SH. JAGDISH SINGH,NABHA vs. ITO, WARD, NABHA

At the outset, it is noted that the appeal is barred by limitation by 332 days. The Counsel of the Assessee brought to our notice of the Bench the condonation application as well as the Affidavit of Shri Jagdish Singh S/o Shri Dayal Singh 695-Chd-2023 – Jagdish Singh, Nabha 2 resident of Street No.6,Ddefence Colony, Almoran Kalah, Patiala wherein, the Assessee has explained the reasons attributable to late filing of appeal by 332 days. After hearing both the parties and perusing the material on record including the affidavit, I find that the delay in filing the appeal is purely for the reasons that the Assessee was not knowing about the ex-parte decision by CIT(A) dismissing the appeal in limine and it was only after on receipt of notice dated 9.11.2023 through ITO, Ward Nabha, the Assessee came to know about the appeal having been decided ex-parte.

Sub-section 5 of Section 253 contemplates that the Tribunal may admit an appeal or permit filing of memorandum of cross- objections after expiry of relevant period, if it is satisfied that there was a sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. This expression sufficient cause employed in the section has also been used identically in sub-section 3 of section 249 of Income Tax Act, which provides powers to the ld. Commissioner to condone the delay in filing the appeal before the Commissioner. Similarly, it has been used in section 5 of Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Whenever interpretation and construction 695-Chd-2023 – Jagdish Singh, Nabha 3 of this expression has fallen for consideration before Hon’ble High Court as well as before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, then, Hon’ble Court were unanimous in their conclusion that this expression is to be used liberally. We may make reference to the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme court from the decision in the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Katiji & Others, 1987 AIR 1353 wherein it has held that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

In the light of above, if we examine the facts of the present case, then it would reveal that there was a bonafide lapse at the end of the assessee because the assessee will not gain anything by making his appeal time barred. The delay in filing the appeal was not adopted as a strategy to litigate with the Revenue. Considering the bonafide mistake, we condone the delay and proceed to decide the appeal on merit.