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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH AND THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.180 OF 2015 (SP)
BETWEEN:
SRI. GANGAHANUMAIAH S/O LATE SRI ANJINAPPA, AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
SRI. RAJAPPA, S/O GANGAHANUMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
SRI. KUMAR, S/O GANGAHANUMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
SRI. RAMAIAH, DEAD BY LRs
SMT. MUNILAKSHMAMMA D/O LATE RAMAIAH, W/O A.V.MUTHURAJU, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS RESIDING AT ALUR AT POST, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK, BANGALORE – 512 123.
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
SRI. MAGE GOWDA, S/O LATE SRI RAMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
SRI GANESH, S/O LATE SRI RAMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
APPELLANT NOS.1-3 & 5-6 ARE RESIDING AT GEJJAGADAHALLI VILLAGE, DASANAPURA HOBLI, BANGALORE NORTH TALUK, BANGALORE -562 123 …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. H.N.SHASHIDHARA, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W SRI. SRINIVASA MURTHY D & SRI. SUHAS S PATIL, ADVOCATES)
AND:
SRI. N.S. GANGADHAR S/O SRI. B B SHIVARUDRAPPA, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, R/AT KOTE BEEDI, NELAMANGALA, BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT – 562 123 …RESPONDENT (BY SRI. SAMPATH A., ADVOCATE)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC., PRAYING TO ALLOW THE APPEAL BY SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 16.12.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.544/2009 ON THE FILE OF SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, NELAMANGALA AND DISMISS THE SAME IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR FURTHER HEARING THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH and HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU
ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU) 1. The present appeal has been filed seeking to challenge the Judgment and Decree dated 16.12.2014 in O.S.No.544/2009 passed by the Senior Civil Judge at Nelamangala (“Impugned Judgment”). By the Impugned Judgment, the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff for specific performance has been decreed by the learned Trial Court with costs.
The decree was stayed by the predecessor bench of this Court by an order dated 04.03.2015.
Briefly the facts are, that a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 01.06.2004 was filed by the respondent/plaintiff directing the appellants/defendants to execute a sale deed in favour of the respondent/plaintiff upon receipt of the balance sale consideration amount.
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In the alternative, the relief for recovery of a sum of Rs.7,59,688/- along with interest was sought for.
3.1. It was the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the property bearing Survey Nos.120, sub-divided as Survey Nos.120/1, 120/2, 120/3 and 120/5 measuring to an extent of 4 acres 27 guntas, situated at Shivanapura Village, Dasanapura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit property’) belonged to one Anjanappa, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants/defendants. The appellants/defendants intended to sell and the respondent/plaintiff agreed to purchase the suit property for a consideration of Rs.30,38,750/-. The agreement to sell also set out that the part sale consideration of Rs.7,59,688/- was paid by the respondent/plaintiff to the appellants/defendants. A period of six months was fixed for the execution of the sale deed. 3.2. The conditions of the agreement to sell also required the respondent/plaintiff to pay further amount of 25% of
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
the sale consideration within three months and appellants/defendants were required to survey the suit property and produce the documents before the Sub-Registrar as per the survey measurement. 3.3. However, since the appellants/defendants failed to survey the suit property and fix the boundaries and undertake obligations in terms of the agreement, the respondent/plaintiff was constrained to send a legal notice dated 23.03.2006. Subsequently, the respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for the following reliefs: a) “to grant a decree for specific performance of the agreement dt. 1/6/2004 by directing the defendants to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff in respect of suit schedule property by receiving the balance sale consideration amount within the time stipulated by this Hon'ble Court;
b) if for any reason the defendants failed and neglects to execute the sale deed by receiving the balance sale consideration in time to be stipulated period by this Hon'ble Court, the plaintiff be permitted to deposit the balance sale consideration after deducting the court costs and other expenses as may be ordered by this Hon'ble Court and to obtain execution of sale deed through the court at the costs of the defendants;
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
c) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct the defendants to deliver the vacant possession of the suit schedule property and to put the plaintiff in physical vacant possession of the property against the registration of the sale deed, failing which this Hon'ble Court be pleased to appoint a Court Commissioner at the costs of the defendants to deliver the vacant possession of the schedule property to the plaintiff by removing any obstructor or obstruction claiming in trust of the defendants;
d) that for the any reason this Hon'ble Court comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled for the equitable relief of Specific performance then this Hon'ble Court grant a decree for a sum of Rs.7,59,688.00 being the amount paid by the plaintiff together with interest at the rate of 24% per annum from the date of suit, till realization;
e) and to grant an order of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from creating or inducting any third party interest or right or creating any mortgage or lease of the suit schedule property either themselves or their agents, attorneys or any persons claiming under the trust of defendants until the decree is satisfied;
f) and to grant such other relief/reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and circumstances of the case and to award costs of the suit, in the interest of justice and equity.”
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3.4. The appellants/defendants entered appearance and raised several defences including denial of execution of the agreement to sell. It was also contended that respondent/plaintiff made them to sign the agreement to sell under coercion. It was further contended that from the date of agreement, 25% further sale consideration was required to be paid which was not done and therefore, no relief could be claimed by the respondent/plaintiff.
3.5. Based on the pleadings, the following issues were framed: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant have entered into an agreement of sale of suit schedule property for sale consideration amount of Rs.30,38,750/- by receiving the part sale consideration amount of Rs.7,59,988/-? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that he is always ready and willing to perform his part of contract? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief as prayed for? 4. What order or decree?
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3.6. The learned Trial Court found that during the cross-examination of D.W.2 on 18.01.2014, the execution of the agreement was confirmed and as was the receipt of advance sale consideration of Rs.7,59,688/- being Rs.1,02,000/- by cash and Rs.6,57,688/- through demand draft. The Learned Trial Court also found that although names of defendant Nos.3 & 5 were mentioned as sellers in the agreement to sell, their signatures were not obtained. A finding was also given that the stand taken by the appellants/defendants in their examination in chief was different and was contrary to the contents of their written statement. Emphasis was laid on the fact that although appellants/defendants attempted to deny the execution of the agreement, the evidence showed otherwise.
3.7. It was held by the Impugned Judgment that since the respondent/plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, while the appellants/defendants failed to conduct their obligations under the contract and failed to produce the documents, the appellants/defendants
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cannot be allowed to dispute the readiness and willingness on the part of the respondent/plaintiff. Accordingly, it was held that since the defendants did not come forward to execute the sale deed, the appellants/defendants were directed to execute sale deed on receipt of the balance sale consideration of Rs.22,79,062/- within three months.
The Learned counsel for the appellants/defendants has contended that the specific performance contract has been granted despite the respondent/plaintiff not being able to show his capacity to perform the contract. It was contended that no document was placed on record by the respondent/plaintiff to show that the respondent/plaintiff had the wherewithal to perform his part of the contract.
The Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the Impugned Judgment does not suffer from any infirmity since the appellants/ defendants did not perform their part of the contract and produced the requisite documents and measurement required, despite the respondent/plaintiff being ready and
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willing to perform the contract. Hence, it was contended that directions be passed for execution of the sale deed of the suit property.
As stated above, although the appellants/defendants had submitted before the Trial Court that they have been coerced into signing the agreement to sell, they have not disputed the finding of the learned Trial Court or before this Court. The only contention that the appellants/defendants have argued before this Court is that pre-requisites for grant of specific performance have not been proved and thus, the relief could not be granted by the Trial Court.
It is settled law that specific performance of a contract cannot be granted unless the person(plaintiff) proves readiness and willingness to perform the contract as per its constructions. It is apposite to set out Section 16(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the S.R. Act’) below in this behalf.
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“16. Personal bars to relief. -Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-
(a) xxxx (b) xxxx (c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant.
2) Explanation. For the purposes of clause (c),
(i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court; [ (ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction.”
The Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Vs. Premlatha Joshi and Others1 has held that specific performance is an equitable relief and that for the grant of such relief, the following material questions are required to be answered:
1 (2019) 3 SCC 704
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
“7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are:
7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property.
7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract.
7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract;
7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff;
7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money, etc. and, if so, on what grounds.
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In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is entitled to exercise it discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts.“
It is no longer res-integra that for a grant of specific performance of a contract, the respondent/plaintiff must plead and prove both his readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The Supreme Court in Sangita Sinha Vs. Bhawana Bhardwaj and Others2 has held thus: “17. It is trite law that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are not one but two separate elements. ‘Readiness’ means the capacity of the Respondent No. 1-buyer to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the sale consideration. ‘Willingness’ refers to the intention of the Respondent No. 1-buyer as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract, which is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser, including attending circumstances.
2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 723
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Respondent No. 1- buyer/purchaser from the date of execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance. This Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency of the suit up to the decree. A few of the said judgments are reproduced hereinbelow:— A. In Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, (1967) 1 SCR 227, it has been held as under:— “6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43: “In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.”
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit….” [Emphasis supplied]
B. In Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1913, it has been held as under:— “6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff….” [Emphasis supplied] C. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429, it has been held as under:— “27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.” [Emphasis supplied]
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
D. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243, it has been held as under:— “30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiff- respondents were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in- chief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff- respondents must be judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on records.” [Emphasis Supplied] E. In Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Ahsanul Ghani (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the plaint, that he has already performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him being on the plaintiff, mere want of objection by the defendant in the written statement is hardly of any effect or consequence. The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the pleading and the evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff has established that he has performed his part of the contract or
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has always been ready and willing to do so…” [Emphasis Supplied] F. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (Dead) by Legal Representatives (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract. 17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115], it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of
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specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus: (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the
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HC-KAR NC: 2025:KHC:46420-DB RFA No. 180 of 2015
plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
Thus a party must prove that he was not only willing to perform but also his “readiness” in terms of his financial capacity must be shown.
Although it is contended by the respondent/plaintiff that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, it is contended by the appellants/defendants that no proof of readiness or the capacity to pay was placed on record by the respondent/plaintiff.
The cross-examination of the P.W.1/N.S.Gangadhar would show that the respondent/plaintiff did not produce any proof that he had with him money at all times. In this regard, it is apposite to set out deposition of P.W.1 below: “After three months, I met Defendants and orally requested them to execute the sale Deed in favour of me as per the Agreement. No one was with me at the time of orally requesting the Defendants.
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It is not true that, I have no money and I have not contacted the Defendants and requested them to execute the Sale Deed. I cannot say in the year 2004 how much income I have earned. I had paid income tax in the year 2004. It is not true that, I have not paid any Income Tax. I have not produced any document to show that I am an agriculturist. I have not sent draft Sale Deed to the Defendants at the time of issuing Legal Notice through my Advocate. It is not true that the Agreement is not valid hence, I am not entitled to seek relief as prayed in the suit. It is not true that, I have not produced documents to show that I have remaining balance amount with me. It is false to suggest that I have not deposited the balance sale consideration amount due to I have no money with me. [Emphasis supplied]
The judgment of the learned Trial Court premised itself on the condition that defendant Nos.3 and 5 have not executed Ex.P1(Agreement to Sell) and thus, relying on the contention of respondent/plaintiff that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, passed a judgment decreeing the suit of the respondent/plaintiff.
13.1. The learned Trial Court however did not take into consideration the sine qua non of grant of relief as is set out in Section 16(1)(c) of the Specific Relief Act. In his cross-examination, D.W.2 - G.Rajappa clearly stated that
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the respondent/plaintiff was not always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract because he was not having sufficient funds. It was further stated that time was essence of the contract and since the respondent/plaintiff did not come forward within time, the sale transaction could not be completed and thus specific performance could not be granted. Paras 6 & 7 of deposition of D.W.2 are reproduced below in this regard: 6. I respectfully submit that the plaintiff was always not ready and willing to perform his part of contract, he had no funds to complete the sale transaction within the time prescribed from the due completion of the sale transaction. Since the plaintiff was not ready and willing and not having sufficient funds, the plaintiff left over the matter for almost 2 years without calling upon us to complete the sale transaction, except for the first time when the plaintiff got issued a legal notice dt. 23.2.2006, for which a suitable reply was issued. Till then not even once the plaintiff approached us and demanded to perform / execute the sale deed. Further as per the conditions the plaintiff has to pay Rs.7,50,000/- within 3 months from 01.6.2004. Even the said amount was not paid by the plaintiff to us since he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and since he had no funds to pay the said amount within 1.9.2004. Even thereafter the plaintiff should have been always ready and
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willing to perform his part of contract by paying the balance amount and demanding for the completion of the sale transaction. Since the plaintiff was not having any funds and he was not ready and willing to pay the balance of sale consideration as agreed upon in the alleged agreement of sale, the plaintiff did not raised his little ringer and has not asked and demanded to perform our part of contract except filing this suit. 7. I respectfully submit that time was the essence of the contract, since the plaintiff has not come forward and completed the sale transaction within the prescribed time _ the above suit for Specific Performance does not survive for consideration and viewed from any angle the plaintiff has miserably failed to perform his part of the contract and is disabled from seeking enforcement of the alleged agreement of sale dt. 1.6.2004. Further since the plaintiff was not having sufficient funds he has not even deposited the balance of sale consideration before this Hon’ble Court at the time of instituting this suit.
[Emphasis Supplied] 14. The learned Trial Court has not given any finding on behalf of the readiness of the plaintiff and instead found that appellants/defendants had failed to make a specific assertion qua execution of the sale agreement. It was further held that examination-in-chief of D.W.1 and D.W.2
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cannot be taken into consideration. The relevant extract of the Impugned Order is below: “13. On combined reading of the contention taken up by the defendants in their written statement, it is clearly discloses that the defendants that too the defendant Nos.3 and 5 failed to take specific contention that their respective fathers have no right to execute sale agreement. It is important to note that the defendant Nos. 1 to 6 jointly filed their written statement by denying the claim of the plaintiff. But the defendants in their written statement no where taken contention that the plaintiff has created sale agreement to deprive the rights of defendant Nos.3 and 5, who are not the signatory to the sale agreement. Apart from that, it is not the case of defendant No.3 and 5 that their respective father acting detrimental to their interest and also mismanaging the funds of the family including the part sale consideration received from the plaintiff. The defendants in their written statement not specifically denied the case of plaintiff. The denial of the defendants is bare denial which cannot be considered under law. Apart from this the defendant Nos. 5 and 2 filed their respective affidavits in lieu of their chief examination. The contents of chief examination portion of DW1 and DW2 cannot be taken into consideration, since the stand taken up by the defendant DW1 and DW2 in their chief examination, is not at all finds place in the written statement. It is well established principles of
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law that any amount of evidence without the pleadings cannot be considered under law. The DW1 and DW2 in their chief examination stated the new story which is contrary to the contents off their written statement. It is important to note that the defendants have seriously disputed the execution of sale agreement, despite of its execution which can be seen from the answers elicited from the mouth of DW2. It is well established principles of law that the manager of the family has got every right to alienate the co-parcnery property for their legal necessity. In the suit on hand the defendant Nos. 3 and 5 have not made specific allegation against their respective fathers about misutilization of the part sale consideration received from the plaintiff. The defendant Nos.1 and 4 being the father of defendant Nos. 3 and 5 entered into an agreement for sale of suit property belongs to the joint family for their legal necessity, which can be seen from the contents of Ex.P1 sale agreement at para No.2, page No.3 of said sale agreement. The defendant Nos. l, 2, 4 and 6 by executing the sale agreement in favour of plaintiff and also by receiving part sale consideration of Rs.7,59,688/- falsely contested the claim of plaintiff.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Concededly and from the examination of the respondent/plaintiff himself, since the readiness could not
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be proved, the learned Trial Court erred in granting the relief of specific performance. In these circumstances, the Impugned Judgment cannot be sustained.
However, it is not disputed by either party that amount of Rs.7,59,688/- has been paid by the respondent/plaintiff to the appellants/defendants.
In view thereof, this Court directs refund of Rs.7,59,688/- along with interest at the rate of *15% per annum by the respondent/plaintiff to the appellants/defendants. The payment shall be made within four months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment.
The appeal is allowed in the aforegoing terms. All pending applications stand closed.
(D K SINGH) JUDGE
(TARA VITASTA GANJU) JUDGE
Yn/TIN List No.: 1 Sl No.: 24 *Retyped & Replaced Vide Court Order dated:27.02.2026 Digitally signed by TARA VITASTA GANJU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNTAKA Digitally signed by DINESH KUMAR SINGH Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNTAKA