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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF JUNE, 2021
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE S.SUJATHA
AND
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
RFA.NO.124 OF 2012 (PAR) C/W RFA.NO.216 OF 2012 (PAR) C/W RFA.NO.164 OF 2012 (PAR) C/W RFA.NO.158 OF 2012 (PAR)
IN RFA NO.124/2012 BETWEEN:
SRI C.R.KEMPARAJU S/O LATE SRI C.RAMASWAMY AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS # 190/1 DOMLUR LAYOUT, BANGALORE-560071 ...APPELLANT (BY SRI.SREEVATSA, SR.ADVOCATE FOR M/S SREEVATSA ASSOCIATES)
AND:
SMT C.R.VANAJAKSHI
D/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
# 343, II A-MAIN, DOMLUR, BANGALORE-560071
SMT NANJAMMA
W/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
R/AT NO.122, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560071
SRI C.R.LAKSHMINARAYAN
S/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
R/AT NO.111, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560071
SMT LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT NO.190/1 DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560071
SRI R.N.AMARNATH
S/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT NO.190/1 DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071
SMT R.N.LATHA
D/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
R/AT NO 16, RAMASWAMY PALYA,
M.S.NAGAR POST, BANGALORE-560033
SRI R.N.MADHUSUDHAN
S/O LATE C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE - 560071. …RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. PRAMILA NESARGI, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI.S.G.MUNISWAMY GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI.VENUGOPAL.M.S, ADVOCATE FOR R3; SRI.JAYAKUMAR.S.PATIL, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI.V.CHANDRAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R4 TO R7; V/O DATED 11/12/2018 NOTICE TO R2 IS DISPENSEDN WITH)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED: 29.10.2011 PASSED IN O.S.NO.11112/1994 ON THE FILE OF THE XXVIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL JUDGE, MAYOHALL UNIT, BANGALORE, PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION AND SEPARATE POSSESSION AND MESNE PROFITS DISMISSING THE COUNTER CLAIM OF THE DEFENDANTS 2 AND 4 TO 7 THEREIN.
IN RFA NO.216/2012 BETWEEN:
SMT LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
R/AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071
SRI R.N.AMARNATH
S/O.LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
R/AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071
SMT R.N.LATHA
D/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT NO.16, RAMASWAMY PALYA,
M.S NAGAR POST, BANGALORE-560 033
SRI R.N MADHUSUDHAN
S/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
R/AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071 ...APPELLANTS (BY SRI.JAYAKUMAR.S.PATIL, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI.V.CHANDRAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
SMT C.R VANAJAKSHI
D/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
R/AT NO.343, II A MAIN,
DOMLUR, BANGALORE-560 071
SMT NANJAMMA
W/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
R/AT NO.122, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071
SRI C.R.KEMPARAJU
S/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
R/AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071
SRI C.R.LAKSHMINARAYAN
S/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
R/AT NO.111, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.SREEVATSA, SR.ADVOCATE FOR M/S SREEVATSA, ASSOCIATES FOR R3; SRI.VENUGOPAL.M.S, ADVOCATE FOR R4; NOTICE TO R1 IS SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED; V/O DATED 14/4/2014 NOTICE TO R2 IS HELD SUFFICIENT)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W ORDER XLI OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED: 29.10.2011 PASSED IN O.S.NO.11112/1994 ON THE FILE OF THE XXVIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL JUDGE, MAYOHALL UNIT, BANGALORE, PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION, SEPARATE POSSESSION, DISMISSING THE COUNTER CLAIM OF THE DEFENDANTS 2 AND 4 TO 7 THEREIN.
IN RFA NO.164/2012 BETWEEN:
SRI C.R.LAKSHMINARAYAN S/O LATE RAMASWAMY, AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS, RESIDING AT NO.277, 6TH CROSS, DOMLUR LAYOUT, BANGALORE-560071 ...APPELLANT (BY SRI.M S VENUGOPAL, ADVOCATE)
AND: 1. SMT. C.R.VANAJAKSHI
D/O LATE RAMASWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.191, DOMLUR VILLAGE,
SHANKARNAG ROAD, BANGALORE-560071
SMT. NANJAMMA
W/O LATE SRI.RAMASWAMY,
AGED ABOUT 85 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.277, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560071
SRI. C.R.KEMPARAJU
S/O LATE C. RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR VILLAGE,
BANGALORE-560071
SMT. LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE C.R.NARAYAN,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR VILLAGE,
BANGALORE-560071
SRI.R.N.AMARNATH
S/O LATE C.R.NARAYAN,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR VILLAGE,
BANGALORE-560071
SMT. R.N.LATHA
D/O LATE C.R.NARAYAN,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.16, RAMASWAMY PALYA,
M.S.NAGAR POST, BANGALORE
SRI. R.N.MADHUSUDAN
S/O LATE C.R.NARAYAN,
AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.190/1, DOMLUR VILLAGE,
BANGALORE-560071 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.SREEVATSA, SR.ADVOCATE FOR M/S SREEVATSA ASSOCIATES FOR R3; SMT.PRAMILA NESARGI, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI.S.G.MUNISWAMY GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R1; SRI.JAYAKUMAR.S.PATIL, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI.V.CHANDRAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R4 TO R7; V/O DATED 28/4/2014 NOTICE TO R2 IS DISPENSED WITH)
THIS RFA IS FILED U/O-XLI, RULE-1, R/W SEC.96 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED: 29.10.2011 PASSED IN O.S.11112/1994 ON THE FILE OF THE XXVIII
ADDL.CITY CIVIL JUDGE, MAYOHALL UNIT, BANGALORE, PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION AND SEPARATE POSSESSION.
IN RFA NO.158/2012 BETWEEN:
SMT C.R VANAJAKSHI D/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS # 343, II A-MAIN, DOMLUR, BANGALORE - 560071 ...APPELLANT (BY SMT.PRAMILA NESARGI, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI.S.G.MUNISWAMY GOWDA, ADVOCATE)
AND: 1. SMT NANJAMMA
W/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
R/AT NO 122, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE - 560071
SRI C R KEMPARAJU
S/O LATE SRI C.RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
R/AT # 190/1 DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE - 560071
SRI C.R.LAKSHMINARAYAN
S/O LATE SRI RAMASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
R/AT NO 111, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE - 560 071
SMT LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT NO 190/1 DOMLUR LAYOUT
BANGALORE - 560071
SRI R.N AMARNATH
S/O LATE SRI C.R. NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT NO 190/1, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE-560 071
SMT R.N.LATHA
D/O LATE SRI C.R.NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
R/AT NO 16, RAMASWAMY PALYA,
MS NAGAR POST, BANGALORE - 560038
SRI R N MADHUSUDHAN
S/O LATE C R NARAYAN
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R/AT NO 190/1, DOMLUR LAYOUT,
BANGALORE - 560071 …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.SREEVATSA, SR.ADVOCATE FOR M/S SREEVATSA ASSOCIATES FOR R2; SRI.VENUGOPAL.M.S, ADVOCATE FOR R3; SRI.JAYAKUMAR.S.PATIL, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI.V.CHANDRAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R4 TO R7; V/O DATED 13/7/2016, R1 IS EXPIRED AND LRs ARE ALREADY ON RECORD IN CONNECTED APPEALS)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W ORDER 41 RULE 1 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED: 29.10.2011 PASSED IN O.S.NO.11112/1994 ON THE FILE OF THE XXVIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL JUDGE, MAYOHALL UNIT, BANGALORE, PARTLY DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION AND SEPARATE POSSESSION, DISMISSING THE COUNTER CLAIM OF THE DEFENDANT NO.2 AND 4 TO 7 THEREIN.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 23.12.2020, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
The present four appeals are all arising out of the judgment and decree passed by the court below in O.S.No.11112/1994, which is filed for partition and separate possession.
RFA No.158/2012 is filed by the plaintiff questioning the judgment and decree passed by the court below insofar as denying share to the plaintiff in item No.1, 3 to 9 of Schedule-C properties. In the present appeal, the appellant is seeking share in the above said properties as well as to grant share in all the properties covered under the counter claim raised by defendant No.3.
Defendant No.2 has filed an appeal in RFA No.124/2012 challenging the judgment and decree in entirety
with a prayer to dismiss the counter claim filed by defendant Nos.3 and 4 to 7.
RFA No.164/2012 is filed by defendant No.3 challenging the judgment and decree insofar as granting share to plaintiff. Further, has prayed to allow his counter claim as prayed.
Defendant Nos.4 to 7 representing the branch of Narayan (brother of plaintiff and defendant 2 and 3) have filed RFA No.216/2012 challenging the judgment and decree insofar as denying share in the properties standing in the name of defendant No.3. 6. RFA No.760/2012 was filed by the purchaser pertaining to Sy.No.81 of Bhoganahalli village. This court having recorded the statement of plaintiff and defendants has allowed the appeal filed by the purchaser and therefore, Sy.No.81 stands excluded and the same is not the subject matter of these appeals.
For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court.
The family tree of the plaintiffs and defendants family is culled out, which is as follows: FAMILY TREE Late Sri Ramaswamy (deceased 09.03.1971)
C.R.Vanajakshi C.R.Kemparaju C.R.Lakshminarayan C.R.Narayan C.R.Parvathamma (R1/Plaintiff) (Deft.No.2/D2) (R.3/D.3) (dead) (not a party) (26.10.1993) (release deed dated 14.04.1971)
Smt.Lakshmamma R.N.Amarnath R.N.Latha R.N.Madhusudhan (R.4/D.4)
(R.5/D.5) (R.6/D.6) (R.7/D.7)
Plaintiff namely, C.R.Vanajakshi is the daughter of late Sri.C.Ramaswamy who has instituted the present suit for partition and separate possession claiming her legitimate share in the suit schedule properties which are at Schedule-A, B, C and D properties. It is stated in the plaint that, plaintiff’s father namely, C.Ramaswamy died on 09.03.1971 leaving behind his wife Smt.Nanjamma who is arrayed as defendant
No.1 in the suit and two daughters, namely, plaintiff and C.R.Parvathamma and three sons namely, C.R.Kemparaj (defendant No.2), C.R.Lakshminarayan (defendant No.3) and C.R.Narayan. Defendant Nos.4 to 7 are the legal heirs of deceased C.R.Narayan. The sister of plaintiff C.R.Parvathamma is not party to the present partition suit. The plaintiff at para 3 of the plaint has stated that her sister C.R.Parvathamma having received her share in the properties has executed a release deed dated 14.04.1971.
The sum and substance of plaintiff’s case before the trial court is that, her father was allotted a house premises bearing No.190/1 comprising of ground floor and first floor situated at Domlur, Bangalore, which is described as item No.2 in Schedule-A in a family partition between himself and his brothers after the death of their father in the year 1955.
Plaintiff has stated that this partition took place in the year 1955. The plaintiff has further stated that her father
was a contractor and out of the said profession, he acquired several properties of his own without the aid of ancestral properties as described in Schedule-A, which was not at all yielding any income. The properties acquired by plaintiff’s father are fully described in Schedule-B. It is also specifically averred in para 5 of the plaint that her father has acquired several properties which are not within her knowledge and she craves leave of the court to add said properties as and when she would acquire details.
Plaintiff specifically alleged in the plaint that defendant Nos.2 and 7 are managing the suit schedule properties and the income derived from the properties left behind by her father is utilized to purchase several properties which are more specifically described in Schedule-C. It is also specifically averred at para 7 of the plaint that item No.2 in Schedule-B consists of a Sharada Lunch Home, shops and rooms and the said properties generate considerable income in the form of rent. It is also stated that items Nos.3 and 4 of
Schedule-B properties also yields substantial rent as it consists of six shops. Similarly, item Nos.4 and 5 also generate substantial rents and all the income generated out of the above said properties is utilized by defendant No.2 to purchase several properties which are more specifically described at Schedule-C.
The grievance of the plaintiff before the trial court was that, though defendants have allotted share to her sister, but however, for strange reasons are denying plaintiff’s legitimate share in the suit schedule properties. It is also specifically alleged at para 10 of the plaint that, defendants have taken signature on blank papers and that they are claiming that there is partition. This fact is seriously disputed by the plaintiff and specific contention is taken that alleged partition deed was never acted upon. It is also stated at para 11 of the plaint that joint family funds is also utilized by defendant No.2 in establishing Laxmi Brick Factory.
Plaintiff alleges that defendants have created documents of partnership, while in fact the said property is also joint family property and plaintiff is entitled for 1/5th share. On these set of pleadings the present suit is filed seeking 1/5th legitimate share in all the suit schedule properties.
On receipt of summons, defendant No.2 tendered appearance and contested the proceedings by filing written statement. Defendant No.2 has stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint. At para 9 of the written statement, defendant No.2 has contended that there was a family settlement in the year 1971 and in the said family settlement, the present plaintiff, Parvathamma and mother, i.e, defendant No.1 were given certain properties towards their share and in lieu of shares allotted to them, they have relinquished their right, title and interest in the properties left behind by the father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 and 3. At para 9, defendant No.2 has specifically contended that
plaintiff was allotted a portion of premises bearing No.191 of Domlur (item No.1 of Schedule-A) and she was also permitted to collect rents pertaining to the properties situated at Haines road. Defendant No.2 has further stated that this arrangement was made and plaintiff was permitted to collect rents since her husband was a drunkard and he deserted plaintiff. After plaintiff’s children attained majority, the rents presently are being collected by defendant No.2. It is also alleged at para 10 of the written statement that, though plaintiff promised that she would execute registered deed of release, since she was in a very economically pitiable condition, defendant No.2 did not insist upon the plaintiff to execute release deed immediately. There is counter allegations by defendant No.2 that taking undue advantage of generosity and lenience shown by defendant No.2, the plaintiff has come up with false and frivolous suit.
Defendant No.2 has contended that, in view of family arrangement, female members of the family have given
up their right, title and interest in the suit schedule properties and it was understood and agreed among the family members that, it is only male members of the family who would alone succeed to all the suit schedule properties left behind by the father. 16. Defendant No.3 filed written statement and stoutly denied the entire averments made in the plaint. It is specifically averred by defendant No.3 also that, plaintiff is not the member of the joint family. At para 4 of the written statement, defendant No.3 also admitted that other sister of plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 and 3 namely, Parvathamma was given her share in the suit schedule properties and she has executed release deed on 14.04.1971. It is also stated by defendant No.3 that, since plaintiff has included properties which were allotted to the share of Parvathamma, she is a necessary party and therefore, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. At para 10 and 11 of the written
statement, defendant No.3 has specifically denied plaintiff’s right in Schedule-B and Schedule-C properties. 17. At para 22 of the written statement, defendant No.3 has taken a contention that there was partition between his father Ramaswamy and his brothers and the properties were allotted to the share of his father and the properties which were allotted to the share of his father were generating income and his father acquired several properties from the joint family funds. Defendant No.3 has also specifically pleaded that acquisition made if any from contract business were also thrown in the common hotchpotch and they were treated as joint family properties. Defendant No.3 has also stated that his father died on 09.03.1971 and the joint family was not earning any income and family had incurred debts which were discharged by his sons by their independent earnings. At para 25 of the written statement, defendant No.3 has taken a contention that Schedule-B properties were acquired from the income derived out of item No.1 of
Schedule-B property and they are joint family properties and it is only defendant Nos.2 and 3 and defendant Nos.4 to 7 who are legal representatives of deceased Narayan being coparceners alone entitled for share in the suit schedule properties and plaintiff cannot lay a claim. Defendant No.3 at para 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 has taken a specific contention that items Nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Schedule-B are joint family properties of defendant No.3 and his brothers, i.e., defendant No.2 and his deceased bother Narayan. However, defendant No.3 has specifically denied the right over this Schedule-B properties.
Defendant No.3 has further claimed that, item No.6, 7, 8, 9(a), 9(b), 9(c), 9(d) and 9(e) and item Nos.6 to 9 of Schedule-C properties are his self-acquired properties and therefore, neither the plaintiff nor defendant No.2, nor defendant Nos.4 to 7 have any semblance of right. On these set of grounds, defendant No.3 has sought for dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff.
By way of counter claim, defendant No.3 has specifically contended that, he along with defendant No.2 by utilizing joint family funds, i.e., rents derived from item Nos.2 and 3 of Schedule-B have purchased Sy.No.46/2, 46/3, 52/1A, 52/2A and 81, Sy.37, 37/4 and the same are the joint family properties of himself, defendant No.2 and deceased brother Narayan and the said properties are liable to be partitioned only between defendant Nos.1 to 7. There is also specific allegation by defendant No.3 that, defendant No.2 was acting as Kartha and the entire rents were being collected by defendant No.2. At para 51, defendant No.3 has also furnished details of properties which are to be partitioned only between defendant Nos.1 to 7. 20. Defendant No.3 at para 4 of the counter claim admits that sister of the plaintiff namely, Parvathamma was allotted share that were owned and possessed by joint family and she has executed release deed. Apart from denying the averments made in the plaint, defendant No.3 has contended
at para 25 of the written statement that item No.1 of Schedule-A was purchased by their father in the name Narayan and defendant No.2 under registered sale deed dated 12.12.1968 and 18.09.1969. He has further stated that, what was purchased was the vacant land and all the three brothers by their joint efforts have put up construction. Therefore, item No.1 of Schedule-A property is self-acquired property of all the three sons of Ramaswamy. Therefore, plaintiff is not at all entitled to clam right in item No.1 of Schedule-A property. Similar contention is raised in respect of item No.2 of Schedule-A property.
However, defendant No.3 admits that item No.1 of Schedule-B property was joint family property. At para 27 of the written statement, it is specifically contended that item No.1 of Schedule-B property is coparcenery property. It is also contended that item No.2 of Schedule-B property was acquired from the income derived out of item No.1 of Schedule-B property. Therefore, it is joint family property and defendant
Nos.2, 3 and deceased Narayan being coparceners are alone entitled for share in the said properties. It is also stated that, entire item No.2 of Schedule-B property are in occupation of tenants and defendant No.2 is collecting more than Rs.40,000/- rent per months. 22. At para 30 of the written statement, defendant No.3 has also contended that plaintiff was allotted properties bearing No.65/1, 65/11 and 65/12 and she was put in exclusive possession of the said properties. Therefore, plaintiff having received her legitimate share in the family settlement cannot maintain the present suit.
Defendant No.3 has also contended at para 33 of the written statement that, item Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 of Schedule-C properties are self-acquired properties of defendant Nos.2 and 3 and late Narayan. Item No.3 in Schedule-C property is self-acquired property of defendant No.3. Defendant No.3 has further claimed that, insofar as item
No.6 of Schedule-C property is concerned, i.e., Sy.No.45 measuring 4 acres 6 guntas, the same is self-acquired property of these defendants. 24. Defendant No.3 in counter claim at para 46 has given details of properties which were acquired by joint efforts of defendant Nos.3 and 2. It is specifically stated that, rents derived from item Nos.2 and 3 of Schedule-B properties was utilized to purchase the following properties, i.e., Sy.No.46/2, 46/3, 52/1A, 52/2A, Sy.No.81 of Boganhalli village, Sy.No.37, 37/4 of Kannurhalli village. Defendant No.3 has also claimed absolute ownership over the property acquired on the basis of gift deed dated 18.08.2010 executed by his mother, i.e., defendant No.1. 25. At para 49, defendant No.3 has also stated that, item Nos.2, 3 and 5 of Schedule-B was getting rents of more than Rs.30,000/- p.m. and said properties are fetching more
than Rs.50,000/- and there is specific allegation that, defendant No.2 is collecting all the rents. 26. Defendant Nos.4, 6 and 7 have filed separate written statement. At para 10 of the written statement, defendant Nos.4, 6 and 7 have contended that they have been assisting defendant Nos.2 and 3 in the family business. It is also stated that father of defendant Nos.5 to 7, defendant Nos.2 and 3 started bricks factory in the year 1982 and defendant Nos.5 to 7 are working in the said factory. Defendant Nos.5, 6 and 7 have further specifically stated in the written statement that, rents generated from Sharada Lunch Home situated at wheelers road and shops situated at Haines road and the entire joint family income is in the hands of defendant Nos.2 and 3 and the said income is utilized to purchase the properties in the name of defendant Nos.2 and 3.
Defendant Nos.4, 6 and 7 by way of counter claim have also claimed share in the properties held by defendant Nos.2 and 3.
The Trial Court based on the rival contentions formulated following issues: 1. Whether plaintiff proves that the defendants acquired schedule property by making use of the income derived from schedule property? 2. Whether plaintiff proves that she has 1/5th share in the suit property? 3. Whether plaintiff proves that out of the funds of joint family, defendant No.2 established one M/s Lakshmi Brick factory viz., item No.4 and 5 in schedule C of the plaint? 4. Whether plaintiff proves that after the demise of her father, the 2nd and 7th defendant have been in actual management of the property though the (plaintiff) she also is in joint possession and
enjoyment of the property as averred in para 6 of the plaint? 5. Whether defendant No.2 proves that item No.1 of the suit property is his self acquired property? 6. Whether defendant No.2 proves that item No.2 of the suit property was already sold by all the LRs of Sri.Ramaswamy? 7. Whether defendant No.2 proves that item No.1 of schedule B property is given to the plaintiff towards his share? 8. Whether defendant No.2 proves that item No.1 of schedule C of the suit property is sold by all the LRs including the plaintiff as averred in para 4 of W.S.? 9. Whether defendant No.2 further proves that item No.2, 3, 4, and 5 of schedule properties are self acquired properties of himself and Sri.Lakshminarayan? 10. Whether defendant No.2 proves that there was family settlement in 1971 wherein the plaintiff was given some properties towards her share?
Whether defendant No.2 proves that he is entitled for compensatory costs? 12. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief as prayed for? 13. What order or decree? Additional issues framed on 10.1.2002: 1. Whether defendant No.3 proves that under release deed dated 14.4.71 plaintiff and C.Parvathamma relinquished their right in joint family? 2. Whether suit is bad for non joinder of C.Parvathamma to the suit? 3. Whether D-3 is entitled to 1/3rd share in schedule attached to his counter claim? Additional issues framed on 29.10.2009: 4. Whether the defendant No.2 proves that plaintiff suit for partition is not maintainable as contended in para No.2 of the counter claim? 5. Whether the defendant No.2 proves that the counter claim properties acquired out of the income derived
from M/s Lakshmi Bricks as contemplated in para 3 of the counter claim? 6. Whether the defendant No.2 proves that he is entitled to share as contended in para No.5 of the counter claim? Additional issues framed on 18.06.2011: 7. Whether the defendant No.3 proves that the counter claim made in his written statement properties are the joint family properties, defendant No.3 is entitled for 1/3rd share? 8. Whether the plaintiff and defendants are entitled for mesne profits? 29. The plaintiff to substantiate her claim examined herself as P.W.1 and relied on relinquishment deed executed by her sister Parvathamma as Ex.P1. She has also produced record of rights as per Exs.P2 and P3.
Defendant No.2 to substantiate his claim examined himself as D.W.1. Defendant No.3 to substantiate his claim
examined himself as D.W.4 and defendant Nos.4, 5 and 7 examined defendant No.5 on their behalf as D.W.6. Defendants have relied on rebuttal evidence. Defendant Nos.1 to 7 by way of rebuttal evidence have relied on documentary evidence Exs.D1 to D434. The trial court having appreciated the oral and documentary evidence has decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff in part. However, the suit is dismissed in respect of item Nos.1 and 3 to 9 of Schedule-C properties and also the properties which are subject matter of counter claim raised by defendant Nos.2 to 7, in the said properties also no share is granted. 31. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the denial of share in Schedule-C properties as well as in the properties covered in the counter claim raised by defendant Nos.2 and 3 has preferred an appeal in RFA No.158/2012. Defendant Nos.2 challenging the judgment and decree in entirety has filed RFA No.124/2012 questioning the judgment and decree in allowing the counter claim filed by defendant No.3 and defendant Nos.4
to 7. Defendant No.3 has preferred an appeal in RFA No.164/2012 challenging the judgment and decree insofar as granting share to the plaintiff and decree in some of the properties which are claimed by defendant No.3 to be self- acquired properties. 32. Learned senior counsel Smt.Pramila Nesargi appearing for the plaintiff would profusely argue and contend before this court that the entire approach adopted by the learned Judge in discarding the clinching evidence has resulted in miscarriage of justice. Learned senior counsel would submit to this court that there an voluminous clinching evidence which would clearly establish that plaintiff was in joint possession with defendant Nos.1 to 7 and she was party to all the transactions relating to the family. To buttress her arguments, she placed reliance on Ex.D57, which is mortgage deed executed by plaintiff and defendants in favour of B.H.Mangala D/o B.V.Hanumaiah. Placing reliance on this document, she would argue and contend before us that the
fact that plaintiff has signed the mortgage deed along with her brother i.e., defendant Nos.2 and 3 would clearly clinch the issue. If at all the plaintiff had no right, then defendants would not have called upon the plaintiff to sign the document. 33. The learned senior counsel would further rely on release deed executed by C.R.Parvathamma who is none other than the sister of plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 and 3. Placing reliance on this release deed, she would submit to this court that defendant Nos.1 to 7 are estopped from contending that plaintiff has no share in all the suit schedule properties. The fact that Parvathamma received her share in the suit schedule properties in-lieu of the legitimate share, she has executed release deed would clinch the issue and the voluminous documents relied on by defendant Nos.1 to 7 would be of no consequence and the said documents cannot outweigh the clinching evidence as per Ex.D57 mortgage deed and Ex.D58.
She would further vehemently argue and contend before this court that, though plaintiff has averred at para 5 of the plaint that suit schedule properties were self-acquired properties of her father C.Ramaswamy, however, the documentary evidence and the pleadings in the written statement would clearly establish that suit schedule properties are coparcenerary properties. The pleadings at para 5 of the plaint cannot be regarded as conclusive admission on the part of the plaintiff. Therefore, the valuable rights which the plaintiff is entitled to cannot be negated by relying on the pleadings at para 5 of the plaint. Learned Senior Counsel placing reliance on the latest judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma and Others1 case would submit to this court that plaintiff is entitled for share in all the suit schedule properties which are subject matter of counter claim filed by defendant Nos.4 to 7, defendant Nos.2 and 3. She would lastly submit to this court that plaintiff’s father C.Ramaswamy died intestate leaving vast
1 (2020) 9 SCC 1
properties which were admittedly fetching huge rents. Plaintiff’s brothers namely, defendant Nos.2 and 3 and also deceased brother Narayan had absolutely no independent earnings. Plaintiff’s brothers in the absence of independent income have utilized surplus income which was received in the form of rents and have purchased Schedule-B and C properties and also several properties in the name of defendant No.3. On these set of grounds she would submit to this court that judgment and decree of the trial court denying share in Schedule-C properties and also in the properties which were subject matter of counter claim raised by defendant Nos.2 and 3 suffers from serious perversity. She would submit to this court that the learned Judge has virtually misread the entire evidence on record and therefore prays to this court that judgment and decree is liable to be set aside by allowing the appeal in entirety by granting 1/5th share in all the suit schedule properties owned by plaintiff’s family.
Per contra, learned senior counsel Sri.Sreevatsa repelling the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs would vehemently argue and contend before this court that suit filed by the plaintiff seeking partition and separate possession ought to have been out- rightly dismissed since plaintiff was married way back in 1961 and therefore she ceased to be a member of joint family of Ramaswamy. He would further argue and contend before this court that till Ramaswamy passed away, he treated all the properties as his absolute properties and there is no pleading or evidence to demonstrate that Ramaswamy acted as Kartha during his lifetime. He would further state that there is no evidence indicating that Ramaswamy consciously and in unequivocal terms put all his properties into common hotchpotch and that the properties were treated as joint family properties. He would further state that there is absolutely no pleading in regard to existence of coparceneray properties and there is no evidence in regard to existence of joint Hindu
family capable of becoming coparcenerary during the lifetime of Ramaswamy.
He would argue and contend before this court that, on the death of Ramaswamy on 09.03.1971, his widow i.e., defendant No.1 and children i.e., plaintiff, defendant Nos.2 and 3 and deceased brother Narayan inherited the properties, but the question that would arise is whether the said inheritance would in itself constitute joint family without there being a clear act of tenants in common intending to place all properties in a common hotchpotch. 37. Learned senior counsel further placing reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in 2Hardeo Rai Vs. Sakuntala Devi would contend before this court that Apex Court had an occasion to draw distinction between coparcenerary property and a property of Hindu undivided family. He would also further submit to this court that there is difference between partnership firm and Hindu joint family
2 (2008)7 SCC 46
firm. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in 3Nanchand Gangaram Shetji Vs Mallappa Mahalingappa Sadalga, would vehemently argue and submit that there is no presumption that business standing in the name of any member of the joint family is a joint family business. He further placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in 4P.S.Sairam Vs P.S.Ram Rao Pissey. Learned senior counsel would further contend that when succession takes place under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the joint family ceases to exist and the heirs would inherited the properties as tenants in common and not joint tenants. 38. Learned senior counsel would further state that all items in Schedule-B properties were purchased by Ramaswamy either in his own name or in the name of his sons and those properties are alone for partition amongst his heirs and Class-I heirs since the daughters and brothers have
3 (1976) 2 SCC 429 4 (2004) 11 SCC 320
succeeded under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, the properties standing in the name of Ramaswamy sons cannot be subject matter of partition. Therefore, all items in Schedule-C will have to be completely excluded. Learned senior counsel would bank on one document which is an estate duty assessment order as per Ex.D53. Placing reliance on this document, he would submit that the declaration made to the estate duty assessment to the Estate Officer at Ex.D53 which is at the earliest point of time would clinch the entire controversy between the parties and plaintiff is entitled for share only in these properties which are covered under Ex.D53. Therefore, he would submit to this court that that learned Judge was not justified in granting share in respect of some properties which are not covered under estate duty assessment order as per Ex.D53.
Learned senior counsel in support of his arguments has placed relieved on following judgments.
i) Surjit Lal Chhabda V. The Comissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, 1976 (3) SCC 142. ii) Mrs. Mllika and others V. Chandrappa and Others 2008 (1)) Kant LJ 82 iii) Dr.Suraj Munjal V. Chandan Munjal and Others 2018 SCC Online Del 6902. iv) Bhagwat Sharan Vs. Purushottam and Others 2020 (6) SCC 387. v) Uttam V. Saubhag Singh and Others 2016 (4) SCC 68. vi) Bhanwar Singh V. Puran and Others 2008 (3) SCC 87. vii) Goli Eswaraiah Vs. commissioner of Gift Tax, Andhra Pradesh 1970 (2) SCC 390. viii) K.V.Narayanan Vs K.V.Ranganadhan and others 1977 (1) SCC 244.
ix) Commissioner of Income – Tax, Orissa Vs. Harish Chandra Gupta 1981 SCC Onliine Ori 104. x) Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others Vs. Chander Sen and others 1986 (3) 567. xi) Aarshiya Gulati (Minor) Vs. Kuldeep Singh Gulati and Others 2019 SCC Online Del 6867. 40. Lastly, he would submit to this court that Laxmi Bricks is a partnership created by three sons of Ramaswamy, and therefore, plaintiff being a sister has absolutely no interest and the fact that partnership firm was unregistered would be of no consequence and it would only affects the rights to file the suit under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. 41. Learned senior counsel based on the above said contentions would sum-up and conclude the argument by stating that plaintiff cannot claim share in Schedule-B
properties which are purchased by brothers of the plaintiff in their individual capacity. He would submit to this court that in the absence of a nucleus, the question of tracing income of the plaint Schedule-B properties to discover source of funds for purchase of Schedule-C properties is impermissible in law. He would place reference to Ex.D245 and submit to this court that there is a clear indication that rents received were being shared by all the children of late Ramaswamy after his death. Learned senior counsel would further state that all properties enumerated in estate duty assessment order are only the properties in which the widow and children are entitled for equal share by way of inheritance under Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act. Placing reliance on Ex.D323, which is a partnership deed, he would submit to this court that plaintiff and other sister Parvathamma do not constitute a joint family along with their brothers and therefore, they cannot claim any share in the partnership business. On these set of grounds, learned senior counsel appearing for defendant No.2 would
submit to this court that appeal filed by defendant No.2 in RFA No.124/2012 has to be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge in granting share in the properties held by defendant No.2 in his individual capacity has to be set aside. 42. Learned counsel for defendant No.3 is aggrieved by granting share to the plaintiff in some of the Schedule-C properties and is also aggrieved by denial of share to the present defendant No.3 as per counter claim filed by defendant No.3. 43. The primary contention of the learned counsel for defendant No.3 is that, defendant No.3 is a junior member and there is clinching evidence on record to indicate that he is separated from the family along with his mother, i.e., defendant No.1 in the year 1989. It is also contended by learned counsel for respondent No.3 that there is clinching evidence on record which clearly establishes that defendant
No.2 was managing the properties and was collecting the rents. Therefore, defendant No.3 who had separated from the family had no occasion to utilize the family funds. Learned counsel for defendant No.3 has taken this court to several admissions given by the plaintiff who is examined as P.W.1 and also referred to ocular evidence of defendant No.2 who is examined as D.W.1. He has argued by referring to the cross- examination of defendant No.2 who has admitted in cross- examination that defendant No.3 along with his mother walked of the family and started residing separately in 1989. Learned counsel would further vehemently argue and contend before this court that defendant No.2 was managing the affairs of the family properties as Kartha and he was collecting rents generated from the family properties. He would also submit to this court that Laxmi Bricks stopped doing business somewhere in the month of August 1988 and therefore there was absolutely no income from Laxmi Bricks after 1988 to acquire properties. Therefore, the allegations made by
defendant No.2 and defendant Nos.4 to 7 that properties purchased by defendant No.3 were infact in the name of defendant No.3 by utilizing the income derived from Laxmi Bricks is totally false. He would submit to this court that, none of the parties have specifically pleaded as to what was the income of the family which was used by defendant No.3 to purchase the properties. He would submit to this court that late Narayan who is the ancestor of defendant Nos.4 to 7 went out of the family in 1984 and there was severance of status in 1984 itself. 44. Learned counsel to substantiate the claim of defendant No.3 would vehemently argue and contend before this court that, item No.1 of Schedule-C to the plaint (item No.24 in the counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7) was purchased by his wife from one B.R. Chandrashekar under registered sale deed dated 22.10.2003 as per Ex.D208 and this purchase was admittedly after filing of the suit. Therefore,
he contends that this property cannot be subject matter of partition. 45. To counter the other defendants and plaintiff, he would also submit to this court that item No.3 in Schedule-C to the plaint (item Nos.26 and 15 in the counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7) were purchased by defendant No.3 from one Nanjappa, i.e. Sy.No.47/1 measuring 8 guntas and Sy.No.46/4 measuring 1 gunta. To substantiate the claim that these properties are self-acquired properties of defendant No.3, learned counsel would take this court to Exs.D194 to 196 filed on 21.03.1994. Placing reliance on this Income Tax returns, he would submit to this court that, the fact that defendant No.3 has declared these properties in his returns would presuppose that these properties are self-acquired properties of defendant No.3. There is absolutely no rebuttal evidence let in either by the plaintiff, defendant No.2 or defendant Nos.4 to 7 to lay a claim over these properties. He would submit to this court that item No.6 of Schedule-C (item
No.29 of counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7) Sy.No.45 measuring 4 acres 6 guntas was purchased by defendant No.3 on 19.09.1990 as per Ex.D211. He would also place reliance on Ex.D224 to demonstrate that this item No.6 bearing Sy.No.45 and also site No.4 were offered as security with Bank of India for having availed cash credit facility for Vidya Chamber Bricks. He would submit to this court that this item No.6 bearing Sy.No.45 is also declared in the income tax returns as per Exs.D194 to 196 which are filed on 21.03.1994. He would lay emphasis on the date of filing of the suit at this juncture by submitting that the suit was admittedly filed on 22.09.1994. He would state that item No.7 of Schedule-C to the plaint (items Nos.30, 31 in the counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7) was purchased by defendant No.3 and his wife jointly from one A.Ramarao and others under registered sale deed dated 10.11.1994. He would submit that this property is also self-acquired property of defendant No.3. He would place reliance on Ex.D187, the certificate issued by Vijay Bank
indicating that documents in respect of site No.34 is offered as security for availing loan for house property. Insofar as item No.8 of Schedule-C to the plaint is concerned (item No.32 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7), he would submit to this court that this site was allotted in favour of defendant No.3 by Bangalore Development Authority in an auction sale dated 19.09.1991. He would submit to this court that this item was purchased after filing of the suit. 46. Item Nos.9(a) and (c) of Schedule-C property (item No.33(a) & (c) in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7) which an Sy.No.46/1 and 49/2 were purchased by defendant No.3 under registered sale deed dated 19.11.1990 and these items are also declared in income tax returns as per Exs.D194 to 196. Similarly, item No.9(d), (e) were purchased by defendant No.3 under registered sale deed dated 18.04.1992 and 17.12.1990 respectively and the same are also declared in the income tax returns.
Learned counsel would further take this court to Ex.D70 and contend before this court that this item No.6 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 and item No.8 in counter claim of defendant No.2 was purchased by wife of defendant No.3 in BDA auction and the sale deed was executed on 29.08.1991. Similarly, item No.7 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 and item No.B in counter claim of defendant No.2 was purchased by defendant No.3 under sale deed dated 27.12.1996, which is much subsequent to filing of the suit. Similarly, item Nos.8, 9 and 10 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 were all purchased subsequent to filing of the suit. 48. He would submit to this court that counter claim made by defendant Nos.4 to 7 and items Nos.F and G in the counter claim of defendant No.2 which is in respect of Sy.No.113/2. He would submit to this court that this item was purchased by defendant No.3 under three differed sale deeds dated 20.11.2001, 21.11.2001 and 13.11.2003. He would
submit to this court that plaintiff and other defendants during the course of trial have impleaded these properties by way of amendment to the plaint and also in the counter claims filed by defendant No.2 and defendant Nos.4 to 7. He would submit to this court that all these properties were purchased subsequent to partition of the suit and some of them are jointly purchased along with his wife and some of them are purchased by his wife and those properties which are standing in the name of his wife cannot be subject matter of the present partition suit, since she is not party to the suit. 49. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in 5Achuthan Nair Vs Chinnmmu Amma, would submit to this court that burden is always on the members who are asserting that properties are joint family properties to establish the same by leading cogent and clinching evidence. But this principle cannot be extended to
5 AIR 1966 SC 411
those parties which are acquired in the name of junior member and there is no presumption either way. 50. To buttress his arguments, he would place reliance on the judgment rendered by Division Bench of this court in the case of 6Krishne Gowda Vs Ninge Gowda. Placing reliance on this judgment, he would submit to this court that, even if the joint family possessed considerable nucleus capable of yielding sufficient income to enable acquisition of properties is not by itself sufficient to hold that acquisition by a junior member of such joint family is with the aid of joint family and no presumption can be drawn in that regard. 51. Learned counsel for defendant No.3 by placing reliance on these material facts and judgments would submit to this court that defendant No.3 never collected rents and never received income from Laxmi Bricks and the fact that defendant No.3 started residing separately in the year 1989 would in itself discharge the burden cast on defendant No.3.
6 ILR 1987 KAR 2833
Learned counsel would also place reliance on ocular evidence of P.W.1, D.W.1 and also ocular evidence of D.W.6 who is examined on behalf of defendant Nos.4 to 7. Placing reliance on the ocular evidence of the above said witnesses, he would sum up his arguments and contend that defendant No.3 is junior member of the family and therefore, the acquisition made by defendant No.3 cannot be subject matter of the present partition suit. He would also submit that there is no evidence adduced either by the plaintiff, defendant No.2 or defendant Nos.4 to 7 to demonstrate that defendant No.3 is also collecting rents and he has utilized the income generated from Laxmi Bricks. He would stress on the material fact that Laxmi Bricks stopped doing business in August 1988, and therefore, there was no income from the Laxmi Bricks as alleged by defendant No.2 and defendant Nos.4 to 7.
Shri Jayakumar S.Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant Nos.4 to 7 would vehemently argue and contend before this Court that the properties
acquired in the name of defendant Nos.2 and 3 are also joint family ancestral properties since the same are acquired with the aid of joint family funds. Learned Senior Counsel by placing reliance on Ex.D-369 would submit to this Court that the defendant No.2 has admitted in unequivocal terms that after the demise of his father Late Ramaswamy, he was compelled to settle down at Bengaluru and he started managing the properties left behind his father. Learned Senior Counsel would also rely on the cross-examination of the plaintiff wherein she has admitted that after the death of her father, it was Narayan who managing the family affairs and after 1 ½ years, the defendant No.2 took over the entire family affairs. Learned Senior Counsel would also place reliance on paragraph 34 of the written statement filed by the defendant No.3 wherein defendant No.3 has also specifically stated that defendant No.2 was managing the entire joint family affairs.
Placing reliance on these relevant materials, he would vehemently argue and contend before this Court that it was the defendant No.2 who was collecting huge rents and therefore, the properties which were acquired in the name of the defendant Nos.2 and 3 are also joint family ancestral properties and defendant Nos.1 to 7 alone are entitled for a share in the properties acquired in the name of defendant Nos.2 and 3.
Learned Senior Counsel would further take this Court to the relevant cross-examination of defendant No.2 and submit to this Court that a specific suggestion was made to defendant No.2 who is examined as DW.1 that he was getting an income of Rs.80,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-. To this suggestion, defendant No.2 has stated that he was getting a rent of Rs.25,000/-. He would further submit to this Court that defendant No.2 having admitted in unequivocal terms that he had maintained accounts with regard to collection of rents has, however, has not placed on record the said
documents and therefore, non-production of vital documents by defendant No.2 would lead to adverse inference under Section 114G of the Evidence Act.
To buttress his arguments, learned Senior Counsel would place reliance on the judgment of this Court in ILR 1994 Kar 2728. Learned Senior Counsel has further relied on paragraph 33 of the written statement wherein defendant No.3 has admitted that item Nos.4 and 5 of ‘B’ schedule properties are joint properties of defendant Nos.1 to 7 and further item Nos.1, 2, 4 and 5 of schedule ‘C’ properties are self acquired properties of defendant Nos.2 and 3 and Late Narayan. He would also place reliance on paragraph 29 of the written statement to demonstrate that ‘B’ schedule properties which are in occupation of tenants, the same generates rent of more than Rs.40,000/- p.m. and defendant No.2 is collecting the same. To demonstrate that the family properties were generating huge income in terms of rent would rely on Exs.D- 155A, D-386, D-389 and D-390. He would lay emphasis on
the fact that defendant No.2 being manager went on purchasing the properties from the income generated from the joint family properties.
Learned Senior Counsel would further contend before this Court that though defendant No.2 has made a feeble attempt in asserting that the properties purchased in his name are his self acquisition, however, to substantiate his claim, there is absolutely no evidence on record.
Learned Senior Counsel would further submit to this Court that the learned Judge erred in not allotting a share in the properties held by the defendant No.3 and the finding recorded by the learned Judge in holding that the properties standing in the name of defendant No.3 and his wife are his self acquired properties is perverse. The learned Judge had totally misread the evidence on record. Learned Senior Counsel would submit to this Court that the documents relied by the defendant No.3 at Exs.D-284 to D-287, D-24, D-269.
D-273 and D-373 are not properly appreciated and its evidentiary value is not assessed property by Learned Judge.
Learned Senior Counsel would try to impress upon us that these documents lack credibility and no evidentiary value can be attached to the said document. He would submit to this Court that all these documents have come into existence subsequent to filing of the suit and these significant details are not at all taken into consideration by the learned Judge while assessing the evidence adduced by the defendant No.3. He would also submit to this Court that there are categorical admissions elicited in cross-examination of defendant No.3 and the said admissions would go to the root of the case and would virtually demolish the defence set up by the defendant No.3. He would submit to this Court that the narrative set up by the defendant No.3 that he was into transport business and the same was generating substantial income and he was also getting agricultural income is not at all substantiated during trial. Learned Senior Counsel would
take this Court to Exs.P-2 and P-3 which are RTC extracts and would submit to this Court that the lands are totally barren lands and therefore, the theory set up by the defendant No.2 that apart from transport business, he was also getting agricultural income is totally a false narrative set up by the defendant No.3 and the same is not at all corroborated and substantiated by producing cogent and clinching evidence.
The main grievance of the defendant Nos.4 to 7 before this Court is that the learned Judge has virtually misread the evidence placed on record by the defendant No.3. The returns submitted by the defendant No.3 for previous three years is filed on 06.10.1994 and these documents cannot be relied on since the declaration of income by the defendant No.3 is subsequent to filing of the suit.
Learned Senior Counsel would sum up his arguments and submit to this Court that the materials on record would clearly establish that the defendant Nos.2 and 3
developed the properties left behind their father by mortgaging the properties and further, the properties were also acquired from the income of the joint family properties. He would submit to this Court that properties purchased in the name of defendant Nos.2 and 3 cannot be treated as joint family properties but they are to be treated as joint properties of defendant Nos.1 to 7. He would also submit to this Court that the properties purchased from the income derived from the joint properties by co-owners of the properties has to be accounted for as joint property and not joint Hindu family properties. To buttress his arguments, he has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court rendered in B.P.Arun Kumar Vs. Smt. Achala & Others7. 61. We have meticulously examined the pleadings in the plaint and also the counter claims filed by the defendant Nos.2 and 3 and defendant Nos.4 to 7. We have given our
7 ILR 2001 Kar 872
anxious consideration to the entire oral and documentary evidence on record. 62. The following points would arise for consideration in the light of the grounds urged by the plaintiffs in RFA.No.158/2012, the grounds urged by the defendant No.2 in RFA.No.124/2012, the grounds urged by the defendant No.3 in RFA.No.164/2012 and the grounds urged by defendant Nos.4 to 7 in RFA.No.216/2012:
1) Whether the Trial Court was justified in denying the share to the plaintiff in item Nos.1 and 3 to 9(a) to 9(e) of Schedule ‘C’ properties and also relief of partition sought in the counter claim?
2) Whether the finding of the Trial Court that item Nos.4 and 5 in Schedule ‘C’ to the plaint are the joint properties of defendant Nos.1 to 7 and the same are acquired from their independent earning is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary to clinching evidence on record?
3) Whether the Trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit of the plaintiff as well as counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 in respect of item Nos.6 to 15 which are referred to in the counter claim filed by defendant Nos.4 to 7?
4) Whether the finding of the Trial Court that item Nos.6 to 15, item Nos.29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 33A, 33B, 33C, 33D and 33E properties which are claimed in the counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 are self acquired properties of defendant No.3?
5) Whether the Trial Court was justified in holding that the properties purchased by the defendant No.2 are out of joint family funds and therefore, the plaintiff and defendant Nos.3 to 7 are also entitled for a share in the properties standing in the name of the defendant No.2?
6) Whether the defendant No.3's share would get enlarged on account of gift deed executed by his mother i.e., deceased defendant No.1?
Re: Point Nos.1 and 2: 63. The plaintiff who is the sister of defendant Nos.2 and 3 has filed a suit by specifically contending that schedule ‘A’ and ‘B’ properties are absolute properties of their father. Schedule ‘A’ is the ancestral property and her father who was a contractor acquired schedule ‘B’ properties without the aid of ancestral property described in schedule ‘A’. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that after the death of her father Ramaswamy, the defendant Nos.2 and 7 started managing the properties and they have been deriving huge amount and the same is utilized to acquire several properties which are morefully described in schedule ‘C’. The plaintiff has also specifically contended that item No.2 in schedule ‘B’ consists of Sharada Lunch Home and yields considerable income by way of rents. The plaintiff has also contended that item Nos.3 and 4 situated at Haines Road, Bengaluru consists of 6 shops and huge rents are collected by the defendant No.2. Item No.5 of schedule ‘B’ is a shop and the same is let out. It is the
specific case of the plaintiff that defendants are utilizing the funds of joint family to purchase several properties. On these set of pleadings, she has filed the present suit by contending that she is entitled for 1/5th share. It is also stated in the plaint that her sister Parvathamma has executed a relinquishment deed by taking her legitimate share. The plaintiff has also seriously disputed the alleged partition deed dated 10.10.1990. The plaintiff is also seeking share in Laxmi Brick which is existing in item Nos.5 and 6 of schedule ‘C’. It is the specific contention of the plaintiff that Laxmi Brick is also a joint family property and the family funds were utilized to establish the said brick factory and therefore, a share is also claimed in the said properties. 64. The defendant No.2 has come up with a plea of prior partition and has contended that item No.1 in schedule ‘B’ property was allotted to the share of plaintiff in a family partition. The plaintiff No.2 also contends that the properties which are allotted to the share of the plaintiff is only by way of
arrangement and in fact plaintiff was required to relinquish her share in all the properties left behind by her father Ramaswamy. Having assured, she has not come forward to execute a relinquishment deed. It is also stated that she was permitted to collect rents from the properties which are situated at Haines Road, Bengaluru and this was a temporary arrangement. 65. The defendant No.2 before this Court has taken a contention that the only properties which were held by Ramaswamy are available for partition amongst his widow and children and the properties which were left behind by the father of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.2 and 3 can be gathered and evidenced from the estate duty assessment order at Ex.D-53 which are submitted to the authorities at undisputed point of time. The contention of the defendant No.2 is as no joint family existed during the life time of Ramaswamy and further, since no joint family was created after his death, the contention of defendant No.2 is that the
entire discussion of the Trial Court is contrary to the pleadings and material on record. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant No.2 has relied on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court and a contention is taken that when succession takes place under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, then joint family ceases to exist and the heirs would hold the properties as tenants in common. 66. Learned Senior Counsel has also laid emphasis on the fact that plaintiff got married in the year 1961 and therefore, she ceases to be a member of a joint family of Ramaswamy. The defendant No.2 has also placed reliance on the pleadings in the plaint and a contention is taken before this Court that the propositus Ramaswamy till his death, treated all the properties standing in the name as his absolute properties and in this background, the learned Senior Counsel contends that Ramaswamy never acted as a Kartha during his life time and therefore, Ramaswamy along with his children did not constitute undivided joint Hindu family. He would also
lay emphasis and place reliance on the pleadings in the plaint and contend that there are absolutely no pleadings in regard to existence of co-parcenary. He would contend that on death of Ramaswamy on 09.03.1971, his estate was inherited by widow and children as class-I heirs and therefore, the plaintiff would be entitled to a share only in respect of properties which were declared under Ex.D-53. The above said contentions are equally supported and pleadings and evidence is lead by defendant Nos.3 and 4 to 7 on the same line. The defendant Nos.3 and 4 to 7 also contend that plaintiff is not entitled for any share in schedule ‘B’ and ‘C’ properties. Though rival parties have lead in voluminous evidence, to ascertain the character and the nature of the properties held by the parties, the release deed executed by the other sister namely, Parvathamma would have relevancy to the controversy between the parties. 67. The contention of the defendant No.2 that the plaintiffs ceased to be a member on account of marriage and
therefore, she cannot claim to be a member of joint Hindu family cannot be acceded to. The said contention runs contrary to the object of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The main object of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is to remove inequalities between male and female with respect to rights in property and evolves a list of heirs entitled to succeed on intestacy. The said Act has been passed to codify and amend the Hindu Law regarding succession. One of the most important features of the Act is the right of a Hindu female to inherit property has been fully recognized and she has been made entitled to a share equal to the male heirs. The Act also purported and intended to abolish women’s limited estate. The concept of co-parcenary has also undergone a change in the sense that succession to co-parcenary property was governed by rule of survivorship. In this rule, the female heirs did not have any place and the property, on the death of a male heir, devolved upon the rest of the male members of the co-parcenary.
Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the rule of survivorship has a limited application and therefore, by bringing in 1956 Act, the sanctity of rule of survivorship has undergone sea change and it had limited application only in case of those families which consisted of male members only. The Act makes no distinction between male and female heirs and the Act provided uniform order of succession governing the property of a male Hindu and therefore, the said Act dispensed with the rules of succession prevailing under Mitakshara and Dayabhaga law. By bringing in amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, the Parliament has conferred co-parcenary status to Hindu female. The amended Section 6 provides for parity of rights in a co-parcenary property among male and female members of joint Hindu family on and from 09.09.2005. The Legislature by bringing in amendment has conferred substantive right in favour of the daughters.
Now let us examine the case of the plaintiff in the light of the 1956 Act and also the latest amendment to Section 6. If the pleadings averred in the plaint are meticulously examined, it can be gathered that the plaintiff has come up with a specific case that all the properties were the absolute properties of her father Ramaswamy. The basis and the foundation laid in the plaint indicate that plaintiff being a daughter probably has made an attempt to bring her claim under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act to enable her to claim equal share along with her brothers i.e., defendant Nos.2 and 3. On a bare reading of the plaint, this Court can gather the fact that plaintiff has asserted that all the suit schedule properties were self acquired property of her father and the subsequent acquisition by her brothers was from the income generated from the properties left behind by her father. The present suit is one for partition and to ascertain the character and nature of the suit schedule properties, the Court need not confine only to the pleadings averred in the
plaint. The Court is also required to test the defence. More than the pleadings, the Court has to also examine the documentary evidence adduced before this Court and therefore, in the light of the controversy between the parties in regard to the nature of the properties which were held by Ramaswamy, the release deed executed by Parvathamma to which all the parties to the suit are signatories would be a deciding factor. Coupled with the said documents, this Court has to also take note of the release deed executed by the sister of the plaintiff namely Smt. Parvathamma as per Ex.P-1 and her brothers at undisputed point of time. The relevant paragraph of Ex.P-1 is reproduced as under:
"2. Whereas late C.Ramaswamy father of the Releaser was the manager of the Hindu joint family consisting of himself and releases 1, 2, 4 and 5. Whereas late C.Ramaswamy died on 9.3.1971. undivided from his sons the other co- parceners whereas thus the Releasor became entitled to a share in the undivided interest of her father late C.Ramaswamy in the joint family
properties whereas the Releasor has acquainted herself about the various items of the properties of her father late C.Ramaswamy and is not only aware of the extent and nature of all the estate of the said joint Hindu family but also its value."
The defendant No.2 who is the Kartha of the family all along has contended that plaintiff married in 1961 is ceased to be a member of family of Ramaswamy. His further contention is that on the death of Ramaswamy on 09.03.1971, his children i.e., the present plaintiff, defendant Nos.2 and 3 and defendant Nos.4 to 7 who are the legal heirs of Narayan all inherited the properties left behind by Ramaswamy as per Ex.D-53 which is the estate duty assessment order. The defendant No.2 contention is that once succession takes place under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, then the joint family ceases to exist and the heirs succeed to property as tenants in common and joint tenants. The defendant No.2 has also placed reliance on the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh and
Others8. We have no cavil to the above said proposition. In the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Kanpur and Others vs. Chander Sen and Others9, it was held that after passing of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the traditional view that on inheritance of immovable property from paternal ancestor upto three degrees, automatically a Hindu undivided family came into existence no longer remained the legal position in view of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court was reiterated in the case of Yudhishter vs. Ashok Kumar10. The Hon’ble Apex Court was of the view that after coming into force of Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, inheritance of the ancestral properties after 1956 does not create Hindu undivided family property and inheritance of ancestral property after 1956, therefore, does not result in the creation of Hindu Undivided family property. This judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court still holds the field and is binding on
8 (2016) 4 SCC 68 9 (1986) 3 SCC 567 10 (1987) 1 SCC 204
all High Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts. But these principles are to be examined in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case on hand. With due respect, we are of the view that the judgment cited in Uttam (supra) has no application to the present case on hand.
We have culled out the covenants of registered release deed executed by Parvathamma as per Ex.P-1. On perusal of the said covenants, there is absolutely no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion that the suit schedule property are co-parcenary properties and the co-parcenary continued to exist even after the death of Ramaswamy. The contention of defendants is that plaintiff has admitted that the all the suit schedule properties are self acquired properties and would bind the plaintiff and therefore, the claim that the suit schedule properties are co-parcenery properties cannot be accepted. The pleadings and ocular evidence of parties have many imperfections and there is often willful misrepresentations. But when it comes to documentary
evidence, the imperfections either do not exist or exist only in small measures. In the event of documentary evidence, generally speaking ocular evidence has no weight. The registered release deed executed by Parvathamma is admitted in unequivocal terms by all the parties to the suit. Therefore, the recitals would bind all the parties. It is trite law that the document is the best evidence of its contents. The policy behind Rules 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act is to bar collateral evidence which can create mischief. Therefore, we are of the view that Sections 91 and 92 of Indian Evidence Act is clearly applicable to the contracts relating to disposition of property. The pleadings and ocular evidence of defendant No.2 to the effect that co-parcenary did not exist either during the life time of Ramaswamy or after his death cannot be accepted. It is trite law that evidence may supplement but not supplant or contradict. The recitals in the registered release deed as per Ex.P-1 are absolutely clear and there is no ambiguity and therefore, there is very little that Court can do
about it. We would also find that the language of release deed is plain in itself and apply accurately to the existing facts and therefore, the stand taken by the defendant Nos.2 to 7 which runs contrary to the recitals in registered release deed as per Ex.P-1 cannot be looked into and the voluminous ocular evidence and also documentary evidence which is contrary to Ex.P-1 are inadmissible. At this juncture, we also hold that we do not find any ambiguity in the registered release deed executed by Parvathamma as per Ex.P-1.
In the release deed, there is a reference to existence of co-parcenery and the parties dealt with on that basis, then it is not open for defendants to resile from that position. The defendant Nos.2 to 7 who are parties to the release deed cannot subsequently take contrary stand and contend that there is a severance in the family or that the properties purchased after death of Ramaswamy are to be treated as joint properties of defendant Nos.2 and 3.
It would be useful for us to extract paragraph 22 of the written statement filed by defendant No.3 and paragraph 3 of the written statement filed by defendant Nos.4 to 7. The same are culled out as under: (written statement filed by defendant No.3) "22. In a partition between father Ramaswamy and his brothers certain properties were allotted to the share of Ramaswamy and he was getting income from the said properties.
Certain properties were acquired by Ramaswamy from the joint family funds. Even if Ramaswamy has made any acquisition from his earnings of contract business, such properties have been merged with the joint family properties and were put into hotchpotch of the joint family, such properties have also become joint family properties."
(written statement filed by defendant Nos.4 to 7) "03. It is submitted that defendant no.5 to 7's grandfather had 3 sons and 2 daughters namely C.R.Narayan, the 2nd defendant and 3rd defendant, the plaintiff and Parvathamma. It is submitted
that defendant No.1 is the grandmother of defendant No.5 to 7. The defendants 1 to 6 are the members of Hindu undivided joint family and they are in joint possession in respect of the properties as stated in the schedule."
It is a common or cardinal principles of law that in a partition suit, all the parties to the suit assume the status of plaintiff, more particularly when defendants are not just defending the suit but have set up counter claim. Defendant No.3 at paragraph 22 of the written statement has pleaded in unequivocal terms that the suit schedule properties are co- parcenery properties. Therefore, the existence of co- parcenery stands established from the covenants in the registered release deed and also from the admitted pleadings. Defendant Nos.4 to 7 have also admitted at paragraph 3 of the written statement.
It would be also useful to refer to the recitals in the gift deed set up by the defendant No.3 executed by defendant
No.1 in favour of defendant No.3. Paragraph 4 of the gift deed would be relevant and the same is culled out as under: "4. The valuable properties left behind by husband of the first party and later on earned by the joint effort of members of the joint family more fully described in the schedule to the deed, which are described in detail with boundaries in the schedule in the end of the instant Gift deed. All the properties described in the schedule are joint family properties."
If the covenants in the registered gift deed are taken into consideration, the mother has taken a contention that from properties left behind by her husband, her sons from joint efforts have purchased suit schedule properties and she also claim that all the properties described in schedule are joint family properties. Now this document is not at all disputed by the defendant No.2. Though whether the gift deed really creates right and title in favour of defendant No.3 is a pure question of law to be examined by this Court. But the admitted covenants in the registered gift deed and admission in unequivocal terms by all the parties would clearly indicate that there was existence of joint family nucleus and
with the aid of joint family funds, the properties were acquired by defendant Nos.2 and 3. These significant details would also have a bearing on the defence set up by defendant No.3 in regard to the nature of the suit properties.
The learned Judge has denied a share to the present plaintiff in item No.5 of schedule 'C' property which is an industrial land bearing Sy.No.19 including Lakshmi Bricks factory measuring 4 acre 19 guntas. The learned Judge has proceeded to hold that item No.5 of schedule 'C' property is joint property of defendant Nos.1 to 7 and therefore, share is granted to defendant No.2, defendant No.3 and defendant Nos.4 to 7. On re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, we would find that defendant Nos.1 to 7 have not at all produced any document to establish as to how the brick business was started. There are no specific pleadings in the written statement either by defendant Nos.2 and 3 or by defendant Nos.4 to 7. Though defendant No.2 specifically contended that Lakshmi Bricks is a partnership created by
three sons of Ramaswamy, however, there is absolutely no evidence indicating as to how the three sons commenced with business and there was no details in mobilizing funds and capital to establish the partnership firm. In absence of clinching evidence, it has to be presumed that Lakshmi Bricks was started by all the three brothers by utilizing joint family funds. On perusal of Ex.D-236, it is forthcoming that defendant No.2 submitted a letter to the Commercial Tax Officer stating that business is closed in 1989. If this document is taken into consideration then it clearly shows that the partnership firm is not at all in existence. As joint family funds were utilized to establish the partnership firm therefore, we are of the view that item No.5 in schedule 'C' property would also become estate of joint family and therefore, plaintiff is also entitled for 1/5th share in item No.5 of schedule 'C' property.
For the foregoing reasons, the point No.1 formulated by this Court is answered in the negative and point No.2 in the affirmative. Re: Point Nos.3 & 4: 79. The defendant No.3 claims that properties which are the subject matter of counter claim raised by defendant Nos.4 to 7 are his self acquisition and the same are not available for partition. It is the specific case that his relationship with the defendant No.2 was cordial only till 1984. The defendant No.3 has contended that it is the defendant No.2 who is managing the affairs of the family properties and the entire rent generated from the properties left behind by their father was collected by the defendant No.2. The defendant No.3 claims that he went out of the family in December 1989. The defendant No.3 contention is that since he walked out of the family in 1989, he had no control over the joint family properties since he started residing in a rented house separately. The defendant No.3 would further contend
that since his brother Narayana (ancestor of defendant Nos.4 to 7) went out of the family in 1984, there was severance of status in 1984 itself. The defendant No.3 claims that defendant No.2 was managing the affairs of the family and therefore, the properties which were purchased in the name of defendant No.2 were with the aid of the joint family funds and therefore, claims a share in the properties standing in the name of defendant No.2. At the same time, it is the specific contention of defendant No.3 that item Nos.1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9A to 9E are his self acquired properties. To substantiate his claim he has relied on Income Tax returns as per Exs.D-194 to D- 196. The defendant No.3 has contended that the income tax returns was submitted by him on 21.03.1994 whereas the suit is filed on 22.09.1994 and therefore, it is specifically contended that income tax returns are credible and the same would clearly establish that the properties cited supra are his self acquisition. He would also contend that insofar as item no.6 in schedule ‘C’ properties is concerned, the same is
purchased by his wife from Bangalore Development Authority in an auction and the sale deed is executed on 29.08.1991 and therefore, he claimed that it is the self acquired property by his wife.
The defendant No.3 has also claimed that item Nos.7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 in the counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 are his self acquired properties. The defendant No.3 by relying on Exs.D-194 to D-196 and other rebuttal evidence has contended that there is no presumption since defendant No.3 is a junior member of the joint family and therefore, all the acquisitions made by defendant No.3 are his self acquired property. It is contended by defendant No.3 that plaintiff and defendant No.2, defendant Nos.4 to 7 have not at all placed on record cogent and clinching evidence to demonstrate that the joint family income was utilized to purchase these properties.
Now in the light of the contentions raised by the defendant No.3, we have meticulously examined the rebuttal evidence placed on record by defendant No.3. The defendant No.3 is heavily banking on Exs.D-194 to D-196. On meticulous examination of Exs.D-194 to D-196, this Court would find that the defendant No.3 has submitted returns of three previous years and the same is filed on 06.10.1994. The learned Judge without examining the evidentiary value of the income tax returns has mechanically accepted the same. On meticulous examination of the income tax returns, this Court would analyse the circumstances under which the income tax returns at Exs.D-194 to D-196 has come into existence. This Court has to examine the credibility of these documents. The declaration of status in income tax returns is not always decisive of real status of an individual. It is always a question of fact which must be decided taking into consideration the entire facts and surrounding circumstances. The defendant No.3 has set up a defence by contending that
his relationship with defendant No.2 was not cordial and he had already separated in December 1989 and therefore, the properties which are acquired by him are after he walked out of the family and therefore, he has tried to project his case by contending that he could not have laid his hands on the corpus on the joint family funds. On perusal of Exs.D-155(A), D-386, D-389 and D-390 clearly demonstrates that the family of plaintiff and defendants possessed prime properties and the said properties which were rented out generated substantial income by way of rents from the properties at item Nos.2 to 5 of ‘B’ schedule property. The defendant No.3 claims that it is the only defendant No.2 who has collected the rents. If the entire defence set up by defendant No.3 is meticulously examined, there is a specific stand taken by the defendant No.3 that it is the defendant No.2 who was collecting the rents. But there is no specific denial that the rents collected by defendant No.2 was not distributed among the three brothers. The defendant No.3 has conveniently chosen to stay
silent on this crucial aspect. The defendant No.3's specific assertion that his relationship was not at all cordial with defendant No.2 has been falsified in cross-examination wherein he has admitted that three agricultural lands were purchased by defendant Nos.3 and 2 during the period 1988 to 1992.
On perusal of the material on record, this Court would also find that defendant No.2 has placed on record a few receipts as per Ex.D-3 which are also signed by all the three brothers and therefore, it would give rise to an inference that the rents were in fact jointly collected by all the three brothers. Though substantial portion of the rent was collected by defendant No.2, defendant No.3 and deceased Narayan have also shared the income generated by way of rents. This Court has to also take into consideration of the fact that defendant No.3 has acquired vast properties in and around Bengaluru. The defendant No.3 claims that he was able to amass the properties by doing transport business and also
from the agricultural lands standing in his name. The plaintiff has produced record of rights and on perusal of Exs.P-2 and P- 3 which are the RTC extracts pertaining to Sy.Nos.46 and 49, the same indicates that they are barren lands. This defence has to be also examined in the context of the pass book produced by defendant No.2 as per Ex.D-318. The same also gives an indication that defendant No.3 has drawn amount from the Corporation Bank in the course of Lakshmi Bricks business. On perusal of Ex.D-313, this Court would find that defendant No.3 had entered into an agreement in respect of Haines Road property i.e., ‘B’ schedule property. From the said document, it can be gathered that he has received a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. The clinching evidence on record clearly establishes that rents generated from item Nos.2 to 5 of schedule ‘B’ property formed substantial income and the same laid a foundation for subsequent acquisition. Therefore, the position is, a fortiori, where apart from acquisitions, the managing member of the plaintiff and defendants family i.e.,
defendant No.2 as well as defendant No.3 had absolutely no other assets or source of income.
It would also be useful for us to refer to the document at Ex.D-245 since defendant No.3 all along claims that he is the youngest of all and he walked out of the family in the year 1989 along with his mother. The specific allegation is that the joint family properties generated huge income in the form of rents. But, however, the entire rents were collected by the defendant No.2. We have already noted that though the other defendants contend that the entire rents were collected by the defendant No.2, however, there is no specific denial that the rent collected by the defendant No.2 was not distributed amongst themselves. In absence of specific denial, the legal notice issued by the defendant No.3 to one of the tenant as per Ex.D-245 would therefore throw light and would clinch the entire controversy between the parties in regard to utilization of joint family funds to purchase several properties. It would be useful for this Court to cull out
the legal notice issued by the defendant No.3 as per Ex.D- 245: "To,
13th June 1996
Adinarayan,
No.140, Wheeler Road,
Bangalore - 8.
Sir,
We act on behalf of our client Shri. C.R.Laxminarayan, S/o.C.Ramaswamy, R/a No.34, I Main, Domlur Layout, Bangalore - 560071 and issue the following notice to you.
That you are the tenant in respect of a portion of the property bearing No.140, Wheeler Road, Bangalore paying a monthly rent of Rs.425/- that our client is one of the co-owner in respect of he property under your occupation along with his brother Shri.C.R.Kemparaj and the children of Sri.R.Narayan and is entitled 1/3rd share of the rent derived from the entire composite building as his legal heirs of late Ramaswamy. Hither to C.R.Kemparaj, the elder brother of our client was collecting the entire rent on behalf of himself and other co-owner and was being shared equally between themselves.
Our client states that there has been difference between our client and C.R.Kemparaj with regard to sharing of the rent and our client has been deprived of his part of the rent for which he is entitled to from the last 6 months.
The clients repeated requests and demands made on Mr.Kemparaj for the rents derived were in vain. In these circumstances, we hereby call upon you to pay 1/3rd of rent amount in future and attain valid receipt thereof. If inspite of this Notice, should you continue to pay the entire rent to Mr.Kemparaj, you would be doing so at your own costs and risks in which event our client would take up the matter to the Court of Law seeking redressal."
On perusal of paragraph 2 of the legal notice dated 13.06.1996, it would clearly demonstrate that defendant No.2 was acting as a kartha who was collecting rents generated from the joint family properties and the same was equally shared by all the three brothers and what is stated by defendant No.3 in his legal notice dated 13.06.1996 addressed to one of the tenant is in respect of the property bearing No.140 at Wheeler Road. The fact that all the three brothers have utilized huge rents which was collected from the joint family property further gets strengthened in the cross- examination of defendant No.3 who has admitted in unequivocal terms that the three agricultural lands were
purchased by defendant No.3 and defendant No.2 during 1988 to 1992 by utilizing the joint family funds and also from the income from Lakshmi Bricks. The relevant portion of cross- examination of defendant No.3 needs to be culled out which is useful in the background of the defence set up by defendant No.3: "qÀ§Æè.J¸ï.£À ¥ÁågÁ 46 gÀ°è ªÀÄÆgÀPÀȶ d«ÄãÀÄUÀ¼À£ÀÄß 88 jAzÀ 92 CªÀ¢üAiÀÄ°è £Á£ÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 2£Éà ¥ÀæwªÁ¢ dAnAiÀiÁV Rjâ ªÀiÁrzÉÝêÉ. MlÄÖ PÀÄlÄA§zÀ ¸ÀévÀÄÛUÀ½AzÀ §AzÀ GvÀà£Àß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ®Qëöä ©æPïì¤AzÀ §AzÀ ªÀgÀªÀiÁ£À¢AzÀ £ÁªÀÅ dAnAiÀiÁV Rjâ ªÀiÁrzÉÝêÉ. ¤±Á£É r 59 ¸ÀªÉð £ÀA§gï 37-4gÀ PÀæAiÀÄ ¥ÀvÀæ DVzÉ JAzÀgÉ ¤d."
This categorical admission would clearly indicate that defendant No.3 also had no independent income and he has also amassed vast properties by utilizing the joint family income and the same stand established in the light of the legal notice issued by the defendant No.3 as well as in the cross- examination. This categorical admission also indicates that the entire defence set up by defendant No.3 that he was the youngest and he had walked out of the family along with his mother in the year 1989 and his relationship with the
defendant No.2 was not cordial and therefore, he had no control over the joint family funds. If this relevant cross- examination and also the claim made in the legal notice vide Ex.D-245 is taken into consideration, we would not hesitate to come to conclusion that though he opted to reside separately, however, he was very much in control with the family business along with the defendant No.2 and even upto 1992, both the brothers i.e., defendant Nos.2 and 3 went on purchasing properties by utilizing joint family funds. The passbook produced by the defendant No.2 as per Ex.D-318 also indicate that the defendant No.3 has drawn amount from the Corporation Bank in the course of Lakshmi Bricks business. On perusal of Ex.D-3, it would clearly establish that plaintiff and defendants have jointly signed Ex.D-3 which is the rent receipt.
Further Ex.D-313 also indicate that the defendant No.3 entered into an agreement in respect of Haines Road Property and has received a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards
advance. Exs.D-245, D-3 and D-313 clearly establishes that defendant No.3 was also managing the family properties and was receiving his share of rent. In the legal notice as per Ex.D-245, defendant No.3 has called upon tenant to pay 1/3rd of rent amount. This document would clinch the issue and the narrative set up by defendant No.3 that he walked out of the family and thereupon he never received any income from the joint family properties stands falsified. The said clinching evidence would virtually outweigh the evidence adduced by defendant No.3. On re-appreciation of evidence adduced by defendant No.3, we are of the view that the Income Tax returns relied on by the defendant No.3 as per Exs.194 to 196 has no evidentiary value and therefore, we are of the view of the same are created for the purpose of the suit and therefore no evidentiary value can be attached to the above said document. The defence set up by the defendant No.3 that he was doing lorry business and owned lorry, JCB, excavator and that he was doing lending business cannot be accepted and is
not at all proved by the defendant No.3 by placing on record cogent and clinching evidence. Several categorical admissions given by defendant No.3 during trial and also the averments in the written statement would in fact go against the stand taken by the defendant No.3.
On re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence, this Court would find that defendant No.3 has not at all produced any documents to prove that he had independent income by doing contract work, bricks manufacturing and transport business. On the contrary, the clinching evidence clearly demonstrates that the family possessed not only surplus income but possessed substantial income. This Court would find that the clinching evidence on record virtually outweighs assertions and acclamations made by defendant Nos.2 to 7. In this background, the stand taken by defendant No.3 that he was living separately and had no control over the funds of the family would not in itself establish and prove his stand that the properties which are
purchased in his name are his self acquisition. Merely because the families are living separately, the nature of the joint family property will not change unless there is a partition, division or settlement.
The clinching evidence on record clearly indicates that neither defendant No.2 nor defendant No.3 had any independent earning and the rents which are collected by defendant No.2 has been utilized to purchase the properties. Though plaintiff and other defendants have contended that defendant No.2 was collecting the rents of Rs.80,000/- p.m. even if this assertion is discarded, the defendant No.2 has voluntarily admitted that the joint family properties generated an income of Rs.25,000/- p.m. Now rents to the tune of Rs.25,000/- in 1980’s has to be regarded as huge income and therefore, all the further acquisitions made by the defendant Nos.2 and 3 has to be inferred that the same are acquired from the joint family income.
Though plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 have claimed share in the properties standing in the name of wife of defendant No.3, however, the wife of defendant No.3 is not a party to the suit. Therefore, item No.1, item No.7 and item No.8 in schedule 'C' cannot be subjected to adjudication in the present partition suit. If at all there was a serious claim in respect of properties standing in the name of wife of defendant No.3, plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 ought to have impleaded the wife of defendant No.3. Therefore, item Nos.1, 7 and 8 in schedule 'C' and item No.6 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 cannot be subjected to adjudication in the present partition suit. Therefore, neither plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 nor defendant No.2 are entitled to any share in the property standing in the name of wife of defendant No.3.
On perusal of the material on record, we would also find that some of the properties are purchased by defendant No.3 subsequent to filing of the suit. Item No.8 in schedule 'C'
is a commercial site No.5 purchased by defendant No.3 under registered sale deed dated 10.06.1988. Item No.b in the counter claim of defendant No.2 and corresponding item No.7 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 is a commercial property bearing No.4 and the same is purchased in the name of defendant No.3 under registered sale deed dated 25.04.2003. The said property is also not available for partition. Similarly item No.d in counter claim of defendant No.2 and item No.9 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 property bearing No.645 is purchased by defendant No.3 under registered sale deed dated 30.09.2010. Similarly, item No.e in counter claim of defendant No.2 and item No.10 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 is property bearing No.277 purchased by defendant No.3 under registered sale deed dated 05.02.2001. Similarly, item Nos.11 and 12 in counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 and item Nos.f and g in counter claim of defendant No.2 is property bearing No.113/2 purchased by defendant No.3 under registered sale deed
dated 20.11.2011. Therefore, the said property is also not available for partition.
Further on perusal of oral and documentary evidence, item No.6 which is a kalyan mantap is not owned by the plaintiff and defendants family and therefore, the same is not available for partition.
All these properties are not available for partition since they are purchased by defendant No.3 after filing of the suit.
On perusal of the entire material on record, we would find that the evidence is clear, unequivocal and clinching. Accordingly, point No.3 is answered in the affirmative and point No.4 is answered partly in the affirmative.
Re: Point No.5: 94. The defendant No.2 main contention is that plaintiff Vanajakshi got married in 1961 and this fact is admitted in
cross-examination by plaintiff and therefore, it is the specific contention of the defendant No.2 that plaintiff went out of the family of Ramaswamy and became member of her husband’s family and therefore, on the death of the father namely, Ramaswamy on 09.05.1971, there were proceedings for estate duty and the estate of Ramaswamy was subjected to estate duty. The defendant No.2 by relying on Ex.D-53 has contended that it is only the properties left behind by Ramaswamy which would be available for partition and by way of inheritance, the widow and children would succeed to the properties set out in estate duty assessment order. The defendant No.2 has contended that, had there been a Hindu undivided family, on account of death of Ramaswamy, there would not have been any estate duty proceedings. The defendant No.2 has also contended that though some of the properties were purchased by father of Ramaswamy in the name of his children and even if sale consideration was paid by Ramaswamy, the plaintiff cannot assert and claim these
properties to be joint family properties, as such the claim would be hit by provisions of Benami Transaction Observations Act, 1993. On this count, the defendant No.2 has strongly contended that schedule ‘B’ properties which were admittedly not standing in the name of Ramaswamy on the date of his death are to be excluded as they are not available for partition.
At this juncture, we would like to again refer to the release deed executed by Parvathamma as per Ex.P-1. The recitals in the said release deed executed by one of the sisters would clinch the entire controversy between the parties. The recitals in the said release deed which has come into existence at undisputed point of time would clearly show that the suit properties were enjoyed by three brothers as co-parceners. The contention of the defendant No.2 that since plaintiff got married way back in 1961, she would cease to be a member of the joint family is not at all sustainable. From their own pleadings in the written statement, it is admitted in
unequivocal terms that plaintiff being the widow sister was part of the family and that she was residing in one portion of the ancestral property. Though it is a trite law that a female cannot be a member of a co-parcener but at the same time, there can be no cavil to the settled proposition of law that a Hindu female can be a member of a Mitakshara joint family. The fact that she continued to be the member of the joint family further gets strengthened in view of the mortgage deed executed by defendants and plaintiff as per Ex.D-23. Therefore, the contention raised by the defendant No.2 that on account of marriage in the year 1961, the plaintiff cannot claim to be a member of the Joint Hindu undivided family cannot be sustained. The concept of severance on account of marriage of Hindu female is unknown to Hindu law. Even on account of death of Ramaswamy, the same would not amount to severance and though male members may continue to have a status of a co-parcener, females are also entitled for a share
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in the properties which are acquired after the death of the Head of the family.
The defendant No.2 to substantiate his claim has also lead in evidence by examining himself as DW.1 and as produced rebuttal evidence. The contention of the defendant No.2 is in absence of there being a joint family, the question of going into the income of plaint schedule ‘B’ properties to trace the source of funds for purchase of ‘C’ schedule properties is impermissible in law.
The defendant No.2 has further contended that item No.4 in schedule ‘C’ properties which is an ancestral land bearing Sy.No.20 measuring 4 acres 11 guntas and item No.5 in schedule ‘C’ properties bearing Sy.No.19 which is also an ancestral land comprise of Lakshmi Bricks which is a partnership created in 1992 and as per the said partition late C.R.Narayana who is the ancestor of defendant Nos.4 to 7, defendant Nos.2 and 3 were partners. The defendant No.2
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has placed reliance on Ex.D-323 and therefore, placing reliance of Ex.D-323, the defendant No.2 has contended that Lakshmi Bricks being a partnership firm created by three sons of Ramaswamy, the other two sisters of defendant Nos.2 and 3 have no rights and interest and therefore, the present plaintiff is not entitled for any share in item Nos.4 and 5 of schedule ‘C’ properties. It is also vehemently argued and contended before this Court that the fact that partnership firm was unregistered has no effect on the existence of the firm.
The defendant No.2 by relying on Ex.D-136 has also contended that deceased brother C.R.Narayan during his life time exited from the partnership firm and therefore, his heirs i.e., defendant Nos.4 to 7 cannot claim any share related to Lakshmi Bricks. It is only the defendant Nos.2 and 3 who are partners are entitled to lay a claim over the assets of partnership firm and therefore, item Nos.4 and 5 of schedule ‘C’ properties would fall outside the purview of the partition suit filed by the plaintiff herein.
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The defendant No.2 also claims that item No.1 in schedule ‘A’ properties i.e., Sy.No.190/1, Bengaluru is the joint property of defendant No.2 and his brother Late C.R.Narayan. The defendant No.2 claims that the property is jointly purchased under registered sale deed dated 12.12.1968 followed by additional sale deed dated 18.09.1969. The defendant No.2 contends that at the time of purchase, it was a vacant site which was later developed and constructed by his deceased brother C.R.Narayan and defendant No.2 from their joint labour. It is also contended by defendant No.2 that even if it is assumed that their father Ramaswamy purchased the said property in the name of his sons, it was well within his discretion and therefore, the other children have no locus standi to challenge the same and claim a share in the property in view of the provisions of Benami Transactions Observations Act and therefore, the defendant No.2 has contended that it is only the defendant No.2 and defendant Nos.4 to 7 who are entitled for a share in item No.1 of schedule ‘A’.
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The defendant No.2 has also contended that item No.2 of Sy.No.54/1 was bequeathed in favour of his father Ramaswamy by Chikkagowdappa under a Will dated 16.09.1953 and his father having acquired valid right and title sold the suit schedule property in favour of one Mallappa. The defendant No.2 has purchased item No.2 under registered sale deed dated 26.08.1974 and it is his self acquired property and therefore, defendant No.2 has contended that item No.2 is also not available for partition. The defendant No.2 also claims that Sy.No.20 of item No.1 in schedule ‘C’ property measuring 4 acres 11 guntas where Lakshmi Bricks is situated is self acquired property of defendant No.2 and defendant No.3. The defendant No.2 claims that this property was purchased from his independent earnings. Similarly, the defendant No.2 also claims that Sy.No.19 in item No.2 of schedule ‘C’ property is joint property of defendant Nos.2 and 3. The defendant No.2 also claims that item No.3 in schedule ‘C’ property are purchased by defendant No.2 in 1988 as per
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Ex.D-382 and item No.4 is purchased in 1991 and it is self acquired property. Item No.5 is purchased by defendant No.2 in 1992-93 and claims that it is self acquired property. Item No.5 in schedule ‘C’ was purchased in 1989 and the same is self acquired property. Insofar as item No.7 is concerned, defendant No.2 claims that this was purchased in the name of defendant No.2 and the same was sold in 1971 with the consent of entire family. The defendant No.2 has further claimed that item No.8 belongs to his daughter and the same is not available. The defendant No.2 placing reliance of Ex.D- 281 has contended that item No.8 in schedule ‘C’ is no where concerned to the family of plaintiff and defendants and the same stands in the name of married daughter and therefore, is not available for partition. Insofar as schedule ‘D’ properties are concerned, defendant No.3 has taken a contention that no materials are placed on record. Therefore, the existence of the said property is not established and therefore, the Trial Court has rightly rejected the claim of the plaintiff.
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In the light of the assertion made by the defendant No.2 pertaining to the properties stated supra, we have meticulously examined the defence set up by defendant No.2 in the written statement. The defendant Nos.3 to 7 as well as the plaintiff has specifically contended that it is the defendant No.2 who was managing the affairs and was also collecting rents. The fact that defendant No.2 was acting as a Kartha can be gathered from paragraph 11 of the written statement and the same is culled out as under: "11. The defendant No.2 submits that right from the day the father of the parties herein died it was the elder brother Narayan who was recognized as the KARTHA of the family being the eldest male member. However, due to his ill health and mis management of the properties huge debts were incurred by the family and it was the second defendant who had to bear the burst of the liabilities."
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This fact is also admitted by defendant No.3 at paragraph 34 of the written statement filed by him. The defendant No.2 asserts that the properties stated supra are either his self acquired properties or joint properties of himself and defendant No.3. We have given our anxious consideration to the entire voluminous evidence i.e., oral and documentary evidence on record. The other contesting parties have succeeded in eliciting that defendant No.2 has collected rents from item Nos.2 to 5 of ‘B’ schedule properties. A specific suggestion was made to the defendant No.3 in cross- examination that he was getting income of Rs.80,000/- to Rs.1,00,000/-. To this suggestion, the defendant No.2 has voluntarily made a statement to the fact that he was getting Rs.25,000/- as rent. The defendant No.2 in cross-examination also admitted that he has maintained accounts with regard to collection of rents. However, on examination of the entire material on record, we would find that the defendant No.2 has
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not placed on record the documents relating to collection of rents.
It can be gathered from the records that the documents relating to the turnover profit of Lakshmi Bricks is also withheld. The facts and circumstances in the present case on hand having regard to the fact that the joint family properties generated huge income would clearly give rise to a presumption that subsequent acquisition by the brothers i.e., defendant Nos.2 and 3 were all acquired with the aid of ancestral properties. The evidence on record clearly gives an indication the manner in which the aid of ancestral properties was taken in their acquisition and therefore, we are of the view that this is a fit case to apply presumption that all the properties acquired after death of Ramaswamy were with the aid of surplus income generated from ancestral properties. The clinching evidence on record clearly demonstrates that rents formed substantial income. The evidence clearly establishes that the business in the hands of the brother i.e.,
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defendant Nos.2 and 3 also grew with the assistance of joint family funds and the earnings of the business were blended with joint family estate and therefore, the business cannot remain free and separate. To support their claim, the defendant No.2 has failed to adduce clinching evidence. If it is admitted that defendant No.2 was acting as a Kartha of the family and if a Kartha were to claim that certain properties have been acquired by him with his own separate funds and not with the help of joint family funds of which he was in possession and charge, the entire burden is on the Kartha to prove by clear and satisfactory evidence that the properties acquired by him were from his separate funds and not with the aid of the joint family corpus. It is trite law that onus of proving in such cases would be always on the manager and not on the other members of the family. The defendant No.2 has miserably failed to establish that the properties which are purchased in his name are his self acquired properties. The defendant No.2 has further failed to establish that the item
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Nos.5 and 6 in schedule ‘C’ properties were acquired by all three brothers by their joint labour and exertion without the aid of ancestral nucleus.
In absence of clinching evidence, the fact that defendant No.2 was managing the entire affairs and there was a tangible surplus income generated by way of rents, a presumption would be that the properties so acquired by the brothers after the death of father would be their joint family property unless contrary is proved by defendant Nos.2 to 7 that the acquirers intended to own the property has co-owners between themselves and the entire sale consideration paid to acquire these properties was not with the aid of the joint family corpus. In absence of clinching evidence to substantiate their claim as alleged in the written statement and also during trial, the properties purchased in the name of brothers cannot be treated as joint properties as claimed but they are to be treated as joint family properties. If they are treated as joint family ancestral properties, then plaintiff
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would be also entitled for a share in all the suit schedule properties which were purchased with the aid of joint family funds.
The fact that defendant No.2 has deliberately withheld the documents would go against the claim made by the defendant No.2. An adverse inference has to be drawn against the defendant No.2 in view of Section 114(G) of Evidence Act. There is absolutely no material on record to indicate as to what was the source of income with which the three brothers started independent business namely Laxmi Bricks and there is absolutely no evidence to demonstrate that they had independent income and from the said income, they purchased agricultural lands. A feeble attempt is made by the defendant No.2 during trial wherein he has stated that he had a lorry in 1960 and from the income generated from the transport business, he has made independent acquisition in his name.
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From the material on record, it is borne out that defendant No.2 was born on 22.03.1950 and therefore, the question of he possessing lorry in 1960’s and doing a transport business appears to be improbable and the same cannot be believed. If he was born in 1950, then obviously he was hardly aged 10 years and therefore, the contention of the defendant No.2 that he had independent earning and he did not utilize the surplus income generated from the joint family properties stands falsified and therefore, the entire defence set up by the defendant No.2 stands demolished.
We would also find from the further cross- examination of defendant No.2, wherein he has pleaded his ignorance during cross-examination in regard to capital mobilized to invest and start a factory. He has admitted in cross-examination that he does not possess any documents. There is further admission wherein he has admitted that he has not obtained any loan. If this relevant ocular evidence is taken into consideration, then we are of the view that the
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defendant No.2 has neither pleaded specifically in the written statement nor he has produced any documents to show that he had independent source of income to purchase the properties stated supra in his name. Therefore, the grounds urged by the defendant No.2 in RFA.No.158/2012 would not displace the findings recorded by the Trial Court on issue Nos.5, 8, 9, 10 and additional issue No.6. Accordingly, point No.5 formulated above is answered in the affirmative.
Re: Point No.6:
The defendant No.3 is also asserting right on the basis of the gift deed dated 18.08.2010 executed by his mother i.e., deceased defendant No.1. The defendant No.3 at paragraph 46(A) by way of amendment to written statement has set up gift deed executed by defendant No.1 during the pendency of the suit and by way of amendment, the defendant No.3 was permitted to incorporate the pleadings in regard to
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execution of the registered gift deed by defendant No.1 on 18.08.2010. By placing reliance on the registered gift deed which is at Ex.D-203, defendant No.3 claims his right and title in respect of share of defendant No.1 in the suit schedule properties.
Though there is no challenge either by plaintiff or to the contesting defendants, we have to examine the validity of gift deed executed by deceased defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3. We have already come to a conclusion that suit properties are co-parcenary properties. If the suit schedule properties are co-parcenary properties, there is a clear embargo on the co-parceners from gifting co-parcenary properties. Any gift deed in respect of co-parcenary is void ab initio and no valid title, interest and possession will pass on defendant No.3. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Babu Mother Savavva Navelgund and Others vs. Gopinath11 has held that alienation by gift of undivided
11 AIR 2000 Kar 27
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interest is void all together. The Division Bench has followed the dictum rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Thamma Venkata Subbamma vs. Thamma Rattamma12. The Division Bench of this Court was of the view that such gifts are void ab initio in their entirety and it is also not allowed even to the extent of their own interest in the property. The Division Bench was of the view that transactions are null and void, since their inception and therefore, the question of seeking cancellation is also not necessary.
In the present case on hand, it is not the co- parcener who has gifted this property. On the contrary, it is the widow of Ramaswamy i.e., deceased defendant No.1 who has gifted the property in favour of defendant No.3. If there is a clear embargo on the co-parceners, then the widow who had limited right and would have taken share notionally out of her husbands share was not at all competent to gift the co- parcenery properties. Therefore, question of defendant No.3's
12 AIR 1987 SC 1775
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share would stand enlarged in view of gift deed executed by deceased defendant No.1 is not permissible under law. Defendant No.3 as a co-parcener is entitled for 1/4th share in the suit schedule properties. The bar or embargo to gift undivided interest continues to remain even after codification of Hindu law. Therefore, even in absence of challenge, defendant No.3 will not have any right and title under the alleged gift deed executed by mother i.e., deceased defendant No.1. Accordingly, point No.6 is answered in negative.
Conclusions:
Having dealt with the points formulated by this Court and having recorded our reasons, this Court being a Court of Final Fact Finding Authority proceeds to record its following conclusions:
a) Based on the pleadings of the parties and also documentary evidence, we have come to conclusion that defendant Nos.2 and 3 are co-parceners and the properties
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left behind by deceased Ramaswamy are all co-parcenary properties and all subsequent acquisition made by defendant Nos.2 and 3 are also held to be co-parcenary properties. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vineeta Sharma (supra), we are of the view that the plaintiff is entitled for equal share as a co-parcener. The existence of a co-parcener nucleus is established and therefore, she would take equal share at par with defendant Nos.2 and 4 and legal representatives of deceased Narayan.
b) The material on record clearly establish that the defendant No.2 was acting as a Kartha of the family. The defendant No.2 contention is that after death of Ramaswamy, the properties left behind by the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 and 3's father are inherited by the parties under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as tenants in common and the joint family ceases to exist and therefore, in absence of co- parcenary, plaintiff cannot claim share in the properties acquired by the three brothers. The defendants primary
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defence is that the parties would succeed only in respect of those properties which were declared in the estate order as per Ex.D-53. Further, he also contends that the property standing in his name are his self acquired properties and a contention is also taken that item No.5 in schedule 'C' which is a partnership firm, plaintiff is not entitled for any share and she cannot maintain a partition suit in respect of a partnership firm. Having taken all these defence, defendant No.2 has not adduced any evidence during trial. It is elicited in cross- examination of defendant No.2, that he has documents relating to the transaction. However, the said documents are not placed on record and therefore, adverse inference has to be drawn against the defendant No.2. The defendant No.2 has also admitted that he was collecting rents to the tune of Rs.25,000/- and therefore, his contention that the property standing in his name are his self acquisition cannot be accepted in absence of evidence to that effect. Therefore, the
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appeal filed by the defendant No.2 in RFA.No.124/2012 is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be rejected.
c) The learned Judge has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and also counter claim of defendant Nos.4 to 7 in respect of item Nos.4 to 6 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule 'C' property. On re-appreciation of entire oral and documentary evidence, we are of the view that the learned Judge erred in believing the evidence adduced by the defendant No.3 pertaining to item Nos.4 to 6 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule 'C' properties. On re-appreciation of the entire evidence, we are of the view that the entire approach of the Trial Court is based on misconception of real point in controversy in the case. The defendant No.3's case is that he walked out of the family in the year 1989 and therefore, he had no control over the family affairs and also joint family funds. The learned Judge has believed Exs.D-194 to 196 which are the Income Tax returns but the evidentiary value of these documents are not examined by the learned Judge. These documents are
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submitted by the defendant No.3 for the year 1990-91, 1991- 92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 on 06.10.1994 and 11.10.1994. Therefore, we are of the view that these Income Tax returns were filed with malafides and in anticipation that there would be a claim by the siblings in the properties which are purchased in his name. Therefore, no credence can be attached to the Income Tax returns at Exs.D-194 to D-196. The civil dispute are decided on the concept of preponderance of probabilities.
d) The material on record clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff and defendants' family possessed prime properties. There are 67 tenements which are leased to the tenants and the same generates huge income. The defendant No.3 claims that the entire rent was collected by defendant No.2. However, defendant Nos.3 and 4 to 7 are quite silent in regard to the relevant issue of whether the funds were shared by all the three brothers. These material aspects stands resolved in the light of Ex.D-245 which is a legal notice issued by the
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defendant No.3 to one of the tenant and in the said legal notice, defendant No.3 has admitted in unequivocal terms that all the three brothers are equally entitled to share rent. Ex.D- 44 also indicates that ancestor of defendant Nos.4 to 7 namely Narayan has also collected rents. Further, Ex.D-3 which is a rent receipt also clearly indicates that all the family members have signed the rent receipts. All these relevant documents are not adverted to by the learned Judge and therefore, the conclusions arrived at by the learned Judge in respect of some of the properties purchased in the name of defendant No.3 is not arrived at by drawing proper inference from fact and the said conclusions are not based on credibility of the clinching documentary evidence. Ex.D-155 is the document relied by the defendant No.3 claiming that he has purchased properties from his independent earning is not at all established and therefore, we are of the view that item Nos.4 to 6 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule 'C' property are also joint family properties
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and plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 and 4 to 7 are also entitled for a share in the said properties.
e) The finding recorded by the learned Judge that plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 are not entitled for a share in item Nos.4 and 9(a) to 9(e) of schedule ‘C’ is palpably erroneous. The clinching evidence on record clearly shows that defendant Nos.2 and 3 have utilized the joint family funds to purchase the properties. Item No.4 in schedule ‘C’ is purchased by defendant Nos.2 and 3 on 29.07.1982. The defendant Nos.2 and 3 have failed to produce clinching evidence that item No.4 bearing Sy.No.20 was purchased by them by their independent income. We have exhaustively dealt with the claim made by defendant No.3 in regard to his self acquisition. Item Nos.9(a) to 9(e) are purchased during the period 1990-92. We have also come to conclusion that though defendant No.3 walked out of the family, however, the document at Ex.D-245 and Ex.D-3 clearly establishes that defendant No.3 was also collecting 1/3rd share in the rents
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generated from item Nos.2 to 5 of schedule ‘B’ property. Therefore, item Nos.9(a) to 9(e) are to be regarded as joint family ancestral properties and therefore, plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 as well as defendant No.2 are entitled for equal share.
f) However, item No.1 in schedule ‘C’ was purchased in the name of wife of defendant No.3 on 22.10.2003. Therefore, since the wife of defendant No.3 is not party and since the sale deed is much subsequent to filing of the suit, this Court cannot examine the nature and character of item No.1 of schedule ‘C’ property without hearing the wife of defendant No.3. Similarly, item Nos.7 and 8 in schedule ‘C’ are not available for partition. Item No.7 of schedule ‘C’ is purchased by wife of defendant No.3 on 10.11.1994 which is after filing of the suit. Similarly, item No.8 is purchased by defendant No.3 under registered sale deed dated 10.06.1998 which is subsequent to filing of the suit.
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g) The defendant Nos.2 and 3 though have set up family settlement by contending that there was a partition in the year 1971 and plaintiff's sister namely Parvathamma, mother and the present plaintiff herein were allotted certain properties towards their legitimate share and therefore, they have relinquished their right, title and interest in the properties left behind by father of defendant No.2. But during trial neither defendant No.2 nor defendant No.3 has produced any clinching evidence indicating that plaintiff was allotted legitimate share in the alleged oral partition. On perusal of the material on record, we would find that that there is no serious contest during trial insofar as this contention is concerned. On the contrary, the defendants have taken a stand during trial that plaintiff having received her legitimate share in the suit schedule properties has not come forward to execute a registered release deed. Therefore, we are of the view that the contention taken by the defendant No.2 in paragraph 9 of the written statement in regard to alleged
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family settlement and contention taken by the defendant No.3 at paragraph 30 of the written statement is not substantiated. Therefore, this material aspect would clearly establish that plaintiff's sister was allotted share and therefore, she executed a release deed. However, there is no material on record indicating that plaintiff was also allotted share in the suit schedule properties. We would also find that there is absolutely no evidence indicating that the alleged family settlement was only in respect of properties covered under Ex.D-53 which is the estate duty assessment order. The failure on the part of defendant Nos.2 and 3 in substantiating their claim in regard to alleged family settlement in 1971 would also strengthen the existence of nucleus and the character of the properties which were held by the surviving brothers as co-parceners and not as tenants in common as alleged by defendant No.2.
h) The learned Judge has also not properly examined the pleadings of the parties to ascertain the character and nature
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of the suit schedule property. Ex.P-1 is a registered release deed executed by sister of the plaintiff and defendant Nos.2 and 3 clearly demonstrate that the properties are treated as a co-parcenary properties. To counter this document, defendant Nos.2, 3 and defendant Nos.4 to 7 have not at all lead in any rebuttal evidence and no explanation is forthcoming to discard the recitals in Ex.P-1. Therefore, the judgment so far as denying plaintiff's share in item Nos.4 to 6 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule 'C' property stands vitiated since it is based on distorted claim of evidence which is not based on legal evidence insofar as denying the share to the plaintiff in the properties held by the defendant No.3 and hence, we are of the view that there is no judicial consideration of evidence adduced by the plaintiff and also documents adduced by contesting defendants. Therefore, the regular first appeal filed by the plaintiff in RFA.No.158/2012 is partly allowed holding that she is entitled for a share in item Nos.4 to 6 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule 'C' property. Similarly, RFA.No.216/2012
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filed by defendant Nos.4 to 7 is partly allowed by holding that they are entitled for share in item Nos.4 to 6 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule 'C' property.
For the foregoing reasons, we pass the following: ORDER
(i) The appeal filed by the plaintiff in RFA.No.158/2012 and the appeal filed by the defendant Nos.4 to 7 in RFA.No.216/2012 are partly allowed and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court passed in O.S.No.11112/1994 is partly modified by granting share to plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 in item Nos.4 to 6 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule ‘C’ properties. Plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 as well as defendant Nos.2 and 3 are entitled for 1/4th share in schedule ‘A’ property, item Nos.1 to 5 in schedule ‘B’ property and item Nos.2 to 5 and 9(a) to 9(e) in schedule ‘C’ property.
(ii) Insofar as properties standing in the name of defendant No.3’s wife and the properties purchased by the
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defendant No.3 after filing of the suit, site No.333 situated at 804, Koramangala standing in the name of daughter of defendant No.2 and item No.6 in schedule ‘B’ property i.e., Kanaka Kalyana Mantapa which is a trust property are not available for partition. Accordingly, claim of plaintiff and defendant Nos.4 to 7 is rejected.
(iii) RFA.No.164/2012 filed by defendant No.3 and RFA.No.124/2012 filed by defendant No.2 are dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE
MBS/CA