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Facts
The Revenue appealed against the CIT(A)'s order which held that assessment year 2012-13 was not covered under section 153C for proceedings initiated based on a search. The crucial dates involved were the search date (18.10.2019) and the date of handing over seized material (18.09.2022).
Held
The Tribunal held that for proceedings under section 153C against a third party, the relevant date for determining the period is the date of handing over of records to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, not the date of search. Since this date (15.09.2022) did not cover assessment year 2012-13, the proceedings were not sustainable.
Key Issues
Whether the relevant date for computing assessment years under Section 153C is the date of search or the date of handing over of records to the AO. Whether assessment year 2012-13 falls within the prescribed period for Section 153C proceedings based on the relevant date.
Sections Cited
153C, 153A, 143(3)
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH: ‘G’ NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI SATBEER SINGH GODARA & SHRI NAVEEN CHANDRA
Assessment Year: 2012-13 Vs. Shree DCIT, Vardhman Township New Delhi Private Limited, 301-311, Indraprakash Building 21, Barakhamba Road, Connaught Place, New Delhi PAN: AACCV2952P (Appellant) (Respondent) Assessee by Sh. Ved Jain, Adv. Sh. Pawan Garg, CA Ms. Ishika Dua, CA Department by Sh. Mahesh Kumar, CIT(DR) Date of hearing 27.10.2025 Date of pronouncement 27.10.2025 ORDER
PER SATBEER SINGH GODARA, JM
This Revenue’s appeal for assessment year 2012-13, arises against the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [in short, the “CIT(A)”], Delhi’s-23 DIN and order no. ITBA/APL/S/250/2024- 25/1075174491(1), dated 28.03.2025 involving proceedings under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
Heard both the parties. Case file perused.
It emerges at the outset during the course of hearing that the Revenue’s first and foremost grievance raised herein challenges correctness of the CIT(A)’s action holding the Assessing Officer’s assessment in question as not sustainable in the eyes of law. This is for the precise reason that he has held the impugned assessment year 2012-13 as not covered under the prescribed block of ten assessment years under section 153C(1) 1st proviso r.w.s. 153A(1) 1st and 2nd proviso of the Act.
We proceed to decide the instant first and foremost legal issue herein between the parties. There is hardly any dispute that the date of search herein happens to be 18.10.2019 i.e. in previous year 2019-20 relevant to financial year 2020-21. And that the date of handing over of the seized material to the assessee’s Assessing Officer herein is 18.09.2022 i.e. in previous year 2022-23 relevant to assessment year 2023-24 ending on 31st March, 2024. It is in this clinching factual backdrop that the Revenue vehemently contends before us that we ought to go by the date of search itself for computing the “relevant assessment year(s)”; as the 2 | P a g e case may be, which includes assessment year 2012-13 before us as well.
We find no merit in the Revenue’s instant first and foremost legal ground. We again deem it appropriate to reiterate the fact at the cost of repetition that the relevant proceedings herein in case of assessee/respondent are under section 153C of the Act as it happens to be a “third” person than the searched assessee. That being the case, various recent landmark judicial precedents i.e. PCIT Vs. Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd., (2024) 465 ITR 101 (Del) and CIT Vs. Jasjit Singh (2024) 465 ITR 101 (SC) have already settled the issue that in such an instance, the date of search is that of handing over of records to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the third party under section 153C(1) 1st proviso only which comes to be as 15.09.2022 wherein the relevant assessment year 2023-24 ends on 31st March, 2024.
That being the case, the maximum assessment years sought to be covered at the Revenue’s behest do not run upto assessment year 2012-13; and, therefore, we hereby conclude going by their lordships’ discussion that the learned Assessing Officer could not have taken recourse to section 153C proceedings against the 3 | P a g e assessee/respondent in very terms. We thus uphold the learned CIT(A)’s action quashing the impugned assessment itself in these facts and circumstances. All other pleadings between the parties stand rendered academic.