MAYA SHIKSHAN PASHISHAN SANSTHAN,HATHRAS vs. ASSESSING OFFICER, WARD-4(3)(4), HATHRAS

Brief facts state that the appellant is running a non-profit educational institution, namely, higher secondary school. Gross receipt during the year under consideration was Rs.98,58,650/- and gross expenditure was Rs.91,57,348/-, leaving a surplus of Rs.7,01,302/-.

Aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal before learned CIT(Appeals), who dismissed assessee’s first appeal in limine, being beyond the period of limitation as provided u/s. 249(2) of the Act.

This second appeal has been filed on the ground, with others on merit, that the ld. CIT(Appeals) has erred in not issuing notice before deciding the delay, hence violated the principles of natural justice.

Perused the records. Heard learned representative for assessee and learned DR for revenue.

Learned AR for the assessee has submitted that this case is covered by the order dated 24.06.2025 passed in assessee’s own case for A.Y. 2019-20. AR, thus, prays to set aside the impugned order and allow assessee’s appeal. 2 | P a g e

Learned DR has submitted that assessee’s first appeal in the present case was dismissed in limine as barred by limitation, whereas the referred case was decided by Ld. CIT(Appeals) on merit. Ld. DR, thus, submitted that the fact situation in two cases is different and supported the impugned order.

Perusal of the record shows that the present appeal is in consequence of the impugned order dated 13.03.2025 passed by learned CIT(Appeals), wherein Ld. CIT(Appeals) has dismissed assesee’s first appeal in limine, being beyond the period of 30 days as provided u/s. 249(2) of the Act, whereas the Tribunal has passed order against the order passed by the first appellate authority on merit. It means that the first appeal in the referred case was filed within 30 days in accordance with section 249(2) of the Act and the order was passed on merit. The law on the subject is well settled that unless the delay is condoned, the appeal does not come into existence legally, and in such absence, the court is wholly without jurisdiction to hear or decide the same on merit.

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D), 2024 SCC online SC 489, has observed that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and 3 | P a g e principles of equity, that the length of delay is a relevant matter, which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. The Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with merits of the main matter. However, the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

Thus, the issue of condonation of delay in the proceedings has to be decided at the first instance before delving into the merits of the case.

Now, coming to the predominant dispute in the present appeal, it transpires from the perusal of record that the first appeal was filed on 29.06.2023 against the assessment order dated 31.01.2020 by a delay of about three years and five months. The assessee failed to make any mention in respect of the fact related to the delay, in form-35. Assessee also failed to file any application/affidavit before the first appellate authority to substantiate and show the sufficient cause for condoning the delay. This shows the assessee’s perception of delay as a non-serious matter and gives an impression of assessee’s lackadaisical propensity, and be curbed.

We take judicial notice of the fact that in the instant case, most of the duration of delay caused in filing appeal before the first appellate authority overlaps the period of spread of global pandemic COVID-19.

In the instant case, the period of delay from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 before the first appellate authority stands excluded in view of the aforesaid order passed by Hon’ble Apex Court. Accordingly, out of three years and five months’ delay, about two years’ of delay stands excluded in view of the aforesaid order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

As far as the remaining delay of about one year and five months is concerned, it is well established principle of law that the substantial justice cannot be denied on technical aberrations. In an adversial justice system like ours, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice can not to be followed. In this view of the matter, the tribunal has the trappings of the court and has incidental and implied powers. In order to prevent any further delay in the legal proceedings, we deem it just, proper and in the interest of justice, to condone the delay in filing 6 | P a g e first appeal before the first appellate authority. We order accordingly.

In the result, appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.