SHRI RAJDEEP SINGH CHIMNI,CHANDIGARH vs. THE ASSTT. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CIRCLE-4(1), CHANDIGARH

That the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has erred in passing an ex-parte order without affording a proper opportunity of hearing which is against the Principles of Natural Justice and as such the order passed is arbitrary and unjustified.

Without prejudice to the above, the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has erred in law as well as on facts in upholding the addition of Rs. 23,57,085/- made by applying the provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b) which is arbitrary and unjustified.

That the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has failed to appreciate that (rectification) was carried out vide order dt. 9th April 2019 whereby the addition was reduced from Rs. 23,57,085/- to Rs. 5,30,791/- by the assessing officer and as such the difference between the purchase value and the circle rate came down to less than 10% tolerance band which does not invite the invocation of provisions of section 56(2)(vii)(b).

That the appellant craves leave to add or amend the grounds of appeal before the appeal is finally heard or disposed off.

That the order of Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)Officer is arbitrary, opposed to the facts of the case and thus untenable.

Ground No. 1 was not pressed during the course of hearing, hence the same is dismissed as not pressed.

In Ground No. 2 & 3, the Ld. AR submitted that the AO has since passed the rectification order whereby the difference between the purchase value and the Circle Rate has come down to less than 10% and therefore the provisions of Section 56(2)(vii)(b) r/w section 50C cannot be attracted.

In this case, our reference was draw to the order so passed by the AO under section 154 /155(15) r.w.s 56(2)(vi)(b) of the Act dt. 09/04/2019 and the contents thereof read as under:

The Ld. DR is heard who has relied on the order of the lower authorities.

We have heard the rival contentions and purused the material available on record. We find that in the instant case, the difference in FMV as so determined by the DVO and the stated purchase consideration is 5.32% i.e, less than 10% of the stated sale consideration, the provisions of section 56(vii)(b) cannot be invoked in light of proviso to section 56(vii)(b) r/w the third proviso to section 50C which has been held applicable retrospectively with effect from 01/04/2003 by the Coordinate Mumbai Benches in case of Maria Fernandes Cheryl vs ITO reported in 123 taxman.com 252 and the relevant findings therein read as under:

These submissions, however, do not impress us. As noted by the Central Board of Direct Taxes circular # 8 of 2018, explaining the reason for the insertion of the third proviso to Section 50C(1), has observed that "It has been pointed out that the variation between stamp duty value and actual consideration received can occur in respect of similar properties in the same area because of a variety of factors, including the shape of the plot or location". Once the CBDT itself accepts that these variations could be on account of a variety of factors, essentially bonafide factors, and, for this reason, Section 50C(1) should not come into play, it was an "unintended consequence" of Section 50(1) that even in such bonafide situations, this provision, which is inherently in the nature of an anti- avoidance provision, is invoked. Once this situation is sought to be addressed, as is the settled legal position- as we will see a little later in our analysis, this situation needs to be addressed in entirety for the entire period in which such legal provisions had effect, and not for a specific time period only. There is no good reason for holding the curative amendment to be only as prospective in effect. Dealing with a somewhat materially identical situation in the case of Rajeev Kumar Agarwal v. Addl. CIT [2014] 45 taxmann.com 555/149 ITD 363 (Agra) wherein a coordinate bench was dealing with the question whether insertion of a proviso to Section 40(a)(i) to cure intended consequence could have retrospective effect, even though not specifically provided for, and speaking through one of us (i.e. the Vice President), the coordinate bench had, after a detailed analysis of the legal position, observed that, "Now that the legislature has been compassionate enough to cure these shortcomings of provision, and thus obviate the unintended hardships, such an amendment in law, in view of the well settled legal position to the effect that a curative amendment to avoid unintended consequences is to be treated as retrospective in nature even though it may not state so specifically, the insertion of second proviso must be given retrospective effect from the point of time when the related legal provision was introduced". Referring to this decision, and extensively reproducing from the same, including the portion extracted above, Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in the case of CIT v. Ansal Landmark Township (P.) Ltd. [2015] 61 taxmann.com 45/234 Taxman 825/377 ITR 635 (Delhi), has approved this approach and observed that "the Court is of the view that the above reasoning of the Agra Bench of ITAT as regards the rationale behind the insertion of the second proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act and its conclusion that the said proviso is declaratory and curative and has retrospective effect from 1st April 2005, merits acceptance". The same was the path followed by another bench of this Tribunal in the case of Dharamashibhai Sonani v. Asstt. CIT [2016] 75 taxmann.com 141/161 ITD 627 which has been approved by Hon'ble Madras High Court in the judgment reported as CIT v. Vummudi Amarendran [2020] 120 taxmann.com 171/429 ITR 97]. The question that we must take a call on, therefore, is as to what is the rationale behind the insertion of the third proviso to section 50C(1), and if that rationale is to provide a remedy for unintended consequences of the main provision, we must hold that the third proviso to section 50C(1) comes into force with effect from the same date on which the main provision, unintended provisions of which are sought to be nullified, itself was brought into effect. Let us understand what the nature of the provisions of section 50C is. In terms of this provision, if the property is sold below the stamp duty valuation rate, which is often called circle rate, this stamp duty valuation report is assumed as sale consideration for the property in question, and, accordingly, capital gains tax is levied. This deeming fiction to substitute apparent sale considerations by notional consideration computed on the basis of a stamp duty valuation rate, was thus to address the issue with respect to potential evasion of taxes by understating the sale consideration amount in a sale deed. As noted by the CBDT, while explaining the justification for insertion of section 50C, "(t)he Finance Act, 2002, has inserted a new section 50C in the Income-tax Act to make a special provision for determining the full value of consideration in cases of transfer of immovable property". Section 50C, thus, on a conceptual note, is a provision to address capital gains tax evasion on account of understatement of the consideration. Of course, the law provides, under section 50C(2), that wherever an assessee claims that the actual market rate is less than the stamp duty valuation, he can have the matter referred to a Departmental Valuation Officer for the ascertainment of the market value, but then it is a cumbersome procedure and, at the end of the day, every valuation, whether by the departmental valuation officer or under the stamp duty valuation notification, is an estimate, and there can always be bonafide variations, though to a certain limited extent, in these estimations. Unless, therefore, some kind of a tolerance band or a safe harbour provision, in respect of such bonafide variations, is implicit in the scheme of law, the assessees are bound to face undue hardships. The mechanism under section 50C proceeds on the assumption that when the sale consideration is less than the stamp duty valuation, the sale consideration is to be treated as understated. This assumption is, however, laid to rest when the variations between the stated consideration and the stamp duty valuation figure are treated as explained. The insertion of the third proviso to Section 50C(1) provides for this tolerance band with respect to a certain degree of variations between the stamp duty valuation and the stated consideration of an immovable property. In other words, as long as the variations are within the permissible limits, the anti-avoidance provisions of Section 50C do not come into play. As we have noted earlier, the CBDT itself accepts that there could be various bonafide reasons explaining the small variations between the sale consideration of immovable property as disclosed by the assessee vis-à-vis the stamp duty valuation for the said immovable property. Obviously, therefore, disturbing the actual sale consideration, for the purpose of computing capital gains, and adopting a notional figure, for that purpose, will not be justified in such cases. On a conceptual note, an estimation of market price is an estimation nevertheless, even if by a statutory authority like the stamp duty valuation authority, and such a valuation can never be elevated to the status of such a precise computation which admits no variations. The rigour of Section 50C(1) was thus relaxed, and very thoughtfully so, to take these bonafide cases of small variations between the stated sale consideration vis-à-vis stamp duty valuation, out of the scope of adjustments contemplated in the computation of capital gains under this anti-avoidance provision. In our humble understanding, it is a case of a curative amendment to take care of unintended consequences of the scheme of Section 50C. It makes perfect sense, and truly reflects a very pragmatic approach full of compassion and fairness, that just because there is a small variation between the stated sale consideration of a property and stamp

Once legislature very graciously accepts, by introducing the legal amendments in question, that there were lacunas in the provisions of section 50C in the sense that even in the cases of genuine variations between the stated consideration and the stamp duty valuation, anti-avoidance provisions under section 50C could be pressed into service, and thus remedied the law, there is no escape from holding that these amendments are effective with effect from the date on which the related provision, i.e., Section 50C, itself was introduced. These amendments are thus held to be retrospective in effect. In our considered view, therefore, the provisions of the third proviso to Section 50C (1), as they stand now, must be held to be effective with effect from 1st April 2003. We order accordingly. Learned Departmental Representative, however, does not give up. Learned Departmental Representative has suggested that we may mention in our order that "relief is being provided as a special case and this decision may not be considered as a precedent". Nothing can be farther from a judicious approach to the process of dispensation of justice, and such an approach, as is prayed for, is an antithesis of the principle of "equality before the law," which is one of our

We have noted that as against the stated consideration of Rs. 75,00,000, the stamp duty valuation of the property is Rs. 79,91,500. The difference is just Rs. 4,91,500, which is about 6.55% of the stated sale consideration. As the difference between the stated consideration vis-à-vis the stamp duty valuation is admittedly less than 10% of the stated consideration in this case, and in the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that section 50C will have no application in the matter. The enhancement in capital gain computation, as made by the Assessing Officer, thus stands disapproved. The assessee gets the relief accordingly.

In the result, the addition so made and sustained by the ld CIT(A) is hereby deleted and the appeal of the assessee is allowed.