No AI summary yet for this case.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH DATED THIS THE 27th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2017 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE S.SUJATHA AND THE HON’BLE Dr. JUSTICE H. B. PRABHAKARA SASTRY INCOME TAX APPEAL No.100015/2014 BETWEEN: 1. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, C.R. BUILDING, NAVANAGAR, HUBLI.
THE ASST. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
CIRCLE 2(1),
HUBLI.
… APPELLANTS (BY SRI.Y.V. RAVIRAJ, ADV.)
AND:
KARNATAKA VIKAS GRAMEEN BANK,
HEAD OFFICE,
BELGAUM ROAD,
DHARWAD.
…RESPONDENT (BY SRI. A. SHANKAR AND SHASHANK HEGDE, ADVS.)
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 260A OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 AGAINST THE ORDER PASSED IN ITA NO.227/BANG/2012, ON THE FILE OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE BENCH ‘C’, THE APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2008-09 IS DISMISSED.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, S.SUJATHA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
2 JUDGMENT
This appeal is filed by the Revenue under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’) challenging the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench “C” (for short, ‘the ITAT’) in ITA No.227/Bang/2012, dated 28.11.2013.
The respondent-assessee is a regional rural bank engaged in the business of banking and also making investment in Government and other securities. For the assessment year 2008-09, the assessee filed its return of income declaring a total income of Rs.93,22,72,000/-. The assessment proceedings were taken up by the assessing authority by issuing notice under Section 143(2) read with Section 129 of the Act on 27.08.2010, which came to be concluded by making various additions to the returned income and demand was made accordingly. Among the various additions made by the assessing
3 authority, two additions are the subject matter of this appeal.
On the additions made by the assessing authority, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (for short, ‘CIT(A)’), which came to be allowed deleting the additions made by the assessing authority. On further appeal before the ITAT, the order of the CIT(A) was confirmed. Being aggrieved, the Revenue is in appeal raising the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the Tribunal was justified in allowing the claim of deduction made by the assessee at Rs.19,62,04,357/- under Section 31(1) (vii a) of the Income Tax Act, 1961? 2. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in allowing the excess claim of deduction made by the assessee under Section 31(1) (viii) of the Income Tax Act 1961 at Rs.6,74,91,000/- without properly appreciating explanation “h” to Section 36(1)(viii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961?
Sri. Y.V. Raviraj, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue would submit that during the assessment
4 proceedings, assessee had claimed deduction under Section 36(1)(viia) towards ‘Provision for bad and doubtful debts’ amounting to Rs.19,62,03,357/-. It was further observed that the assessee had also claimed deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act at Rs.2,47,52,075/-. The assessing authority considering the provisions under provisions of Section 36(1)(vii) relating to bad and doubtful debts to be written off as irrecoverable and also considering the provisions of Section 36(1)(viia) and Section 36(2)(v) of the Act came to the conclusion that while considering the claim for bad and doubtful debts under Section 36(1)(vii), only such amount of bad debts written off as exceeds the credit balance available in the provisions for bad and doubtful debt account created under Section 36(1)(viia) of the Act should be allowed as deduction. This aspect of the matter was not appreciated by the CIT(A) as well as ITAT. It was further contended that as regards excess deduction claimed under section 36(1)(viii) has to be
5 computed for Long Term Eligible Advances at Rs.456 Crores as seen from the annual report for the financial year 2007-08 and not at Rs.1055.01 crores as claimed by the assessee, the same was not properly appreciated by the CIT(A) as well as ITAT, which deserves to be considered by this Court.
Sri. A. Shankar and Shashank Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the assessee inviting the attention of this Court to the orders of the CIT(A) as well as ITAT submits that both the facts finding authorities have carefully examined these issues. The finding was given by the CIT(A) that the appellant has not debited bad debt written off under Section 36(1)(vii) in the books nor claimed deduction in the return of income but reduced from opening provision for bad and doubtful debts. This was appreciated and confirmed by the ITAT. As regards the eligible advances, it was further contended that the assessing authority has wrongly considered the advances
6 at Rs.456.53 crores based on aging analysis as on 31.03.2008, what was required to be considered was that the advances given for a period of more than five years may be outstanding for a period for less than five years as on 31.03.2008, due to repayment being made in accordance with terms and loans and advances. Misunderstanding of the facts has resulted in miscarriage of justice, the same has been analysed by the CIT(A) and ITAT in considering the eligible advances amount of Rs.1055.01 Crores and not Rs.456 Crores as adopted by the Assessing Officer, which do not call for any interference by this Court.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record.
As regards the question relating to the bad and doubtful debts, it is clear that the assessee has not claimed any deduction in the return of income, writing off bad debts under Section 36(1)(viii) of the Act. It is the
7 reduction made from opening provision for bad and doubtful debts. Both the appellate facts finding authorities i.e. CIT(A) as well as ITAT have recorded this finding. In view of the aforesaid, the arguments of learned counsel for the Revenue do not merit any consideration.
Section 36(1)(viii) provides in respect of special reserve created and maintained by a specified entity, an amount not exceeding twenty percent of the profits derived from eligible advances computed under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession” (before making any deduction under this clause) carried to such reserved account.
As regards eligible advances, it is worth to refer to Section 36(1)(viii), Explanation (b) which defines, “eligible advances” means, [i) in respect of the specified entity referred to in sub-clause(i) or sub-clause(ii) or sub-clause(iii) or sub-clause(iv) of clause (a), the business of providing long term finance for A) industrial or agricultural
8 development; B) development of infrastructure facility in India; or C) development of housing in India;].
‘Long term finance’ is defined under clause-(h) of explanation to Section 36 (1) (viii) of the Act , which reads thus: “long term finance” means any loan or advance where the terms under which moneys are loaned or advanced provide for repayment along with the interest thereof during a period of not less than five years”
A reading of these provisions makes it clear that any loans or advances where the terms under which moneys are loaned or advanced during a period not less than five years shall be considered as ‘eligible advances’.
The assessing officer appears to have misunderstood this total eligible advances based on the aging analysis not considering the actual advances given for a period of more than five years. The appellate fact finding authorities have set-aside the findings of the assessing authority after analyzing the material on record and held that it is not an amount loaned or advanced reflected in the aging analysis
9 after certain repayment made during the period of more than five years, but it should be actual amount or loans advanced and bearing interest which have to be repaid during the period of more than five years shall be the eligible advances and accordingly accepted the eligible advances at Rs.1055.01 crores allowable for deduction under Section 36(1)(viii) of the Act. The said finding do not call for any interference by this Court.
Accordingly, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
The appeal stands dismissed.
Sd/- JUDGE
Sd/- JUDGE
JTR