RABDI VIBHAG PROGRESSIVE KELAVNI MANDAL,VALSAD vs. CIT(EXEMPTION), AHMEDABAD

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AHMEDABAD “C” BENCH Before: Shri Waseem Ahmed, Accountant Member And Shri T.R. Senthil Kumar, Judicial Member

ITA No. 797/Ahd/2023

Rabdi Vibhag The CIT (Exemption), Progressive Kelavni Ahmedabad Mandal, Vs Rabdi Pardi, (Respondent) Valsad-396125, Gujarat PAN: AABTR0797A (Appellant) Assessee Represented: Shri Rasesh Shah, A.R. Revenue Represented: Shri Kamlesh Makwana, CIT-DR Date of hearing : 22-01-2024 Date of pronouncement : 24-01-2024 आदेश/ORDER PER : T.R. SENTHIL KUMAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER:-

This appeal is filed by the Assessee as against the order dated 12.08.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), Ahmedabad rejecting registration under section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 2 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

06.04.2022. The assessee Trust also granted provisional registration u/s. 80G(5) of the Act by Ld. CIT(E) vide order dated 13.05.2022. Thereafter the assessee Trust filed Form 10AB for final registration u/s. 80G(5) of the Act on 23.02.2023 which was rejected by Ld. CIT(E) on the ground that the application was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under the Act and also extended period of limitation granted by CBDT by various circulars issued from time to time. Thus denying registration u/s. 80G(5) of the Act and also cancelling provisional registration granted on 13.05.2022 to the assessee.

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 3 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

order dated 30.11.2023, whereby set aside the rejection order with a direction to reconsider Form 10AB for final registration u/s. 80G of the Act. Similarly the ld. Counsel placed various decisions passed by other Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunals and decisions of the High Courts of Delhi.

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 4 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

"(iii) where the institution or fund has been provisionally approved, at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval or within six months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier;"

6.2 Reading of the above sub-section makes it clear that there is no provision to condone the delay in Registration of the Trust. However, the CBDT has extended the above time limits by invoking section 119 of the Act by issuing circular No. 8 of 2022, dated 31-03- 2022 extending the time limit upto 30th September, 2022. It is thereafter by circular No. 6 of 2023 dated 24-05-2023 clarified as follows:-

“7. It may be also noted that the extension of due date as mentioned in paragraph 5(ii) shall also apply in case of all pending applications under clause (iii) of the first proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or sub-clause (iii) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A of the Act, as the case may be. Hence, in cases where the trust has already made an application in Form Ho. 10AB under the said provisions but such application has been furnished after 30.09.2022 and where the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner has not passed an order before the issuance of this Circular, the pending application in Form No. 10AB may be treated as a valid application. Further, in cases where the trust had already made an application in Form No. 10AB, and where the Principal

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 5 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

Commissioner or Commissioner has passed an order rejecting such application, on or before the issuance of this Circular, solely on account of the fact that the application was furnished after the due date, the trust may furnish a fresh application in Form No. 10AB within the extended time provided in paragraph 5(ii) i.e. 30.09.2023.”

However, this clause (7) was not referred by the CIT(E) in his order while rejecting the registration u/s. 80G of the Act to the assessee on the sole ground that he has no power to condone the delay of belated filing of Form no. 10AB u/s. 80G(5) of the Act. 6.3 Reading of the above circular makes it clear that the time is extended up till 30-09-2023, whereas the assessee filed belated application on 28-02-2023. The above circular also clarified that even in case, where the application in Form No. 10AB was rejected by the CIT(E) on or before issuance of this circular dated 24-05- 2023, the assessee trust can make fresh application in Form 10AB on or before 30-09-2023. Thus, the ld. CIT(E) has not considered the clause 7 of the Circular no. 6 of 2023 thereby rejected the application which is in our considered view is against the circular issued by the CBDT. Therefore, we hereby set aside the impugned order passed by CIT(E) with a direction to reconsider the From No.10AB for final registration u/s. 80G of the Act by giving proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee trust. Needless to say the assessee trust should co-operate by furnishing all the required details as mandated under the law for granting final registration u/s. 80G of the Act.” 7. Further the Surat Bench of this Tribunal in ITA No. 728 & 732/SRT/2023 vide order dated 09.01.2024 held as follows:

“…13. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered facts of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. We note that in the latest Circular No.6/2023 dated 24.05.2023, the date was not extended by the CBDT, so far as, filing of Form No. 10AB, u/s 80G(5)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is concerned. 14. We note that the extended period, as per Circular No.8/2022, as extended period declared by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) is, on or before 30.09.2022, which has also expired, in the assessee`s case under consideration. However, after this Circular

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 6 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

No.8/2022, the CBDT has issued another Circular No.6/2023 dated 24.05.2023 wherein in para-5, the CBDT has instructed as follows: “5. In order to mitigate genuine hardship in such cases, the Board, in the exercise of the power under section 119 of the Act, extends the due date of making an application in,- (i) Form No.10A, in case of an application under clause (i) of the first proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or under sub-clause (i) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A or under clause (i) of the first proviso to sub-section (5) of section 80G of the Act, till 30.09.2023 where the due date for making such application has expired prior to such date; (ii) Form No.10AB, in case of an application under clause (iii) of the first proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or under sub-clause (iii) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 122A of the Act, till 30.09.2023 where the due date for making such application has expired prior to such date.

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 7 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

“where the institution or fund has been provisionally approved, at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval or within six months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier.” Therefore, it is undue hardship to the assessee, as the CBDT, in the latest Circular No.6/2023 dated 24.05.2023, about application for registration or approval under Section 80G, in form No. 10AB, did not mention the extended period. Thus, we find merit in the submission of ld Counsel to the effect that assessee is an old trust, which had registered on 29.11.2001 and commenced its activities from 2001, therefore, it is impossible to file the application u/s 80G(5) (iii) of the Act, “within six months of commencement of its activities’ as stated in above clause (iii) of 3rd proviso of section 80G(5) of the Act. Besides, as per circular No.8/2022 of CBDT dated 31.03.2022, the extended time is up to 30.09.2022, however, the assessee filed Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) (iii) on 24.02.2023, therefore, application filed by the assessee before the ld CIT(E) is delayed by 147 days (approx.), and hence ld CIT(E) rejected application of assessee in Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) (iii) of the Act, as not maintainable and also cancelled the provisional approval granted in Form No.10AC, under clause (iv) of first proviso to sub- section (5) of section 80 G of the Act. 17. Therefore, in this ambiguity situation in circular No.8/2022 of CBDT dated 31.03.2022 and latest Circular No.6/2023 dated 24.05.2023, of the CBDT, we do not have any option but to condone the delay in filing application in Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) of the Act. We note that Co-ordinate Bench of Jodhpur in the case of Bhamashah Sundarlal Daga Charitable Trust vs. CIT(Exemption) in ITA No.278/JODH/2023 dated 10.11.2023 dealt with the issue of clause-(iii) 3rd proviso u/s 80G(5) of the Act stating that “whichever is earlier” is applicable only to the newly constructed trust. The findings of the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Bhamashah Sundarlal Daga Charitable Trust (supra) is reproduced below: 10.1 In this background, we need to read the sub-clause (iii) of the Proviso to Section 80G(5) of the Act. For ready reference it is again reproduced here under : “ (iii) where the institution or fund has been provisionally approved, at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval or within six months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier”

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 8 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

10.2 The sub-clause says that the Institution which have provisional registration have to apply at-least six months prior to expiry of the provisional registration or within Six months of commencement of activities, whichever is earlier. 10.3 In continuation of this when we read the ‘sub clause iii of Proviso’ of section 80G(5), which we have already reproduced above, it is clear that the intention of parliament in putting the word “or within six months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier” is in the context of the newly formed Trust/institutions. For the existing Trust/Institution, the time limit for applying for Regular Registration is within six months of expiry of Provisional registration if they are applying under sub clause (iii) of the Proviso to Section 80G(5) of the Act. This will be the harmonious interpretation. 11. If we agree with the interpretation of the ld.CIT(E), then say a trust which was formed in the year 2000, performed charitable activities since 2000, but did not applied for registration u/s.80G, the said trust will never be able to apply for registration now. This in our opinion is not the intention of the legislation. This interpretation leads to absurd situation. 11.1 In this context, we will like to refer to observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K P Varghase(supra), where in Hon’ble SC observed as under : Quote, “It is a well-recognised rule of construction that a statutory provision must be so construed, if possible, that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. There are many situations where the construction suggested on behalf of the revenue would lead to a wholly unreasonable result which could never have been intended by the Legislature. Take, for example, a case where A agrees to sell his property to B for a certain price and before the sale is completed pursuant to the agreement and it is quite well known that sometimes the completion of the sale may take place even a couple of years after the date of the agreement - the market price shoots up with the result that the market price prevailing on the date of the sale exceeds the agreed price at which the property is sold by more than 15 per cent of such agreed price. This is not at all an uncommon case in an economy of rising prices and in fact we would find in a large number of cases where the sale is completed more than a year or two after the date of the agreement that the market price prevailing on the date of the sale is very much more than the price at which the property is sold under the agreement. Can it be contended with any degree of fairness and justice that in such cases, where there is clearly no understatement of consideration in respect of the transfer and the transaction is perfectly honest and bona fide and, in fact, in fulfilment of a contractual obligation, the assessee who has sold the property should be liable to pay tax on

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 9 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

capital gains which have not accrued or arisen to him. It would indeed be most harsh and inequitable to tax the assessee on income which has neither arisen to him nor is received by him, merely because he has carried out the contractual obligation undertaken by him. It is difficult to conceive of any rational reason why the Legislature should have thought it fit to impose liability to tax on an assessee who is bound by law to carry out his contractual obligation to sell the property at the agreed price and honestly carries out such contractual obligation. It would indeed be strange if obedience to the law should attract the levy of tax on income which has neither arisen to the assessee nor has been received by him. If we may take another illustration, let us consider a case where A sells his property to B with a stipulation that after sometime, which may be a couple of years or more, he shall resell the property to A for the same price. Could it be contended in such a case that when B transfers the property to A for the same price at which he originally purchased it, he should be liable to pay tax on the basis as if he has received the market value of the property as on the date of resale, if, in the mean-while, the market price has shot up and exceeds the agreed price by more than 15 per cent. Many other similar situations can be contemplated where it would be absurd and unreasonable to apply section 52(2) according to its strict literal construction. We must, therefore, eschew literalness in the interpretation of section 52(2) and try to arrive at an interpretation which avoids this absurdity and mischief and makes the provision rational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied and we cannot find any escape from the tyranny of the literal interpretation. It is now a well- settled rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the Legislature, the Court may modify the language used by the Legislature or even 'do some violence" to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the Legislature and produce a rational construction -” Unquote. 11.2 Thus, as observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court, that the statutory provision shall be interpreted in such a way to avoid absurdity. In this case to avoid the absurdity as discussed by us in earlier paragraph, we are of the opinion that the words, “within six months of commencement of its activities” has to be interpreted that it applies for those trusts/institutions which have not started charitable activities at the time of obtaining Provisional registration, and not for those trust/institutions which have already started charitable activities before obtaining Provisional Registration. We derive the strength from the Speech of Hon’ble Finance Minister and the Memorandum of Finance Bill 2020. 11.3 Therefore, in these facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the Assessee Trust had applied for registration within the time allowed

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 10 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

under the Act. Hence, the application of the assessee is valid and maintainable. 12. Even otherwise, the Provisional Approval is uptoA.Y.2025-26, and it can be cancelled by the ld.CIT(E) only on the specific violations by the assessee. However, in this case the ld.CIT(E) has not mentioned about any violation by the Assessee. Therefore, even on this ground the rejection is not sustainable. 13. However, the ld.CIT(E) has not discussed whether the Assessee fulfils all other conditions mentioned in the section as he rejected it on technical ground. Therefore, in these facts and circumstances we hold that the Assessee had made the application in form 10AB within the prescribed time limit and hence it is valid application. Therefore, we direct the ld.CIT(E) to treat the application as filed within statutory time and verify assessee’s eligibility as per the Act. The ld.CIT(E) shall grant opportunity to the assessee. Assessee shall be at liberty to file all the necessary documents before the ld.CIT(E). 14. Accordingly, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purpose. Since we have set aside to Ld.CIT(E), we do not intend to adjudicate each ground separately.” 18. We note that the Co-ordinate Bench of ITAT Jodhpur in the case of Bhamashah Sundarlal Daga Charitable Trust (supra) dealt with only the issue/terminology of “whichever is earlier” which is applicable to new trust which have created recently, and it does not deal with condonation of delay in case of old trust who made the application before ld CIT(E ) very late, that is, the issue mention in clause (iii) of 3rd proviso of section 80(5), “where the institution or fund has been provisionally approved, at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval..” has not been adjudicated. 19. Now the next question before us is that whether Tribunal has power to condone the delay in filing the Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) of the Act. The Tribunal is a final fact finding authority, and based on the assessee`s facts and undue hardship created by the clause (iii) of 3rd proviso of section 80(5) of the Act, the Tribunal may condone the delay in filing the Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) of the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that delay in filing the Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) should be condoned in the interest of justice. For that we rely on the judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of DCIT(Exemption) vs. Vishwa Jagriti Mission [2013] 30 taxmann.com 41 (Delhi)/[2013] 213 Taxman 65 (Delhi), wherein the Hon’ble Delhi High Court held as follows:

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 11 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

“18. The main question that falls for our consideration is whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay in the filing of the application for registration under section 12A of the Act and whether the view taken by the Tribunal is perverse. The question whether there was sufficient cause for the delay is always a question of fact as has been held by two Division Bench judgments of this Court: (i) CIT v. Parma Nand [2004] 266 ITR 255/135 Taxman 100 (Delhi) and (ii) CIT v. ITOCHU Corpn. [2004] 268 ITR 172/139 Taxman 348 (Delhi). The Tribunal has, in an elaborate order in which all the facts and the rival submissions have been taken into consideration, held that there was sufficient cause for the delay on the part of the assessee-society in making the applications for registration under section 12A and 80G of the Act. It is not necessary, nor is it proper, for us to decide the culpability or otherwise of A.K. Sikri who was the Treasurer of the assessee-society. All that we need to examine is whether the Tribunal had valid materials before it on the basis of which it could have reasonably come to the conclusion that the assessee-society was prevented by sufficient cause in applying for the registration in time. It is manifest from a fair reading of the order of the Tribunal that it had weighed the circumstances in which the assessee-society was placed and the action it took immediately on receipt of the complaint from M.P. Mansinghka Trust of Mumbai; it has referred to the confession of Sikri in the meeting of the governing body owning up responsibility for having misled the assessee-society by representing that the necessary application for registration were made in time; it has also referred to the action taken by the assessee-society against Sikri when it found that Sikri was not taking adequate steps to remedy the situation; it has also referred to the police complaints filed not only by the assessee-society against Sikri, but also to the complaint filed by the income tax authorities against Sikri which indicated that they also viewed Sikri to be responsible for the mis-representation, fake certificates of registration, etc. Moreover, the Tribunal has taken note of the fact that the Metropolitan Magistrate, acting on the police complaint, remanded Sikri to custody and also referred to the fact that in the bail application, Sikri had again owned up responsibility for the fake certificates of registration. Taking an overall view of the facts and going by the preponderance of probabilities, the Tribunal came to hold the view that it was because of the irregularities, illegalities and mis-representations of Sikri that the assessee-society was led to believe that appropriate applications under the Act were already filed with the income tax authorities for registration. The assessee-society was thus under the belief, though mistaken but honest, that there was no delay and once it came to know on 06.12.2005 about the irregularities on a complaint from M.P. Mansinghka Trust of Mumbai and on further enquiry conducted on 14.12.2005 by the governing body, it hastened to take remedial action by filing applications for registration both under section 12A and 80G of the

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 12 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

Act, which were followed up by another set of applications filed directly with the DIT (Exemptions) on 21.12.2005; these applications were obviously delayed and the condonation application was filed on 14.03.2006 narrating the events that led to the delay. 19. In the above circumstances, it seems to us that the Tribunal has acted judicially, taking note of all the facts and circumstances including probabilities of the case. In Esthuri Aswathiah v. CIT [1967] 66 ITR 478 (SC), the Supreme Court outlined the duties of the Tribunal in the following words: - "The function of the Tribunal in hearing an appeal is purely judicial. It is under a duty to decide all questions of fact and law raised in the appeal before it: for that purpose it must consider whether on the materials relied upon by the assessee his plea is made out. Conclusive proof of the claim is not predicated: the Tribunal may act upon probabilities, and presumptions may supply gaps in the evidence which may not, on account of delay or the nature of the transactions or for other reasons, be supplied from independent sources. But the Tribunal cannot make arbitrary decisions: it cannot found its judgment on conjectures, surmises or speculation. Between the claims of the public revenue and of the taxpayers, the Tribunal must maintain a judicial balance." In Udhavdas Kewalram v. CIT [1967] 66 ITR 462 (SC) the very same Bench of three judges of the Supreme Court again observed as under: - "The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal performs a judicial function under the Indian Income-tax Act: it is invested with authority to determine finally all questions of fact. The Tribunal must, in deciding an appeal, consider with due care all the material facts and record its finding on all the contentions raised by the assessee and the Commissioner in the light of the evidence and the relevant law ......................................The Tribunal was undoubtedly competent to disagree with the view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. But in proceeding to do so, the Tribunal had to act judicially, i.e., to consider all the evidence in favour of and against the assessee. An order recorded on a review of only a part of the evidence and ignoring the remaining evidence cannot be regarded as conclusively determining the questions of fact raised before the Tribunal." 20. We are satisfied that the Tribunal has, in making its decision, kept in mind the aforesaid principles adumbrated by the Supreme Court. Its order cannot, therefore, be branded as perverse or unreasonable or irrational.

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 13 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 14 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 15 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

There is no need to further elaborate this position, because the law as laid down in these observations is well settled, and has been adopted in the construction of section 66 of the Act." 25. This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Daulatram Rawatmull [1964] 53 ITR 574 where it was held that "if there is some evidence to support the finding recorded by the Tribunal, even if it appears to the High Court that on re-appreciation of the evidence, it might arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal" the High Court has no power to interfere with the findings of the Tribunal. These decisions were applied by a Division Bench of this Court in CIT v. Baba Avtar Singh[1972] 83 ITR 738 where it was observed as under: - "The submission made by Mr. Sharma does not appear to us to be correct. It is well-settled that the court cannot set aside the Tribunal's finding of fact if there is some evidence to support that finding even though the court itself might have come to a different conclusion upon the evidence." 26. The aforesaid principles govern the order of the Tribunal and the approach to be adopted by us in the present case. At best, what can be argued by the Revenue is only that another view was possible to be taken by the Tribunal and this Court should prefer the alternative view on the same facts and evidence and discard the Tribunal's view. Obviously the argument cannot be upheld, having regard to the above judgments. 27. For the above reasons we answer the substantial questions of law framed in ITA Nos.754, 773 and 775 of 2010 in the negative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. Consequently the sole substantial question of law framed by us in ITA Nos.1092, 1101, 1103, 1104, 1112 and 1124 of 2010 is answered in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The C.M. Application is disposed of. The appeals of the Revenue are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.”

I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 16 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

Order pronounced in the open court on 24 -01-2024

Sd/- Sd/- (WASEEM AHMED) (T.R. SENTHIL KUMAR) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER True Copy JUDICIAL MEMBER Ahmedabad : Dated 24/01/2024 आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत / Copy of Order Forwarded to:- 1. Assessee 2. Revenue 3. Concerned CIT 4. CIT (A) 5. DR, ITAT, Ahmedabad 6. Guard file. By order/आदेश से, उप/सहायक पंजीकार आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, अहमदाबाद