CIT vs. LATA JAIN

+ + + + + IN THE HIGH COURT OF'DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on : 26fr September.2012. Date of Decision : 28m September.2012. rrA 1667/2010 rTA 85/2011 CIT versus DINESH JAIN HUF ITA 1800/2010 rrA 1803/2010 ITA 180s/20r0 ITA 1807/2010 ITA 1809/2010 rTA r811/2010 ITA 1812 120t0 ITA 1813/2010 rTA 1967/2010 ITA 1972/2OLO CIT versus LATA JAIN ITA 181s/20t0 ITA 1816/2010 ITAISIT/2OIO rrA 1818/2010 rrA 18t9/20r0 rrA 1968/2010 TTA 1969/2010 ..... Appellant ..... Respondent ..... Appellant ..... Respondent + + + + + + -r + + + + + + -r ITA No.l66712010 & conn. Page I of2 Signing Date:07.09.2024 17:11:16 Certify that the digital and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. Signature Not Verified

+ ITA 197012010 + rTA t97 u20I0 CIT versus DINESH JAIN ..... Appellant ..... Respondent Presence : Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal, sr. standing counsel with Mr. Puneet Gupta, jr. standing counsel and Ms. Gayatri Verma, Adv' for revenue. Mr. Ajay Vohra, Ms. KavitaJha and IW. Vaibhav Kulkarni, Advs. for resPondent. CORAM: MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR 1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2. To be referred to the Reporters or not? 3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? R.V. EASWAR. J.: For order, see ITA No.1814/2010. fil...-. (R.V. (s.RA SEPTEMBER 28,2012 vld EASWAR) JUDGE I l^^-l"B* VINDRA BHAT) JUDGE ITA No.166712010 & conn. Page2 of2

IN TI{E HIGH COURT OF'DELHI AT NE\ru DELIII Reserved on : 26ft September.2012. Date of Decision : 28tr'September.2012. -{- + ITA 1667/2070 ITA 85/2011 CIT -r -t- + -1- + -r f I I + + . versus DINESI{ JAIN HUF ITA 1800/2010 ITA l BO3I2OTO ITA 1805/2010 ITA 180712010 rTA 1809/2010 ITA 181 TI2OIO ITA 18I2I2OTO ITA 1813/2010 rTA1967l20l0 rTA 1972/2010 CIT ..... Appellant ..... Respondent ..... Appellant ..... Respondent Page I ofl0 + -r f + -l- I -r -r LATA JAIN ITA 1814/2OIO ITA 181s/2010 ITA 181612010 ITA 18t7/2010 ITA 1818/2010 ITA 181912010 ITA 196812010 ITA No. I 814/2010 & conn.

+ ITA 1969t20t0 . + ITA 1970/2010 + ITAI9TI/2010 CIT versus DINESH JAIN ..... Appellant ..... Respondent Presence : Mr. sanjeev Sabharwal, sr. standing counsel with Mr. Puneet Gupta, jr. standing counsel and Ms. Gayatri Venna, Adv. for revenue. Mr.Ajay Vohra, Ms. Kavita Jha and AzIr. Vaibhav I(ulkarni Advs. for respondent. COR,AM: MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR 1 . Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2.Tobe refened to the Reporters or not? 'i 3. Whether the judgrnemt should be reported in the Digest? 1 R.V. EASWA.R.. J.: These are appeals filed by the Cornmissioner of Incorne-tax under section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ("Act") against the orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal ("Tribunal"). The following common substantial questions of law were frarned by the court on3-2-20II: "whether learned ITAT erred in deleting the addition made by ihe Assessing officer on account of unexplained investment in rent yielding property by applying the provisions of Rule 3 of par B of 3'" Schedule tct the Wealth Tax Act? " ITA No. l814/2010 & conn. Page 2 of10

/14., l-/ ead 2. ITA No.18l4l20l0 has by consent of the parties been taken as the I matter. The facts necessary for our purpose in brief are that there was a search operation under sec.I32 of the Act in the residential and business premises of the assessee Dinesh Jain on 9-12-2003. The materials seized during the search revealed, inter alia, investment in various properties by the assessee. One such property was Flat No.306, Palm Court, Sukharali Chowk, Gurgaon, which was purchased for Rs.17,55,000. The Assessing Officer noticed that this was a cornmercial property which was fetching a rent of Rs.7.02 laldrs per annum. He was of the .view that a property which was fetching such a substantial rental income could not have been acquired for Rs.17.55 lakhs. Ahnost 40% of the investment was being got back by the assessee by way of rent every year, which was disproportionally high in comparison with the amount invested. According to hirn, returns on investment were in the range of 70Yo per annurn. He therefore took the view that the assessee rnust have invested more than what was disclosed in the sale document r,vhich attracted the provisions of Section 698 of the Act. He called upon the assessee to explain the position. The assessee denied investing anything over and above the amount declared in the document. The Assessing Officer however concluded that the fair market value of the properfy should be estirnated in accordance with Rule 3 of the Schedule III to the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. He accordingly calculated the "net annualised maintainable rent" of the property at Rs.6,63,000 and multiplying the sarne by I2.5 as provided in the Rule cited above, arrived ht the value of the property at Rs.82,87,500 and held that "that is the valuation or the amount which the assessee must have paid". The difference between value of the property calculated in accordance with the Rule and the arnount shown in the sale document came to Rs.65,32,500 which was assessed as unexplained investment under sec.69B. 3. Similar addition was made in respect of another property (Flat No.6 in the same building) acquired by the assessee and the total addition made under sec.69B was Rs.1,38,26,450. . 4. The assessee filed an appeal against the assessment and questioned, inter alia, the addition made under section 698. Besides challenging the adoption of ITA No. 1814/2010 & conn. Page3 ofl0

@ the value of the properties calculated on the basis of Rule 3 of Schedule III to the Wealth Tax Act for purposes of comparison and for ascertaining the alleged unexplained portion of the purchase consideration, the assessee also adduced evidence in the form of cornparable properties in the same building, such as Flat No.511 and several other instances to dernonstrate that the price shown to have been paid by the assessee, as per the sale docurnent, represented the real and actual consideration for the properties and nothing was paid as on-lnonies over and above the stated consideration. 5. The CIT(A) obtained a remand report from the Assessing Officer. The assessee filed rejoinder to the same. On a consideration of all the facts and the evidence, the CIT(A), following his decision taken in the earlier year, held that the amount declared by the assessee as purchase price cannot be taken as sacrosanct and that the Assessing Officer can go behind it and find out the "correct and fair valuations of the imrnovable properties due to the fact that no direct evidences in these transactions can be gathered". In this view of the matter, he upheld the view taken by the Assessing officer in principle. However, he reduced the additions to Rs.27,98,268 for Flat No.6 and Rs.22,57,975 for Flat No.306. 6. There were cross-appeals by the assessee and the revenue before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, following its earlier order dated 30-9-2009 in the assessee's case for solne earlier years, deleted the entire addition made under sec.69B, following the judgrnents of the Supreme Court in K.p. Varghese vs Iro Q981) 131 ITR 597 and cIT vs shtvakami Company (p) Ltd. (1986) 159 ITR 71 and the judgments of this court in CIT vs Shalcuntala Devi in ITA No.345l2007, CIT vs Ashok l{hetrapal (2001) 294 ITR I43 and, CIT vs Manoj Jain (2006) 287 ITR 285. 7 . We should have thought that the question is concluded by the judgrnents cited above, both of the Supreme Court and of this court, but the contention of Mr. Sabharwal for the revenue is that where the facts and circumstances perrnit an inference of understatement of consideration, it is not necessary to look for direct evidence of understatement which, in the very nature of things, is ITA No. I 8 l412010 & conn. Page 4 ofl0

@ irnpossible to obtain. He points out to what he describes as "disproportionately high returns for the investment" in the properties - the rental income is 40Vo of the investment in the firsi. year, and that would not have been possible unless a much higher amount than what was declared had'been invested by the assessee. The returns, according to him, are so high that they shock the conscience of the court. He contends that judicial notice can be taken note of the fact, under section 57 of the Evidence Act, that notifications have been issued under section 75 of the Stamp Act prescribing circle rates for the properties and rarely do properties get transferred for such rates. 8. These arguments are cettainly attractive but the language ernployed by Section 69B is the first stumbling block which l\lk. Sabharwal has to overcome. The section is in the following terms: ,SECTION 6gN - AMO(]NT OF INT/ESTMENTS, ETC., NOT FULLY DISCLOSED IN BOOKS OF ACCO(INT. Where in any financial year the assessee has made investments or is found to be the owner of any bullion, jewellery, or other valuable article, and the Assessing officer find,s that the amount expended on making such investments or in acquiring such bullion, jewellery or other valuable article exceeds the amount recorded in this behalf in the boorcs of account ntaintained by tlte assessee for any source of income, and the assessee offers no explanation about such excess amount or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer', satisfactory, the excess amount may be deemed, to be the income of the assessee for suchfinancial year.,' The section in tenns requires that the Assessing Officer has to first "find" that the assessee has "expended" an amount which he has not fully recorded in his books of account. It is only then that the burden shifts to the assessee to furnish a satisfactory explanation. Till the initial burden is discharged by the Assessing Officer, the section remains dormant. 9 - A "finding" obviously should rest on evidence. In the present case, it is comrnon ground thbt no incrirninating material was seized during the search ITA No. l814/2010 & conn. Page 5 of 10

which revealed any understatement of the purchase price. That is precisely the reason why the Assessing Officer had to resort to Rule 3 of Schedule III to the Wealth Tax Act. This Rule does not even claim to estimate the "fair market value" of an asset; it rnerely lays down a procedure for computing the value of an asset for the pulposes of the 'V/ealth Tax Act. The Schedule derives its authority frorn Section 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act. The section, as it now stands, has dropped all pretensions to ascertaining the fair market value of an asset for the purposes of the Wealth Tax Act. Prior to the amendment made w.e.f. 1-4-1989 the section provided for the estimation of the fair rnarket value of an asset on the principle of what it would fetch if sold in the open market. This involved an assumption of an open market, be it fictional, a willing seller and a willing buyer, all fictional. This fiction facilitated a realistic estimation of the fair rnarket value of the property, and it moved with the ups and downs of the rnarket. Not anymore. From I-4-I989, the value was frozen. For all times to corne, an imrnovable property that fetches rent shall be valued at 12.5 tirnes the net maintainable rent. 10. There is a funclamental fallacy in invoking the provisions of the Wealth Tax Act to the application of section 698 of the Income Tax Act, nofwithstanding that both the Acts are cognate and have even been said to constifute an integrated scheme of taxation. Under the Income Tax Act, we are to find what was the real and actual consideration paid by the assessee and whether the full consideration has been recorded in the books. Under section 7(1) of the Wealth Tax Act as it stood before I-4-I989, we are to estimate the fair market value of the asset; after this date, it is. not even estimation of the fair market value, but computation of the value of the asset on the basis of certain rules prescribed by the statute. If A dies leaving prirne property in Connaught Place to his son B, B pays nothing for the property; the property rnay command a rnarket price of several crores. If "A", becauie of his love and affection for "B", sells the property for Rupee One to "B"; in this case, the consideration paid is only Rupee One, though the property is worth several millions. If the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over "B" has to make an addition under section 698, he can do so only if he "finds" that B has "expended" money which he has not fully recorded in this books of account; he cannot make any ITA No. l814/2010 & conn. I Page 6 of10

addition rnerely because the property could fetch several crore of rupees in the market. 11. Section 69B does not permit an inference to be drawn fi'om the circumstances suffounding the transaction that the purchaser of the property must have paid more than what was actually recorded in his books of account for the sirnple reason that such an inference could be very subjective and could involve the dangerous consequence of a notional or fictional income being brought to tax contrary to the strict provisions of Article 265 of the Constitution of India and Entry 82 in List I of the seventh schedule thereto which deals with "Taxes on income other than agricultural income". This was one of the rnajor considerations that weighed with the Supreme Court in K.P. Varghese (supra) in which case the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 52 fell for interpretation. It was observed that Parliament cannot choose to tax as income an item which in no rational sense can be regarded as a citizen's incorne or ever receipt. Section 52(2) (which now stands omitted) applied to the transferor of properfy for a consideration that was lesser than the fair market value by 15% or more; in such a case, the Assessing Officer was conferred the power to adopt the fair market value of the property as the sale price and compute the capital gains accordingly. The Supreme Court held that it was the burden of the Assessing Officer to prove that there was understatement of consideration and once that burden was discharged it was not required of him to prove the precise extent of understatement and he could adopt the difference between the stated consideration and the fair market value of the properfy as the understatement. The sub-section was held to provide for a "statutory. best judgrnent" once actual understatement was proved; it obviated the need to prove the exact amount of understaternent. Additional reasons for the result were (a) that the marginal note to the section referred to "cases of understaternent"; (b) the speech of the Finance Minister while introducing the provision; and (c) the absurd or irrational results that would flow from a literal interpretation of the sub-section, which could not have been intended by the legislature. 12. While the omitted section 52(2) applied to the transferor of the prgperfy, section 698 applies to the transferee - the purchaser - of the property. It refers ITA No. I 814/2010 & conn. Page 7 of l0

ri to the money "expended" by the assessee, but not recorded in his books of account, which is a clear reference to undisclosed incorne being used in the investment. Applying the logic and reasoning in K.P. Varghese (supra) it seems to us that even for the purposes of Section 698 it is the burden of the Assessing Officer to first prove that there was understatement of the consideration (investrnent) in the books of account. Once that undervaluation is established as a matter of fact, the Assessing Officer, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation frorn the assessee as to the source of the undisclosed portion of the investment, can proceed to adopt solne dependable or reliable yardstick with which to rneasure the extent of understaternent of the investment. One such yardstick can be the fair market value of the property determined in accordance with the Wealth Tax Act. We however clarify that this Court is not concluding that such yardstick is determinative; in view of the findings anived at by us that the Assessing Officer did not gather foundational facts to point to undervaluation the adoption of the nonns under the Wealth Tax Act is not cornmented upon by us. 13. The grror comrnitted by the income-tax authorities in the present case is to jurnp the first step in the process of applying section 698 - that of proving understatement of the investment - and apply the measure of understatement. If anything, the language ernployed in section 69B is in stricter terms than the erstwhile section 52(2).It does not even authorise the adoption of any yardstick to measure the precise extent of understatement. There can therefore be no compromise in the application of the section. It would seeln to require the Assessing Officer even to show the exact extent of understatement of the investrnent; it does not even give the Assessing Officer the option of applying any reasonable yardstick to lneasure the precise extent of understaternent of the investment once the fact of understatement is proved. It appears to us that the Assessing Officer is not only required to prove understatement of the purchase price, but also to show the precise extent of the understatement. There is no authority given by the section to adopt some reaionable yardstick to rneasure the extent of understatement. But since it may not be possible in all cases to prove the precise or exact amount of undisclosed investment, it is perhaps reasonable to permit the Assessing Officer to rely on solne acceptable basis of ITA No. I 814/2010 & conn. Page 8 of 10

ascertaining the market value of the properfy to assess the- undisclosed investment. Whether the basis adopted by the Assessing Officer is an acceptable one or not may depend on the facts and circurnstances of the particular case. That question may however arise only when actual understatement is first proved by the Assessing Officer. It is only to this extent that the rigour of the burden placed on the Assessing Officer rnay be relaxed in cases where there is evidence to show understatement of the investment. but evidence to show the precise extent thereof is lacking. 14. In Lalchand Bhagat Ambica Ram Vs. Commissioner of Inconte Tax, Bihar and Orissa (1959) 37.ITR 288, the Supreme Court disapproved the practice of making additions in the assessrnents on mere suspicion and surmise or by taking note of the notorious practices prevailing in trade circles. At page 299 of the report, it was observed as follows : "Adverting to the various probabilities which weighed with the Income-tax Officer we may observe that the notoriety for smuggling food grains and other commodities to Bengal by country boats acquired by Sahibgunj and the notoriety achteved by Dlnilian as a great receiving centre for such commodities were merely a background of suspicion and the appellant could not be tarred with the sanne brush as every arhatdar and grain merchant who might have been indulging in smuggling operations, without an tota of evidence in tltat behalf, " This takes care of the argument of lzlr. Sabharwal that judicial notice can be taken of the practice prevailing in the property market of not disciosing the full consideration for transfer of properties. 15. Since the entire case has proceeded on the assumption that there was understatement of the investment, without a finding that the assessee invested rnore than what was recorded in the books of account, we are unable to approve of the decision of the income-tax authorities. Section 69F was wrongly invoked. The order of the Tribunal is approved; the substantial question of law is answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the CIT. ITA No. I 814/2010 & conn. Page 9 of l0

v 16. Since the basis of the additions made in all the other cases is the same as in ITA No.1814/2010, the substantial questions of law in those cases are also sirnilarly answered. 17. The appeals filed by the CIT are dismissed with no order as to costs. lil -,*r . (R.V.'EASWAR) JUDGE SEPTEMBER 28,20L2 vld ITA No. I 814/201 0 & conn. 10 F (s. RAVINDRA BIIAT) JT]DGE Page 10 of I i' I {*#