19 orders · Page 1 of 1
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the AO were outside the scope of the limited scrutiny for which notice under section 143(2) was issued. Furthermore, it was admitted that no approval was taken to widen the scope of the limited scrutiny.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged their responsibility by providing names and addresses of persons who advanced money and confirmed the transactions. The onus then shifted to the revenue, which failed to discharge it. For the boundary wall advance, income was assessed at 8% of the amount. For cash withdrawal and redeposit, no addition was sustained.
The Tribunal noted that the issue was identical to a previous decision involving the assessee's brother. Following the precedent, the Assessing Officer was directed to grant the benefit of deduction under Section 10(38). Consequently, the penalty under Section 271 was also deleted.
The Tribunal held that the return filed by the assessee was in compliance with the ITAT's order for de novo assessment and should be treated as a return filed under Section 139(1) of the Act. Consequently, a notice under Section 143(2) was indeed required, and its absence vitiates the assessment. Regarding incriminating material, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. was applicable, and since no incriminating material was found, the assessment was rightly quashed.
The Tribunal held that the return filed by the assessee was in compliance with the ITAT's order for de novo assessment and should be treated as a return filed under Section 139(1) of the Act. Consequently, a notice under Section 143(2) was indeed required, and its absence vitiates the assessment. Regarding incriminating material, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. was applicable, and since no incriminating material was found, the assessment was rightly quashed.
The Tribunal held that the return filed by the assessee was in compliance with the ITAT's order for de novo assessment and should be treated as a return filed under Section 139(1) of the Act. Consequently, a notice under Section 143(2) was indeed required, and its absence vitiates the assessment. Regarding incriminating material, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. was applicable, and since no incriminating material was found, the assessment was rightly quashed.
The Tribunal held that the return filed by the assessee was in compliance with the ITAT's order for de novo assessment and should be treated as a return filed under Section 139(1) of the Act. Consequently, a notice under Section 143(2) was indeed required, and its absence vitiates the assessment. Regarding incriminating material, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. was applicable, and since no incriminating material was found, the assessment was rightly quashed.
The Tribunal held that the notice issued under Section 148A(b) did not provide the assessee with the mandatory minimum of seven clear days to respond. Following the decision of the Hon'ble Jharkhand High Court in Satish Kumar and the Tribunal's own coordinate bench decision, the notice was quashed.
The Tribunal held that since the notice under Section 148 was issued beyond three years from the end of the assessment year, the prior approval for such reopening should have been obtained from the Principal Chief Commissioner (Pr. CCIT), not the Principal Commissioner (Pr. CIT). Therefore, the approval was invalid, making the notice and the consequent assessment order bad in law.
The Tribunal held that the repeated changes in allowing and denying the exemption under section 154 indicate that the issue is debatable. A debatable issue cannot be rectified under section 154 as a mistake apparent from the record. Furthermore, if exemption is denied, the income should be treated as business income and assessed accordingly, which was not done.
The Tribunal held that the reopening was based on a change of opinion and reappraisal of existing evidence, not on any new material. Since the original assessment was completed under Section 143(3) and the reopening was initiated beyond four years, it was impermissible. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa in Rama Devi Sabat vs. DCIT.
The Tribunal held that Section 269SS, as amended, applies to advances received for the transfer of immovable property. However, the cash payment in this case was received at the time of registration of the sale deed, not as an advance. Therefore, the provisions of Section 269SS were not applicable.
The Tribunal held that the delay in construction was on the part of the state government and the assessee had not violated any provisions of Section 11 of the IT Act. The assessee had kept the funds invested as prescribed and not for other purposes. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order deleting the additions was well-reasoned.
The Tribunal held that the return filed by the assessee was in compliance with the ITAT's order for de novo assessment and should be treated as a return filed under Section 139(1) of the Act. Consequently, a notice under Section 143(2) was indeed required, and its absence vitiates the assessment. Regarding incriminating material, the Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell Pvt. Ltd. was applicable, and since no incriminating material was found, the assessment was rightly quashed.
The Tribunal noted that the issue was identical to a previous decision involving the assessee's brother. Following the precedent, the Assessing Officer was directed to grant the benefit of deduction under Section 10(38). Consequently, the penalty under Section 271 was also deleted.
The Tribunal found that the reasons for the delay were reasonable and plausible and condoned the delay. The appeal was restored to the CIT(A) for adjudication on merits.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged their responsibility by providing names and addresses of persons who advanced money and confirmed the transactions. The onus then shifted to the revenue, which failed to discharge it. For the boundary wall advance, income was assessed at 8% of the amount. For cash withdrawal and redeposit, no addition was sustained.
The Tribunal restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for re-adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to be heard. However, a cost of Rs. 15,000/- per appeal was imposed on the assessee due to non-cooperation.
The Tribunal restored the issues to the Assessing Officer for re-adjudication, granting the assessee an opportunity to be heard. However, a cost of Rs. 15,000/- per appeal was imposed on the assessee due to non-cooperation.