders. Therefore, the assessment orders were without jurisdiction.
The Tribunal held that the assessment orders passed by the NFAC were issued prior to the effective date of its jurisdiction. Therefore, the NFAC acted without jurisdiction when passing these orders, making them invalid.
The Tribunal held that for AY 2019-20 and 2020-21, the assessee failed to provide cogent evidence to support the claimed income, thus upholding the lower authorities' orders. However, for AY 2021-22 and 2022-23, the Tribunal found that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence of being in the rice trading business and that applying Section 69A would lead to double taxation, setting aside the additions.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. Considering that the assessee claimed to have new evidence (consignment notes) and to ensure fair play, the Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and remitted the matter back to the AO for de novo reassessment.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For AY 2019-20 and 2020-21, the Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities, dismissing the appeals as the assessee failed to provide cogent evidence for salary income and commission/brokerage. However, for AY 2021-22 and 2022-23, the Tribunal found that the assessee had provided sufficient evidence for rice trading business and had offered income on a presumptive basis under Section 44AD, hence additions under Section 69A were not justified and resulted in double taxation.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeals. For AY 2019-20 and 2020-21, the Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities and dismissed the appeals, finding the assessee failed to produce cogent evidence for salary and commission income. For AY 2021-22 and 2022-23, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's business of rice trading, finding sufficient evidence and holding that Section 69A was not applicable to income offered under the presumptive scheme of Section 44AD. These appeals were allowed.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing appeals. For AY 2019-20 and 2020-21, the Tribunal upheld the lower authorities' orders dismissing the assessee's appeal, finding a lack of cogent evidence for salary income and commission. However, for AY 2021-22 and 2022-23, the Tribunal accepted the assessee's rice trading business, holding that Section 69A is not applicable to income offered under the presumptive taxation scheme of Section 44AD, thus directing the deletion of additions.
The Tribunal noted that some grounds were not pressed. Regarding the main issue of bogus expenditure, the Tribunal observed that the assessee's sub-contractor, proprietor of M/s. Jagannath Enterprise, could not appear earlier due to medical reasons. The Tribunal, in the interest of justice, decided to set aside the order and remit the matter back to the AO for fresh assessment.
The Tribunal noted that the AO might not have examined all entries and the assessee failed to satisfactorily explain the difference between bank credits and turnover. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s order and restored the appeal for a de novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that the rejection of the application solely on technical grounds without considering the merits and without providing a proper opportunity of hearing was not justified. The Tribunal set aside the order and remanded the matter back to the CIT(Exemption).
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 62 days, finding sufficient cause for the assessee's inability to file on time. The Tribunal set aside the CIT(A)'s ex parte order and restored the appeal to the CIT(A) for a fresh decision on merits, after granting the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were validly initiated, dismissing grounds related to the validity of the notice u/s 148. However, it found merit in the assessee's contentions regarding the additions made under Sections 68 and 69C, noting the lack of incriminating evidence, violation of natural justice by not providing cross-examination, and prior acceptance of investments by the Revenue.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) was correct in deleting the addition. The Tribunal noted that the share scrips themselves were not doubted, and many of the purchasing companies were active during the year of transaction, even if some were later struck off. The Tribunal relied on judicial precedents that if share purchases were accepted as genuine in earlier years, sales of such shares should not be added under section 68.