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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, BENCH : COCHIN
Before: SHRI N. V. VASUDEVAN & Ms. PADMAVATHY S.
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL BENCH : COCHIN BEFORE SHRI N. V. VASUDEVAN, VICE PRESIDENT AND Ms. PADMAVATHY S., ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
ITA Nos. and Appellant Respondent Assessment Year 32/Coch/2022 Manjilas Agro Foods Pvt. Ltd., The Income Tax Officer, 2011-12 Sasthri Road, Nellikunnu, Ward 1(2), Thrissur – 680 005. Thrissur. PAN : AABCM 6595N 33/Coch/2022 -do- -do- 2012-13 34/Coch/2022 -do- ACIT, 2014-15 Circle - 1(1), Thrissur.
Assessee by : Shri C V Varghese, CA Revenue by : Smt. J M Jamuna Devi, Sr. AR
Date of hearing : 06.12.2022 Date of Pronouncement : 19.12.2022
O R D E R Per Padmavathy S, Accountant Member: These appeals by the assessee are is against the order of the CIT(Appeals) National Faceless Appeal Centre [NFAC] dated 6.12.2021, 30.11.2021 & 6.12.2021 for the assessment years 2011-12, 2012-13 & 2014-15 respectively. They were heard together and are disposed of by this common order.
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AY 2011-12
For the AY 2011-12, the assessee has raised the following grounds:-
“1) The order passed by the CIT (Appeals) for the Assessment Year 2011-12 is legally bad and against facts because of the following reasons. 2) The Hon'ble CIT (Appeals) statement in para 5.2.2 that the appellant attended the hearing is not a reason to excuse non- furnishing the reason. The appellant asked specifically reason for re-opening in writing and gave request on 24/01/2017 and 16/02/2017. 3) The Hon'ble Kerala High Court, the juridical High Court of assesse had held in the following cases that after reopening the Assessing Officer cannot change the rate of depreciation once allowed. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax v. Pala Marketing Co- operative Society Ltd 243 ITR 499 4) The Madras High Court in CIT v. Sundaram Industries Ltd. [1998] 231 I IR 761, where the Income-tax Officer claimed to have found a mistake in granting a larger claim for depreciation on an asset which, according to him, was put to greater private use than what was claimed in the return, found that even assuming that there was any mistake in it, it was held that the power to reopen the assessment even under section 147(b) does not include the power to correct a mistake. 5) The assesse craves leave to add/alter any of the grounds of appeal before or at the time of hearing.” 3. The assessee is a company engaged in production and manufacturing of rice products. The assessee filed its return of income for ay 2011-12 on 29.9.2011 declaring an income of Rs.19,99,250 which was revised on 15.6.2012 to Rs.22,65,500. The assessment was
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completed u/s. 143(3) determining a total income ofRs.32,65,500. Subsequently, a notice u/s. 148 was served on the assessee. The assessee in response to notice submitted to consider the revised return to be the return filed in response to notice u/s. 148. During the year under consideration, the assessee has claimed depreciation at 30% on the temp van used for the purpose of business. The AO held that depreciation on tempo van should be restricted to 15% by relying on the decision of Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Anamay Construction Co. v. UOI dated 5.10.2015, ITA No.2 of 2013. Accordingly, the AO made an addition of Rs.7,27,142.
The assessee filed an appeal before the CIT(A) contending that while completing the assessment u/s. 143(3), all details are truly and fully disclosed and that the reassessment is done on the basis of change of opinion of the AO. The assessee also contended that the reasons recorded were not made available to the assessee. However, the CIT(A) rejected the contention of the assessee on the ground that the assessee has appeared before the AO in the reassessment proceedings from time to time and had discussed the impugned issue with the AO. The assessee did not seek any reason before the AO and therefore cannot contend the reopening on this ground. The CIT(A) on merits held that claim of higher depreciation by the assessee is not justified. Aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal.
The ld. AR submitted that during the original assessment proceedings u/s. 143(3), the AO after conducting enquiries allowed the
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depreciation @ 30% based on the submissions made by the assessee. The AO cannot change his opinion with respect to the rate of depreciation applicable and this cannot be the reason for reopening u/s. 148. The ld. AR further submitted that the Kerala High Court in the case of DCIT v. Pala Marketing Co-op. Society Ltd., 243 ITR 499 (Ker) have considered similar issue and held that the AO cannot change the rate of depreciation once allowed by reopening the assessment. The ld. AR also submitted that the reasons recorded were not made available to the assessee which was requested by specific request submitted on 24.1.2017 and 16.2.2017.
We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material on record. In Pala Marketing Co-op. Society Ltd., 243 ITR 499 (Ker), the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in identical circumstances of the case held as under:-
“19. In the present case, it is to be noted that the rates of depreciation admissible are indicated in Appendix I to the Income-tax Rules, 1962 ('the Rules') which were applicable from 2-4-1987 under Serial No. III relating to machinery and plant. Different rates are provided varying between 33.33 per cent to 100 per cent. Sub-item (1) deals with machinery and plant other than those covered by sub-items (2) and (3). 'Plant and machinery' covered by item (1) qualify for depreciation allowance at 33.33 per cent. Sub-items (2) and (3 ) deal with various other categories of plant and machinery to which the rate applicable is 50 per cent. 20. Depreciation statement as filed before the Assessing Officer contained 8 items in respect of which 33.33 per cent was claimed, and in respect of other 12 items 50 per cent was claimed. Details of the plant and machinery, WDV, additions during the year, depreciation claimed and WDV, on the close of the assessment
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year were indicated. Assessment order itself shows that after examining books of account produced and after verifying the necessary details, the total income is computed. In a case of claiming depreciation, the material facts required to be disclosed are the nature of the plant and machinery in respect of which depreciation is claimed, the value thereof at the beginning of the assessment year and at the end of the year, addition or disposal, if any. These facts were disclosed in the statement filed. As indicated above, details of the plant and machinery were given along with the value. It was for the Assessing Officer to apply the rate of depreciation correctly. Merely because he did not do so, it cannot lead to an inference that material facts have not been supplied. It is not a case where facts material for the purpose of assessment were wrongly withheld. It is not the case of the revenue that there was any wrong or misleading description given. 21. In the aforesaid factual background and the legal principles anlaysed above, it is to be seen whether there was disclosure of material facts. As indicated above, such a question has to be decided on the fact situation of every case. Material or primary facts are to be disclosed, and not inferential facts. In other words, significant facts are to be disclosed. It must not be derived from or dependent on something else. Present case has a great deal of similarity with the one which was under consideration of the Apex Court in Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. ITO 1977 (1) SCC 408. As observed in para 13 thereof, there is no suggestion that the particulars disclosed in the requisite portion of the return were factually incorrect. Nor is it the case of the revenue that the assessee failed to furnish the particulars required to be furnished. Dispute is on the rate applicable. 22. Stand of the learned counsel for the revenue was that the return filed cannot be treated as one under section 139 of the Act, as the correct rate of depreciation was not indicated for the purpose of claiming depreciation, the correct rate at which depreciation is allowable has to be indicated, and otherwise, return cannot be treated as one under section 139. This argument has to be noticed to be rejected. 23. Proviso to section 147 provides that where any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment
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year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139, consequences will follow. According to the learned counsel for the revenue, return under section 139 has to be a return complete in all respects. This plea is clearly untenable. Return under section 139 has to be filed in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed. Merely because the return is not complete, it nevertheless is a return under section 139 which is clear from a reading of sub-section (5) of section 139 as it stood at the relevant time. It says that if any person has furnished any return under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and discovers any omission or any wrong statement therein, he may furnish revised return. Such revised return can also be filed in respect of return which was filed in pursuance of the notice under sub-section (1) of section 142. With effect from 1-9-1980, sub- section (9) has been introduced which provides that where the assessing authority considers that the return of income furnished by the assessee is defective, he may intimate the defect to the assessee and give him an opportunity to rectify the defect within stipulated time and if the defect is not rectified, the return shall be treated as an invalid return and the provisions of the Act shall apply as if the assessee had failed to furnish the return and if the defect is rectified, the Assessing Officer shall treat the return as a valid return. In which circumstances, the return is to be regarded as defective have been laid down in the Explanation to sub- section (9). 24. Above being the position, the irresistable conclusion is that the assessee had disclosed all material facts fully and truly. That being the position, conclusions of the learned Single Judge cannot be faulted. Writ appeal being without any merit is dismissed.” 7. We also notice that the assessee has made specific request with respect to the reasons for reopening which has not been given to the assessee. In view of the same, we remit the issue back to the AO with a direction to give the reasons recorded in writing for the purpose of reopening the assessment. The AO is also directed to keep in mind the
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decision of the Hon’ble Kerala High Court (supra) and decide the issue accordingly.
In the appeal for AY 2011-12, the assessee has contented the impugned issue only on legal grounds and accordingly we have adjudicated only the legal issue. The issue on merits for this assessment year is left open. It is ordered accordingly.
This appeal for AY 2011-12 is allowed for statistical purposes.
AY 2012-13
For AY 2012-13, the assessee raised the following grounds. –
The order passed by the CIT (Appeals) for the Assessment Year 2012-13 is legally bad and against facts because of the following reasons. 2. It is very strange to note that the notice of demand u/s 156 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was served on the assessee 17-03-2015. But the Assessment Order was served on 10/04/2015. From this it is very clear that the demand was determined before passing the Assessment Order and the Assessment Order was framed in such a manner that the total demand tally with notice of demand. This is against Circular No.DOMS No.29 dated 08-08- 1978. The contention of the learned CIT (A) that this is only the procedure defects cannot be considered as valid. 3. The learned CIT was wrong in concluding that disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia), restricted to 30% has no retrospective effects. It has been clarified by various courts that the same has retrospective effect. 4. The assessee claimed 30% depreciation since the vehicles were used to distribute the finished goods to the dealers and to purchase paddy from agriculturists. Since the vehicles were used exclusively for this purpose the obsolescence is very high and hence 30% depreciation is allowable applying function test.
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The learned Assessing Officer was wrong in disallowing Rs.1,00,000/- as personal use of car. This is highly excessive and without any basis. This aspect was not considered by learned CIT(A). In a limited company personal expenses cannot be debited to Profit and Loss Account. 6. The adhoc disallowance of Rs.3,21,911/- was upheld by the learned CIT stating that the same was not challenged in last year. Each year is a separate block of assessment. Hence this contention is wrong. 11. The assessee filed the return of income for AY 2012-13 declaring a total income of Rs.22,61,383. The case was selected for scrutiny and a notice u/s.143(2) was duly served on the assessee. The AO made the following disallowances while concluding the assessment u/s.143(3)
(i) Disallowance commission paid u/s.40(a)(ia) – Rs.3,21,097 (ii) Depreciation on van – Rs.2,45,533 (iii) Personal use of car by directors – Rs.1,00,000 (iv) Disallowance of sales promotion expenses – Rs.3.21.911 (v) Adhoc disallowance of goods vehicle expenses u/s.40A(3) – Rs.11,03,020 12. The CIT(A) gave partial by deleting the disallowance of goods vehicle expenses and sustained rest of the disallowances. Aggrieved the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal
Disallowance commission paid u/s.40(a)(ia)
The assessing officer noticed that the assessee has not deducted tax on the commission paid to agents on loading and unloading for an amount of Rs.3,21,097 and accordingly disallowed the entire amount u/s.40(a)(ia). The assessee submitted before the CIT(A) that the
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amount of disallowance should be restricted to 30% on the ground that the amendment to section 40(a)(ia) is retrospective. The CIT(A) rejected the contention of the assessee and upheld the disallowance by stating that for the relevant assessment year the disallowance was 100%.
Before us the ld AR reiterated the submissions made before the lower authorities. The ld AR submitted that many courts have held that the amendment section 40(a)(ia) restricting the disallowance to 30% is retrospective and that the lower authorities failed to consider the same. In this regard the ld AR relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd (2015) 377 ITR 635 (Del). The ld DR relied on the order of the lower authorities
We heard the rival submissions and perused the material on record. The amendment was brought by the Finance Act (No. 2) 2014 effective from 1-4-2015 whereas the year before us relates to the assessment year 2012-13. The Finance Act, 2014 brought an amendment to the first proviso to the section 40(a)(ia) of the Act which reads as under –
“Accordingly, Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act has been amended to provide that in case of non-deduction of tax at source or non-payment of tax so deducted on payments made to residents as specified in section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, the disallowance shall be restricted to 30% of the amount of expenditure claimed.”
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It is also noticed that Clause 14.3 of the explanatory memorandum to Finance Bill 2014 explained rationale behind this amended provision which reads as under –
“14.3 As mentioned above, in case of non-deduction of tax at source or nonpayment of tax so deducted from certain payments made to residents, the entire amount of expenditure on which tax was deductible is disallowed under section 40(a)(ia) for the purposes of computing income under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. The disallowance of whole of the amount of expenditure causes hardship , especially in case of payment made to a resident in whose case the withholding of tax is only a mode of collection of tax and does not result into final discharge of tax liability.” 17. Thus, from the explanatory memorandum it is noted that amendment vide Finance Act, 2014 was brought with effect to remove hardships faced by the assessee. However, it has been given w.e.f. 01- 04-2015. Thus, the issue which arises for consideration is whether amendment brought by Finance Act, 2014 restricting disallowance of expenditure to 30%, since with object to remove hardship, can by necessary implication be considered as retrospective in its application. We notice that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Ansal Land Mark Township (P.) Ltd in the context of the insertion of 2nd proviso to section 40(a)(ia), held that though it has been stated in the 2nd proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act that the same is inserted from 01.04.2013 but the same has retrospective application as the insertion of 2nd proviso is declarative and curative in nature and would be effective from the date of main proviso to section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. We also notice that the Five Members Constitution Bench of Supreme
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Court in the case of CIT v. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466/227 Taxman 121/49 taxmann.com 249, wherein it has been observed that in case the amendment is brought to remove the hardship caused to the assessee, the same assumes the character of being clarificatory in nature. We, therefore, respectfully following the ratio laid down in the above decisions, direct the AO to restrict the disallowance equal to 30% of the total expenses. The ground raised by the assessee is allowed.”
Depreciation on van
The assessee has claimed depreciation on tempo van used for transporting rice at the rate of 30%. The AO restricted the depreciation to 15% by holding that the higher rate of depreciation is available only to those vehicles used in the business of running them on hire. Accordingly the AO made a disallowance of 15% of depreciation claimed amounting to Rs.2,43,533. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance.
Before us the ld AR submitted that tempo van is used for transporting rice and hence based on the usage the assessee had claimed the higher rate of depreciation. It is submitted that instead the use of the tempo for transportation of the goods should determine higher depreciation on the basis of functionality test. The ld AR relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs Dr B V Rao (2000) 243 ITR 81.
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We heard the ld DR. The rate of depreciation on Motor cars other than those used in a business of running them on hire is at the rate of 15% and those Motor cars used in a business of running them on hire is at 30% as per the Act. The Ld AR relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs Dr B V Rao which is clearly distinguishable from assessee’s case since in that case the building used as nursing home was an integral part of the plant and machinery installed therein and in that context the Apex court held that the assessee was entitled for a higher depreciation. In assessee’s case the tempo van is used for the business purpose of transporting rice which is an activity in the normal course of business. Hence the tempo van though essential for the purpose of business cannot be said to be an integral part of the other plant and equipment and therefore the above decision cannot be applied in assessee’s case. Further the Act is very clear on the rate of depreciation on the motor vehicle used for the purpose of business to be at 15% and hence we see no reason to interfere with the decision of the CIT(A). This ground of the assessee is accordingly dismissed.
Personal use of car by directors
The AO noticed that the assessee has claimed vehicle expenses and depreciation which included the expenses and depreciation towards the car used by the director. Accordingly the AO disallowed a sum of Rs.1,00,000 out of the total expenses towards the car. The CIT(A) has upheld the disallowance on the ground that the assessee did
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not make any submissions before him and therefore held the assessee does not wish to contend the issue.
Before us the ld AR submitted that though the vehicle is used by the director, the usage is for the purpose of business and not personal purpose. The ld AR therefore submitted that no disallowance is warranted in this regard. The ld AR relied on the decision of Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs Haryana Oxygen Ltd where it is held that the use of car by the directors of the company can not be characterised as non business purpose of the company.
We heard the parties. The AO has made an adhoc disallowance without going into the merits of the issue. The CIT(A) has upheld the disallowance on the ground that the assessee has not made any submissions. In these circumstances, we deem it fit to remit the issue back to the CIT(A) to consider the issue based on merits and examination of the facts to decide whether the car is used for the purpose of business to decide the allowability accordingly. Needless to say that the assessee should be given giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It is ordered accordingly.
Disallowance of sales promotion expenses
We notice that the AO has disallowed a percentage of the sales promotion expenses as not being incurred for the purpose of the business of the assessee. The CIT(A) has confirmed the disallowance on the ground that assessee has accepted similar adhoc disallowance in
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AY 2011-12. This decision of the CIT(A) without going into the merits of the issue is not correct. Accordingly we remit the issue back to CIT(A) to examine the issue on merits considering the submissions of the assessee and decide in accordance with law. It is ordered accordingly.
The appeal of the assessee for AY 2012-13 is partly allowed.
AY 2014-15
For the assessment year the issues contended by the assessee relate to the following
(i) Disallowance of PF/ESI on delayed remittance (ii) Disallowance of depreciation of tempo Van / Goods vehicle (iii) Adhoc disallowance of sales promotion expenses
With regard to the issue of delayed remittance of ESI/PF, the issue of allowability of the claim is settled by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Checkmate Services (P.) Ltd. Vs CIT-1, [2022] 143 taxmann.com 178 (SC) where the Apex Court has held that Section 43B(b) does not cover employees' contributions to PF,ESI etc deducted by employer from salaries of employees and that employees contribution has to be deposited within the due date u/s 36(1)(va) i.e. due dates under the relevant employee welfare legislation like PF Act, ESI Act etc. failing which the same would be treated as income in the hands of the employer u/s.2(24)(x). The relevant extract of the decision is as given below –
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When Parliament introduced Section 43B, what was on the statute book, was only employer’s contribution (Section 34(1)(iv)). At that point in time, there was no question of employee’s contribution being considered as part of the employer’s earning. On the application of the original principles of law it could have been treated only as receipts not amounting to income. When Parliament introduced the amendments in 1988-89, inserting Section 36(1)(va) and simultaneously inserting the second proviso of Section 43B, its intention was not to treat the disparate nature of the amounts, similarly. As discussed previously, the memorandum introducing the Finance Bill clearly stated that the provisions – especially second proviso to Section 43B - was introduced to ensure timely payments were made by the employer to the concerned fund (EPF, ESI, etc.) and avoid the mischief of employers retaining amounts for long periods. That Parliament intended to retain the separate character of these two amounts, is evident from the use of different language. Section 2(24)(x) too, deems amount received from the employees (whether the amount is received from the employee or by way of deduction authorized by the statute) as income - it is the character of the amount that is important, i.e., not income earned. Thus, amounts retained by the employer from out of the employee’s income by way of deduction etc. were treated as income in the hands of the employer. The significance of this provision is that on the one hand it brought into the fold of “income” amounts that were receipts or deductions from employees income; at the time, payment within the prescribed time – by way of contribution of the employees’ share to their credit with the relevant fund is to be treated as deduction (Section 36(1)(va)). The other important feature is that this distinction between the employers’ contribution (Section 36(1)(iv)) and employees’ contribution required to be deposited by the employer (Section 36(1)(va)) was maintained - and continues to be maintained. On the other hand, Section 43B covers all deductions that are permissible as expenditures, or out-goings forming part of the assessees’ liability. These include liabilities such as tax liability, cess duties etc. or interest liability having regard to the terms of the contract. Thus, timely payment of these alone entitle an assessee to the benefit of deduction from the total income. The essential objective of Section 43B is to ensure that if assessees are following the mercantile
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method of accounting, nevertheless, the deduction of such liabilities, based only on book entries, would not be given. To pass muster, actual payments were a necessary pre-condition for allowing the expenditure. 53. The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under law – in terms of Section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) - unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under Section 43B. 54. In the opinion of this Court, the reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non-obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee’s income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non- obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only
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deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such interpretation were to be adopted, the non-obstante clause under Section 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee’s contribution on or before the due date as a condition for deduction. 55. In the light of the above reasoning, this court is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the approach of the impugned judgment. The decisions of the other High Courts, holding to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. For these reasons, this court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. 28. In view of the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we hold that the employees contribution to PF and ESI should be remitted before the due date as per explanation to section 36(1)(va) i.e. on or before the due date under the relevant employee welfare legislation like PF Act, ESI Act etc., for the same to be otherwise allowable u/s.43B. We therefore see no reason to interfere with the order of the CIT(Appeals). The grounds taken by the assessee on this issue is dismissed.
With regard to the issue of depreciation on tempo van / goods vehicle we have adjudicated the same issue in AY 2012-13 and the facts of the year under consideration being same is applicable to the
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year 2014-15 also. Accordingly this ground of the assessee is dismissed
The issue of adhoc disallowance of sales promotion is upheld by the CIT(A) on the same ground as in AY 2012-13 i.e. the assessee has accepted the disallowance in AY 2011-12. Since there is no change to the facts for the year under consideration, we remit the issue for AY 2014-15 also back to the CIT(A) with similar directions. It is ordered accordingly. This ground is allowed for statistical purposes.
In the result, all the appeals by the assessee are partly allowed.
Pronounced in the open court on this 19th day of December, 2022.
Sd/- Sd/- ( N V VASUDEVAN ) ( PADMAVATHY S ) VICE PRESIDENT ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
Bangalore, Dated, the 19th December, 2022. /Desai S Murthy /
Copy to:
Appellant 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. CIT(A) 5. DR, ITAT, Bangalore. By order
Assistant Registrar, ITAT, Bangalore/Cochin.