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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI BENCHES “C”, MUMBAI
Before: Shri Joginder Singh & Shri Rajendra
आदेश / O R D E R Per Joginder Singh (Judicial Member) The assessee is aggrieved by the impugned order
dated 10/07/2012, of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax
invoking revisional jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (hereinafter the Act).
However, there is delay of 252 days in filing the
appeal before this Tribunal against the impugned order.
The assessee has filed application for condonation of delay
along with an affidavit in support of the application. The
crux of argument advanced on behalf of the assessee is that
pursuant to the decision from Hon’ble Madras High Court,
in identical matter in the own case of the assessee on the
issue of Employee Stock Option Plan (hereinafter ESOP)
confirming the order of the Tribunal in SSI Ltd. vs DCIT
(2004) 85 TTJ (Chennai) 1049 holding that the assessee
has to follow SEBI directions and by following such
directions, the assessee claimed the ascertained amount as
liability for deduction. In view of the aforesaid decision, the
assessee decided to file an appeal. It was contended that
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the decision from Hon’ble Madras High Court came in June
2012 in favour of the assessee and the assessee filed the
appeal on 07/01/2013. It was contended that keeping in
view, the substantial cause of justice, the delay may be
condoned.
2.1. On the other hand, Shri M. Dayasagar, ld. CIT-
DR, contended that delay may not be condoned for which
reliance was placed upon the decision of the Tribunal in
Vikas Bhalchandra (ITA No.3245/Mum/2012) order dated
20/08/2014 and Shri Vijay V. Meghani vs DCIT (ITA
No.5418 & 5419/Mum/2011) order dated 20/08/2014. ld.
CIT-DR brought to our notice to amendment made by the
Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01/06/2015.
2.2. We have considered the rival submissions and
perused the material available on record. Under the facts
narrated before us, considering the situation, no doubt
filing of an appeal is a right granted under the statute to
the assessee and is not an automatic privilege, therefore,
the assessee is expected to be vigilant in adhering to the
manner and mode in which the appeals are to be filed in
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terms of the relevant provisions of the Act. Nevertheless, a
liberal approach has to be adopted by the appellate
authorities, where delay has occurred for “bona fide
reasons” on the part of the assessee or the Revenue in filing
the appeals. In matters concerning the filing of appeals, in
exercise of the statutory right, a refusal to condoned the
delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out
at the threshold, which may lead to miscarriage of justice.
The judiciary is respected not on account of its power to
legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
2.3. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a celebrated decision in
Collector, Land Acquisition vs Mst. Katiji & Ors. 167 ITR
471 opined that when technical consideration and
substantial justice are pitted against each other, the courts
are expected to further the cause of substantial justice.
This is for the reason that an opposing party, in a dispute,
cannot have a vested right in injustice being done because
of a non- deliberate delay. Therefore, it follows that while
considering matters relating to the condonation of delay,
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judicious and liberal approach is to be adopted. If
“sufficient cause” is found to exist, which is bona-fide one,
and not due to negligence of the assessee, the delay needs
to condoned in such cases. The expression ‘sufficient
cause’ is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply
law in a meaningful manner, which sub-serves the end of
justice- that being the life purpose of the existence of the
institution of the courts. When substantial justice and
technical consideration are pitted against each other, the
cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. This
means that there should be no malafide or dilatory tactics.
Sufficient cause should receive liberal construction to
advance substantial justice. The Hon’ble Apex Court in
Collector, Land Acquisition vs Mst. Katiji & Ors. (167 ITR
471) observed as under:-
“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 51 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on de merits. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common
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knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the others courts in the hierarchy.”
2.4. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Vedabai Alia Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil vs.
Shantaram Baburao Patil 253 ITR 798 held that the court
has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case
keeping in mind that in construing the expression
‘sufficient cause’, the principle of advancing substantial
justice is of prime importance. The court held that the
expression “sufficient cause” should receive liberal
construction.
2.5. So far as, the decisions cited by the ld. CIT-DR is
concerned, we find that in the case of Shri Vikash
Bhalchandra vs ACIT, there was delay of 2009 days and in
the case of Shri Vijay Meghani, there was delay of 2984
days, whereas, in the appeal of the assessee, there is delay
of 252 days, therefore, considering the huge delay in the
cases relied upon by the ld. CIT-DR and comparatively,
lesser delay in the present appeal, the reasons of delay,
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explanation of the assessee and having made the aforesaid
observation and considering the material facts available on
record, as mentioned earlier, by taking a lenient view, the
delay is condoned.
So far as, the merits of the case is concerned, the
ld. counsel for the assessee invited our attention to page-4
of the paper book, pages-40 & 42 of the paper book
explained that the revisional jurisdiction was wrongly
invoked. The ld. counsel also filed an order u/s 7(1) of the
R.T.I. Act, 2005 duly signed by the Central Public
Information Officer/DCIT, Circle-7(3)(2), Mumbai. Our
attention was also invited to the order sheet (page-3,
annexure-A and page-4) along with the factual matrix
recorded in the assessment order. The crux of the
argument is that necessary details were filed by the
assessee and the same were duly examined by the
Assessing Officer, therefore, the assessment order is neither
erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
3.1. On the other hand, the ld. CIT-DR, defended the
order of the ld. CIT by contending that the necessary details
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were not filed by the assessee and further the Assessing
Officer has not put into writing the claim of the assessee
and also the order is short one, therefore, in the absence of
detailed assessment order, prejudice has been caused to
the Revenue.
3.2. We have considered the rival submissions and
perused the material available on record. We find that in
the assessment order (page-40 & 41 of the paper book), the
facts have been mentioned that the assessee company is
engaged in the business of mobile value, added services
under the brand name Mauj, declared loss of
Rs.8,37,31,010/- in its return filed on 31/10/2007, which
was processed u/s 143(3) on 27/02/2009. The case of the
assessee was selected for scrutiny under CASS, therefore,
notice u/s 143(2) of the Act was served upon the assessee.
Thereafter notice u/s 142(1) along with questionnaire was
issued to the assessee to which the assessee furnished the
requisite details along with physical copy of e-filed return
and the case of discussed, as is evident from page-1 of the
assessment order. In para -3, the assessee has made
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discussion with respect to disallowance out of staff welfare
expenses and at page-2(page-41 of the paper book), there is
mention “on examination of details filed by the assessee”
meaning thereby, the facts were duly examined by the
Assessing Officer. Likewise, in para-4, discussion has been
made with respect to business development expenses and
in para-5, further discussion has been made on
disallowance of miscellaneous expenses and thereafter in
para-6, the income was computed. In the concluding para,
direction has been issued for giving credit for pre-paid taxes
and charging of interest u/s 234A, 234B and 234C as
applicable. We also note that vide letter dated 14/12/2009
addressed to the ACIT (pages 42 to 45 of the paper book)
explanation with respect to ESOP and the details of
expenses was furnished. It is not the case that the ld.
Assessing Officer passed the order blindly. Possibly, the
order may not be detailed one but that does not mean the
assessment was framed without examining the facts,
therefore, the assessment order cannot be said to be
erroneous or prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.
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3.3. So far as, the scope of revision u/s 263 of the Act
is concerned, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has
enlightened us in its order dated 15/04/1993 in CIT vs
Gabrial India Ltd. (1993) 203 ITR 108 (pages 9 to 15 of the
paper book), wherein discussion was made at length and
finally decided in favour of the assessee. The relevant
portion of the order is reproduced hereunder:-
“7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the orders of the Income-tax Officer, the Commissioner and the Tribunal. On perusal of the admitted facts, it appears that the Income-tax Officer in the instant case had examined the allowability of the claim of the assessee for deduction of the above amount of Rs. 99,326. While doing so, he asked for an explanation from the assessee in regard to the nature thereof. The assessee furnished a detailed explanation, vide his letter dated September 19, 1975. It was on a consideration of the said explanation and on being satisfied that it was a revenue expenditure that the Income-tax Officer allowed the claim for deduction. It is, however, correct that in his order, he did not make any discussion in regard to the query made by him and the explanation submitted by the assessee thereto.
According to the commissioner of Income-tax, the order of the Income-tax Officer did not disclose any application of mind. He issued the notice as he felt that the expenditure in question might be a capital expenditure. But despite examining the matter at length and hearing the assessee, he could not come to any conclusion that the expenditure was not revenue expenditure but expenditure of capital nature. He referred the matter back to the Income-tax Officer to examine the same and to decide afresh.
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The Tribunal did not approve such action of the Commissioner. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether the Commissioner without arriving at a finding that the order in question was erroneous can set aside the assessment in exercise of power under section 263 of the Act. It may be expedient at this stage to set out section 263 of the Act. Section 263, so far as relevant, runs as follows :
"263. Revision of orders prejudicial to Revenue. - (1) The Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceeding under this Act, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the Income-tax Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment.
(2) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) -
(a) to revise an order of reassessment made under section 147, or
(b) after the expiry of two years from the date of the order sought to be revised. . . .
From a reading of sub-section (1) of section 263, it is clear that the power of suo motu revision can be exercised by the Commissioner only if, on examination of the records of any proceedings under this Act, he considers that any order passed therein by the Income-tax Officer is "erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue". It is not an arbitrary or unchartered power. It can be exercised only on fulfilment of the requirements laid down in sub-section (1). The consideration of the Commissioner as to whether an order is erroneous in so
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far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, must be based on materials on the record of the proceedings called for by him. If there are no materials on record on the basis of which it can be said that the Commissioner acting in a reasonable manner could have come to such a conclusion, the very initiation of proceedings by him will be illegal and without jurisdiction. The Commissioner cannot initiate proceedings with a view to starting fishing and roving enquiries in matters or orders which are already concluded. Such action will be against the well-accepted policy of law that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings, that stale issues should not be reactivated beyond a particular stage and that lapse of time must induce repose in and set at rest judicial and quasi-judicial controversies as it must in other spheres of human activity. (See Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. ITO ).
As observed in Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. ITO by Raghuveer J. (as his Lordship then was), the Department cannot be permitted to begin fresh litigation because of new views they entertain on facts or new versions which they present as to what should be the inference or proper inference either of the facts disclosed or the weight of the circumstances. If this is permitted, litigation would have no end, "except when legal ingenuity is exhausted". To do so, is ". . . to divide one argument into two and to multiply the litigation".
The power of suo motu revision under subsection (1) is in the nature of supervisory jurisdiction and the same can be exercised only if the circumstances specified therein exist. Two circumstances must exist to enable the Commissioner to exercise power of revision under this sub-section, viz., (i) the order is erroneous; (ii) by virtue of the order being erroneous prejudice has been caused to the interests of the Revenue. It has, therefore, to be considered firstly as to when an order can be said to be erroneous. We find that the expressions "erroneous", "erroneous assessment" and "erroneous judgment" have been defined in Black's Law Dictionary. According to the definition, "erroneous"
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means "involving error; deviating from the law". "Erroneous assessment" refers to an assessment that deviates from the law and is, therefore, invalid, and is a defect that is jurisdictional in its nature, and does not refer to the judgment of the Assessing Officer in fixing the amount of valuation of the property. Similarly, "erroneous judgment" means "one rendered according to course and practice of court, but contrary to law, upon mistaken view of law; or upon erroneous application of legal principles".
From the aforesaid definitions it is clear that an order cannot be termed as erroneous unless it is not in accordance with law. If an Income-tax Officer acting in accordance with law makes a certain assessment, the same cannot be branded as erroneous by the Commissioner simply because, according to him, the order should have been written more elaborately This section does not visualise a case of substitution of the judgment of the Commissioner for that of the Income-tax Officer, who passed the order unless the decision is held to be erroneous. Cases may be visualised where the Income-tax Officer while making an assessment examines the accounts, makes enquiries, applies his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines the income either by accepting the accounts or by making some estimate himself. The Commissioner, on perusal of the records, may be of the opinion that the estimate made by the officer concerned was on the lower side and left to the Commissioner he would have estimated the income at a figure higher than the one determined by the Income-tax Officer. That would not vest the Commissioner with power to re-examine the accounts and determine the income himself at a higher figure. It is because the Income-tax Officer has exercised the quasi- judicial power vested in him in accordance with law and arrived at conclusion and such a conclusion cannot be termed to be erroneous simply because the Commissioner does not feel satisfied with the conclusion. It may be said in such a case that in the opinion of the Commissioner the order in question is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. But that by itself will
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not be enough to vest the Commissioner with the power of suo motu revision because the first requirement, viz., that the order is erroneous, is absent. Similarly, if an order is erroneous but not prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, then also the power of suo motu revision cannot be exercised. Any and every erroneous order cannot be the subject-matter of revision because the second requirement also must be fulfilled. There must be some prima facie material on record to show that tax which was lawfully exigible has not been imposed or that by the application of the relevant statute on an incorrect or incomplete interpretation a lesser tax than what was just has been imposed.
As observed in Dawjee Dadabhoy and Co. v. S. P. Jain [1957] 31 ITR 872 (Cat), at page 881, "the words 'prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue' have not been defined, but it must mean that the orders of assessment challenged are such as are not in accordance with law, in consequence whereof the lawful revenue due to the State has not been realised or cannot be realised. It can mean nothing else". The aforesaid observations were also applied by the Gujarat High Court in Addl. CIT v. Mukur Corporation [1978] 111 ITR 312. We are of the opinion that the aforesaid interpretation given by the Calcutta High Court to the expression "prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue" is the correct interpretation.
We, therefore, hold that in order to exercise power under sub-section (1) of section 263 of the Act there must be material before the Commissioner to consider that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer was erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. We have already held what is erroneous. It must be an order which is not in accordance with the law or which has been passed by the Income-tax Officer without making any enquiry in undue haste. We have also held as to what is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. An order can be said to be prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue if it is not in accordance with the law in consequence whereof the lawful revenue due to the State has not
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been realised or cannot be realised. There must be material available on the record called for by the Commissioner to satisfy him prima facie that the aforesaid two requisites are present. If not, he has no authority to initiate proceedings for revision. Exercise of power of suo motu revision under such circumstances will amount to arbitrary exercise of power. It is well-settled that when exercise of statutory power is dependent upon the existence of certain objective facts, the authority before exercising such power must have materials on record to satisfy it in that regard. If the action of the authority is challenged before the court it would be open to the courts to examine whether the relevant objective factors were available from the records called for and examined by such authority. Our aforesaid conclusion gets full support from a decision of Sabyasachi Mukharji J. (as his Lordship then was) in Russell Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. A. Chowdhury, Addl. CIT . In our opinion, any other view in the matter will amount to giving unbridled and arbitrary power to the revising authority to initiate proceedings for revision in every case and start re-examination and fresh enquiries in matters which have already been concluded under the law. As already stated it is a quasi judicial power hedged in with limitation and has to be exercised subject to the same and within its scope and ambit. So far as calling for the records and examining the same is concerned, undoubtedly, it is an administrative act, but on examination "to consider" or in other words, to form an opinion that the particular order is erroneous in so tar as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, is a quasi-judicial act because on this consideration or opinion the whole machinery of re-examination and reconsideration of an order of assessment, which has already been concluded and controversy which has been set at rest, is set again in motion. It is an important decision and the same cannot be based on the whims or caprice of the revising authority. There must be materials available from the records called for by the Commissioner.
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We may now examine the facts of the present case in the light of the powers of the Commissioner set out above. The Income- tax Officer in this case had made enquiries in regard to the nature of the expenditure incurred by the assessee. The assessee had given detailed explanation in that regard by a letter in writing. All these are part of the record of the case. Evidently, the claim was allowed by the Income-tax Officer on being satisfied with the explanation of the assessee. Such decision of the Income-tax Officer cannot be held to be "erroneous" simply because in his order he did not make an elaborate discussion in that regard. Moreover, in the instant case, the Commissioner himself, even after initiating proceedings for revision and hearing the assessee, could not say that the allowance of the claim of the assessee was erroneous and that the expenditure was not revenue expenditure but an expenditure of capital nature. He simply asked the Income-tax Officer to re-examine the matter. That, in our opinion, is not permissible. Further inquiry and/or fresh determination can be directed by the Commissioner only after coming to the conclusion that the earlier finding of the Income-tax Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Without doing so, he does not get the power to set aside the assessment. In the instant case, the Commissioner did so and it is for that reason that the Tribunal did not approve his action and set aside his order. We do not find any infirmity in the above conclusion of the Tribunal.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”
3.4. In the celebrated case of Malabar Industrial
Company Ltd. vs CIT (243 ITR 83)(SC), it was held that for
invoking jurisdiction u/s 263 by the ld. Commissioner, the
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order should be either erroneous and prejudicial to the
interest of Revenue. In that case, the assessment was
framed without making an enquiry by the Assessing Officer,
in that situation, exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the
CIT was held to be justified. However, in the present case,
due enquiries was made by the Assessing Officer and the
necessary details, filed by the assessee were examined,
therefore, this judicial pronouncements supports the case
of the assessee. Identical ratio was laid down in CIT vs Max
India Ltd. (2007) 295 ITR 282, wherein, the decision of
Malabar Industrial Company Ltd. was also considered and
the appeal of the Department was dismissed. It is
elementary, as was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Malabar Industrial Co Ltd Vs CIT [(2000) 243 ITR 83
(SC)], “Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order
of AO cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the
Revenue, for example, when an ITO adopted one of the
courses permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of
revenue; or where two views are possible and the ITO has
taken one view with which the CIT does not agree, it cannot
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be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests
of the Revenue unless the view taken by the ITO is
unsustainable in law”. Learned Commissioner was thus in
error in holding that the ld. Assessing Officer did not made
enquiries while framing the assessment and rendered the
assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest
of the revenue, we find no such error, which can lead to the
assessment order being subjected to the revision
proceedings under section 263.
3.5. The case of the assessee is further fortified by
the decision in Siddhi Real Estate Developers vs CIT (ITA
No.2630 to 2635/Mum/2012) order dated 13/05/2014,
wherein, various decisions like Mudhit Madanlal Gupta vs
ACIT (51 DTR 217), DCIT vs Magapatta Township
Development and Construction Company (141 ITD
682)(Pune), Rahul Construction Company vs ITO (ITA
No.1250/Pn/2009), CIT vs Vandana Properties (2012) 353
ITR 36 (Bom.) and various decisions were considered and
finally decided in favour of the assessee.
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3.6. Hon’ble Delhi High Court in CIT vs Sunbeam
Auto Ltd. (2011) 332 ITR 167 order dated 11/09/2009,
after considering various decisions, made an elaborate
discussion and decided in favour of the assessee by holding
that there is distinction between “lack of enquiry” and
“inadequate enquiry” and hold that if there is an enquiry,
even inadequate, that would not by itself give occasion to
the CIT to pass order us/ 263, merely because he has a
different opinion in the matter. This judicial
pronouncement squarely defends the case of the assessee.
While coming to this conclusion, the Hon’ble Court duly
considered the following decision
a. Asstt. CIT vs. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P) Ltd. (2007) 210 CTR (SC) 30 (2007) 291 ITR 500 (SC) b. CIT vs. Mysore Spun Concrete Pipe (P) Ltd. (1991) 97 CTR (Kar) 117 (1992) 194 ITR 159 (Kar) c. CIT vs. Seshasayee Paper & Boards Ltd. (2000) 242 ITR 490 (Mad) d. Gee Vee Enterprises vs. Add!. CIT 1975 CTR (Del) 61 : (1975) 99 ITR 375 (Del) e. Madras Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd. vs. CIT (1997) 139 CTR (SC) 555 (1997) 225 ITR 802 (SC) f. Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (2000) 159 CTR (SC) 1 : (2000) 243 ITR 83 (SC)
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3.7. Now, we shall deal with the contention of the ld.
CIT-DR with respect to amendment made by the Finance
Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01/06/2015. The provision of the Act is
reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
“ 263. (1) The [Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceeding under this Act, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the Assessing Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment. [Explanation 1.]—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that, for the purposes of this sub-section,— (a) an order passed on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988 by the Assessing Officer shall include— (i) an order of assessment made by the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or the Income-tax Officer on the basis of the directions issued by the Joint Commissioner under section 144A; (ii) an order made by the Joint Commissioner in exercise of the powers or in the performance of the functions of an Assessing Officer conferred on, or assigned to, him under the orders or directions issued by the Board or by the [Principal Chief Commissioner or] Chief Commissioner or [Principal Director General or] Director General or [Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner authorised by the Board in this behalf under section 120; (b) "record" shall include and shall be deemed always to have included all records relating to any proceeding under this Act available at the time of examination by the [Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner; (c) where any order referred to in this sub-section and passed by the Assessing Officer had been the subject matter of any appeal filed on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988, the powers of the [Principal Commissioner or] Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend and shall be deemed always to have extended to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal.
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[Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, it is hereby declared that an order passed by the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to be erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, if, in the opinion of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner,— (a) the order is passed without making inquiries or verification which should have been made; (b) the order is passed allowing any relief without inquiring into the claim; (c) the order has not been made in accordance with any order, direction or instruction issued by the Board under section 119; or (d) the order has not been passed in accordance with any decision which is prejudicial to the assessee, rendered by the jurisdictional High Court or Supreme Court in the case of the assessee or any other person.] (2) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) after the expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought to be revised was passed. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), an order in revision under this section may be passed at any time in the case of an order which has been passed in consequence of, or to give effect to, any finding or direction contained in an order of the Appellate Tribunal, [National Tax Tribunal,] the High Court or the Supreme Court. Explanation.—In computing the period of limitation for the purposes of sub-section (2), the time taken in giving an opportunity to the assessee to be reheard under the proviso to section 129 and any period during which any proceeding under this section is stayed by an order or injunction of any court shall be excluded.”
If the aforesaid insertion of Explanation -2 is analyzed the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked only when
(a) The order is passed without making enquiries or verification which should have been made
(b) The order is passed allowing any relief without enquiring into the claim
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(c) The order has not been made in accordance with any order, direction or instruction issued by the Board u/s 119 or
(d) The order has not been passed in accordance with any decision which is prejudicial to the assessee, rendered by the jurisdictional high court or Supreme Court in a case of the assessee or any other person.
3.8. If the aforesaid insertion, w.e.f. 01/06/2015, if
kept in juxtaposition with the facts of the present appeal, it
can be said that there is no violation of the insertion by the
Assessing Officer because the assessment order was passed
after considering the details and on
examination/verification of the same and the relief was
granted to the assessee after making due enquiry,
therefore, so far as, explanation-2(a) and (b) is concerned,
consequently, on this count also, we find no merit in the
assertion made on behalf of the Revenue.
3.9. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in M/s.
Simandhar Association vs Principal CIT (I.T.A. No.
789/Mum/2016) Order dated 21/03/2016 has discussed
the scope of revisional jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act. The
relevant portion from the order is reproduced hereunder:-
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“The scope of revision proceedings initiated under section 263 of the Act was considered by Hon'ble Bombay High Court, in the case of Grasim Industries Ltd. V CIT (321 ITR 92) by taking into account the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant observations are extracted below: “Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 empowers the Commissioner to call for and examine the record of any proceedings under the Act and, if he considers that any order passed therein, by the Assessing Officer is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, to pass an order upon hearing the assessee and after an enquiry as is necessary, enhancing or modifying the assessment or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment. The key words that are used by section 263 are that the order must be considered by the Commissioner to be “erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue”. This provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in several judgments to which it is now necessary to turn. In Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT [2000] 243 ITR 83, the Supreme Court held that the provision “cannot be invoked to correct each and every type of mistake or error committed by the Assessing Officer” and “it is only when an order is erroneous that the section will be attracted”. The Supreme Court held that an incorrect assumption of fact or an incorrect application of law, will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous. An order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice or without application of mind, would be an order falling in that category. The expression “prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue”, the Supreme Court held, it is of wide import and is not confined to a loss of tax. What is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue is explained in the judgment of the Supreme Court (headnote) :
“The phrase ‘prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue’ has to be read in conjunction with an erroneous order passed by the Assessing Officer. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the Assessing Officer, cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, for example, when an Income-tax Officer adopted one of the courses permissible in law and it has
ITA No.210/Mum/2013 24 People Inf ocom Pvt. Ltd.
resulted in loss of revenue, or where two views are possible and the Income-tax Officer has taken one view with which the Commissioner does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue unless the view taken by the Income-tax Officer is unsustainable in law.” The principle which has been laid down in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. [2000] 243 ITR 83 (SC) has been followed and explained in a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Max India Ltd. [2007] 295 ITR 282.” The principles laid down by the courts are that the Learned CIT cannot invoke his powers of revision under section 263 if the Assessing Officer has conducted enquiries and applied his mind to the issues. If the assessment order has been passed by causing enquiries, then it would not give occasion to the Commissioner to pass orders under section 263 of the Act, merely because he has a different opinion in the matter. The consideration of the Commissioner as to whether an order is erroneous in so far it is prejudicial to the interests of Revenue must be based on materials on record of the proceedings called for by him. If there are no materials on record on the basis of which it can be said that the Commissioner acting in a reasonable manner could have come to such a conclusion, the very initiation of proceedings by him will be illegal and without jurisdiction. The Commissioner cannot initiate proceedings with a view to start fishing and roving enquiries in matters or orders which are already concluded.” 3.10. The ratio laid down by the Ahmadabad Bench of the
Tribunal in the case of Aditya medisales vs addl. CIT (ITA
No.1334/Ahd/2015) order dated 16/02/2016 further
supports the case of the assessee, wherein, the revisional
jurisdiction invoked u/s 263 of the Act was quashed. The
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relevant portion from the aforesaid order is reproduced
hereunder for ready reference:-
“ 7. We have noted that as on the time of passing the impugned revision order, the matter regarding disallowance under section 14 A was pending for I . T.A . No. 1334/Ahd/15 Assessment Year : 2010 -1 1 consideration before the CIT(A). The assessee had filed the appeal before the CIT(A) on 22nd March 2013 and even the written submissions were filed on 14th October 2013. Learned CIT(A) was thus in seisin of the question as to whether the disallowance under section 14A was correctly made, and let us not forget that the CIT(A) had all the powers, co terminus with the powers of the Assessing Officer, including the powers of enhancement. As to whether the learned Commissioner could have exercised his revision powers under section 263 at this point of time, we find guidance from Hon'ble Madras High Court's judgment, in the case of CWT Vs Sampathmal Chordia [(2002) 256 ITR 440 (Mad)], which observes, inter alia, as follows: 2. The revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a manner which would result in depriving the appellate authority of the power to examine the correctness of the order under appeal, when an appeal, has, in fact, been filed in respect of those matters and was pending before the appellate authority. The Explanation to s. 25(2) in cl. (c) thereof, after its amendment by the Finance Act of 1989 makes this abundantly clear. That provision sets out that where the order sought to be revised is one passed by the AO and had been made the subject-matter of an appeal, the power of the CWT will extend to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal.
The provisions of Explanation (c) to Section 25(2) to the Wealth Tax Act and Explanation c to 263(1) of the Income Tax Act are exactly the same. For the sake of completeness, however, these two provisions are reproduced below:
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(c) where any order referred to in this sub-section and passed by the Assessing Officer had been the subject matter of any appeal filed on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988, the powers of the Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend and shall be deemed always to have extended to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal. [Explanation c to Section 25(2)] (c) where any order referred to in this sub-section and passed by the Assessing Officer had been the subject matter of any appeal filed on or before or after the 1st day of June, 1988, the powers of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend and shall be deemed always to have extended] to such matters as had not been considered and decided in such appeal. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
In view of the above analysis, as also bearing in mind entirety of the case, we are of the considered view that the learned Commissioner was indeed in error in exercising his revision powers under section 263 on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. As learned CIT(A) was in seisin of the same matter, i.e. disallowance under section 14A, in the appellate proceedings, learned Commissioner could not have invoked his revision powers on the issue before the CIT(A). The view adopted by the learned Assessing Officer was after due examination of the matter and a considered view after taking into account all the relevant factor and even if a different view, on the same set of facts, was possible, the possibility of another view in favour of the assessee did not render the assessment erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue so as to trigger revision under section 263. In any event, even on merits, the stand of the Commissioner was incorrect and unsustainable in law. For all these reasons, we are not inclined to uphold the impugned order. Accordingly, the revision order stands quashed.”
ITA No.210/Mum/2013 27 People Inf ocom Pvt. Ltd.
3.11. To sum up the issue, admittedly, an incorrect
assumption of fact or an incorrect application of law would
satisfy the requirement of order being erroneous u/s. 263
of the Act. The phrase “prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue” u/s. 263 of the Act, has to be read in conjunction
with the expression “erroneous” order by the Assessing
Officer. Every loss of Revenue as a consequence of
assessment order cannot be termed as prejudicial to the
interest of Revenue, meaning thereby, “prejudice” must be
prejudice to the Revenue administration. At the same time,
if another view is possible revision is not permissible. Our
view is fortified by the decision from Himachal Pradesh
Financial Corpn. (186 Taxmann 105)(HP), Bismillah Trading
Co. (248 ITR 292)(Ker.) and CIT vs. Green World Corpn. (314
ITR 81)(SC). For invoking revisional jurisdiction u/s. 263
the assessment order must contain grievous error which is
subversive of the administration of Revenue. Further, exact
error must be disclosed by the Commissioner as was held
in CIT vs. G.K. Kabra (211 ITR 336)(AP). Totality of facts,
clearly indicates that assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act was
ITA No.210/Mum/2013 28 People Inf ocom Pvt. Ltd.
framed by the Assessing Officer after obtaining necessary
details from the assessee and further the same were
examined by him. Therefore, even if, the same has not been
spelt elaborately in the assessment order it cannot be said
that there is a “lack of enquiry” or prejudice has been
caused to the Revenue, as we have discussed various case
laws in earlier part of this order which are identical to the
facts before us. It is also noted that while invoking the
revisional jurisdiction, the ld. Commissioner has not
pointed out exact error in the assessment order specifying
as to how the assessment order is erroneous/prejudicial to
the interest of the Revenue. In view of these facts and the
judicial pronouncements from Hon'ble Apex Court, various
Hon'ble High Courts and various Benches of the Tribunal,
we set aside the order of the ld. Commissioner invoking
revisional jurisdiction u/s 263 of the Act, being not within
the parameters of the law, as the assessment was framed
by the Assessing Officer after considering necessary details
filed by the assessee and on examination of the same. It is
not the case that the assessment was framed in a hasty
ITA No.210/Mum/2013 29 People Inf ocom Pvt. Ltd.
manner or without considering the factual
matrix/necessary details. The jurisdiction u/s 263 of the
Act could not be assumed merely stating that adequate
enquiry was not made by the Assessing Officer. The
decision from Delhi High Court in CIT vs Sunbeam Auto Ltd
(supra) and the decision of the Tribunal in Vegesina Kamala
vs ITO (2016) 66 taxman.com 280 (Vishakhapatnam)
supports the case of the assessee. therefore, considering
the totality of facts and the judicial pronouncement, the
revisional order is quashed. The appeal of the assessee is
allowed.
Finally, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
This order was pronounced in the open in the
presence of ld. representatives from both sides at the
conclusion of the hearing on 19/05/2016.
Sd/- Sd/- (Rajendra) (Joginder Singh) लेखा सद�य / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER �या�यक सद�य / JUDICIAL MEMBER मुंबई Mumbai; �दनांक Dated : 19/05/2016
f{x~{tÜ? P.S/.�न.स.
ITA No.210/Mum/2013 30 People Inf ocom Pvt. Ltd.
आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत/Copy of the Order forwarded to :
अपीलाथ� / The Appellant (Respective assessee) 2. ��यथ� / The Respondent. 3. आयकर आयु�त(अपील) / The CIT, Mumbai. 4. आयकर आयु�त / CIT(A)- , Mumbai, 5. �वभागीय ��त�न�ध, आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, मुंबई / DR, ITAT, Mumbai 6. गाड� फाईल / Guard file. आदेशानुसार/ BY ORDER, स�या�पत ��त //True Copy//
उप/सहायक पंजीकार (Dy./Asstt. Registrar) आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, मुंबई / ITAT, Mumbai