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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH “I-1”, NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI R. K. PANDA & MS. SUCHITRA KAMBLE
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH “I-1”, NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI R. K. PANDA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MS. SUCHITRA KAMBLE, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA No.1637/Del/2014 Assessment Year : 2007-08 Asahi India Glass Limited, DCIT, Circle- 2(1), 38, Okhla Industrial Area, New Delhi. Vs. Phase- III, New Delhi.
PAN : AADCA7706R (Appellant) (Respondent)
ITA No.2183/Del/2014 Assessment Year : 2007-08 DCIT, Circle- 2(1), Asahi India Glass Limited, New Delhi. 12, Basant Lok, Vasant Vihar, Vs. New Delhi.
PAN : AADCA7706R (Appellant) (Respondent)
Assessee by : Shri Sandip Sapra, Adv. Department by : Shri Kumar Parnav, Sr.DR Date of hearing : 06-12-2017 Date of pronouncement : 26-02-2018
O R D E R PER R. K. PANDA, AM : These are cross appeals. The first one is filed by the assessee and the second one filed by the Revenue and are directed against the order dated 27.01.2014 of the CIT(A)- XX, New Delhi relating to assessment year 2007-08.
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For the sake of convenience, these were heard together and are being disposed
of by this common order.
ITA No.1637/Del/2014 (By Assessee) :
Ground of appeal no.1 reads as under :-
“1. That the learned CIT(A) erred on facts and under the law in upholding the action of the assessing officer and restricting the disallowance to Rs.1275500/- u/s 14A under the normal provisions of the IT Act and under the MAT Provisions u/s 115JB. The authorities below erred in involving Rule 8D of the IT Rules even though the same was made operative from 24th March, 2008 and was not applicable for A.Y. 2007-08. No nexus between the interest paid on borrowed funds and tax free income was established by the authorities below. At any rate without prejudice the additions as made are excessive.
Facts of the case, in brief, are that the assessee company is manufacturing
toughened glass, laminated glass and float glass. The assessee has a financial
and technical collaboration with Asahi Glass Company Limited Japan (AGC).
Asahi India Glass Limited is India’s largest manufacturer of world-glass
automotive safety glass. It performs all the functions, starting from purchase of
raw materials, processing it into final product till the stage of carrying out the
marketing functions and after sales service. It filed its return of income on
30.10.2007 declaring loss of Rs.65,37,51,392/- under the normal provisions and
book profit of Rs.42,25,48,996/- u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act. During the course of
assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer observed that the assessee
company has shown dividend income of Rs.8,27,937/- and long term capital
3 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
gain at Rs.60,12,597/- which have been claimed exempt u/s 10(34) and 10(38)
respectively. He, therefore, asked the assessee to explain as to why the
disallowance u/s 14A should not be made for the expenditure incurred in
relation to incomes which do not form part of total income and also to explain
as to why the same should also not be added to the book profit within the
meaning of Clause (f) of Explanation (1) to section 115JB of the I.T. Act. It
was explained by the assessee that the dividends are automatically received and
no expenditure for earning the same has been incurred. However, the Assessing
Officer was not satisfied with the explanation given by the assessee. Relying on
various decisions, he computed the disallowance u/s 14A at Rs.14,72,158/- and
made addition of the same to the total income of the assessee.
Before the ld. CIT(A), the assessee reiterated the same arguments as
made before the Assessing Officer. Various decisions were also brought to his
notice to the proposition that no disallowance is called for.
However, the ld. CIT(A) was not fully satisfied with the explanation
given by the assessee. Observing that the top management of the assessee
company is involved in making decisions for investments in shares and
securities, he held that the estimation of 0.5% of the average value of
investment should be considered as administrative cost for earning exempt
income during the year. He accordingly estimated such disallowance at
4 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
Rs.3,07,500/-. However, proportionate disallowance of interest was computed
by him of Rs.9.68 lakhs. He accordingly directed the Assessing Officer to
restrict the disallowance u/s 14A at Rs.12,75,500/- as against Rs.14,72,158/-
made by the Assessing Officer. He directed the Assessing Officer to add the
amount of Rs.12,75,500/- instead of Rs.14,72,158/- as expenditure in relation to
exempt income.
Aggrieved with such order of ld. CIT(A), the assessee is in appeal before
the Tribunal.
Ld. counsel for the assessee strongly objected to the order of the ld.
CIT(A). He submitted that the provisions of Rule 8D are not applicable to the
assessee company since the assessment year involved is assessment year
2007-08. Relying on various decisions, he submitted that the said Rules are
prospective in nature and are applicable from assessment year 2008-09 onwards.
Further, no expenditure has been incurred either for earning the dividend
income or the long term capital gain. Referring to various decisions, he
submitted that no disallowance u/s 14A is called for when the Assessing Officer
has not pointed out any expenditure which according to him has been incurred
by the assessee. He, however, fairly conceded that under identical facts and
circumstances, the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for assessment year 2006-07
5 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
vide ITA No.4242/Del/2010 order dated 06.04.2016 has restored the issue to the
file of the Assessing Officer.
Ld. DR on the other hand submitted that since the Tribunal in preceding
assessment year has restored the issue to the file of the Assessing Officer,
therefore, for this year also, this issue should be restored to the file of the
Assessing Officer for adjudication afresh in the light of the decision of the
Tribunal in assessee’s own case in the preceding year.
We have considered the rival arguments made by both the sides, perused
the orders of the Assessing Officer and the ld. CIT(A) and the Paper Book filed
on behalf of the assessee. We have also considered the various decisions cited
before us. We find the Assessing Officer made disallowance of Rs.14,72,158/-
u/s 14A and also added the same to the book profit u/s 115JB. We find the ld.
CIT(A) restricted such disallowance to Rs.12,75,500/- and also directed the
Assessing Officer to add the amount of Rs.12,75,500/- to the book profit instead
of Rs.14,72,158/- as expenditure incurred in relation to the exempt income. We
find under identical circumstances, the Tribunal in assessee’s own case for
assessment year 2006-07 vide order dated 06.04.2016 has restored the issue to
the file of the Assessing Officer by observing as under :-
“12.3. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the relevant material on record. The assessment year under consideration is 2006-07. The Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in Maxopp Investments Ltd. Vs. CIT (2012) 347 ITR 272
6 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
(Del), has held that the provisions of Rule 8D are applicable only from the assessment year 2008-09. It has further been held that in the period anterior to that, the disallowance is required to be made on some reasonable basis. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court on the point, we cannot approve the view taken by the AO in computing the disallowance u/s 14A as per the mandate of Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside on this issue and the matter is restored to the file of the AO for making disallowance u/s 14A on some reasonable basis as has been held by the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the afore noted case.”
Respectfully following the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own
case in assessment year 2006-07, we deem it proper to restore the issue to the
file of the Assessing Officer for adjudication of the issue afresh in the light of
the decision of the Tribunal and in accordance with law after giving due
opportunity of being heard to the assessee. We hold and direct accordingly.
The ground no.1 by the assessee is accordingly allowed for statistical purposes.
Original ground no.2 by the assessee reads as under :-
That the learned CIT(A) erred on facts and under the law in not allowing interest charged u/s 234B in respect of disallowances on account of ‘Provision for bad and doubtful debts’ and ‘Deferred tax liability’ made under MAT provision of the IT Act which were inserted with retrospective effect after filing the income tax return.”
Subsequently, at the time of hearing, the assessee filed the amended
ground of appeal no.2 which reads as under :-
“That the learned CIT(A) erred on facts and under the law in not deleting interest charged u/s 234B and 234C of I.T. Act in respect of disallowance on account of ‘provision for bad and doubtful debts’ and ‘deferred tax liability’ made under MAT provision of the I.T. Act which were inserted with retrospective effect after filing the income tax return.”
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Facts of the case, in brief, are that the Assessing Officer in the assessment
order has not discussed the issue relating to charging of interest u/s 234B and
234C of the I.T. Act. However, before the ld. CIT(A), the assessee took the
ground challenging the charging of interest u/s 234B in respect of disallowance
on account of ‘provision for bad and doubtful debts’ and disallowance on
account of ‘deferred tax liability’ on the ground that such disallowances made
under the provisions of the I.T. Act have been inserted after the filing of the
income-tax return for the year under consideration from retrospective effect.
The ld. CIT(A), however, did not adjudicate the issue raised by the assessee.
Ld counsel for the assessee referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Orissa
High Court in the case of Siksha “O” Anusandhan vs. CIT reported in 336 ITR
112 submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in the said decision has held that
once the materials are available on record, the Appellate Court should have
disposed of the same on the merits by taking these materials into consideration
and there is no need to direct remand.
Referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case
of Mohd. Ayyub and Sons Agency’s case reported in 197 ITR 637, he submitted
that when the new issue is raised before the Tribunal and no further
investigation is required into the facts of the case, the Tribunal is under a
statutory obligation not only to entertain the plea but is also to decide the same
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after providing sufficient opportunity of being heard to either sides. Relying on
various other decisions, he submitted that since this ground was specifically
argued before the ld. CIT(A), the relevant details of which are placed at page 26
to 41 of the Paper Book and since the same has not been adjudicated by the ld.
CIT(A), therefore, this ground needs to be adjudicated here itself instead of
restoring it to the file of the ld. CIT(A).
So far as merit of the case is concerned, he submitted that the assessee
filed its return of income on 30.10.2007 and paid tax u/s 115JB as per
computation of income, the details of the same are placed at pages 45 - 46 of the
Paper Book. He submitted that as per such computation of income, the assessee
did not offer deferred tax liability amounting to Rs.19,96,77,375/- and provision
for bad and doubtful debts amounting to Rs.75,00,000/- under the MAT
provision i.e. u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act. He submitted that the explanation (1)(h)
to section 115JB was inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect
from 01.04.2001 whereby deferred tax liability was to be added to the book
profit under the MAT provision. Referring to 300 ITR (Statutes) page 17, he
submitted that the Finance Act, 2008 received the assent of the President on
10.05.2008. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer vide order dated 28.01.2011
added Rs.19,96,77,375/- on account of deferred tax liability to the taxable book
profit u/s 115JB and levied interest u/s 234B and 234C thereon.
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Similarly, Explanation 1(i) to section 115JB was inserted by the Finance
(No.2) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2001 whereby provision
for bad and doubtful debts was to be added to the book profit under the MAT
provision. Accordingly, the Assessing Officer vide assessment order dated
28.01.2011 added Rs.75,00,000/- on account of bad and doubtful debts to the
taxable book profit u/s 115JB and levied interest u/s 234B and 234C thereon.
He submitted that since the aforesaid Explanations were introduced or brought
in with retrospective effect by the Finance Act, 2008 and 2009 respectively,
therefore, the assessee could not be termed as defaulter in payment of advance
tax and hence was not liable to pay interest in terms of section 234B and 234C
of the I.T. Act.
Referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case
of CIT vs. JSW Energy Ltd., he submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in the
said decision has held that where the assessee computed book profit of
assessment year 2006-07 as per prevailing law, no interest under section 234B
could be levied consequent to inclusion of various items while computing book
profit as per Explanation to section 115JB which has been brought on statute by
Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2001.
Referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case
of CIT vs. Emami Ltd. reported in 337 ITR 470, he submitted that the Hon'ble
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High Court in the said decision has held that where the assessee had no liability
to pay any advance tax u/s 208 on any of due dates for payment of advance tax
installments and it became liable to pay tax by virtue of a retrospective
amendment made long after close of financial year, assessee could not be
branded as a defaulter in payment of advance tax and no interest could be
imposed upon it u/s 234B and 234C of the I.T. Act. He accordingly submitted
that the grounds raised by the assessee should be allowed and levy of interest
u/s 234B and 234C in respect of disallowance on account of provision for bad
and doubtful debts and deferred tax liability made under MAT provision should
be deleted.
The ld. DR on the other hand strongly objected to the arguments
advanced by the ld. counsel for the assessee. Referring to the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JCIT vs. M/s Rolta India Ltd. vide Civil
Appeal No.135 of 2011 order dated 07.01.2011, he submitted that the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the said decision has held that interest u/s 234B and 234C
shall be payable on failure to pay advance tax in respect of tax payable u/s
115JA and 115JB. He submitted that the provisions of section 115J, 115JA and
115JB are special provision. For purpose of advance tax the evaluation of
current income and determination of the tax thereon had to be made in terms of
the statutory scheme comprising section 115J and 115JA. Hence, levy of
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interest was inescapable. The assessee was bound to pay advance tax under the
scheme of the Act. Referring to the provisions of section 234B, he submitted
that it is clear that it applies to all companies and there is no exclusion of section
115J and 115JA in levying of interest u/s 234B. He accordingly submitted that
the grounds raised by the assessee should be dismissed.
We have heard the rival contentions made by both the sides, perused the
materials available on record and the Paper Book filed on behalf of the assessee.
We have also considered the various decisions cited before us. We find the
Assessing Officer in the body of assessment order has merely mentioned that as
the tax liability worked out u/s 115JB on the book profit of Rs.16,35,315/- is
higher than the tax payable as per normal provisions of the Act, the total tax
payable is determined u/s 115JB of the I.T. Act and the interest is charged u/s
234B, 234C and 234D. We find the assessee before the ld. CIT(A) has raised
the ground challenging the levy of interest u/s 234B in respect of disallowance
on account of provision for bad and doubtful debts and disallowance on account
of deferred tax liability under MAT provisions which has been reproduced by
the ld. CIT(A) at page 2 of the order which reads as under :-
“6. That the Ld. AO erred in charging interest under section 234B of the Act. 6.1 That the Ld. AO erred in charging interest under section 234B of the Act in respect of the following disallowances made under the MAT provisions of the Act which have been inserted after filing the tax return for the year under consideration from retrospective effect.
12 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
� Disallowance on account of “provision for bad and doubtful debts”; and � Disallowance on account of “deferred tax liability”.”
We find although a specific ground was raised by the assessee before the
ld. CIT(A), however, he has not adjudicated the same. Now, the assessee before
the Tribunal has raised a ground challenging the levy of interest u/s 234B in
respect of disallowance on account of the various additions made under MAT
provisions which has been amended to include also the levy of interest u/s
234C. Since this amended ground is purely a legal ground, therefore, following
the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of NTPC Ltd. vs. CIT
reported in 229 ITR 383, the request of the assessee to amend ground no.2 taken
originally is accepted and the amended ground is admitted for adjudication.
It is an admitted position that the facts are available on record and no
fresh investigation is required to ascertain the facts of the case. The Hon’ble
Orissa High Court in the case of Siksha “O” Anusandhan (supra) has
disapproved the remand of the matter to the file of the ld. CIT(A) for fresh
hearing when full facts were available. The relevant observations of the High
Court reads as under :-
“21. Admittedly, the Tribunal after being satisfied that the additional ground taken by the appellant before it to be a question of law and goes to the root of the matter vide order dated 05.05.2009 (Annexure-8) directed the learned D.R. to produce the records of search to examine as to whether search warrant was issued in the name of the assessee or not and adjourned the case to 06.05.2009. At this stage, there is no reason as to why the Tribunal being the final fact finding authority could not have
13 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
recorded its finding on aforesaid vital jurisdictional issue when consciously the Tribunal called for the record of search. This action of the learned Tribunal, in our view, seems to be unjust. 22. The specific stand of the appellant is that pursuant to order dated 05.05.2009 (Annexure-8) passed by the learned I.T.A.T. directing learned D.R. to produce the records of the search to examine whether search warrant was issued in the name of the assessee, the Revenue produced the search records and the I.T.A.T. after examining the relevant records was satisfied that no such search warrant was issued against the appellant-Society under Section 132(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961. In spite of the same, the I.T.A.T. vide its order dated 27.07.2009 remitted the matter to the C.I.T.(A) for fresh hearing which is not permissible under the law. 23. Law is well settled that once the materials are available on record, the appellate Court should have disposed of the case on merit taking those materials into consideration and there is no need to direct remand. 24. The apex Court in Indian Bank Vs. K.S.Govindan Nair & Ors., (2004) 13 SCC 697, held that once the materials are available on record, it was for the High Court to have decided the matter on the basis of that materials after appreciation of evidence, and there was no need for directing remand. 25. The apex Court in Gowrammanni & Ors. Vs. V.V.Patil (D) by L.Rs. & Ors., (2009) (II) OLR SC 465, held that the appellate court should have itself disposed of the case on merits taking into consideration the evidence adduced before the trial Court as on the question of identity of disputed land the parties have adduced evidence, the Court Commissioner was appointed and submitted a report, and he was examined as a witness and duly cross-examined and thereupon the suit was disposed of by the trial Court. 26. The Allahabad High Court in Mohd. Ayyub and Sons Agency's case (supra), held that the power of the Tribunal to permit any party to the appeal to raise the question of jurisdiction, which goes to the root of the matter and does not involve further investigation into facts, cannot be disputed on the plain reading of rule 11 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. Indeed, on such a plea being taken, the Tribunal is under a statutory obligation not only to entertain the plea but also to decide the same after providing sufficient opportunity of being heard to the other side. 27. The Allahabad High Court in A.D.Sons Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax (1989) 29 STL 37 Allahabad, held that on the facts of the case and in view of the finding recorded in the said impugned order, the Tribunal was in error in remanding the case to the assessing authority for giving second innings to the Department, and it was not open to the Tribunal under the law to do so. 28. However, we find that neither the order of the learned Tribunal nor Annexure- 8 reveals whether the Revenue had produced the relevant search records pursuant to direction of the Tribunal vide order dated 05.05.2009. If the records were produced as contended by the appellant, the learned I.T.A.T. should have recorded its findings vis-à-vis the stand taken by the appellant. If the relevant records were not produced by the Revenue pursuant to order of the Tribunal dated 05.05.2009, the Tribunal should have insisted upon production of the search records in view of the specific stand of the appellant that there was no search warrant in the name of the appellant-
14 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
assessee, which was the foundation of jurisdictional issue. After verifying the relevant search records, learned Tribunal should have taken a decision on the additional ground and should not have remitted the matter to the C.I.T.(A) for adjudication on the additional ground that goes to the root of the case.”
In view of the decision cited (supra) the amended ground raised by the
assessee is not only admitted but we proceed to adjudicate the same on merit as
well since the relevant facts are available on record and no further investigation
of the facts are required.
Now coming to the merits of the case, it is the submission of the ld.
counsel for the assessee that since Explanation (1)(h) to section 115JB was
inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2001
whereby differed tax liability was to be added to the book profit under the MAT
provisions and since the Finance Act, 2008 received the assent of the President
on 10.05.2008, therefore, levy of interest u/s 234B and 234C on account of
addition of the same to the book profit u/s 115JB is improper.
Similarly, it is also his submission that Explanation (1)(i) to section
115JB was inserted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect
from 01.04.2001 whereby provision for bad and doubtful debts was to be added
to the book profit of the assessee under the MAT provision and, therefore, the
Assessing Officer, who made addition of Rs.75,00,000/- on account of bad and
15 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
doubtful debts to the taxable book profit could not have levied interest u/s 234B
and 234C thereon.
We find the provisions of section 208 as it stood at the relevant time read
as under :-
“Conditions of liability to pay advance tax. 208. Advance tax shall be payable during a financial year in every case where the amount of such tax payable by the assessee during that year, as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, is ten thousand rupees or more.
Now, the question that arises is as to whether there is any statutory
obligation on the part of the assessee to pay advance tax during the said
previous year when the Explanation 1(h) to provisions of section 115JB was
inserted by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2001
whereby the deferred tax liability was added to the book profit under the MAT
provision and when the Finance Act, 2008 received assent of the President on
10.05.2008 and the assessee is liable for interest u/s 234B and 234C on account
of such addition to the book profit. Similar is the question in respect of the
addition of provision for bad and doubtful debts to the book profit under the
MAT provision as per Explanation (1)(i) to section 115JB which was inserted
by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2001. We
find the issue has been settled by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court (supra) and
the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court (supra).
16 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
We find the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Emami Ltd.
(supra) while deciding an identical issue has observed as under :-
“9. However, in order to attract the provisions contained in Sections 234B and 234C of the Act, it must be established that the assessee had the liability to pay advance tax as provided in Sections 207 and 208 of the Act within the time prescribed under Section 211 of the Act. Those provisions are quoted below: “207. Liability for payment of advance tax.—Tax shall be payable in advance during any financial year, in accordance with the provisions of Sections 208 to 219 (both inclusive), in respect of the total income of the assessee which would be chargeable to tax for the assessment year immediately following that financial year, such income being hereafter in this Chapter referred to as “current income”. “208. Conditions of liability to pay advance tax.—Advance tax shall be payable during a financial year in every case where the amount of such tax payable by the assessee during that year, as computed in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, is [five thousand rupees] or more. “211. Instalments of advance tax and due dates.—1[(1) Advance tax on the current income calculated in the manner laid down in Section 209 shall be payable by— (a) all the companies, who are liable to pay the same, in four instalments during each financial year and the due date of each instalment and the amount of such instalment shall be as specified in Table I below: TABLE I Due date of installment Amount payable On or before the 15th June – Not less than fifteen per cent of such advance tax. On or before the 15th September – Not less than forty-five per cent of such advance tax, as reduced by the amount, if any, paid in the earlier instalment. On or before the 15th December – Not less than seventy-five per cent of such advance tax, as reduced by the amount or amounts, if any, paid in the earlier instalment or instalments. On or before the 15th March – The whole amount of such advance tax as reduced by the amount or amounts, if any, paid in the earlier instalment or instalments. (b) all the assessees (other than companies), who are liable to pay the same, in three instalments during each financial year and the due date of each instalment and the amount of such instalment shall be as specified in Table II below: TABLE II Due date of instalment Amount payable On or before the 15th September Not less than thirty per cent of such advance tax.
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On or before the 15th December Not less than sixty per cent of such advance tax, as reduced by the amount, if any, paid in the earlier instalment. On or before the 15th March The whole amount of such advance tax as reduced by the amount or amounts, if any, paid in the earlier instalment or instalments: Provided that any amount paid by way of advance tax on or before the 31st day of March shall also be treated as advance tax paid during the financial year ending on that day for all the purposes of this Act.] (2) If the notice of demand issued under Section 156 in pursuance of an order of the Assessing Officer under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of Section 210 is served after any of the due dates specified in subsection (1), the appropriate part or, as the case may be, the whole of the amount of the advance tax specified in such notice shall be payable on or before each of such of those dates as fall after the date of service of the notice of demand.”(Emphasis supplied by us). A mere reading of those provisions leaves no doubt that the advance tax is an amount payable in advance during any Financial Year in accordance with the provisions of the Act in respect of the total income of the assessee which would be chargeable to tax for the Assessment Year immediately following that Financial Year. Thus, in order to hold an assessee liable for payment of advance tax, the liability to pay such tax must exist on the last date of payment of advance tax as provided under the Act or at least on the last date of the Financial Year preceding the Assessment Year in question. If such liability arises subsequently when the last date of payment of advance tax or even the last date of the Financial Year preceding the assessment year is over, it is inappropriate suggest that still the assessee had the liability to pay “advance tax” within the meaning of the Act. 10. In the case before us, the last date of the relevant Financial Year was March 31, 2001 and on that day, admittedly, the appellant had no liability to pay any amount of advance tax in accordance with the then law prevailing in the country. Consequently, the appellant paid no advance tax and submitted its regular return on October 31, 2001 within the time fixed by law wherein it declared its total income and the book profit both as nil. However, consequent to the amendment of the provisions contained in Section 11 5JB of the Act by virtue of Finance Act, 2002 which was published in the official gazette on May 11, 2002 giving retrospective effect to the amendment from April 1, 2001, the appellant first voluntarily paid a sum of Rs. 1,55,62,511/- on account of the tax payable on book profit as provided in amended provision of Section 115 JB and then filed its revised return of March 31, 2003 declaring its business income as nil but the book profit under Section 1 15JB as Rs.20,63,65,71 1/-. The Assessing Officer accepted such return of income but imposed interest under Section 234B and 234C of the Act amounting to Rs.44,00,937/- and Rs. 11,78,960/- respectively. 11. In our opinion, the amended provision of Section 11 5JB having come into force with effect from April 1, 2001, the appellant cannot be held defaulter of payment of advance tax. As pointed out earlier, on the last date of the Financial Year
18 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
preceding the relevant Assessment Year, as the book profit of the appellant in accordance with the then provision of law was nil, we cannot conceive of any “advance tax” which in essence is payable within the last day of the financial year preceding the relevant Assessment Year as provided in Sections 207 and 208 or within the dates indicated in Section 211 of the Act which inevitably falls within the last date of Financial Year preceding the relevant Assessment Year. Consequently, the assessee cannot be branded as a defaulter in payment of advance tax as mentioned above. 12. At this stage, we may profitably rely upon the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Star India P. Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, reported in (2006) 280 ITR 321, strongly relied upon by Mr. Bajoria, where the Apex Court in the context of imposition of Service Tax by the Finance Act, 2002 with retrospective effect held that that the liability to pay interest would arise only on default and is really in the nature of quasi-punishment and thus, although the liability to pay tax arose due to retrospective effect of law, same should not entail the punishment of payment of interest. 13. Although Mr. Nizamuddin, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, in this connection, strongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Joint Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Rolta India Ltd., reported in (2011) 330 ITR 470, we find that in that case the question was whether interest under Section 234B of the Act could be charged on the tax calculated on the book profit under Section 115JA and in other words, whether advance tax was at all payable on book profits under Section 115JA of the Act. The Supreme Court answered the said question in the affirmative and further held that the provisions of interest on default as provided in Sections 234B and 234C would also apply. We have already pointed out that Mr. Bajoria, at the very outset, conceded that the said decision should be applied for answering the first question formulated in this appeal against his client. In our opinion, the said decision is not relevant for considering the second and the third questions as to whether an assessee can be said to be a defaulter in payment of advance tax if he had no liability to make payment of such tax on the last date of a Financial Year preceding the relevant Assessment Year as such question did not arise in the said case before the Supreme Court. 14. It appears that the learned Tribunal has not at all considered the aforesaid aspect as to the liability of the assessee to make payment of the advance tax on the last day of the Financial Year i.e. March 31, 2001 when its book profit was nil according to the then law of the land. The various decisions of the other High Courts and the Tribunals relied upon by the Tribunal did not effectively consider the question whether even in a case like the present one where on the last date of the Financial Year preceding the relevant Assessment Year, the assessee had no liability to pay advance tax, he would be nevertheless asked to pay interest in terms of Section 234B and Section 234C of the Act for default in making payment of tax in advance which was physically impossible.”
19 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
We find the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of JSW Energy Ltd.
(supra) following the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the case of
Emami Ltd. (supra) and various other decisions has upheld the decision of the
Tribunal in deleting the levy of interest u/s 234B on account of the addition
made by the Assessing Officer while making MAT calculation u/s 115JB on the
basis of amendments made to such provisions with retrospective effect from
01.04.2001. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble High Court read as
under :-
“11. Then, Mr. Tejveer Singh vehemently contended that in relation to question no. 2, the findings require detailed probe by this Court. He submits that the Tribunal was not right in law when it held that no interest under section 234B of the I.T. Act can be levied. Though several items have to be calculated while computing book profit and in terms of explanation to section 115JB of the I.T. Act, that explanation has been brought on the statute book and with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2001, therefore, this calculation of the tribunal is erroneous in law. 12. However, Mr. Kaka, learned senior counsel invited our attention to section 234B of the I.T. Act to submit that this is provision to recover interest for default in payment of advance tax. It directs payment of simple interest and in terms of this provision provided any assessee who is liable to pay advance tax under section 208 has failed to pay such tax or where the advance tax paid is less than 90% of the assessed tax. Thus, this is a provision whereunder interest could be recovered wherein advance tax for the assessment year fails to take note of the amendment to the Income Tax Act which is brought in subsequently. When the Parliament stepped into to amend the Act though with retrospective effect but in 2008, then, there is no default in payment of advance tax for the assessment year 2006-07. The computation of income based on which the advance tax was paid was in tune with the law prevailing on the date on which tax was due and payable. Any further addition in the income by way of amended provisions and which were incorporated subsequently, therefore, does not attract payment of interest as there is no default. 13. Mr. Kaka also invited our attention to section 115JB and particularly, insertion of clause (h) in Explanation (1). That clause reads as under : "(h) The amount of deferred tax and the provision therefor." 14. This clause has been substituted by Finance Act, 2008 with restrospective effect from 1st April, 2001. Prior to the same it read as under :
20 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
'4. Substituted for the portion beginning with the words "if any amount referred" and ending with the words "as reduced by " by the Finance Act, 2008, w.r.e.f. 1.4.2001." Prior to its substitution, read as under : "If any amount referred to in clauses (a) to (g), is debited to the Profit and Loss account, and as reduced by....' 15. The Tribunal in this regard noted rival contentions and the admitted facts. It also relied upon and followed the judgment of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in Emami Ltd. v. CIT[2011] 337 ITR 470/200 Taxman 326/12 taxmann.com 64. 16. In paragraph 13 of the Tribunal's impugned order the relevant portion from Calcutta High Court's judgment has been extracted. The Calcutta High Court, therefore, found that the provisions would indicate that they are mandatory. There is no scope for waiving of the provision. However, in order to attract the provisions contained in section 234B and 234C of the Act, it must be established that the assessee had the liability to pay advance tax as provided under sections 207 and 208 of the I.T. Act within the time prescribed under section 211 of that Act. Noting the rival contentions, the Calcutta High Court proceeded to hold that the last date of relevant financial year was 31st March, 2001 and on that date, admittedly, the appellant before it had no liability to pay any amount of advance tax in accordance with the then law prevailing in the country. Consequently, the appellant paid no advance tax and submitted its regular returns on 31st October 2001, within the time fixed by law wherein it declared its total income and the book profit both as Nil. The amendment to section 115JB by virtue of Finance Act, 2002 and which was referred to in the Calcutta High Court judgment has retrospective effect from 1st April, 2001. 17. In the present case, what the assessee has pointed out is that some of the amounts included in the book profits as per Explanation (h) to section 115JB were brought in by the Finance Act, 2008 with retrospective effect from 1st April, 2001. The assessee cannot be held to be liable for failing to make a provision for payment of advance tax which was not possible on the last date as per the law then prevailing. Thus, clause (h) which is reproduced above having been brought in with retrospective effect but by Finance Act 2008, the advance tax computation by the assessee for the year 2006-07 cannot be faulted and it cannot be said that the assessee is in default and therefore, there is any liability to pay interest in terms of section 234B of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 18. In the case of Star India (P.) Ltd. v. CCE[2006] 280 ITR 321/150 Taxman 128 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the service of "broadcasting" was made a taxable service with effect from July 16, 2001, by the Finance Act, 2001. The appellant disputed its liability to make any payment for service tax on the ground that it did not broadcast. The Commissioner, however, held against the appellant. The matter was carried before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and during pendency of appeal the Finance Act, 2001 was amended by the Finance Act, 2002. The effect of amendment, inter alia, was to make an agent, such as the appellant, before the Supreme Court, liable to pay service tax as broadcaster. 19. The Supreme Court noted that the Appellants' appeal pending before the Commissioner was rejected by him on the basis of this amendment. The tribunal also
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maintained this order and that part of the order passed by the Commissioner was not challenged in appeal. However, the appellant was aggrieved by the fact that the tribunal held it liable to pay interest on the amount which it was required to pay by reason of the 2002 amendment. The assessee contended that once the amendment was brought in, pending the appeal, there was no question of applying section 234B or any analogus provision and payment of interest. It is in that regard that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : "7. In any event, it is clear from the language of the validation clause, as quoted by us earlier, that the liability was extended not by way of clarification but by way of amendment to the Finance Act with retrospective effect. It is well established that while it is permissible for the Legislature to retrospectively legislate, such, retrospectivity is normally not permissible to create an offence retrospectively. There were clearly judgments, decrees or orders of courts and Tribunals or other authorities, which required to be neutralised by the validation clause. We can only assume that the judgments, decree or orders, etc., had, in fact, held that persons situate like the appellants were not liable as service providers. This is also clear from the Explanation to the valuation section which says that no act or acts on the part of any person shall be punishable as an offence which would not have been so punishable if the section had not come into force. 8. The liability to pay interest would only arise on default and is really in the nature of a quasi-punishment. Such liability although created retrospectively could not entail the punishment of payment of interest with retrospective effect." 20. The Supreme Court held that the liability to pay interest would only arise on default and is really in the nature of a quasi punishment. The liability to tax although credited retrospectively could not entail the punishment of payment of interest with retrospective effect. It is this principle which has been laid down which is followed by the Calcutta High Court. It is that principle relied upon by the Calcutta High Court which has been applied by the Tribunal to the facts and circumstances of the present case. We do not think that the assessee before us can be called upon to pay interest in terms of section 234B, once the explanation was introduced or brought in with retrospective effect but by Finance Act, 2008. Then, there was no liability to pay interest in terms of this provision. That was because the assessee cannot be termed as defaulter in payment of advance tax. The advance tax computation on the basis of the unamended (sic) provision therefore could not have been entertained. 21. We do not see any broader or wider question arising for our determination as the view taken even on this question is neither perverse or neither vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record.”
In view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court and the
Hon’ble Bombay High Court cited (supra), we are of the considered opinion
22 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
that no interest u/s 234B and 243C could have been levied consequent to
inclusion of the above two items while computing book profit as per
Explanation (1) to section 115JB which were brought on the statute book with
retrospective effect from 01.04.2001 by the Finance Act, 2008 and 2009
respectively and that after filing of the return of income. The assessee cannot be
held as a defaulter of payment of advance tax on account of a subsequent
amendment which came into force retrospectively after filing of the return.
So far as the decision relied on by the ld. DR in the case of Rolta India
Ltd. (supra) is concerned, the same relates to the levy of interest u/s 234B on the
tax calculated on book profit u/s 115JA. There is no dispute to the fact that the
assessee is liable to interest u/s 234B on the tax calculated on book profit u/s
115J/115JA. The question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was as to whether
the assessee which is a MAT company was not in a position to estimate its profit for the current year prior to the end of the financial year on 31st March.
However, in the instant case the amendments which got the assent of the
President were brought into the statue book after the end of the financial year.
Therefore, the assessee was not in a position to estimate its liability under the
MAT provisions. Therefore, the decision relied on by the ld. DR is not
applicable to the present case. In view of the above discussion, the amended
ground raised by the assessee is allowed.
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ITA No.2183/Del/2014 (By Revenue) :
The ground no.1 by the Revenue reads as under :-
“1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) is not justified in deleting the addition of Rs.4,09,00,000/- made on account of adjustment following TPO’s order on ALP and holding that the action of the TPO in determining the ALP of Royalty paid for the Taloja Plant of the assessee at NIL was incorrect and unsustainable.”
Facts of the case, in brief, are that the assessee during the year under
consideration has entered into the following international transactions with its
AE in both its automotive and float glass divisions :-
International Transactions Automotive Float Method Purchase of raw material 24.65 TNMM Import of stores & machinery spares 5.77 0.2 TNMM Import of clear float and reflective glass 6.38 TNMM Purchase of capital goods 8.57 124.82 TNMM Import of Tin bath blocks & machinery - 1.08 TNMM spares Fee for Technical consultancy services 0.44 16.50 TNMM Royalty for use of technical know-how 3.30 1.83 CUP TOTAL 58.97 44.87 10.3.84
The Assessing Officer referred the matter to the TPO for determination of
the arm’s length price of the international transactions entered into by the
assessee. The TPO observed that the assessee has adopted the TNMM on an
entity level basis to determine the arm’s length price of all its international
transactions except for the payment of royalty for use of technical know-how.
He observed that the assessee has applied CUP method to benchmark the
24 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
payment of Royalty to its AEs. While doing so, the assessee has relied on the
rates charged in case of Sona Koyo Steering Systems Limited as an effective
CUP for royalty payments made to its AEs. The TPO disregarded the analysis
carried out by the assessee and analyzed the margins of the automotive glass
division and float glass division separately. Based on the segmentation, the
TPO concluded the Automotive Glass division to be at arm’s length.
So far as the Float Glass division is concerned, the TPO accepted the
various corroborative analysis of the assessee to demonstrate the arm’s length
price of all the international transactions except for the payment of royalty.
With regards to the payment of royalty, the TPO selected following
comparables to determine the benefits received by the assessee under the royalty
agreement :-
Company Name March 2007 Product Profile OP/Sales Gujarat Guardian Ltd. 28.63% Manufactures Float and mirror glass. Saint-Gobain Glass India Ltd. 8.33% Manufactures Float glass. Sejal Architectural Glass Ltd. 11.01% Manufactures toughened, laminated and other glass. AVERAGE 15.99%
While doing so, the TPO disregarded the following companies as
potential comparables to the assessee’s float glass division:-
Company Name March 2007 Product Profile OP/Sales
25 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. 1.35% Manufacture Figured and Wired glass. Hindusthan National Glass & 10.92% Manufactures glass containers. Inds. Ltd. Triveni Glass Ltd. -5.50% Manufactures float, sheet, figured and wired glass.
Thereafter, the TPO compared the operating margins of the Float Glass
division of the assessee with the mean of the operating margins of these
comparables. Upon comparison, the TPO concluded that the higher mean
operating margin of these comparables vis-à-vis that of the assessee indicated
that the assessee has not derived commensurate benefit from the payments made
by it on account of royalty. On the basis of the above, the TPO determined the
arm’s length price for the payment of royalty as NIL under CUP and,
accordingly, proceeded with an upward adjustment of Rs.4.09 crores to the
income of the assessee on account of the international transactions in the Float
Glass division. The Assessing Officer, thereafter, in the assessment order made
addition of Rs.4.09 crores to the total income of the assessee.
Before the ld. CIT(A), the assessee submitted that it has paid on amount
of Rs.3.62 crores as royalty for technical know-how in the Automotive Glass
division and Rs.4.09 crores in the Float Glass division. Thus, the total royalty
of Rs.7.71 crores paid by the assessee to its AEs amounted to 0.98% of its net
sales. It was submitted that the royalty paid by Sona Steering Systems Limited
26 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
was considered as an appropriate CUP for benchmarking the royalty payments
of the assessee since in either case, the technology was ultimately used to cater
to OEMs. Accordingly, the Sona Steering agreement was submitted before the
TPO during the course of assessment proceedings. It was submitted that as per
agreement, Sona Steering paid royalty to its foreign collaborator at 3% of the
turnover. Since the total payment of royalty made by the assessee amounted to
only 1.91% of its turnover, which is lower than the royalty paid by Sona
Steering, it substantiates the arm’s length nature of its royalty transaction. It
was submitted that the TPO rejected the CUP data on the ground that Sona
Steering has significant RPT. Referring to the decision of the Mumbai Bench of
the Tribunal in the case of Bayer Material Science P. Ltd. (ITA
No.7977/Mum/2010), it was argued that the Tribunal in the said decision has
held that in absence of any uncontrolled transactions, it was perfectly in order to
consider a genuine controlled transaction. It was further submitted that AGC
Japan has only 22.21% shareholding in the assessee company. So far as other
shareholders are concerned, Indian promoters constitutes 33.03% and the
remaining shares i.e. 44.76% are held by general public. Thus, the AEs are not
in a position to wield significant influence over the assessee’s business. It was
argued that as a listed company, the assessee is in compliance with the corporate
governance conditions stipulated in clause 49 of the listing agreement with
27 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
stock exchange. Under the said clause, the assessee has to file quarterly
compliance reports before stock exchanges. Therefore, its performance and
commercial expediency of its business decision are subject to intense scrutiny
by its shareholders. It was argued that the assessee is receiving continuous
technical know-how, information, inputs, training and support for the
manufacturing of float glass and its variants from its AEs. the assessee argued
that the direct benefit to the assessee from the licensed technology has been the
increase in the sales over the years with its ability to cater to the changing needs
of its customers. The following details were furnished before the ld. CIT(A) :- Turnover of Asahi India over the years Company Name Sales (in Rs. Lakhs) Mar-05 Mar-06 Mar-07 Mar-08 Asahi India Glass Ltd. 67,606 68,283 87,830 111,382 Y.o.Y. growth in sales 1% 29% 27%
Various submissions were made to challenge the action of the TPO. The
assessee further submitted fresh comparable uncontrolled price for the payment
of royalty and connected agreements which were forwarded to the TPO for a
remand report. The TPO in his report objected to the admission of the
additional evidences filed before the ld. CIT(A) and justified its earlier action.
The ld. CIT(A) confronted to the assessee to the remand report made by the
Assessing Officer. After considering the contents of the remand report and the
28 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
rejoinder of the assessee to such remand report, the ld. CIT(A) directed the TPO
to delete the addition of Rs.4.09 crores on account of TP adjustment in respect
of royalty by observing as under :- “10.4 I have carefully considered the submissions of the appellant and also the remand report dated 01/01/2013. In the TP study the royalty paid by Sona Steering Systems Limited was considered by the appellant as an appropriate Comparable Uncontrolled Price ('CUP') for benchmarking the royalty payments of the appellant. During the appellate proceedings the appellant had undertaken a search of independent agreements over global royalty database namely, RoyaltyStat database, to identify comparable uncontrolled agreements to compare royalty rates paid by appellant to its AEs with the rates charged between independent third parties for use of similar intangibles. As per the search, the arithmetic mean of the royalty rates on sales/ revenue of 5 agreements between independent third parties worked out to 4.36%. The appellant has claimed that as the royalty rates of 0.98% paid by appellant were lower than the rates charged between independent third parties for use of similar intangibles, the transaction of payment of royalty by the appellant to its AEs should be considered to be at arm's length. However, CUP data furnished by the appellant was not accepted by the TPO. 10.5 The appellant has submitted that AGC Japan has only 22.21% shareholding in the appellant. Of the other shareholders, Indian promoters constitute 33.03% and the remaining i.e. 44.76% are publicly held. Thus, the appellant has argued that the AEs are not in a position to wield significant influence over the appellant's business and as a listed company, the appellant is in compliance with the corporate governance conditions stipulated in Clause 49 of the listing agreement with stock exchange. Under the said clause, the appellant has to file quarterly compliance reports before stock exchanges. Thus, its performance and commercial expediency of its business decision are subject to intense scrutiny by its shareholders. The TPO concluded that all transactions relating to Automotive division were at arm's length. However, in the Float Glass division, the TPO concluded the appellant has not derived any benefit from payment of royalty to its AEs. In this regard, the appellant has argued that it has been receiving continuous technical know-how, information, inputs, training and support for the manufacturing of float glass and its variants from its AEs. The appellant has also informed that the availed technology has enabled it to avoid common quality defects in float glass including bubble formation and ripples. These defects curb the use of end use of float glass results in
29 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
bulk rejection of orders and loss of customer base. The licensed technology ensures lower defects, increased aesthetics and enhanced product perception. Furthermore, float glass is often treated with colorants and chemical coatings for specialty applications. The appellant has argued that the direct benefit to the appellant from the licensed technology has been the increase in the sales over the years with its ability to cater to the changing needs of its customer which can be seen from the table below: Turnover of Asahi India over the years Company Sales (in Rs. Lakhs) Name Mar- Mar- Mar- Mar-08 05 06 07 Asahi India 67,606 68,283 87,830 111,382 Glass Ltd. Y.o.Y growth in 1% 29% 27% sales
10.6 The appellant has further submitted that approximately 80% of the sales revenue of the appellant represents sales made to global customers of the Asahi Group and these sales would not have been possible in absence of the technical and brand affiliation with the Asahi Group. The appellant has also argued that the majority of the benefit derived by the appellant includes retention of its customer base who may be lured by competitors unless the appellant constantly evolves its product portfolio. The royalty payments were made by the appellant for availing patented technology. The appellant has highlighted that the Asahi brand and associated technology is quintessential for its continued existence and sustenance in the float glass industry.
10.7 Since float glass constitute the base raw material for manufacture of auto-glass, the float glass technology would be crucial for the performance of its automotive division as well. Generally, the Float Glass division provides about 30% of the total raw material requirement of the automotive division. The appellant has explained that in the absence of the requisite know-how, the appellant would be compelled to rely on external suppliers which would result in a dip in its overall profits. In this connection, the appellant has submitted that the technology and know-how of float glass is only restricted to Asahi Glass, Saint Gobain and Guardian. The appellant has also explained that all the players in the float glass industry would be licensing the technology and know-how of their respective group companies for the production and sale of float glass in its region.
30 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
10.8 Based on the discussion hereinabove, it is fair to conclude that there is no meaningful analysis / evidence provided by the TPO to hold that the entire royalty payment should be reduced to zero. The appellant has been able to demonstrate that the appellant has received technical know-how, information, inputs, training and support for the manufacturing of float glass and its variants from its AEs in lieu of royalty payment and no independent company will provide such services free of charge. The royalty payments were made by the appellant for availing patented technology. The above benefits derived by the appellant are critical to the smooth functioning of its business. Considering facts of the case, I am of the view that the action of the TPO in determining the ALP of "Royalty" paid by the appellant at Nil is incorrect and unsustainable. Accordingly the AO/TPO is directed to delete the addition of Rs.4.09 Crores on account of Transfer Pricing Adjustment in respect to Royalty.”
Aggrieved with such order of the ld. CIT(A), the Revenue is in appeal
before the Tribunal.
Ld. DR strongly opposed the order of the ld. CIT(A) in granting relief to
the assessee. Referring to para 10.4 of the order of the ld. CIT(A), he submitted
that he has not properly adjudicated issue and, therefore, the order of the ld.
CIT(A) should be reversed and that of the Assessing Officer be restored.
Ld. counsel of the assessee on the other hand heavily relied on the order
of the ld. CIT(A). He submitted that the ld. CIT(A) has given justifiable reasons
while deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer. He submitted that
the assessee company in the instant case has paid royalty of Rs.4.09 crores on
net sales of float glass of Rs.238.61 crores to its AEs which works out to only
1.71% of sales. Therefore, the same deserves to be allowed because due to the
licensed technology made available by the AEs, the assessee company was able
31 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
to cater to the changing needs of its customers, maintain quality and was also
able to increase its sales over the years and smooth functioning of its business.
He submitted that since the assessee company does not undertake any research
and development activity on its own and totally depends upon its AEs for
technology, therefore, without such technology the assessee would not have
achieved such higher turnover. He submitted that no independent third party
will let any other entity to use its licensed technology without charging a
fee/royalty. Since the float glass constitutes about 30% of raw material for
manufacture of auto glass, the float glass technology becomes crucial for the
performance of its automotive division as well. He further submitted that since
the assessee is a public limited company which is listed on BSE and NSE in
which Asahi Glass Co. Ltd., Japan (AE) holds only 22.21% shareholding while
Indian promoters held 33.03% and the remaining 44.76% shareholding was held
by the public, therefore, the AEs were not in a position to wield significant
influence over assessee’s business as its performance and commercial
expediency were subject to intense scrutiny by its shareholders. He submitted
that in earlier years royalty paid by the AEs for float glass technology has been
accepted by the Department. Similarly, royalty paid at 3% by Sona Steering
Systems Ltd. to its AE has been accepted by the Department which is more than
1.71% paid by the assessee company. Referring to the decision of the Hon’ble
32 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. EKL Appliances Ltd. reported in 345
ITR 241, he submitted that the Hon'ble High Court in the said decision has held
that financial health of the assessee could never be a criterion to judge the
allowability of an expense. There was no authority for that. So long as the
expenditure or payment had been demonstrated to have incurred or laid out for
the purpose of business, it was no concern of the TPO to disallow it on any
extraneous reasoning. As provided in the OECD guidelines, he was excepted to
examine the international transaction as he actually found them and then make
suitable adjustment but a wholesale disallowance of the expenditure,
particularly on the grounds which has been given by the TPO was not
contemplated or authorized. Even on the merits, the disallowance of the entire
brand fee/royalty payment was not warranted.
Referring to the order of the immediately preceding assessment year
2006-07, he submitted that TPO had accepted the royalty payment under the
Float Glass Division at ALP. However, for the remaining international
transactions namely purchase of capital goods, import of machinery spares and
clear float glass etc, adjustment was made as per the provisions of section 92CA
of the I.T. Act by comparing the operating margin of the Float Glass Division of
the assessee company with the mean/average operating margin of three
comparable companies namely Gujarat Guardian Ltd., Hindustan National
33 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
Glass and Industries and Saint Gobain Glass India Ltd.. However, the TPO
excluded two companies namely Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. and Triveni Glass Ltd.
as comparables. On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal vide order 06.04.2016
directed the TPO to include Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. and Triveni Glass Ltd. as
comparables. Consequently, pursuant to the order of the Tribunal, the TPO
worked out the average/mean operating margin by including Bharat Glass Tube
Ltd. and Triveni Glass Ltd. as comparables. Therefore, Bharat Glass Tube Ltd.
and Triveni Glass Ltd. ought to be considered as comparables for the year under
consideration for working out the average/mean operating margin of Float Glass
Division. He submitted that Gujarat Guardian Ltd. and Sejal Architectural
Glass Ltd. could not be considered as comparable because Gujarat Guardian
Ltd. was engaged in the manufacture of float glass and mirror glass and Sejal
Architectural Glass Ltd. was engaged in the manufacture of toughened glass and
laminated glass. Before the TPO the said companies were given as comparables
because the assessee company is engaged in the manufacture of both toughened
glass and float glass for which royalty had been paid. However, the TPO
accepted the royalty payment towards technical fee of toughened glass and
determined the arm’s length price of royalty at Nil as against royalty of Rs.4.09
crores paid towards float glass. Therefore, Gujarat Guardian Ltd. and Sejal
Architectural Glass Ltd. could not be considered as comparables for working
34 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
out the average/mean operating margin of Float Glass Division. He submitted
that the average/mean operating margin of the three comparables namely (i)
Saint Gobain Glass India Ltd. (8.33%), (ii) Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. (1.35%) and
(iii) Triveni Glass Ltd. (-5.50%) gives the margin of average of 1.39%. In other
words, the average/mean operating margin of these comparable companies
works out to 1.39% which is even less than 6.02% operating margin of the
assessee company. In view of the above, the order of ld. CIT(A) being in
consonance with facts and law should be upheld and the grounds raised by the
Revenue should be dismissed.
We have considered the rival arguments made by both the sides, perused
the orders of the Assessing Officer and the ld. CIT(A) and the Paper Book filed
on behalf of the assessee. We have also considered the various decisions cited
before us. We find the TPO made an addition Rs.4.09 crores to the total income
of the assessee by disallowing payment of royalty by the assessee to its AE
being at arm’s length price. We find the ld. CIT(A) deleted the addition made
by the AO/TPO, the reasons of which have already been reproduced in the
preceding paragraphs. We do not find any infirmity in the order of the ld.
CIT(A) on this issue. We find the assessee before the TPO had given analysis
of the comparables with an average/mean margin of 8.66%. The details of
which are as under :-
35 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
Company Name Sales (Cr.) Total cost Operating OP/Sales (TC) (Cr.) Profit %age (OP) (Cr.) 1) Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. 41.36 40.08 0.56 1.35% 2) Gujarat Guardian Ltd. 484.63 359.3 125.33 25.86% 3) Hindustan National Glass & Inds. 596.17 531.06 65.11 10.92% Ltd. 4) Saint Gobain Glass India Ltd. 854.28 783.12 71.16 8.33% 5) Sejal Archtiectural Glass Ltd. 43.87 39.04 4.83 11.01% 6) Triveni Glass Ltd. 106.23 112.07 -5.84 -5.50% Mean/Average 8.66%
The operating margin of the assessee company for float glass division
was shown at 6.02% which the TPO has reproduced at page 4 of his order. We
find the TPO in the order rejected three comparables namely Bharat Glass
Tubes Ltd., Hindustan National Glass & Inds. Ltd. and Triveni Glass Ltd. as
comparables and worked out the average/mean operating margin of three
comparables at 15.99%. After comparing the operating margin of the float glass
division of the assessee company at 6.02%, the TPO made addition of Rs.4.09
crores on the ground that the assessee company had not derived any benefit
from payment of royalty and determined the arm’s length price of royalty at Nil
under CUP. We find ld. CIT(A) deleted the addition which has been already
been reproduced in the preceding paragraph. We do not find any infirmity in
the order of the ld. CIT(A) on this issue. We find the assessee company has
paid royalty of 4.09 crores on net sales of float glass of Rs.238.61 crores to its
AEs which works out to only 1.71% of the sales. We find merit in the argument
36 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
of the ld. counsel for the assessee that due to the licensed technology made
available by the AEs, the assessee company was able to maintain quality and
increase its sales. For the year ending March, 2005 the turnover was
Rs.67,606/- lakhs which has gone up to Rs.68,283/- lakhs for the year ending
March, 2006 and Rs.87,830/- lakhs for the year ending March, 2007 and
Rs.111,382/- for the ending March, 2008. This indicates that there is huge jump
in the turnover between the year 2006 to 2008 as compared to financial years
2004-05 and 2005-06. Further, the royalty paid by the assessee to AE for float
glass technology has been accepted by the Department in the earlier years. We
also find merit in the submission of the ld. counsel for the assessee that since the
assessee is a public limited company with only 22.21% shareholding by its AE
and Indian promoters holding 33.03% and the general public holding 44.76%,
therefore, the AEs were not in a position to wield significant influence over
assessee’s business as its performance and commercial expediency were subject
to intense scrutiny by shareholders of the companies which are listed on BSE
and NSE. We further find the Revenue has accepted the royalty paid at the rate
of 3% by Sona Steering Systems Ltd. to its AE which is much more than 1.71%.
Further, in the immediately preceding year 2006-07, the Tribunal had directed
the TPO to include Bharat Glass Tube Ltd. and Triveni Glass Ltd. as
comparables. If these two companies are included as comparables, the average
37 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
margin comes to 1.39% which is much less than the operating margin of 6.02%
of the assessee company.
We find the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. EKL
Appliances Ltd. (supra) has held that the financial health of the assessee could
never be a criterion to judge the allowability of an expense. There was no
authority for that. So long as the expenditure or payment has been
demonstrated to have been incurred or laid out for the purpose of business; it
was no concern of the TPO to disallow it on any extraneous reasoning. He was
expected to examine the international transaction as he actually found them and
then make suitable adjustment but a wholesale disallowance of the expenditure
is not warranted. It has further been held that it is not open to the TPO to
question the judgment of the assessee as to how it should conduct its business
and regarding the necessity or otherwise of incurring the expenditure in the
interest of its business. It is entirely the choice of the assessee as to from whom
it contemplates to source its technology or technical knowhow and as to what
steps should be taken to meet the competition prevalent in the market and to
stave off the competitors. This is the domain of the businessman and the TPO
has no say in the matter. The Revenue cannot justifiably claim to place itself in
the arm chair of businessman or in the position of the Board of Directors and
assume the role to decide how much is the reasonable expenditure having regard
38 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
to the circumstances of the case. In view of the above discussion and in view of
the detailed reasoning giving by the ld. CIT(A) while deleting the disallowance
made by the Assessing Officer. We find no infirmity in the same. Accordingly,
the order of the ld. CIT(A) is upheld and the ground raised by the Revenue is
dismissed.
Ground no.2 by the Revenue reads as under :-
“2. In deleting the addition amounting to Rs.40,36,786/- made on account of provision for gratuity to book profit as per provision of section 115JB of the Income Tax Act 1961.”
Facts of the case, in brief, are that the Assessing Officer during the
assessment proceedings observed that the assessee has debited an amount of
Rs.40,36,786/- on account of provision for gratuity which has been added to the
taxable income of the assessee while computing the income under the normal
provisions of the Act. Since the same has not been added to the net profit for
the purpose of computing book profit, he asked the assessee explain as to why
the same should not be added back to the book profit. It was explained by the
assessee that the provision for gratuity is ascertained liability calculated by
approved valuer and no addition should be made to the book profit. However,
the Assessing Officer was not satisfied with the explanation given by the
assessee. He observed that the provision for gratuity is made on the basis of
39 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
actuarial valuation but the actual payment of the gratuity is deferred to a later
date on the happening of certain event namely death or voluntary retirement of
the employee which are uncertain events. He, therefore, held that the provision
made by the assessee for the payment of gratuity is unascertained liability. He
accordingly added the same to the book profit as per clause (c) of Explanation
(1) below sub-section 2 of section 115JB. Before the ld. CIT(A), the assessee
relying on various decisions argued that the provision for gratuity being
unascertained liability cannot be added to the book profit. Based on the
argument advanced by the assessee, ld. CIT(A) deleted the addition by
observing as under :-
“The provision for gratuity amounting to Rs.40,36,786/- debited to the profit and loss account has been added to the taxable income while computing the income under normal provisions of the Act. Since the same is not added to the net profit for the purpose of computing the book profit, the assessing officer has added it to the book profit on this account. The assessing officer has also observed that the provision for gratuity has been made on the basis of actuarial valuation. During the course of the appellate proceedings, the Appellant has explained that this provision is not an unascertained liability instead it has been created on the basis of the actuarial valuation. Thus, the clause (c) of the explanation (1) does not apply in the instant case. The appellant has also relied on various case laws. In the case of DCIT Vs. Inox Leisure (supra) the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat has held “Considering the above judicial pronouncements and the facts on hand, we have no hesitation in upholding the Tribunal’s view that though actual payment of gratuity may be made at a later point of time upon periodical release of the employees from service, it is provision having been made on actuarial basis it cannot be stated to be an uncertained liability so as to add it back in terms of Clause (c) to Explanation 1 to section 115JB.” Respectfully following the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of DCIT Vs. Inox Leisure (supra), the assessing officer is directed to exclude the provision for gratuity amounting to Rs.40,36,786/- while computing book profit u/s 115JB. This ground of appeal is allowed.”
40 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
Aggrieved with such order of the ld. CIT(A), the Revenue is in appeal
before the Tribunal.
After hearing both the sides, we do not find any infirmity in the order of
the ld. CIT(A). It is an admitted fact that the provision for such gratuity was
made on the basis of actuarial valuation which even has been accepted by the
Assessing Officer. The only grievance of the Assessing Officer is that since the
actual payment of the gratuity is deferred to a later date on the happening of
certain events namely death or voluntary retirement of the employee which are
uncertain events, therefore, such provision is as an unascertained liability.
However, the various Benches of the Tribunal are continuously and consistently
holding that when the provision for gratuity is being made on the basis of
actuarial valuation, it cannot be said to be an unascertained liability and added
in terms of clause (c) to Explanation (1) to section 115JB of the I.T. Act.
The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Echjay Forgings
Private Limited reported in 251 ITR 15 has held that since provision for gratuity
was made on the basis of actuarial valuation, it was an ascertained liability and
the said amount would not be added to the net profits. Similar view has been
held by the Indore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Eicher Motors Ltd. vs.
DCIT reported in 82 TTJ 61. The various other decisions relied on by the ld.
counsel for the assessee also support its case. In view of the above and in
41 ITA No.1637/Del/2014 ITA No.2183/Del/2014
absence of any contrary material brought to our notice by the ld. DR against the
order of the ld. CIT(A), we do not find any infirmity in the same. Accordingly,
the order of the ld. CIT(A) on this issue is upheld and the ground raised by the
Revenue is dismissed.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed for
statistical purposes and the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open Court on this 26th February, 2018.
Sd/- Sd/- (SUCHITRA KAMBLE) (R. K. PANDA) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Dated: 26-02-2018. Sujeet Copy of order to: - 1) The Appellant 2) The Respondent 3) The CIT 4) The CIT(A) 5) The DR, I.T.A.T., New Delhi By Order //True Copy// Assistant Registrar ITAT, New Delhi