RABDI VIBHAG PROGRESSIVE KELAVNI MANDAL,VALSAD vs. CIT(EXEMPTION), AHMEDABAD

Rabdi Vibhag The CIT (Exemption), Progressive Kelavni Ahmedabad Mandal, Vs Rabdi Pardi, (Respondent) Valsad-396125, Gujarat PAN: AABTR0797A (Appellant) Assessee Represented: Shri Rasesh Shah, A.R. Revenue Represented: Shri Kamlesh Makwana, CIT-DR Date of hearing : 22-01-2024 Date of pronouncement : 24-01-2024 आदेश/ORDER PER : T.R. SENTHIL KUMAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER:-

This appeal is filed by the Assessee as against the order dated 12.08.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), Ahmedabad rejecting registration under section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

06.04.2022. The assessee Trust also granted provisional registration u/s. 80G(5) of the Act by Ld. CIT(E) vide order dated 13.05.2022. Thereafter the assessee Trust filed Form 10AB for final registration u/s. 80G(5) of the Act on 23.02.2023 which was rejected by Ld. CIT(E) on the ground that the application was filed beyond the limitation period prescribed under the Act and also extended period of limitation granted by CBDT by various circulars issued from time to time. Thus denying registration u/s. 80G(5) of the Act and also cancelling provisional registration granted on 13.05.2022 to the assessee.

1. On the facts and in circumstances of the case as well as law, the ld. CIT(Exemption) has erred in rejecting assessee's application u/s. 80G(5) filed on 23.02.2023 on the ground that assessee didn't file the application before 30.09.2022 when the assessee has filed the application in time as per the extension granted till 30.09.2023 as per circular no. 6/2023 dated 29.05.2023. 2 Even otherwise, the ld. CIT(Exemption) has erred in rejecting application u/s. 80G(5) filed on 23.02.2023 when the assessee was under honest belief that extension was granted till 30.09.2023 as per circular no. 6/2023 dated 29.05.2023. 3 It is therefore prayed that the CIT(Exemption) should be directed passed u/s. 80G(5) of the I.T. Act, 1961 may please be set aside to the file of CIT(Exemption) with appropriate direction.

4. Appellant craves leave to add, alter or delete any ground(s) either before or in the course of hearing of the appeal.

4. Ld. Counsel Shri Rasesh Shah appearing for the assessee submitted before us that this very same issue was held in favour of the assessee by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Best Buds Pet Care vs. CIT(E) in vide I.T.A No. 797/Ahd/2023 Page No 3 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E) order dated 30.11.2023, whereby set aside the rejection order with a direction to reconsider Form 10AB for final registration u/s. 80G of the Act. Similarly the ld. Counsel placed various decisions passed by other Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunals and decisions of the High Courts of Delhi.

"(iii) where the institution or fund has been provisionally approved, at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval or within six months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier;"

6.2 Reading of the above sub-section makes it clear that there is no provision to condone the delay in Registration of the Trust. However, the CBDT has extended the above time limits by invoking section 119 of the Act by issuing circular No. 8 of 2022, dated 31-03- 2022 extending the time limit upto 30th September, 2022. It is thereafter by circular No. 6 of 2023 dated 24-05-2023 clarified as follows:-

“7. It may be also noted that the extension of due date as mentioned in paragraph 5(ii) shall also apply in case of all pending applications under clause (iii) of the first proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or sub-clause (iii) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A of the Act, as the case may be. Hence, in cases where the trust has already made an application in Form Ho. 10AB under the said provisions but such application has been furnished after 30.09.2022 and where the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner has not passed an order before the issuance of this Circular, the pending application in Form No. 10AB may be treated as a valid application. Further, in cases where the trust had already made an application in Form No. 10AB, and where the Principal Page No 5 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

Commissioner or Commissioner has passed an order rejecting such application, on or before the issuance of this Circular, solely on account of the fact that the application was furnished after the due date, the trust may furnish a fresh application in Form No. 10AB within the extended time provided in paragraph 5(ii) i.e. 30.09.2023.”

However, this clause (7) was not referred by the CIT(E) in his order while rejecting the registration u/s. 80G of the Act to the assessee on the sole ground that he has no power to condone the delay of belated filing of Form no. 10AB u/s. 80G(5) of the Act. 6.3 Reading of the above circular makes it clear that the time is extended up till 30-09-2023, whereas the assessee filed belated application on 28-02-2023. The above circular also clarified that even in case, where the application in Form No. 10AB was rejected by the CIT(E) on or before issuance of this circular dated 24-05- 2023, the assessee trust can make fresh application in Form 10AB on or before 30-09-2023. Thus, the ld. CIT(E) has not considered the clause 7 of the Circular no. 6 of 2023 thereby rejected the application which is in our considered view is against the circular issued by the CBDT. Therefore, we hereby set aside the impugned order passed by CIT(E) with a direction to reconsider the From No.10AB for final registration u/s. 80G of the Act by giving proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee trust. Needless to say the assessee trust should co-operate by furnishing all the required details as mandated under the law for granting final registration u/s. 80G of the Act.”

“…13. We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record and duly considered facts of the case in the light of the applicable legal position. We note that in the latest Circular No.6/2023 dated 24.05.2023, the date was not extended by the CBDT, so far as, filing of Form No. 10AB, u/s 80G(5)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is concerned.

14. We note that the extended period, as per Circular No.8/2022, as extended period declared by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) is, on or before 30.09.2022, which has also expired, in the assessee`s case under consideration. However, after this Circular Page No 6 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

No.8/2022, the CBDT has issued another Circular No.6/2023 dated 24.05.2023 wherein in para-5, the CBDT has instructed as follows: “5. In order to mitigate genuine hardship in such cases, the Board, in the exercise of the power under section 119 of the Act, extends the due date of making an application in,- (i) Form No.10A, in case of an application under clause (i) of the first proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or under sub-clause (i) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 12A or under clause (i) of the first proviso to sub-section (5) of section 80G of the Act, till 30.09.2023 where the due date for making such application has expired prior to such date; (ii) Form No.10AB, in case of an application under clause (iii) of the first proviso to clause (23C) of section 10 or under sub-clause (iii) of clause (ac) of sub-section (1) of section 122A of the Act, till 30.09.2023 where the due date for making such application has expired prior to such date.

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“where the institution or fund has been provisionally approved, at least six months prior to expiry of the period of the provisional approval or within six months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier.” Therefore, it is undue hardship to the assessee, as the CBDT, in the latest Circular No.6/2023 dated 24.05.2023, about application for registration or approval under Section 80G, in form No. 10AB, did not mention the extended period. Thus, we find merit in the submission of ld Counsel to the effect that assessee is an old trust, which had registered on 29.11.2001 and commenced its activities from 2001, therefore, it is impossible to file the application u/s 80G(5) (iii) of the Act, “within six months of commencement of its activities’ as stated in above clause (iii) of 3rd proviso of section 80G(5) of the Act. Besides, as per circular No.8/2022 of CBDT dated 31.03.2022, the extended time is up to 30.09.2022, however, the assessee filed Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) (iii) on 24.02.2023, therefore, application filed by the assessee before the ld CIT(E) is delayed by 147 days (approx.), and hence ld CIT(E) rejected application of assessee in Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) (iii) of the Act, as not maintainable and also cancelled the provisional approval granted in Form No.10AC, under clause (iv) of first proviso to sub- section (5) of section 80 G of the Act.

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10.2 The sub-clause says that the Institution which have provisional registration have to apply at-least six months prior to expiry of the provisional registration or within Six months of commencement of activities, whichever is earlier. 10.3 In continuation of this when we read the ‘sub clause iii of Proviso’ of section 80G(5), which we have already reproduced above, it is clear that the intention of parliament in putting the word “or within six months of commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier” is in the context of the newly formed Trust/institutions. For the existing Trust/Institution, the time limit for applying for Regular Registration is within six months of expiry of Provisional registration if they are applying under sub clause (iii) of the Proviso to Section 80G(5) of the Act. This will be the harmonious interpretation.

capital gains which have not accrued or arisen to him. It would indeed be most harsh and inequitable to tax the assessee on income which has neither arisen to him nor is received by him, merely because he has carried out the contractual obligation undertaken by him. It is difficult to conceive of any rational reason why the Legislature should have thought it fit to impose liability to tax on an assessee who is bound by law to carry out his contractual obligation to sell the property at the agreed price and honestly carries out such contractual obligation. It would indeed be strange if obedience to the law should attract the levy of tax on income which has neither arisen to the assessee nor has been received by him. If we may take another illustration, let us consider a case where A sells his property to B with a stipulation that after sometime, which may be a couple of years or more, he shall resell the property to A for the same price. Could it be contended in such a case that when B transfers the property to A for the same price at which he originally purchased it, he should be liable to pay tax on the basis as if he has received the market value of the property as on the date of resale, if, in the mean-while, the market price has shot up and exceeds the agreed price by more than 15 per cent. Many other similar situations can be contemplated where it would be absurd and unreasonable to apply section 52(2) according to its strict literal construction. We must, therefore, eschew literalness in the interpretation of section 52(2) and try to arrive at an interpretation which avoids this absurdity and mischief and makes the provision rational and sensible, unless of course, our hands are tied and we cannot find any escape from the tyranny of the literal interpretation. It is now a well- settled rule of construction that where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the Legislature, the Court may modify the language used by the Legislature or even 'do some violence" to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the Legislature and produce a rational construction -” Unquote. 11.2 Thus, as observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court, that the statutory provision shall be interpreted in such a way to avoid absurdity. In this case to avoid the absurdity as discussed by us in earlier paragraph, we are of the opinion that the words, “within six months of commencement of its activities” has to be interpreted that it applies for those trusts/institutions which have not started charitable activities at the time of obtaining Provisional registration, and not for those trust/institutions which have already started charitable activities before obtaining Provisional Registration. We derive the strength from the Speech of Hon’ble Finance Minister and the Memorandum of Finance Bill 2020. 11.3 Therefore, in these facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that the Assessee Trust had applied for registration within the time allowed Page No 10 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E) under the Act. Hence, the application of the assessee is valid and maintainable.

19. Now the next question before us is that whether Tribunal has power to condone the delay in filing the Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) of the Act. The Tribunal is a final fact finding authority, and based on the assessee`s facts and undue hardship created by the clause (iii) of 3rd proviso of section 80(5) of the Act, the Tribunal may condone the delay in filing the Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) of the Act. Therefore, we are of the view that delay in filing the Form No.10AB, u/s 80G(5) should be condoned in the interest of justice. For that we rely on the judgment of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of DCIT(Exemption) vs. Vishwa Jagriti Mission [2013] 30 taxmann.com 41 (Delhi)/[2013] 213 Taxman 65 (Delhi), wherein the Hon’ble Delhi High Court held as follows:

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“18. The main question that falls for our consideration is whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay in the filing of the application for registration under section 12A of the Act and whether the view taken by the Tribunal is perverse. The question whether there was sufficient cause for the delay is always a question of fact as has been held by two Division Bench judgments of this Court: (i) CIT v. Parma Nand [2004] 266 ITR 255/135 Taxman 100 (Delhi) and (ii) CIT v. ITOCHU Corpn. [2004] 268 ITR 172/139 Taxman 348 (Delhi). The Tribunal has, in an elaborate order in which all the facts and the rival submissions have been taken into consideration, held that there was sufficient cause for the delay on the part of the assessee-society in making the applications for registration under section 12A and 80G of the Act. It is not necessary, nor is it proper, for us to decide the culpability or otherwise of A.K. Sikri who was the Treasurer of the assessee-society. All that we need to examine is whether the Tribunal had valid materials before it on the basis of which it could have reasonably come to the conclusion that the assessee-society was prevented by sufficient cause in applying for the registration in time. It is manifest from a fair reading of the order of the Tribunal that it had weighed the circumstances in which the assessee-society was placed and the action it took immediately on receipt of the complaint from M.P. Mansinghka Trust of Mumbai; it has referred to the confession of Sikri in the meeting of the governing body owning up responsibility for having misled the assessee-society by representing that the necessary application for registration were made in time; it has also referred to the action taken by the assessee-society against Sikri when it found that Sikri was not taking adequate steps to remedy the situation; it has also referred to the police complaints filed not only by the assessee-society against Sikri, but also to the complaint filed by the income tax authorities against Sikri which indicated that they also viewed Sikri to be responsible for the mis-representation, fake certificates of registration, etc. Moreover, the Tribunal has taken note of the fact that the Metropolitan Magistrate, acting on the police complaint, remanded Sikri to custody and also referred to the fact that in the bail application, Sikri had again owned up responsibility for the fake certificates of registration. Taking an overall view of the facts and going by the preponderance of probabilities, the Tribunal came to hold the view that it was because of the irregularities, illegalities and mis-representations of Sikri that the assessee-society was led to believe that appropriate applications under the Act were already filed with the income tax authorities for registration. The assessee-society was thus under the belief, though mistaken but honest, that there was no delay and once it came to know on 06.12.2005 about the irregularities on a complaint from M.P. Mansinghka Trust of Mumbai and on further enquiry conducted on 14.12.2005 by the governing body, it hastened to take remedial action by filing applications for registration both under section 12A and 80G of the Page No 12 Rabdi Vibhag Progressive Kelavni Mandal vs. CIT(E)

Act, which were followed up by another set of applications filed directly with the DIT (Exemptions) on 21.12.2005; these applications were obviously delayed and the condonation application was filed on 14.03.2006 narrating the events that led to the delay.

20. We are satisfied that the Tribunal has, in making its decision, kept in mind the aforesaid principles adumbrated by the Supreme Court. Its order cannot, therefore, be branded as perverse or unreasonable or irrational.

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2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."

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There is no need to further elaborate this position, because the law as laid down in these observations is well settled, and has been adopted in the construction of section 66 of the Act."

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