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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF JUNE, 2021 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N.K.SUDHINDRARAO R.S.A.No.70/2007
BETWEEN:
MRS. MARY JOYCE POONACHA W/O MR. M.A.POONACHA MAJOR, RESIDING AT No.111, GARDEN HOUSE, PRS LAYOUT, BANASAWADI BANGALORE – 560 047.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI K.N.PHANINDRA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SMT. VAISHALI HEGDE, ADVOCATE)
AND:
M/S. K.T.PLANTATIONS PVT.LTD.,
AT No.112, RICHMOND TOWERS
No.12, RICHMOND ROAD
BANGALORE – 560 025.
MR. R. DEVDAS
FATHER’S NAME NOT KNOWN
MAJOR, RESIDING AT
No.8, CARLESTON
BANGALORE – 560 005.
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY CHIEF SECRETARY R
VIDHANA SOUDHA
BANGALORE.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI K.GANESH NAYAK, ADVOCATE FOR R1 SRI M RAVIPRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR R2 SMT T H SAVITHA, HCGP FOR R3)
THIS RSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 100 OF CPC AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED:7.10.2006 PASSED IN R.A.No.33/2002 ON THE FILE OF THE DISTRICT, AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND PRESIDING OFFICER, FTC-II, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, BANGALORE, ALLOWING THE APPEAL AND SETTING ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DT 26.8.2002 PASSED IN O.S.No.122/92 ON THE FILE OF THE II ADDL.CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN), BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT, BANGALORE.
THIS RSA COMING ON FOR FURTHER DICTATION THIS DAY, THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCING THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This regular second appeal under Section 100 CPC is directed against the common judgment and decree dated 7-10-2006 passed in R.A.Nos.33 and 35 of 2002 by the District and Sessions Judge and Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court –II, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, wherein appeal filed by the plaintiff -K.T. Plantations Private Limited in RA
No.33/2002 came to be allowed and the appeal filed by 3rd defendant-R. Devdas, in R.A.No.35/2002 is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 26-08-2002 passed in O.S.No.122/1992 by the II Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Dn), Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, came to be set aside and consequently, the suit of the plaintiff came to be decreed as prayed for declaring that the sale deed dated 16-2-1992 executed by 1st defendant –Mme Devika Rani Roerich in favour of plaintiff-Company is valid and binding and restraining the defendants from transferring the suit schedule property to any Trust, Society or any other person in any manner or from creating any charge, lien, encumbrance etc., on the suit schedule property and permanently restrained the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.
Now this Court is concerned with the judgment passed in R.A.No.33/2002 against which 2nd defendant/appellant herein filed this appeal as the parties in other appeal has not come up before this court in appeal.
This second appeal is preferred against the declaration that the sale deed dated 16.02.1992 executed by the defendants in favour of plaintiff- company is valid and binding on 1st defendant in respect of the land and property known as “Tataguni Estate”, which was owned by Mme Devika Rani Roerich.
In order to avoid confusion and overlapping, the parties are addressed in accordance with their rankings and status as stood before the trial court.
It is necessary to mention the names of the plaintiff and defendants as per the cause title in the original suit, which are as under: Plaintiff: M/s. K.T. Plantations Pvt. Ltd., No.112, Richmond Towers, 12, Richmond Road, Bangalore-560 025. Defendants: 1. Mme.Devika Rani Roerich W/o. Dr. Svetoslav Roerich, since dead by Lrs:
Mrs. Mary Joyce Poonacha 9-A, Edward Road, Bangalore-560 001.
R. Devdas No.8, Carleston road Bangalore 560 005.
Government of Karnataka Represented by its Chief Secretary Vidhana Soudha, Bangalore-01.
The case of the plaintiff in brief is that; it is a registered stock company under the Companies Act 1956. The object of the Company is carrying on the
business of plantation and allied activities which is represented by its Managing Director Mr.K.T.Bhagath. 1st defendant – MMe Devika Rani Roerich and her husband Dr.Svetoslav Roerich both being the absolute owners of the property known as “Tataguni Estate” situate at Bangalore-Kanakapura Main Road, wherein the land was being cultivated. 1st defendant – MMe Devika Rani Roerich and her husband were residing in the house which is situated in the estate which was called as “Tataguni Estate”. However, in view of their old age and ill-health and in order to get better medical facilities, they started living permanently since last three years at Hotel Ashok. 2nd defendant is the Private Secretary of 1st defendant’s husband Dr.Svetoslav Roerich and looking after his entire affairs.
Plaintiff-Company came to know that 1st defendant and her husband were intending to sell their estate in view of their old age and incapacity to manage the same and approached 1st defendant and her husband with an intention to purchase the entire estate. After due deliberations, both parties reached consensus, under which, 1st defendant agreed to sell the “Tataguni Estate” to the plaintiff- Company. Accordingly, 1st defendant executed sale agreement dated 30.07.1991 agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property. The said agreement was also filed before the authorities of income tax under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act. The plaintiff-Company has paid a sum of Rs.10.00 lakhs as advance to 1st defendant. While scrutinizing the title deeds of 1st defendant, it was noticed that the total extent of land was stated to be 223 acres and 30 guntas and not 223 acres and 05 guntas. Accordingly, supplementary agreement was
entered between the plaintiff-Company and 1st defendant on 21.09.1991 and sale consideration was also revised to Rs.89,50,000/-. Subsequently, 1st defendant obtained income tax clearance from Income Tax Authorities for the sale of plaint schedule land and the sale consideration fixed for the entire property measuring 223 acres 30 guntas was Rs.89,50,000/-. Thereafter, plaintiff-Company paid the balance sale consideration of Rs.79,50,000/- through cheques in favour of 1st defendant on various dates. After receipt of sale consideration on various dates, 1st defendant executed a sale deed on 16.02.1992 in favour of the plaintiff-Company conveying the schedule property in the presence of the witnesses. The possession of the schedule property was also delivered to the plaintiff- Company on that day and since then plaintiff is in possession of the same. However, plaintiff-Company permitted 1st defendant and her husband to keep their
belongings in the studio house situated therein temporarily till an alternate arrangement is made.
It is further stated that 1st defendant and plaintiff-Company went to the jurisdictional Sub- Registrar Office to fix the date and time for completing the registration of the document. At that time, the Sub-Registrar told them that there is a direction from the State Government not to register any document executed by 1st defendant and her husband. Thereafter, plaintiff met the Inspector General of Registration, Karnataka and explained him the transaction that took place between him and 1st defendant and that all the requirements under law have been complied with. Thereafter, an official memo dated 5.3.1992 was issued directing the District Registrar, Bangalore District, Bangalore, for registration of the sale deed in compliance with law.
When this was brought to the notice of 1st defendant, she agreed to come to the Sub-Registrar’s Office at Kengeri on 7-3-1992 for executing and completing the registration formalities of the schedule property. Thereafter, the Managing Director of the plaintiff- Company went to the Office of the Sub-Registrar on 07.03.1992 and presented the sale deed for registration. The registration fee was also paid by the plaintiff as required. But, 1st defendant did not turn up to the office of the Sub-Registrar at the appointed time and therefore, the Managing Director of plaintiff- Company contacted 1st defendant, he was informed that 1st defendant is not keeping good health and he was requested to find out if the Sub-Registrar would go over to the residence of 1st defendant to complete the registration formalities. In this connection, a request letter was given by 1st defendant to the
jurisdictional Sub-Registrar’s Office requesting private attendance to complete the registration formalities.
On receipt of the said request letter, the Sub- Registrar, Kengeri, issued a commission to the Head quarters Sub-Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore, to go over to the residence of 1st defendant to complete the registration formalities, since she was residing within his jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the head quarters Sub- Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore, along with the Managing Director of plaintiff-Company went to Hotel Ashok on the evening of 7.3.1992 and when they went there, they were informed that 1st defendant was under medication and doctor has advised her to take full rest and nobody can meet her. In view of the said situation, the head quarters Sub-Registrar
returned without executing the Commission warrant regarding registration of sale deed.
Thereafter, the Managing Director of the plaintiff- company tried to contact 1st defendant for completing the registration formalities on various occasions, but 2nd defendant never permitted him to contact 1st defendant for one or other reasons. It is stated that 2nd defendant was not happy about the direct dealing which the plaintiff-Company had with the 1st defendant in respect of sale of plaint schedule property, in her absence and therefore, 2nd defendant wanted to drag on and prevent the registration formalities for various and extraneous reasons. As the 1st defendant and her husband solely depending upon 2nd defendant for their day to day needs, 2nd defendant had a dominating position over 1st defendant and 2nd defendant created such a situation with a view to make unlawful gain to herself over the
interest of 1st defendant and to cause unlawful loss to plaintiff-Company. 2nd defendant gave a paper publication in Indian Express dated 17.03.1992 stating that 1st defendant and her husband have authorized her to deal with their properties. But 1st defendant gave separate publication on 18.3.1992 stating that she has not authorized 2nd defendant to represent her and to deal with her property.
It is also stated that, 2nd defendant gave various press statements to defeat the plaintiff’s claim. In one such statement, 2nd defendant state that a Trust is being formed and all the properties of 1st defendant and her husband including the plaint schedule property has to be transferred to the Trust. It is contended that 1st defendant being under the control of 2nd defendant may be coerced to execute the document for creation of such Trust and transferring the schedule property in its favour. In
this connection, 2nd defendant and her persons have organized a function on 15.6.1992 and inaugurated a Trust in the name and style “International Roerich Memorial Trust”. It is also contended that 2nd defendant and other interested persons have been prevailing upon 1st defendant and her husband to transfer the property either in the name of Trust or another name in order to make gain.
Thus, the plaintiff- company requested the 1st defendant to complete the formalities of the registration. In the meanwhile, it is also noticed that O.S.No.34/1994 was filed for permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff’s company from interfering with the schedule property and the sale deed is not binding on her and the same was dismissed for non- prosecution.
By the attitude of the 2nd defendant, 1st defendant has been and was used by 2nd defendant. 2nd Defendant do not have any right over the schedule property. The 2nd defendant made an calculated approach to grab the entire suit schedule property. There are every possibility that they may dominate and trespass into the schedule property and filed a suit for injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the possession of the schedule property.
Initially, plaintiff filed the suit against defendant Nos.1 and 2. In pursuance of the summons, they appeared through their counsel. 1st defendant filed her written statement and 2nd defendant by filing a memo adopted the same. Subsequently, 3rd defendant voluntarily got impleaded in the suit and filed the written statement and as per
the order of 1st appellate court in R.A.No.3/1997, Government of Karnataka was impleaded as 4th defendant.
The sum and substance of the written statement filed by 1st defendant is, she denied the execution of agreement to sell and sale deed as stated by the plaintiff-Company. Thus, what is stated is, 1st defendant and her husband never intended to alienate the entire estate. 1st defendant was not present at the time of negotiation of price for sale of property sold by her husband which is western portion of Tataguni estate in favour of plaintiff-Company and she has not agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre.
It is further claimed that Managing Director of plaintiff-Company K.T. Bhagath was with one
R.Devdas and his son Jude Devdas. These two persons used to frequently visit 1st defendant’s house and developed friendship with her and gradually developed interest in looking after the welfare of 1st defendant and catering to her needs. During that time, R. Devdas and Jude Devdas used to call upon 1st defendant to sign some papers stating that the papers are necessary to look after Tataguni estate properly and also to look after the paintings in the bungalow. 1st defendant was aged 84 years and was not keeping good health during May 1991 to March 1992 and she regained good health in March 1992 and she came to know that the manner in which R. Devdas and his son Jude Devdas have virtually duped her and obtained her signatures on papers by misrepresentation and fraud and therefore, she issued a public notice in the news paper. She had not received a single rupee as consideration under the agreement of sale or sale
deed. She does not know how the cheques were credited or encashed.
The main contention of the 1st defendant is that, sale deed is bogus, obtained with fraud by plaintiff Company and the suit itself is vitiated by fraud. In the said para 1st defendant also says the witnesses to the sale deed are none other than the wife and daughter of R.Devdas. 1st defendant denies that the plaintiff is in possession of the schedule property. 2nd defendant was in dominating position with a view to make unlawful gain for herself and she was only once dominated by R.Devdas and his son Jude Devdas when she was not keeping good health. It is contended that, 1st defendant issued paper publication on 17.3.1992 and the public notice issued on 18.3.1992 in the news paper was issued by the plaintiff in collusion with R. Devdas and Jude Devdas
and she has not issued any such public notice on 18.3.1992.
1st defendant admitted the press statement given in respect of Trust and it was not created to defeat the lawful rights and interest of plaintiff. It is contended that the Artists Camp was conducted in the schedule property which belongs to 1st defendant and therefore, question of obtaining permission from plaintiff does not arise since the plaintiff was not in possession of the schedule property and not entitled to equitable relief of permanent injunction.
1st defendant died on 9.3.1994 and 2nd defendant claiming to be legal representative of 1st defendant filed an application for amendment of the written statement by adding paragraphs 13A (1)and 13A (xvi) which came to be allowed.
Learned trial Judge on the basis of the pleadings and contentions of both the parties framed the following issues;
Whether the plaintiff proves that the 1st defendant has executed the sale deed dated 16.02.1992 in respect of plaint schedule properties?
Whether the plaintiff proves that he is in lawful possession of the plaint schedule properties?
Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendants are interfering with his lawful possession of plaint schedule properties?
Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendants are attempting to alienate or transfer the suit schedule properties to a Trust, Society or any other person?
Whether the defendants prove that the suit is barred by Res-judicata in view of the withdrawal of plaintiff’s earlier suit O.S.No.3693/92?
Whether the defendants prove that the court fee paid is insufficient?
Whether the defendants prove that the sale deed dated 16.02.1992 and earlier agreement to
sale pertaining to plaint schedule properties are vitiated by fraud?
What order or decree? Addl. Issue No.1: Whether the 3rd defendant proves that there was an agreement dated 24.01.1992 between plaintiff and 1st defendant?
Learned trial Judge was accommodated with following oral and documentary evidence on behalf of plaintiff and defendants; Oral evidence on behalf of Plaintiff: P.W.1 : K.T.Bhagath P.W.2 : T.Mayappa P.W.3 : Prabhakar P.W.4 : C.K.Venkatakrishna P.W.5 : Sathya Narayana P.W.6 : Smt.Anasuya Devdas
Documentary evidence on behalf of plaintiff: Ex.P.1 : Sale deed Ex.P.2 : Memo Ex.P.3 : Tax clearance application Ex.P.4 : Order copy o the Income tax authority Ex.P.5 : No Objection certificate Exs.P.6 & 7: Memo of the District Registrar Office Ex.P.8 : File of District Registrar Ex.P.9 : Cheque Ex.P.10 : Account extract
Exs.P.11 to 15: Cheques Ex.P.16 : Account extract Ex.P.18 : Supplementary agreement Ex.P.19 : Certified copy of the order of the Sub-Registrar Ex.P.20 : Copy of the charge sheet Exs.P.21 & 22: News paper cutting (publication) Ex.P.23 : Invitation Card! Ex.P.24 : Cheque for Rs.5!,00,000/- Ex.P.25 : Memorandum of articles of Association Ex.P.26 : Notification copy of the board meeting Ex.P.27 : Page No.32 of board meeting Ex.P.28 : Page No.25 of board meeting Ex.P.29 : Page No.26 to 29 of board meeting Ex.P.30 : Page Nos.72 to 74 of board meeting Ex.P.31 : Page Nos.46 to 97 of board meeting Ex.P.32 : Page Nos.112 to 116 of board meeting Ex.P.33 : Page Nos.98 to 100 of board meeting Ex.P.34 : Page No.32 of ledger book Ex.P.35 : Page No.33 of Ledger book Ex.P.36 : Page Nos.62 and 63 of Ledger book Ex.P.37 : Page Nos.60 and 61 of Ledger book Ex.P.38 : Ledger for the year 1992-93 Ex.P.39 : Certified copy of plaint in O.S.No.2073/1995 Ex.P.40 : Account extract Ex.P.41 : Copy of FIR Ex.P.42 : Letter written to Devdas Ex.P.43 : Letter written to Issar
Oral evidence on behalf of defendants:
D.W.1 : Mrs.Mary Joyce Poonacha
D.W.2 : R.Devdas
Documentary evidence marked on behalf of defendants:
Ex.D.1
: Cheque
Exs.D.2 to D.4 : Account Opening Forms
Exs.D.5 to 19 : Transferred debit chits
Exs.D.20 to 23 : Account Opening Forms
Exs.D.24 & 25 : Account extracts
Exs.D.26 & 27 : Account opening Forms
Exs.D.28 to 31 : Account extracts
Ex.D.32
: Copy of sale deed Ex.P.1
Ex.D.33
: Original sale agreement
Ex.D.34
: Order of High Court in W.P.No.205/92
Ex.D.35
: Order copy of W.P.No.205/92
On conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. In the meanwhile, the learned counsel submits in the first instance, O.S.No.122/1992 was decreed on 16-12-1996 and R.A.No.3/1997 was filed and the same was allowed and judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was set-aside and matter was remanded by framing the following issues and for decide the same: 1. Whether the sale deed is vitiated by exercising undue influence by the plaintiff and the third defendant played on the first defendant?
Whether the suit is hit under Section 23 of the Contract Act?
Whether the suit is not maintainable for not asking consequential relief?
Whether the suit is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief of Act?
Whether the suit is barred under Order 11 rule 2 of CPC?
Whether the sale transaction is sham transaction?
Whether the relief prayed for cannot be granted?
Upon conclusion of the trial after the remand, the learned trial judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 26-08-2002. Against which regular appeals came to be filed by the plaintiff- M/s. K.T.Plantations Pvt. Ltd., and 3rd defendant – Mr.R.Devdas in R.A.Nos.33/2002 and 35/2002. R.A.No.33/2002 came to be allowed and R.A.No.35/2002 came to be dismissed. The present appeal is filed by the 2nd defendant-Mrs. Mary Joyce Pooncha, challenging the judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate Court, in decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff- Company.
This court while admitting the appeal on 11.6.2013 framed the following substantial questions of law: 1. Can there be a declaration that sale deed dated 16.2.1992 which is unregistered is valid and does it not negate the Section 17 of the Registration Act?
Can there be a declaration that the sale deed with respect to agriculturla property in favour of a company is valid in the light of bar contained in Section 79(b) of Land reforms Act?
Can there be a declaration that the sale deed with respect to property which has vested in the Government by virtue of Act 19 of 1996 valid?
Can there be a declaration when no consequential relief is prayed for in the light of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act?
Learned Senior Counsel for appellant Mr.K.N. Phanindra for Smt.Vaishali Hegde would submit 1st defendant neither executed the sale agreement nor the sale deed. It is also submitted that there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and 1st defendant. 1st defendant was residing
in Tataguni Estate and later, in the grand Ashoka Hotel. Learned counsel also pointed out that by virtue of denial of the sale agreement and the sale deed by 1st defendant, the question of considering the sale deed for registration does not arise. It was also submitted that the sale deed is brought up under suspicious circumstances by the plaintiff- Company. The agreement if any was not in force and there is no duty to execute the sale deed, as such, the execution of the same is fake and unreliable.
It was also brought to the notice that the land in question has already been acquired by the Government by a separate notification and the Special Statue by the Central Government. Thus, for all the legal and practical purpose, result of the case would mean only the amount of deposit which is made by the Government by virtue of the acquisition. Learned Counsel would further submit that the plaintiff-
Company is a real estate dealer and is engaged in taking away the property through illegal means and present case is one of the best example.
Another fact to be considered is, earlier original suit in No.122/1992 filed by plaintiff- M/s.K.T.Plantations Private Limited was decreed on 16-12-1996 and the appeal preferred against the same in R.A.No.3/1997 came to be allowed, the judgment and decree came to be set aside and matter has been remanded to the trial court after framing additional issues. Against the said judgment and decree, plaintiff preferred an appeal before this court in MSA No.301/1999 which came to be partly allowed on 28-7-2000 and remanded the matter to the trial court and IA filed for additional written statement and documents or calling for the witnesses is allowed. After the remand, the plaintiff and 3rd defendant were
cross examined. Thereafter, the trial judge dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 26-8-2002. Against the said judgment and decree, plaintiff filed an appeal in R.A.No.33/2002 and 3rd defendant- R. Devdas preferred an appeal in R.A.No.35/2002. The first appellate court allowed R.A.No.33/2002 and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and consequently, the suit of the plaintiff stands decreed as prayed for. The operative portion of the judgment is as under:
“The appeal No.33/2002 is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff stands decreed as prayed for. It is declared that the sale deed dated 16-2-1992 executed by 1st defendant Madam Devikarani Roerich in favour of the plaintiff Company is valid and binding on her. The defendants are restrained form transferring the sit schedule property to any Trust, Society or any other person in any manner or from creating any charge, lieu, encumbrance etc., on the suit schedule property. The defendants, their men, agents, servants or any one claiming through or under them are permanently restrained from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property.
Appeal No.35/2002 is dismissed.
Keep copy of this judgment in RA No.35/02.”
In the circumstances, this Court is sitting on one appeal i.e. judgment and decree passed in R.A.No.33/1992 on 7-10-2006.
Learned counsel for appellant/2nd defendant Mr.K.N.Phanindra would submit that the document Ex.P1 neither could be called as sale agreement nor as sale deed and it has become incapable of further appreciation and the plaintiff has lost the suit at the threshold.
31.
Learned counsel Mr.K.G.Nayak, for plaintiff/1st respondent herein submits that, it was Mme Devika Rani Roerich who wanted to sell the schedule property and the plaintiff- Company entered into an agreement to purchase the schedule property
for a consideration at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre and total extent being 223 acres 05 guntas, popularly known as ‘Tataguni Estate’ wherein MMe Devika Rani Roerich and Mr.Roerich were living and later they shifted to Hotel Ashoka. The said agreement is marked as Ex.P17. Later it was discovered that the extent of land was actually 223 acres 30 guntas and accordingly, supplementary agreement was entered into. Calculating at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre, the total amount would be Rs.223.30 x 40,000/- = Rs.89,50,000/- and an advance amount of Rs.10,00,000/- was paid and however, at the time of execution of Ex.P1 the full amount of Rs.79,50,000/- was made. Thus the plaintiff-Company in tandum has complied with all the formalities and procedure and the promises. It was 1st defendant who did not stick to her promise and finally made the plaintiff to run from pillar to post.
Learned counsel further submits that on the date fixed for execution, the document was executed. In the sense, the contents of the sale deed were typed on the judicial stamp paper of Rs.11,63,500/-. According to plaintiff, in between agreement Ex.P17 and supplementary agreement Ex.P18, the sale deed was executed on 16-2-1992. It was the 1st defendant who asked the plaintiff to meet her for the further acts at Hotel Ashoka where she was staying and when they went to Hotel Ashoka, it was stated that, it was not possible to meet her because she was not feeling well. Meanwhile, when the Managing Director of plaintiff-Company went to Hotel Ashok, he was not alone and because of the illness of the 1st defendant Registration Authority was requested to exercise formality of registration as provided under Section 72 of the Registration Act, as such, Head quarter Sub -
Registrar, Gandhinagar also had accompanied the Managing Director of the plaintiff company.
Learned counsel further submits that in the light of the refusal by 2nd defendant to meet 1st defendant, sale deed could not be registered. It is in this connection, the plaintiff filed a representation for appearing before the Sub- Registrar seeking compulsory registration of the document by virtue of execution being completed and subsequent refusal of the executant. However, the same was rejected and the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Registrar and matter was pending. It was further submitted that when the matter was pending before the Registrar, suit was filed in O.S.No.32/1994. Thus, in the circumstances it was double effort by the plaintiff. Under one segment he was agitating before the District Registrar in R.A.No.3/1992-93 and on the
other hand, he was prosecuting the suit before the trial court.
Learned counsel further submit that in the meanwhile defendant approached the High court against the rejection of application by the District Registrar. Thus, in the proceeding before the District Registrar, defendant entered appearance and moved for stay of the proceedings and that was rejected. Against the said rejection order, 1st defendant preferred a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.26677/1993 which came to be dismissed on 23-09-1993. Being aggrieved by the said order, 1st defendant preferred writ appeal in W.A.No.2667/1994 which also came to be dismissed on 22-6-1994. Under the circumstances, 1st defendant preferred Special Leave petition before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave to petition No.20022/94 which came to be disposed of on 30-1-1995 and it was bearing CA
No.3094/1995. The order passed by the Apex court is as under:
“Leave granted.
We have heard the counsel on either side at length.
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of
the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka,
dated 22.6.1994 made in W.A.No. 2667/ 93.
The facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal are
as under:
One Devika Rani had allegedly executed an agreement on July 30, 1991 and supplemental agreement on September 2 1, 1991 respectively to sell 223 acres of land in Tataguni Estates on the outskirts of Bangalore City. It had been claimed that in furtherance thereof she had executed a sale deed said to be on 16.2.1992 but the same was not registered. Respondent No. 1 filed O.S.No. 122/92 in the court of City Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural for declaration that the said sale deed dt. 16.2.92 executed by Mrs. Devika Rani Roerich in its favour was valid and binding on her and also for mandatory injunction restraining her from creating any encumbrances on the said property or from transferring it and for a further perpetual injunction restraining her from interfering with his alleged possession and enjoyment of that property. Devika Rani filed her written statement on 2.7.1992 whereby she denied the execution of the sale deed and the agreements to sell in favour of the respondent No. 1 and of the passing of consideration under them. Thus, according to the defendant, she did not execute any agreement to sell or any sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1 in respect of the suit schedule property and
the same is bogus and vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation.
Respondent No.1 has been consistently making efforts and attempts to grab the property of the defendant and their earlier suit No. O.S.3692/92 which was filed in the City Civil Court at Bangalore was withdrawn by them. The present suit had been filed with an additional relief of declaration also. Evidently, the plaintiff was filing speculative and false suits so as to somehow coerce the defendant to sell away her estate to the plaintiff. This defendant had not executed any agreement or supplementary agreement to sell nor had made any application to the Income Tax Authorities nor had she executed an absolute sale deed. The entire agreement of sale and sale deed arc nothing but sham and bogus and a collusive job of K.T. Bhagath, the Managing Director of the K.T.Plantations and R.Devdas and Jude Devdas. The agreements to sell and deed of sale were vitiated by fraud and were unenforceable in die eye of law. This defendant reiterated that she has not handed over possession of the suit schedule property to respondent No. 1 and that she was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as its absolute owner thereof. In support thereof, she has raised several contentions which are not relevant for the disposal of this appeal.
The Sub-Registrar, Kengeri in his endorsement dated 30.7.92 refused to register the document, the sale-deed. This situation led respondent No. 1 to file an appeal before the District Registrar within thirty days on 28.8.92. When the Registrar was proceeding to hear the appeal to register the document, the appellant sought for stay of further proceedings in view of the pendency of the suit but he declined to stay the proceedings. Now it is an
admitted fact that Devika Rani died subsequently. The appellant filed W.P.No. 22677/93 in the High Court and the learned Single Judge by his order dated 23.9.93 dismissed the same. On appeal, as stated earlier, the Division Bench dismissed the Writ Appeal. Thus, this appeal by special leave.
The only question that arises in this appeal is whether the Dist. Registrar was right in proceeding with the hearing of the appeal and whether the High Court was right in declining to stay the proceedings before the District Registrar. On a consideration of the facts and circum- stances of the case, we are of the view that both the District Registrar committed a palpable error of law in proceeding with the matter and the High Court was unjustified in refusing to interfere.
Section 34(3) of the Registration Act, 1908, (for short, 'the Act'), empowers the Registrar when a document is presented for registration to enquire and satisfy himself on certain matters. Section 34(3) reads:
"34(3) The registering officer shall thereupon-
(a) enquire whether or not such document was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed;
(b)satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him and alleging that they have executed the document; and
(c)in the case of any person appearing as a
representative, assign or satisfy himself of the
right of such so to appear." (emphasis supplied)
The Sub-Registrar is required to satisfy himself with the due execution of the document/deed said to have been executed by Devika Rani since she herself was not present at the time of registration of the document. Consequently, the appeal came to be filed. It was within his power that before proceeding to register the alleged conveyance said to have been executed by Devika Rani to satisfy himself whether or not she executed it and whether or not the person presented on her behalf was authorised to have it registered on her be- half He was also empowered to summon her to appear before him before proceeding to register the document. Under the circumstances he refused to register the document. Under ss.72 and 73, of the Act, undoubtedly, the existence of the, power of the, Register to proceed- with the peal is not disputed and cannot be disputed. But the question is of the proprietary and justness of the exercise of the power. Whether he was right in his exercise of discretion to proceed with the hearing of the appeal. As stated earlier, when the executant has denied the execution of the alleged sale deed and passing of the consideration as on 2.7.92 and the dispute when was pending trial in the civil suit filed by the alleged vendee itself The appropriate course should have been that the Registrar should have stayed his hands and directed the plaintiff to obtain appropriate direction from the Civil Court or a decree. When the, appellant approached the High Court, the High Court also should have directed the Civil Judge to dispose of the suit. Then the Registrar should have heard the appeal. Instead, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition and Writ Appeal. Therefore, the orders of the High Court arc set aside. There shall be a direction to the District Registrar not to proceed further with the hearing of the matter till the civil suit is disposed of The trial court is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible within a period of one year
from today. Depending upon the result in the suit, the District Registrar shall take further action.
It is true as rightly contended by Shri R.F.Nariman, the learned senior counsel, that by operation of the prohibition contained in s.49 of the Act the unregistered impugned document effecting the immovable property cannot be looked into. Since the suit is not against an order under sec.77 of the Act, lifting of the bar provided by sec. 78(3) will not come to the aid of the plaintiff. It indicates that when execution of sale deed is in controversy and is subject matter of a suit, s.77(3) lifts the bar of s.49 and enables the court to look into the document for adjudicating the controversy. In these circumstances we direct the trial court to look into the document only for the limited purpose of finding out whether Devika Rani had executed the impugned sale deed alleged to have been executed by her and not for any other purpose. Status quo as on date of suit shall continue till the suit is disposed of.
The appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the
circumstances, without costs.”
Thus, the Hon’ble Apex Court came to a finding that it was not proper aspect for the District Registrar or the Sub-Registrar to entertain the proceedings subsequent to closure and thus asked them to keep quite and leave the matter for judicial side for adjudication and at that level, the proceedings
stopped. It was thereafter, the prosecution of original suit in OS No.122/1992 continued and it was ended in an dismissal for default in the beginning and thereafter appeal was preferred against the said order of dismissal and it came to be allowed and the matter was remanded. In the second phase of proceedings before the trial court, the suit was dismissed, against which, it was the turn of the plaintiff to approach the appellate Court in R.A.No.33/2006 and that came to be allowed. Thus, the present appeal under Section 100 CPC was preferred against the divergent view of the courts below.
As stated above, this court while admitting the appeal on 11-06-2013 framed the following substantial question of law: 1. Can there be a declaration that sale deed dated 16-2-1992 which is unregistered is valid and does
it not negate the Section 17 of the Registration Act? 2. Can there be a declaration that the sale deed with respect to agricultural property in favour of a company is valid in the light of bar contained in Section 79(b) of Land Reforms Act?
Can there be a declaration that the sale deed with respect to property which has vested in the Government by virtue of Act 19 of 1996 valid?
Can there e a declaration when no consequential relief is prayed for in the light of Section 344 of Specific Relief Act?
In addition to it I found it necessary to frame additional substantial questions of law as under:
(i) Whether non registration of document after non registration of an instrument of conveyance after being executed become a nullity if it is not registered?
(ii) Whether the courts are having power to receive the document, examine the validity and genuineness of its execution and thereafter consider
the non registration, regard being had to the fact that execution was completed? (iii) Whether 1st defendant admitted the execution of the sale agreements -Ex.P17 and P18 or the suit document Ex.P1 at any given point of time and if the admission stated above was made what would be the legal effect of the same?
Learned Senior counsel Mr.K.N.Phanindra for appellant would submit that the sale agreements or sale deed do not have full and substantial value. He would also submit that the execution of the registered sale deed of the schedule property only can complete the transfer of ownership as that is the only procedure which is the final one. He would further submit the conduct of the 1st defendant from the beginning of the transaction shows that she has denied the claim of the plaintiff even the agreement and sale deed. The plaintiff wanted to make wrongful gain by playing mischief and it was the manipulated
document that was produced before the Sub-Registrar Kengeri and the District Registrar. He further submits that the very plaintiff has not mentioned the circumstances which show that 1st defendant had intention to sell the schedule property. He also submit about the value being meager.
Learned counsel Mr.K.G.Nayak would submit that not only the documentary evidence and even the circumstances suggest irrefutably that 1st defendant entered into an agreement as per Ex.P17 and also subsequent agreement as per Ex.P18 and also executed the sale deed marked as Ex.P1. Learned counsel would further submit that the attendant circumstances of 1st defendant being staying at Ashoka Hotel instead of Tataguni Estate because of the health reasons along with her husband Mr.Roerich. Sale agreement, consideration given through cheques and the subsequent sale agreement wherein an
advance amount of Rs.10.00 lakhs was given in the form of cheque and further the balance consideration being given to her gets doubly confirmed by the evidence of the Bank managers who have been examined on behalf of plaintiff and it was also submitted that 1st defendant was a celebrity at one point of time and she retained her upper hand on all the stages of the transaction.
O.S.No.32/1994 on the file of learned II Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore, was filed by the 1st defendant wherein she claimed that consent given by her was polluted by flaws like coercion and undue influence and therefore she is not liable under the said document and sought declaration that the same is null and void. The said suit came to be dismissed for non prosecution on 25-9-2002. The proceedings stopped at that level and thereafter, neither an application was
filed under order 9 Rule 9 or appeal was preferred against the said judgment.
Learned counsel further submitted that the sale agreement Ex.P17 or supplementary sale agreement Ex.P18 or the sale deed Ex.P1 are absolutely free from any legal defects and cumulative legal effect of all the three documents is that the execution of the sale deed is complete and formality of registration is pending. Thus, the right of the plaintiff under the said three documents along with other documents establish consideration being recognized.
In the context and circumstances of the case, before delving on the other aspects of the case, it is necessary to mention that there are three phases in the entire transaction. The first one is, the agreement claimed as Ex.P17 dated 30-2-1991
wherein the plaintiff Company entered into an agreement to purchase the suit schedule property of 223 acres 05 guntas of land from Mme Devika Rani Roerich at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre and the advance amount paid on that date was Rs.10.00 lakhs under the agreement.
Second agreement marked as Ex.P18 dated 21-9-1991 was entered into because there was an error regarding mentioning of the extent of the schedule property as 223 acres 05 guntas. However, the actual extent as per survey records was 223 acres and 30 guntas. The period to execute the sale deed mentioned therein is 5 months.
All the stalemate and chaos in the case commenced from February 1992 precisely from 16-2-1992. The consideration that was payable to Mme Devikarani Roerich was Rs.79,50,000/- and
entire balance amount was paid through cheques. The details of the cheques are as under:
Rs.10,00,000/- at the time of agreement dated 23.8.1991 by cheque No.186055 dated 23.8.1991.
Sl. No. Amount Ch. Nos. Dated 1 Rs.25,00,000/- 995706 12.2.1992 2 Rs.10,00,000/- 995707 14.2.1992 3 Rs.15,00,000/- 995708 17.2.1992 4 Rs.10,00,000/- 995709 19.2.1992 5 Rs.14,50,000/- 995710 19.2.1992 6 Rs.5,00,000/- 430225 19.2.1992 Tot al Rs.79,50,000/- At the time of Ex.P1.
+ Rs.10,00,000/- Advance
Rs.89,50,000/-
All drawn on Karnataka Bank Limited, Koramangala Branch, Bangalore and
(f) Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five Lakhs only) by cheque No.430225 dated 19.02.1992 drawn on state Bank of Mysore, Cooke Town Branch, Bangalore; all subject to realization.”
The said amount of consideration of Rs.79,50,000/- was paid to Mme Devika Rani Roerich as on the date 16-2-1992. Regarding the issue of said cheques, PW3-Prabhakar, Manager State Bank of Mysore, PW5-Satyanarayana, Manager, Syndicate
bank have deposed regarding honouring of the cheques and transferring the amount to the account of Mme Devikarani Roerich. Thus, these two witnesses speak regarding honouring of the cheques.
Further the next formality that was due was, execution of the registered sale deed and it was done by Mme Devika Rani Roerich and she was absolutely was in know of the contents of the deed wherein she had sold the schedule property to the plaintiff for the total consideration of Rs.89,50,000/-, out of which Rs.10.00 lakhs was given as advance and the balance amount of Rs.79,50,000/- was paid through cheques.
In the circumstances, and in the presence of Mr.Roerich, she subscribed her signature to the document Ex.P1 which is the sale deed and the final formality in respect of the sale of immoveable
property is the registration. Insofar as presentation of document is concerned, it can either be presented by seller or purchaser and the next aspect is, admission of execution wherein Sub-Registrar would ask the executant of the contents of the sale deed and when the vendor replies confirming the sale and also receiving of consideration, the vendor will be asked to sign at the column mentioned for “execution admitted” so that the seller has admitted execution. Next one is, the office formalities, where the document in the post registration stage would describe the registered sale deed, Book Number, Volume, Page Numbers etc. However, now, the same is effected according to the latest technology.
Now the next aspect that has come up for consideration before this Court in this case is regarding the registration and consequences of refusal to register. In this connection, Sections 73, 74 and 75
of the Indian Registration Act,
indicate the formalities.
When the execution is denied by the seller after completing formalities of execution, the Sub- Registrar would get authority to admit the execution. The purchaser has a right to present the document for compulsory registration. In this case, it was not the case of refusing registration in the office of the Sub- Registrar but the place included within the meaning of the office of the Sub-Registrar.
As stated by plaintiff earlier, Mme Devika Rani Roerich had stated that it would be difficult for her to come to Sub–Registrar’s office and hence on her request and as provided under the Registration Act for issuing commission warrant to facilitate the registration of the sale deed at a place other than the office of the Sub-Registrar, a Commissioner was
appointed on behalf of the Registration authority to preside over the matter for registration of sale deed at Hotel Ashoka where 1st defendant was stationed. It is also the case of the plaintiff that when they went to Hotel Ashoka, 2nd defendant never allowed the plaintiff to have access with Mme Devika Rani Roerich and by virtue of not meeting Mme Devika Rani Roerich, the Commissioner returned to Sub-Registrar’s office. It was at that moment, Sub-Registrar was requested by the plaintiff for compulsory registration of the sale deed.
‘Compulsory Registration’ comes into picture when the execution of sale deed is over and after entering into the contract and the sale deed in pursuance of the willingness, offer and acceptance, receipt of consideration and when 1st defendant has appended the signature to the deed, if the registration is stopped for any other reason beyond control and at
that time, compulsory registration would be effected. In this case, as stated above, first, Sub-Registrar was requested to issue a commission to go to Hotel Ashoka where 1st defendant was stationed on her own for the health reasons as claimed by herself and considering her refusal and the circumstances, the Sub-Registrar refused to register the sale deed. It was after that appeal was preferred by the plaintiff. The sale deed Ex.P-1 was stated to be in the custody of the registration authority when the plaintiff applied for compulsory registration on 28.08.1992. It is on 30-7-1992 appeal was presented before the District Registrar and this has led for the further proceedings. During the pendency of the same, 2nd defendant filed application for stay and the District Registrar declined to stay the proceedings against which 2nd defendant/appellant filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.22677/1994 and it came to be
dismissed on 23-09-1993. Against which, writ appeal was preferred in W.A.No.2667/1994 which came to be dismissed on 22-6-1994. It was against the dismissal of the writ appeal, 2nd defendant approached the Hon’ble Apex Court in Special Leave Petition No.20022/94 and thereafter, it was treated as Civil Appeal No.3094/1995 which came to be disposed of on 20-01-1995 directing the trial court to dispose of the suit expeditiously.
The portion of the judgment (first and last para) passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court is necessary to be extracted which is as under:
“Leave granted.
We have heard the counsel on either side at
length. This appeal by special leave arises
from the order of the Division Bench of
the High Court of Karnataka, dated 22.6.1994
made in W.A.No. 2667/ 93.
The facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal
are as under:
One Devika Rani had allegedly executed an agreement on July 30, 1991 and supplemental agreement on September 2 1, 1991 respectively to sell 223 acres of land in Tataguni Estates on the outskirts of Bangalore City. It had been claimed that in furtherance thereof she had executed a sale deed said to be on 16.2.1992 but the same was not registered. Respondent No. 1 filed O.S.No. 122/92 in the court of City Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural for declaration that the said sale deed dt. 16.2.92 executed by Mrs. Devika Rani Roerich in its favour was valid and binding on her and also for mandatory injunction restraining her from creating any encumbrances on the said property or from transferring it and for a further perpetual injunction restraining her from interfering with his alleged possession and enjoyment of that property. Devika Rani filed her written statement on 2.7.1992 whereby she denied the execution of the sale deed and the agreements to sell in favour of the respondent No. 1 and of the passing of consideration under them. Thus, according to the defendant, she did not execute any agreement to sell or any sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1 in respect of the suit schedule property and the same is bogus and vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation.
Respondent No.1 has been consistently making efforts and attempts to grab the property of the defendant and their earlier suit No. O.S.3692/92 which was filed in the City Civil Court at Bangalore was withdrawn by them. The present suit had been filed with an additional relief of declaration also. Evidently, the plaintiff was filing speculative and false
suits so as to somehow coerce the defendant to sell away her estate to the plaintiff. This defendant had not executed any agreement or supplementary agreement to sell nor had made any application to the Income Tax Authorities nor had she executed an absolute sale deed. The entire agreement of sale and sale deed arc nothing but sham and bogus and a collusive job of K.T. Bhagath, the Managing Director of the K.T.Plantations and R.Devdas and Jude Devdas. The agreements to sell and deed of sale were vitiated by fraud and were unenforceable in die eye of law. This defendant reiterated that she has not handed over possession of the suit schedule property to respondent No. 1 and that she was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as its absolute owner thereof. In support thereof, she has raised several contentions which are not relevant for the disposal of this appeal.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
The only question that arises in this appeal is whether the Dist. Registrar was right in proceeding with the hearing of the appeal and whether the High Court was right in declining to stay the proceedings before the District Registrar. On a consideration of the facts and circum- stances of the case, we are of the view that both the District Registrar committed a palpable error of law in proceeding with the matter and the High Court was unjus- tified in refusing to interfere.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
It is true as rightly contended by Shri R.F.Nariman, the learned senior counsel, that by operation of the prohibition contained in s.49 of the Act the unregistered impugned document effecting the immovable property cannot be looked into. Since the suit is not against an order under sec.77 of the Act, lifting of the bar provided by sec. 78(3) will not come to the aid of the plaintiff. It indicates that when execution of sale deed is in controversy and is subject matter of a suit, s.77(3) lifts the bar of s.49 and enables the court to look into the document for adjudicating the controversy. In these circumstances we direct the trial court to look into the document only for the limited purpose of finding out whether Devika Rani had executed the impugned sale deed alleged to have been executed by her and not for any other purpose. Status quo as on date of suit shall continue till the suit is disposed of.
The appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the
circumstances, without costs.”
In the circumstances, it was the direction issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court against the proceeding of matter by the Registration Authorities till the disposal of the suit by the Civil Court. In the matter before the Civil Court, the relief sought in respect of Ex.P1 and the prayer is as under:
“Declare that the sale deed dated 16.02.92 executed by the defendant MMe.Devika Rani Roerich in favour of the plaintiff company is valid and binding on her.”
Thus, the relief sought by the plaintiff is to declare the sale deed dated 16-2-1992 executed by 1st defendant –Mme Devika Rani in favour of the plaintiff as valid and binding and also for permanent injunction regarding interference or creating any encumbrance and also from interfering with possession of the property. In this connection, it is necessary to mention that the case of the plaintiff is on the basis of the sale deed that was executed, but not registered.
It is necessary to mention the meaning of the term “Execution”. The Oxford dictionary meaning of word “Execution” is the action of executing a plan, order, or a legal instrument.
Execution means the accomplishment of a thing, the completion of an act or instrument.
Hence, the plaint meaning of the word “Execution” is the process of completion of accomplishment of an act. Here, we have to see the meaning of the term ‘execution” with regard to the documents in legal sense.
A reading of Sestina 68 of Evidence Act will show that “Attestation” and ’Execution” are two different acts one following the other. There can be no valid execution of a document which, under the law, is required to be attested without the proof of its due attestation and if due attestation is not proved, the fat of execution is of no avail.”
The term ‘Execution’ is defined by P. Ramanatha Aiyar in the Law Lexicon – The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary, 5th Edition is as under:
“Execution of a deed or other instrument. Thus when the terms are applied to a written instrument they include the performance of all acts which may be necessary to render it complete as a deed or an instrument importing the intended obligation, of every act required to give the instrument validity, or to carry it into effect or to give the instrument validity, or to carry it into effect or to give it the forms required to tender it valid. (Webster Dict). “The word ‘executes’ applied to a deed, rather to a will” Casement v.Fullon, (5 Moore PC 130, 141, 13). In a technical sense, the words necessarily include in
English law the performance of three acts signing, sealing and delivery and in some instances the acknowledgment of the instrument, but the act of delivery is not always included; and not infrequently the terms are employed to express merely the acts of signing and sealing, or of signing only. The officer of a corporation affixing its seal to a deed is “the party executing the deed”. Execution must mean voluntary execution, the signing of the document of the executant’s free will. Where the signature to an agreement was obtained by duress and intimidation, there is no execution of the documents. [1 CLJ 126:(6 WR Mis 131: 1 BLROC 47: 4 MHCR 425 Dis.)]
“The term execution of document consists in signing a document, written out, read over and understood and does not consist of merely signing a blank paper”. AIR 1916 Pat 206, quoted. Birbal Singh v.Harphool Khan, AIR 1976 All 23 t 24. [Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881), S.118]. Execution of document is not mere signing of it. It is a solemn act of the executant who must own up the recitals in the instrument and there must be clear evidence that the put his signature in a document after knowing fully its contents. Bhutkani Nath v. Kamaleshwari Nath, AIR 1972 Assam and Nagaland 15, 17. [Registration Act (16 of 1908), S.60(2)].”
Now the question is, in the light of the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said Civil Appeal, the trial court was directed to proceed with the matter and the registration authorities to wait till the out come of the suit before Civil court.
The trial court, after trying the issues and concluding the trial, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff on 26-8-2002. Against the said judgment, plaintiff preferred a regular appeal before the 1st appellate court in RA No.33/2002 and 3rd defendant preferred RA No.35/2002. The 1st appellate court through its judgment dated 7-10-2006 allowed the appeal in R.A.No.33/2002 and R.A.No.35/2002 came to be dismissed. The operative portion of the said judgment of the first appellate court reads as under:
“The appeal No.33/2002 is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiff stand decreed as prayed for. It is declared that, the sale deed dated; 16.2.1992 executed by 1st defendant Madam Devikarani Roerich in favour of the plaintiff Company is valid and binding on her. The defendants are restrained from transferring the suit schedule property to any Trust, Society or any other person in any manner or from creating any charge, lien, encumbrance etc., on the suit schedule property. The defendants, their men, agents, servants or any one claiming through or under them are permanently restrained from
interfering wit the plaintiffs peaceful possession and emjoyment of suit schedule property.
Appeal No.35/2002 is dismissed.”
Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in OS No.122/1992 was set aside. Against the judgment and decree passed in R.A.No.33/2002, 2nd defendant- Mary Joyce Poonacha has presented this appeal.
At this stage, it is necessary to recollect the following points: * The suit document of the plaintiff is Ex.P1 which is the sale deed on a non judicial stamp paper of Rs.11,63,500/-; * The contents of the said sale deed is that, 1st defendant- Mme Devika Rani Roerich, executed the sale deed in respect of the schedule property which was made in pursuance of the earlier sale agreement and supplementary agreement which are marked as Exs.P17 and P18 dated 30.7.1991 and 21.9.91;
* The prayer sought by the plaintiff in regular appeal No.33/2002 was allowed.
Under the circumstances, the position would be, plaintiff is basing its claim for the relief on Ex.P1 and the related document. The claim in the plaint is that, Ex.P1 was duly executed by 1st defendant in favour of plaintiff-Company for the consideration amount of Rs.89,50,000/- and sold the schedule property which consisted of 223 acres 30 guntas of land as mentioned in the schedule to the plaint. It is further claimed that 1st defendant after executing the sale deed failed to co-operate for registration and it was presented for compulsory registration before the Sub-Registrar and later on his refusal before the District Registrar for sanction of registration. Under these circumstances, the points that emerges at this stage is, plaintiff after having made the payment of Rs.89,50,000/- also purchased
non judicial stamp paper of Rs.11,63,500/-. The sale deed was written, executed and attested. Regard being had to the fact that, plaintiff has to present the same for compulsory registration in the circumstances and what could be understood from the above activities is that, the entire action led for presenting the document for compulsory registration.
The Ex.P1 was executed on 16-2-1992 and document was presented for compulsory registration on 7-3-1992 and appeal was filed in R.A.No.3/1992 on 28-8-1992. That goes to show that plaintiff through its case, presented the pleading that it did not claim its title solely on the basis of the execution of the sale deed and wanted to get the formality of the registration completed. Hence, plaintiff presented the document before the Sub-Registrar for compulsory registration under Section 34 of the Indian
Registration Act, and by that time, the civil suit filed on 18-6-1992 was already pending. The proceedings before the court and the Registration authority cannot be bifurcated and placed in two water tight compartments.
In this connection, the following dates are relevant: Date of presentation of document before Sub-Registrar: 28-8-1992 Date of rejection : 30-7-1992
Date of filing of appeal before District Registrar in RA No.3/1992: 7-3-1992 Date of filing of the suit is :18-6-1992
At this stage, it is necessary to mention, Section 34 and 35 of the Indian Registration Act, which read as under: “34. Enquiry before registration by registering officer.—(l) Subject to the provisions contained in this Part and in sections 41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 88 and 89, no document shall be registered under this Act, unless the persons
executing such document, or their representatives, assigns or agents authorized as aforesaid, appear before the registering officer within the time allowed for presentation under sections 23, 24, 25 and 26: Provided that, if owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident all such persons do not so appear, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in appearing does not exceed four months, may direct that on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration fee, in addition to the fine, if any, payable under section 25, the document may be registered.
(2) Appearances under sub-section (1) may be simultaneous or at different times.
(3) The registering officer shall thereupon—
(a) enquire whether or not such document was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed;
(b) satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him and alleging that they have executed the document; and
(c) in the case of any person appearing as a representative, assign or agent, satisfy himself of the right of such person so to appear.
(4) Any application for a direction under the proviso to sub-section (1) may be lodged with a Sub-Registrar, who shall forthwith forward it to the Registrar to whom he is subordinate.
(5) Nothing in this section applies to copies of decrees or orders. State Amendments Tamil Nadu: In section 34,—
(1) in sub-section (1), after the expression “persons executing such document”, the expression “and in the case of document for sale of property, the persons claiming under that document” shall be inserted;
(2) in sub-section (3), in clause (b), after the expression “executed the document”, the expression “or they are claiming under the document” shall be inserted.
(3) after section 34, the following section insert:— “34A. Person claiming under document for sale of property also to sign document.—Subject to the provisions of this Act, no document for sale of peoperty shall be registered under this Act, unless the person claiming under the document has also signed such document.”. [Vide Tamil Nadu Act 28 of 2000].
Procedure on admission and denial of execution respectively.— (1)
(a) If all the persons executing the document appear personally before the registering officer and are personally known to him, or if he be otherwise satisfied that they are the person they represent themselves to be, and if they all admit the execution of the document, or
(b) if in the case of any person appearing by a representative, assign or agent, such representative, assign or agent admits the execution, or
(c) if the person executing the document is dead, and his representative or assign appears before the registering officer and admits the execution, the registering officer shall register the document as directed in sections 58 to 61 inclusive.
(2) The registering officer may, in order to satisfy himself that the persons appearing before him are the persons they represent themselves to be, or for any other purpose contemplated by this Act, examine any one present in his office.
(3) (a) If any person by whom the document purports to be executed denies its execution, or (b) if any such person appears to the registering officer to be a minor, an idiot or a lunatic, or
(c) if any person by whom the document purports to be executed is dead, and his representative or assign denies its execution, the registering officer shall refuse to register the document as to the person so denying, appearing or dead: Provided that, where such officer is a Registrar, he shall follow the procedure prescribed in Part XII: 50 [Provided further that the 51 [State Government] may, by notification in the 52 [Official Gazette], declare that any Sub-Registrar named in the notification shall, in respect of documents the execution of which is denied, be deemed to be
a Registrar for the purposes of this sub-section and of Part XII.]
Thus, what could be understood is, during the pendency of the suit, the appeal came to be filed before the District Registrar and it is nothing but simultaneous proceedings for the same relief was being initiated. The Hon’ble Apex Court has made an observation that “District Registrar or Sub Registrar should have stayed themselves away from adjudicating the matter when the same was before the civil court.” The Hon’ble Apex Court set aside the order passed in W.A.No.2667/1993 that was filed by 2nd defendant having been aggrieved by the dismissal of W.P.No.22677/1993 where she sought for staying the proceedings before the District Registrar.
In the whole set of circumstances of the case, the scope of this case would be, to peruse the point of law regarding the rights of the plaintiff and
the contentions of the defendants. The material before this court is: “The proceeding that was in force before the Sub Registrar and District Registrar were for compulsory registration and the original suit to enforce the right of the plaintiff over the schedule property with the prayer as stated above.”
Above all, the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court is about the scope of this case. It is necessary to repeat the portion of Paragraph No.9 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.3094/1995 which is as under:
“It is true as rightly contended by Shri R.F.Nariman, the learned senior counsel, that by operation of the prohibition contained in s.49 of the Act the unregistered impugned document effecting the immovable property cannot be looked into. Since the suit is not against an order under sec.77 of the Act, lifting of the bar provided by sec. 78(3) will not come to the aid of the plaintiff. It indicates that when execution of sale deed is in controversy and is subject matter of a suit, s.77(3) lifts the bar of s.49 and enables the court to look into the document for adjudicating the controversy. In these circumstances we direct the trial court to look into the document only for the limited purpose of finding out whether
Devika Rani had executed the impugned sale deed alleged to have been executed by her and not for any other purpose. Status quo as on date of suit shall continue till the suit is disposed of.
The appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs.”
Thus, the matter remains in the suspended animation insofar as Sub-Registrar and District Registrar are concerned and the Civil court has to dispose of the suit. The Hon’ble Apex court has observed that “the Sub-Registrar is required to satisfy himself with the due execution of the document.”
The direction was given to the trial court to look into the document only for the limited purpose of finding out whether 1st defendant had executed the sale deed alleged to have been executed by her and not for any other purpose.
I have mentioned the meaning of the term “Execution” above and it means completion or
accomplishment of the purpose and in the context, it is completing the formality of the sale deed, as the execution is the penultimate stage and the registration is the final stage. Regard being had to the fact that it invariably suggests that direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court to the trial court that it has to find out whether it is executed and thereafter if it comes to a decision as to whether it is executed or other wise, the matter has to be resumed by the registration authorities.
In the circumstances, much of the addressing has been to the admissibility of the document. The action by the parties becomes closed when once the execution is complete as mentioned at the back of any registered sale deed and the presentation of sale deed for registration is a formality.
Thus, the focal point of the suit would be the execution of sale deed by MMe Devika Rani Roerich on 16-02-1992 which is marked as Ex.P1 before the trial court.
The term ‘Sale’ is defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, as under: “Sale” defined.—‘‘Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part- paid and part-promised.
Sale how made.—Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. 1In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.
Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.
The case of the plaintiff is that, sale deed Ex.P1 was preceded by sale agreements dated
30-07-2002 marked as Ex.P17 and dated 21-09-1991 marked as Ex.P18, as it is stated that the total extent of schedule property is 223 acres 30 guntas, but 30 guntas was not mentioned in the first agreement, Ex.P17. The total sale consideration is Rs.89,50,000/- at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre. The plaintiff claims that the total consideration was paid to the 1st defendant through cheques.
The details of payment of sale consideration by way of cheques as mentioned in the sale deed Ex.P1 are as under:
Sl. No. Amount Ch. Nos. Dated 1 Rs.25,00,000/- 995706 12.2.1992 2 Rs.10,00,000/- 995707 14.2.1992 3 Rs.15,00,000/- 995708 17.2.1992 4 Rs.10,00,000/- 995709 19.2.1992 5 Rs.14,50,000/- 995710 19.2.1992 6 Rs.5,00,000/- 430225 19.2.1992 Total Rs.79,50,000/- At the time of Ex.P1.
+ Rs.10,00,000/- Advance
Rs.89,50,000/-
All drawn on Karnataka Bank Limited, Koramangala Branch, Bangalore and
(f) Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five Lakhs only) by cheque No.430225 dated 19.02.1992 drawn on state Bank of Mysore, Cooke Town Branch, Bangalore; all subject to realization.”
The witnesses examined by the plaintiff in support of its case are PWs 1 to 6. PW1-K.T. Bhagath, PW2-T.Mayappa, official from the office of the Registrar; PW3-Prabhakar Rao, Sub Accountant in Central Bank of Mysore (However, it is submitted that it is Central Bank of India and it seems to have been erroneously typed as Mysore). PW4-C.K.Venkata Krishnan is the Manager of Karnataka Bank, Koramangala Branch, Bangalore. PW5- Sathyanarayana is the Branch Manager in State Bank of Mysore.
PW1-K.T.Bagath is stated to be the Managing Director of plaintiff company- M/s.K.T.Plantation, which is a joint stock company
incorporated during the year 1988 under the Companies Act, 1952. He has reiterated the averments made in the plaint. It means to say that the schedule property earlier belonged to 1st defendant and her husband. The entire estate was in two phases. As both 1st defendant and her husband were aged 80 years and both of them were in advanced stage, they were maintaining the schedule property through servants. He tells about the intention of 1st defendant to sell the schedule property. The plaintiff company had entered into an agreement to purchase 233 acres 05 guntas from Dr.Roerich, husband of 1st defendant. The sale agreement was entered into on 30-10-1990 and total consideration was Rs.93,63,000/- and paid Rs.83,62,000/- on the date of agreement and thereafter registered sale deed was executed on 23-3-2001. As there were no documents in respect of 92.17 guntas of land sale
deed was not executed and sale deed was executed in respect of 141 acres 25 guntas of land. Hence, plaintiff has filed a separate suit in O.S.No.2073/1995 (Ex.P39) claiming refund of sale consideration amount in respect of 92 acres 17 guntas of undocumented land and the said suit was dismissed as the Government was not made as a party to the said suit.
PW6-Anasuya Devdas, D/o R.Devdas is one of the attestor to Ex.P1 and she says that she knows about Ex.P1 sale deed dated 16-2-1992 and execution of the said sale deed in the house of defendant No.3. The mother of this witness and PW-1 –K.T.Bhagat and his Advocate and 3rd defendant were present in the house. 1st defendant had gone through the document Ex.P1 and signed on Ex.P1 page wise as per Ex.P1a to P-1g in their presence. This witness and even her mother also have signed Ex.P1. The signature of this witness is marked as Ex.P1(h). She submits that her
mother was bedridden and not in a position to come to court to give evidence.
The sale consideration is stated to have been made through cheques as spoken by the bank officials PWs 3, 4 and 5.
PW1 is the Managing Director of plaintiff- Company and PW6 is the attestor. Both speak regarding execution of the sale deed and PW-1 tells about the issuance of cheques in respect of the sale consideration of Rs.89,50,000/- which are endorsed by PWs 3 to 5.
Insofar as proceedings before the Sub- Registrar is concerned, it is the case of the plaintiff as narrated in the plaint that 1st defendant first informed that she is unable come to the office of the Sub- Registrar and at that time she was residing at Hotel Ashoka, Bangalore. However, by that time, the sale
deed was already executed, signed on each page by 1st defendant in the house of 3rd defendant. Thus, the direct execution of the sale deed Ex.P1 is spoken by PW1 and PW6 but the legal formality of registration was not effected.
The features of valid contract as mentioned in Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 are offer and acceptance, legal relationship, contractual capacity, competency of the parties to enter into contract, agreement not declared void, certainty and possibility of performance of legal formalities. Last feature covers registration apart from the execution of the sale deed.
1st defendant earlier had filed original suit against the present plaintiff in O.S.No.32/1994, for the following reliefs:
“(a) for a declaration that the Sale deed dated:16.2.1992 purported to have been
executed by the first plaintiff and under which the first defendant is claiming rights in respect of the suit schedule properties is null and void and vitiated by fraud and the said documents is invalid and not binding on the first plaintiff.
(b) for a permanent injunction restraining defendant No.1 or any person claiming through or under them from interfering with plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
(c) for costs of this suit and to grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstances of the case.”
It means 1st defendant claims that the sale deed dated 16-2-1992 was not executed by her and to declare the same as null and void. It is relevant to note that the value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction was made at Rs.55,000/- and stamp duty of Rs.3,375/- was paid. The said suit was presented on 1-2-1994 which came to be dismissed for non-prosecution and the case was closed on 25-09-2002. 1st defendant in this case is the plaintiff in that case, did not chose to pursue the matter
further either making application under order 9 rule 9 CPC or by preferring an appeal and in this case, she is contesting the suit as 1st defendant. Contentions in the written statement of 1st defendant is that she has not executed the sale agreement or sale deeds and the documents are manipulated. At the same time, it is also contended by her that, her signatures were obtained on blank papers and that were misused. Thus, the plaintiff is expected to prove the execution of the sale deed. In this regard, PW1 in his evidence speaks about Exs.P17 and P18 dated 30-07-1991 and 21-9-1991 respectively and also sale deed Ex.P1.
Learned counsel for 1st respondent/plaintiff Mr. K.G. Nayak would submit that apart from the execution of the sale deed, the payment of consideration is also proved by the plaintiff. In this connection, the entire sale consideration of Rs.89,50,000/- is stated to have been paid through
cheques and PWs 3 to 5 are the bank officials who have given their oral evidence in this connection. The trial court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff mainly on the ground that, it is not demonstrated in the evidence and assigned the reasons in the judgment. The portion of paragraph No.35 of the judgment of the trial court is as under: “Issue No.11 and 12: The defendants have taken contention that the plaintiff without asking the relief of specific performance of contract the suit one filed for declaration is not maintainable and it is hit by 34 of the Specific Relief Act. On going through the plaint averments it is clear that the plaintiff has filed this suit against the defendants for declaration to declare the sale deed executed by the first defendant is valid and binding etc. It appears the plaintiff filed the suit on the presumption that the execution of the document is admitted and the registration is refused. Therefore the plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief of title in respect of the sale deed is concerned. Since the plaintiff document is not a registered and that document is compulsory registerable U/s 49 of the registration Act. The document in question is not a registered. The defendant has taken contention with regard to maintainability of the suit. The plaintiff ought to have prayed for specific performance of contract with declaratory relief of possession. Mere the defendant No.1 admitting her signature on the sale deed the
plaintiff will not entitled the decree as sought for and the sale deed is not registered in accordance with Sec.49 of the Registration Act. Proof of signing the document does not amount to execution of the document in the eye of law. The first defendant had denied the execution of the document during her life time. So the declaratory suit filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and it is hit by Sec.34 of the Specific Relief Act. On the basis of unregistered document the plaintiff will not get any title over the suit schedule property and valid title is not conveyed in favour of the plaintiff also. Hence the suit is barred U/s 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Further suit is not maintainable for not asking the consequential relief. Hence I answer the issues No.11 and 12 in the AFFIRMATIVE.”
The trial judge recorded Ex.P1 as suspicious nature of document and out come of fraud and undue influence by the plaintiff. In this connection, there is no mention of dismissal of O.S.No.32/1994 that was filed by 1st defendant.
The next aspect is regarding the reliefs sought by the plaintiff. In the light of the reasoning assigned by the trial court and the first appellate
court, prayer No.(a) in the plaint assumes significance and the same is as under:
“Declare that the sale deed dated 16-2-1992
executed by the defendant Mme.Devika Rani
Roerich in favour of the plaintiff company is
valid and binding on her.”
Here, the learned counsel for plaintiff Mr.K.G.Nayak submit that the application was filed for amendment of prayer and later the same was withdrawn, as such, the original relief stands.
The reliefs have to be read in between the lines to the effect that it is not for declaration of title and that the plaintiff appears to be aware of the situation that the sale deed Ex.P1 executed by 1st defendant-Mme Devika Rani Roerich is not a registered deed or any passing of title to complete the transaction. The essential elements apart from the others are, the legal formalities, which include
execution of sale deed and its registration. Normally, the executed document is presented for registration may be either by the purchaser or in certain occasions by the vendor. It is upon the registration, the process of transfer is completed. When the execution is not admitted the registration is refused or in the enquiry held by the Registrar he finds that sale deed was executed, he proceeds for registration under Section 34 and 35 of the Registration Act. Of course, appeal lies from the order of the Sub-Registrar to the District Registrar under Section 72 of the Registration Act.
It is very important to note that the plaintiff claims that the sale deed was duly executed by 1st defendant and her non co-operation was only in respect of registration of the sale deed, because of which, the document was presented for compulsory registration before the competent authority. So the presentation of the document for the registration
before the Sub-Registrar and filing of the suit do not go diagonally opposite to each other, because, the sale deed need not be presented in the presence of the Sub-Registrar. It is registered when the execution is admitted by the executants of the document as it was not admitted, the further proceedings before the Sub registrar and thereafter before the District Registrar. In the meanwhile, the suit was filed before the learned trial judge and the dates are as stated above which presupposes the Sub-Registrar or the District Registrar to get the jurisdiction to exercise their powers only in respect of an executed document. To find out whether the document is executed or otherwise, it is within the exclusive domain of the Civil Courts and in respect of which suit is pending. Invariably, answer to the said question is, on execution, the registration authority would get the jurisdiction over the matter and not until then because
it is not the business of the registration authority to give a finding on execution. It is in this way, the duty of the executives differs or it is excluded from the scope of judicial adjudication.
Importantly, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed regarding the scope of jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar and District Registrar and directed them to wait for the result of the Civil suit pending on execution of sale deed by 1st defendant. The said observation is extracted above. Admittedly, the core of legal position and stage of the case is that, claim of the plaintiff is that sale deed is duly executed by the vendor 1st defendant-Mme Devika Rani Roerich and the 2nd defendant is claiming as legatee of 1st defendant, who stepped into the shoes of the latter in the matters of rights over the schedule property. Regard being had to the claim of the plaintiff that full
consideration of the sale is paid and the document is executed.
Meanwhile, another aspect to be considered is, the schedule property is no more available for the parties by virtue of the acquisition of the same by the Government through a special statute bearing LA(BILL)No.18/1996 the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (acquisition and transfer) Bill 1996 vide Gazette Notification dated 08.03.1994. It is submitted by the learned counsel for plaintiff the acquisition is challenged. It is not the domain of the court to adjudicate on the said matter.
The plaintiff claims that sale deed was duly executed on 16-2-1992. In this connection, the following citations are relied upon by the parties: I. In the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited through Director V/s State of Haryana and Another” - (2012) 1SCC 656.
II. In the case of S. Kaladevi V/s. V.R.Somasundaram and Others - (2010) 5 SCC 401 and the head note of the same reads as under:
“A Registration Act, 1908- Ss.49 proviso and 17 – unregistered sale deed – Admissibility in evidence – Unregistered sale deed tendered not as evidence of completed sale but as proof of oral agreement of sale, held, can be received in evidence by making endorsement that it was received only as evidence of oral agreement of sale under S.49 proviso- Hence, where in suit for specific performance of alleged agreement of sale, plaintiff tendered in her evidence unregistered sale deed, held, trial court ought to have marked the same and proceed with the suit accordingly – Directed accordingly – Admission of unregistered sale deed in evidence in such case, held, not hit by S.3(b), Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Ss. 5, 107 and 123 – Evidence Act, 1872 – S.91 – Specific Relief Act, 1963, Ss.10 and 3(b).”
III. In the case of Mary Joyce Poonacha (Mrs) V/s.K.T Plantations Pvt. Ltd. and Others - 1995 Supp (2) SCC 459 and head note reads as under:
“A Registration Act, 1908- Ss.34(3), 77(3) and 49 – Enquiry to be made by registering officer on presentation of sale deed for registration – Where dispute regarding execution of alleged sale deed pending trial before Civil Court, Registrar should direct the plaintiff to obtain appropriate direction or order from Civil Court instead of proceedings with the matter – Agreement of sale and sale deed in furtherance thereof alleged to have been executed by ‘D’ in favour of respondent – Suit filed in Civil Court by respondent for declaration that the alleged
possession – Written statement filed by ‘D’ denying execution of the agreement and the sale deed – ‘D’ dying subsequently – Alleged sale deed presented for registration – Sub-Registrar refusing to register the sale deed – On appeal, District Registrar proceeding to hear the appeal and refusing the prayer for stay of proceeding in view of pendency of the civil suit – High Court also declining to interfere under Art, 226 – Held, District Registrar erred in proceeding wit the matter and High Court erred in refusing to interfere – Civil Court directed to look into the sale deed for the limited purpose of ascertaining its execution in view of S.77(3).”
IV. In the case of M/s. K.B.Saha & Sons Pvt. Ltd. V/s. M/s. Development consultant Ltd - (2008) 8 SCC 564.
V. Prem Narain V/s. Mahabir Jain – 2018(7) ADJ 691, 2018(29) ALR 112, 2018 141 RD47, wherein, head note reads as under:
Limitation – Cancellation sale deed
- Determination of period – Appeal filed against dismissal of suit for cancellation sale deed – whether point of limitation for decree of cancellation of transfer deed, should commence from date of knowledge, starting from date of registration of document or from date of execution of document – Held, act of registration was not a mere instance of collecting revenue by State as registration was not a mere instance of collecting revenue by State as registration fee and providing authenticity to document – It was by act of registration title, of property passes to transferor from date of execution of deed of transfer – Suit could not have been instituted by Appellant without producing in evidence registered sale deed – Therefore for purpose of instituting suit and for starting of limitation for
challenging sale deed would be knowledge of fact of registration of document which created entitlement of Appellant to institute suit – Prior to registration of document, Appellant was legally disentitled to challenge sale deed before competent Civil Court – Entitlement of Appellant to institute suit arose only when he got knowledge of registration of sale deed – Suit was not barred by time- Appeal allowed. [29], [31], [33], [34].”
Learned counsel for appellant has relied on the following decisions: 1. 2017 (1) SCC 599 - Ghansyam Sarda - Vs- Sashikant Jha, Director, M/s. J.K.Jute Mills Company Limited & Ors.
2009 (7) SCC 363 - Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited. -Vs- State of Haryana & Another
2010 (8) SCC 383 - Meghamala and Ors.-Vs-G Narasimha Reddy and Ors.
2011(9) SCC 1 - K.T.Plantation Private Limited & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka”.
As discussed above, with reference to Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the sale of immoveable property worth 100 or more than 100 is to be effected through registered document which invariably supposes that it shall be in writing and
sufficient non judicial stamp shall be required. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, reads as under: 54. “Sale” defined.—‘‘Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.— 3Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. 1In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.
The plaintiff also claims that Ex.P17 and Ex.P18 dated 30-7-1992 and 28-8-1992 are the sale agreement and supplementary agreement respectively. The extent of land was increased by 30 guntas in the latter document. I am reminded of the fact that, suit is not filed for specific performance seeking execution of the sale deed of the schedule property. It is upon the execution of the sale deed
followed by consideration is the important phase in the transfer of immoveable property by way of sale. However, registration of the sale deed is essential under Section 17 of the Registration Act. As per the law
recognized, valid transfer is only upon registration of the executed sale deed by the concerned authorities. As I have stated in the earlier discussion, it is not a declaration of title which is sought by the plaintiff, but it is for the relief of declaration that the sale deed Ex.P1 was executed by 1st defendant.
The delicate but important difference between execution and registration can be understood by reading decisions cited above. If execution is the important stage, the registration also is equally important. At this stage, it cannot be said that plaintiff is claiming declaration of ownership on the basis of Ex.P1. The plaintiff in the circumstances of
the case, appears to be aware of the fact that it is not a total and complete sale deed that is presented by it as Ex.P1. It is in the said direction, it presented the document for compulsory registration before the Sub- Registrar under Section 34 of the Act. However, that came to be rejected and appeal was preferred before the Registrar in R.A.No.3/1992-93 on 20-8-1992.
Under Section 34 of the Registration Act, subject to provisions mentioned in Sections 41, 43, 45, 69, 75, 77, 88 and 89 no document shall be registered under this Act, unless the persons executing such document or their representatives, assignees or agents authorized as aforesaid, appear before the registering officer within the time allowed for presentation under Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26, provided that, if owing to urgent necessity or unavoidable accident all such persons do not so
appear, the Registrar, in cases where the delay in appearing does not exceed four months may direct that on payment of a fine not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper registration fee in addition to the fine, if any payable under Section 25, the document may be registered.
Here, what is necessary is the document that is executed has to be presented for registration within four months when the vendor does not dispute the execution. In this case, according to plaintiff, 1st defendant refused to appear for registration, under the circumstances, Sub-Registrar refused the registration of the property and the matter was taken in R.A.No.3/1991-93 before the Registrar to decide the validity of the execution of the sale deed or to hold in a case whether the executants or his or her agent or authorized person does not appear before the registering authority or there are material
circumstances to believe that the executants has disputed the execution of the sale deed, the registering authority cannot assume jurisdiction to decide the validity. A fact will be taken as proved when it is admitted by the parties under Section 58 of the Evidence Act or be held as proved by the Court. Thus, execution admitted by vendor of the sale deed is equal to adjudication of the court of competent jurisdiction that the document has been duly executed after the trial whether the Court holds that the objections or denial by the vendor are not tenable. It is in this connection, a direction that was issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court prevailed on the trial judge and the appellate judge as well, wherein, it is incumbent upon them to hold enquiry on the validity of the execution of the sale deed and close the matter.
In the above connection, the trial judge held that the document was not duly executed and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff in OS No.122/1992 and against which the regular appeal was filed by the plaintiff before the first appellate court in R.A.No.33/2002 that came to be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court was set aside and consequently, the suit of the plaintiff is decreed. In this direction, the first appellate court finds that the sale deed was duly executed by 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the sale consideration stated therein.
Now the term “execution” assumes importance with reference to its meaning. The meaning of the term is stated in the discussion above. In the context of the case, the ‘execution’ means, the executants under the sale deed subscribes his or her signature after understanding
the contents of the sale deed and agreeing the contents of it.
The reasoning assigned by the trial court and the first appellate court, documents filed by the plaintiff and the defendants, particularly, Exs.P1, 17, 18, scope of Sections 17, 34, 72 of the Registration Act, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding estoppel, the pleadings of the parties are to be considered.
Insofar as subject matter of the suit is concerned, it has been admittedly acquired by the Government under Special Statute as stated above. Regard being had to the fact that the said fact is not disputed by both the parties. As the subject matter of the case is already acquired by the Government, the
compensation is the only alternative available in place of schedule property.
Here, the basic rule is, whoever has the right, title and interest over the schedule property on the date of acquisition will be entitled for the same.
It is necessary to keep in mind the provisions of law mentioned in the Indian Registration Act, viz., Sections 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, & 77.
As stated above the transfer of ownership over immovable property gets completed once registration of the sale deed is complete, which is nothing but the formality of admission of execution by the vendor before the registering authority. In order to present document for registration, execution should have been completed. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the executed sale deed at Ex.P1 was not
registered. The very question is, whether such document creates rights over the schedule property and declaration sought is in respect of documents stated to be executed.
When the document is required to undergo different steps or process, enforceability, whether it would be fit for the subsequent steps if the previous step was as per law, it is exactly the prayer made by the plaintiff to declare the document as duly executed. If once, the execution is completed the next process is registration.
The oral evidence of PW1 is regarding the execution of the sale deed at Ex.P1. PW2 is an official from the registration office who speaks regarding presentation of documents, PWs 3 to 5 are the Bank officials. The sale consideration under Ex.P1 is stated to have been passed through cheques. Ex.P17 and 18
are the sale agreements that preceded the execution of the sale. P17 is dated 30.7.1991 and P18 dated 21.9.1991. The second agreement was regarding the extension of the extent to include additional 30 guntas to 223 acres of land.
The plaintiff had presented Exhibit Nos.17- 18 in the suit for declaration. Thus Ex.P1 for a moment cannot be taken as a sale agreement to seek for specific performance. It is also to be mentioned that O.S.No.32/1994 was filed by the 1st defendant earlier and relief sought is at page No.43 before the trial court. The said matter was dismissed for non- prosecution on 25.9.2002.
The question regarding whether the suit is barred by res- judicata requires that earlier matter has been decided on merits by the competent court of law between the same parties in respect of the
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same subject matter. No doubt dismissal for non prosecution if recalled cannot be considered as governed by Doctrine of res-judicata in strict sense, but the consideration is that 1st defendant Mme Devika Rani has not challenged the said order, not filed any other suit and as it has time limit because in the said suit it is contended by her, fraud and undue influence exercised on her in order to get sale deed. In other words, the plea taken by the 1st defendant in the present suit through her written statement substantially is equal to plaint filed by her in O.S.No.32/1994.
In a suit where a party alleges misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence or coercion, the said contract is voidable at the option of the aggrieved party and he can seek for cancellation of such documents in a suit filed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. The party pleading or alleging mis-
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representation of facts, fraud, undue influence or coercion has a strong responsibility of discharging the burden, existence of the circumstances with proof and such plaint shall be strictly with detailed particulars as envisaged in Order VI Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure which is as under:
“ORDER VI RULE 4. Particulars to be given where necessary. - In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading.”
The duty of the Court is to consider and adjudicate whether the document-Ex.P-17 is duly executed under which the suit property was agreed to be sold for a sum of Rs.89,50,000/- which is corroborated by Ex.P18 wherein the discrepancy in the extent was rectified.
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The observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.3094/1995 is already stated above. The focus is on the said direction. In the result, considering the oral and documentary evidence the first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court. In this connection the trial court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No.122/1992 on 26.8.2002. However, the plaintiff preferred R.A.No.33/2002 that was directed against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.122/1992 dated 26.8.2002 which came to be allowed on 7.10.2006 the operative portion of the same is stated above.
Now the question is, the jurisdiction of the court does not extend for registration of the sale deed. By reading Sections 72 and 73 of Indian Registration Act, it is clear that when once a document is executed and if it is difficult for vendor to appear before the Sub-Registrar, under such circumstances,
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when the Sub-Registrar believe the presence of vendor has to be dispensed in his office and the prescribed procedure is available so that he can go to place of the vendor regarding completing the formality of the registration. In this connection, it is necessary to mention proving of execution of document in either way is taken, formality of registration when the execution is duly admitted or when it is denied by the vendor regarding the execution of such sale deed and the competent court of law has to decide that the said document is proved to be executed. From the oral and documentary evidence on record, it is clear point of law that a valid execution is the legal right on the purchaser and he is entitled for benefits which are up to the execution and for further formality matter goes to the registration authority for registration of the said document. Thus, in this connection I do not have any doubt as there is no iota of evidence to hold
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against the execution of sale deed and the plaintiff in all circumstances is entitled for the prayer sought by it and requires to be confirmed.
In other words, at the cost of repetition, it is necessary to observe that the suit is not for declaration of title, but it is for declaration that the document is duly executed and the trial court was swayed away by wrong inference that as if the suit is for a declaration of title. What the plaintiff seeks is, declaration of document as duly executed so that, if proved, to pave way for the further formalities in the case. The 2nd defendant miserably failed to establish her pleas, signature on the documents are to be that of the 1st defendant. In so far as 2nd defendant is concerned, she can get only that benefit which was with the executant of the Will as on the date of death of testatrix. By virtue of documents Exs.P17, 18 and P1, there was nothing for 2nd defendant to succeed.
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The execution of Will is not in question. On the other hand, competency to execute Will was not there because 1st defendant has not executed the Will. Thus she can inherit under testamentary or intestate succession provided 1st defendant had estate. As no one can convey what better than she or he has under the maxim Nemo Dat Quad non and equally no one can inherit what the propositus never possessed. Under the circumstances, the learned first appellate judge in R.A.33/2002 was right in allowing the appeal preferred by the plaintiff as the trial judge committed blatant error and judgment of the trial court is perverse, arbitrary and liable to be set aside and was rightly done so by the first appellate judge by allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the trial court consequently decreeing the suit.
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The plaintiff has successfully proved the payment of full sale consideration of Rs.89,50,000/- and the execution of the sale deed-Ex.P1 in pursuance to sale agreements Ex.P 17 and P18.
It is stated by the learned counsel for the parties that the land has been acquired by the Government under special statue. Acquisition is not challenged. It is not the domain of going deeper into the said question. If the land is acquired, the party is entitled for compensation ordered on it.
Insofar as finding on execution of sale deed is concerned, it is held in favour of the plaintiff and decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for. Thus, the plaintiff company is entitled for all rights of executant, ownership and possession of schedule property in respect of which the plaintiff company paid consideration as stated above.
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Smt.T.H.Savitha, learned HCGP submits that she represents Government and they undertake to go ahead with their duties as per law.
Substantial questions of law are answered accordingly.
Regular Second Appeal is dismissed with costs throughout.
Sd/- JUDGE
tsn*/akv