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The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not provide proper opportunity for hearing or to produce additional evidence. Therefore, the matters were remanded back to the CIT(A) for proper adjudication after verifying the evidence and following principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal noted that the CIT(A) had not commented on the merits of the case regarding the refund in respect of TDS credit. The rectification application filed by the assessee was neither rejected nor accepted by the Assessing Officer. The CPGRAM complaint was closed by stating the case as 'closed'. The Tribunal found it appropriate to remand the matter back to the Assessing Officer. The direction is that if the credit of TDS is in the name of the trustee, and the trust provides details of whether the money was credited to the trust's account, the same should be taken into account, and due credit should be given to the assessee trust. The appeals are partly allowed for statistical purposes. The decision in ITA No. 326/Ahd/2025 for AY 2020-21 will be followed for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23. No issue was expressly left undecided.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal held that for unabated assessment years, additions can only be made if there is incriminating material found during the search. In the absence of such material, the AO cannot make additions based on other information.
The Tribunal acknowledged the assessee's claim of technical glitches and a change in management as reasons for the delay in filing Form 10B. It held that the delay was not deliberate and should be condoned, remanding the matter back to the CIT(A) to accept Form 10B and adjudicate the issue appropriately.
The Tribunal found that the CIT(A) did not provide proper opportunity for hearing or to produce additional evidence. Therefore, the matters were remanded back to the CIT(A) for proper adjudication after verifying the evidence and following principles of natural justice.
The Tribunal condoned the 104-day delay in filing the appeal before it, finding the explanation genuine. It noted that the CIT(A) did not consider the merits of the TDS credit claim. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify the TDS credit, especially when deducted in the name of the trustee, and grant credit if the funds were indeed credited to the trust's account.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
For ITA 109/Ahd/2025, the tribunal ruled that the CIT(A) erroneously dismissed the appeal due to delay and remanded the matter back for adjudication on merits. For ITA 110/Ahd/2025, the tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not properly adjudicated certain issues, particularly regarding income from other sources, and thus remanded the case to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration on merits.
For ITA 109/Ahd/2025, the tribunal ruled that the CIT(A) erroneously dismissed the appeal due to delay and remanded the matter back for adjudication on merits. For ITA 110/Ahd/2025, the tribunal found that the CIT(A) had not properly adjudicated certain issues, particularly regarding income from other sources, and thus remanded the case to the CIT(A) for fresh consideration on merits.
The Tribunal held that the additions made by the Assessing Officer (AO) in the unabated assessment years were not based on any incriminating material found during the search. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court's decision in PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd., which clearly states that in the case of unabated/completed assessments, no addition can be made by the AO in the absence of any incriminating material unearthed during the search. The Tribunal noted that the limitation period for issuing notice under section 143(2) for the assessment years in question had expired prior to the date of the search. Therefore, the AO lacked the jurisdiction to proceed under section 153A based solely on 'other material' without incriminating evidence. The Tribunal found no merit in the grounds of appeal filed by the Revenue and upheld the findings of the CIT(A) that the additions made by the AO were rightly deleted. The specific issue regarding the profit element versus gross receipts and telescoping of payments was implicitly resolved by the deletion of additions due to lack of incriminating material, as the CIT(A) had already directed the AO to confine the business income at a certain amount and delete the remaining. The Tribunal did not expressly decide on the profit margin or telescoping theory as the primary basis for deletion was the absence of incriminating material.
The Tribunal condoned the 104-day delay in filing the appeal before it, finding the explanation genuine. It noted that the CIT(A) did not consider the merits of the TDS credit claim. The matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to verify the TDS credit, especially when deducted in the name of the trustee, and grant credit if the funds were indeed credited to the trust's account.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, a cooperative society engaged in trading of quota items and providing Kishan Cash Credit (KCC) loans, had sufficiently explained the source of cash deposits. The evidence, including audited financial statements, bank statements, and KCC loan recovery details, supported the assessee's claims.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly deleted the addition of cash deposits as they were out of business transactions, supported by evidence. However, the Tribunal upheld the disallowance of salary expenses due to lack of TDS and proof of employees' income disclosure.
The Tribunal held that the principle of consistency should be applied as depreciation on similar intangible assets had been allowed in previous years. It also noted that once an asset becomes part of a block of assets, its individual identity is lost, and depreciation is allowable on the block. The revision order of the PCIT was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(A) correctly deleted the addition of cash deposits as they were out of business transactions, supported by evidence. However, the Tribunal upheld the disallowance of salary expenses due to lack of TDS and proof of employees' income disclosure.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, a cooperative society engaged in trading of quota items and providing Kishan Cash Credit (KCC) loans, had sufficiently explained the source of cash deposits. The evidence, including audited financial statements, bank statements, and KCC loan recovery details, supported the assessee's claims.
The Tribunal held that the assessee, a cooperative society engaged in trading of quota items and providing Kishan Cash Credit (KCC) loans, had sufficiently explained the source of cash deposits. The evidence, including audited financial statements, bank statements, and KCC loan recovery details, supported the assessee's claims.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s order, ruling that the land remained agricultural at the time of sale by the assessee, and its subsequent conversion by the purchaser for industrial use did not alter its agricultural nature for the assessee's transaction. It was noted that the assessee was registered as an agriculturist and the land records showed it as agricultural at the time of purchase.
The Tribunal held that expenses incurred for a third-party firm, even if the assessee has a shareholding or partnership interest, cannot be treated as wholly and exclusively for the assessee's own business. The Tribunal referred to the principle that one must look to the direct concern and purpose of the expenditure, not remote or indirect results. While acknowledging that the determination of indirect benefits is subjective, the Tribunal found that the CIT(A)'s approach of allowing 25% of the expenses, despite the assessee having only a 10% profit share in the third-party firm, was reasonable. The Tribunal found no infirmity in the CIT(A)'s order and dismissed the assessee's appeal.
The Tribunal held that the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT) was justified in invoking revisionary powers under section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The sole basis for the PCIT's action was the erroneous issuance of a penalty notice under section 271(1)(c) of the Act, instead of the correctly applicable section 271AAC(1), as mentioned in the body of the reassessment order. The Tribunal found this to be an erroneous order prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. While the Assessing Officer (AO) had correctly invoked section 271AAC(1) in the reassessment order, the subsequent issuance of the wrong penalty notice was considered a procedural defect. The Tribunal noted that the AO could have rectified this under section 292B. However, the PCIT, by directing the AO to drop proceedings under section 271(1)(c) and issue a fresh notice under section 271AAC(1), effectively modified the reassessment order to correct this error. The Tribunal respectfully followed the decision of the Allahabad High Court in a similar case, holding that the omission of the Income Tax Officer to initiate penalty proceedings correctly during the assessment renders the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue, giving the Commissioner jurisdiction to revise such an order. The Tribunal distinguished the assessee's reliance on the Delhi High Court in J.K. D'Costa, noting that in the present case, the AO had consciously invoked the correct section in the order, but erred in issuing the notice. Therefore, the revisionary jurisdiction invoked by the PCIT was considered well within the provisions of law.
The Tribunal held that the plain words of Section 56(2)(x) include 'any immovable property', and agricultural land falls within this definition. However, the Tribunal also noted that if the stamp duty value is disputed, the AO is required to refer the matter to the DVO.
The Tribunal condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, considering the assessee's failure to provide satisfactory explanations or evidence during assessment and appellate proceedings, and the fact that the assessee did not respond to notices, the previous order was not interfered with initially. Subsequently, due to the assessee's ill health and demise, the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) observed that the CIT(Exemptions) denied registration without providing adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The ITAT also noted that the CIT(Exemptions)'s order itself acknowledged the charitable nature of the trust's objects despite perceived community restrictions. Therefore, the ITAT restored the matter to the CIT(Exemptions) for de novo consideration, mandating that the assessee be given a proper opportunity to respond to specific queries regarding its objects and their applicability.
The Tribunal held that the lower authorities failed to properly appreciate the material on record and that the addition under Section 69 was not sustainable. The Tribunal found that the assessee had discharged the onus of proving the source of funds for the investment.
The Tribunal held that the surplus from the surrender of ULIPs is taxable under 'Income from other sources' and not 'Capital gain'. However, considering a recent Mumbai Tribunal decision, the matter was set aside to the AO for fresh consideration.
The Tribunal upheld the decision of the CIT(A), stating that the Assessing Officer should have referred the matter to the District Valuation Officer for verification. The Revenue failed to provide any evidence to counter the assessee's claim regarding the carpet area.
The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the Ld. CIT(E) for de-novo consideration, allowing the assessee an opportunity to comply with the notices. The CIT(E) is free to pass orders based on available material if non-compliance persists.
The Tribunal held that although the quantum issue was decided against the assessee, the penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income should not be levied automatically. The assessee had consistently treated the receipts as corpus donations for many years, disclosed all facts, and acted under a bona fide belief. Relying on judicial precedents, the Tribunal considered this not a fit case for penalty.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) passed the order without affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the assessee and noted that judicial precedents suggest CBDT circulars cannot unduly restrict assessee rights. Consequently, the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal condoned the delay of 95 days in filing the appeal, finding no perceptible prejudice to the revenue. The Tribunal restored the matter to the file of the CIT(Exemptions) for de-novo consideration in the interest of justice. The Tribunal clarified that if the assessee fails to comply before the CIT(Exemptions) in the de-novo proceedings, the CIT(E) would be at liberty to pass appropriate orders based on the available material. The Tribunal did not decide the substantive issues raised in the grounds of appeal but rather remanded the matter for fresh adjudication.
The Tribunal held that there was a merit in the assessee's claim of inadvertently selecting the wrong section code and that the assessee did not have a proper opportunity to be heard. The matter was restored to the CIT(E) for de-novo consideration.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence, particularly regarding third-party statements. Therefore, the Tribunal accepted additional evidence and set aside the matter for de novo assessment by the AO.
The Tribunal held that the assessee had discharged its onus by providing substantial documentation to establish the advance against a property transaction, not a loan. The identity and genuineness of the party were proven, and the Assessing Officer failed to rebut the evidence, making the addition unsustainable.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence, particularly regarding third-party statements. Therefore, the Tribunal accepted additional evidence and set aside the matter for de novo assessment by the AO.
The Tribunal held that there was an inadvertent error in filing the form and that the assessee did not get an opportunity to be heard. Following a coordinate bench decision, the matter was restored to the CIT(E) for de novo consideration.
The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) acted summarily without inquiry. The inclusion of a religious object does not disqualify the trust if the activities are not wholly or substantially religious, and expenditure on religious purposes is less than 5% of total income.
The Tribunal decided both issues in favour of the assessee. On the first issue, it held that the notional rental value of unsold flats held as stock-in-trade is not taxable under the head 'Income from House Property' for AY 2017-18. The Tribunal reasoned that the legislative scheme, the nature of the asset as stock-in-trade, and judicial precedents, including the prospective nature of Section 23(5), support this view. The deeming fiction under Section 22 is not applicable to stock-in-trade in this context. The addition of Rs. 10,93,898/- was directed to be deleted. On the second issue, the Tribunal found merit in the assessee's explanation that the differential amount represented genuine business expenditure forming part of the capitalized cost of land acquisition. The Tribunal noted that stamp duty and registration fees were connected to a registered Power of Attorney, a public document, and vakil fees were supported by signed internal vouchers. The Tribunal held that the AO erred in disallowing the cost solely for want of external vouchers without appreciating the nature of the documents and the business purpose. The disallowance of Rs. 10,30,580/- was directed to be deleted. The appeal was allowed.
The Tribunal held that the cash deposits were sufficiently explained by the assessee's retail sales during the demonetization period, which were duly recorded in audited books of accounts. The AO had not rejected the books of accounts, making the addition unsustainable.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence, particularly regarding third-party statements. Therefore, the Tribunal accepted additional evidence and set aside the matter for de novo assessment by the AO.
The Tribunal found that the assessee was not given sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence, particularly regarding third-party statements. Therefore, the Tribunal accepted additional evidence and set aside the matter for de novo assessment by the AO.
The Tribunal noted that the assessee had raised an additional ground before the CIT(A) claiming exemption under Section 54B in respect of the sale of land at Survey Nos. 197/1 and 198/1, stating that the proceeds were from the sale of agricultural land. However, the CIT(A) had not adjudicated this additional ground. The Tribunal observed that if this fact of non-adjudication by the CIT(A) had been brought to the High Court's notice, the High Court might have set aside the matter to the CIT(A). Since the matter was set aside to the Tribunal, and it was evident that the additional ground was not adjudicated by either the CIT(A) or the AO, the Tribunal, in the interest of natural justice, decided to set aside the matter back to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. The AO is directed to decide the issue on merits after giving the assessee a proper opportunity of hearing and passing an order in accordance with the law. The additional ground filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
The Tribunal held that denial of exemption solely on the ground of delayed filing of Form 10B is not justified, especially when the report was submitted before the intimation under Section 143(1) was issued. The Tribunal considered the late filing as a procedural defect, not a deliberate omission.
The Tribunal noted that while the assessee admitted to incurring religious expenditure exceeding 5% in prior years, it contended that this was not the case for the impugned year. The Tribunal, considering the issue and the arguments, decided to restore the matter to the CIT for de-novo consideration, allowing the assessee to present further judicial precedents.