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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, MUMBAI BENCHES “E”, MUMBAI
Before: Shri JOGINDER SINGH, & Shri G. MANJUNATHA
आयकर अपील"य अ"धकरण, मुंबई "यायपीठ, ‘ ई’,मुंबई। IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI BENCHES “E”, MUMBAI
"ी जो"ग"दर "संह, "या"यक सद"य एवं "ी जी. मंजूनाथ, लेखा सद"य, के सम"
Before Shri JOGINDER SINGH, Judicial Member, and Shri G. MANJUNATHA, Accountant Member Assessment Years: 2006-07 Income Tax Officer-2(3)(2), M/s Saturn Advisory Room No. 518A, Services Pvt. Ltd., बनाम/ Aayakar Bhavan, M.K. Road, 44, Strategic House, Vs. Mumbai-400020 Mint Road, Fort, Mumbai-400001 (राज"व /Revenue) ("नधा"रती/Assessee) PAN No.:-AAJCS2674N
Shri V. Justin-DR राज"व क" ओर से / Revenue by "नधा"रती क" ओर से / Assessee by Shri Vimal Punamiya
12/09/2017 सुनवाई क" तार"ख / Date of Hearing : 12/09/2017 आदेश क" तार"ख /Date of Order:
2 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. आदेश / O R D E R Per Joginder Singh (Judicial Member) The Revenue is aggrieved by the impugned order dated
27/10/2014 of the Ld. First Appellate Authority, Mumbai.
Ground no. 1 & 2, raised by the Revenue pertains to deleting
the addition made on account of on money cash payment for purchase of property at Delhi ignoring the incriminating
documents/evidences received from DRI, Mumbai as the assessee was unable to explain the transaction or rebut the presumption that on money was paid for the purchase of the property.
During hearing, the ld. DR, Shri V. Justin,
advanced arguments, which is identical to the ground raised
by submitting that no explanation was adduced by the assessee with respect to cash portion and merely claimed
that money was paid through demand draft. It was contended that while granting relief to the assessee
circumstantial evidence were not considered by the First
Appellate Authority. Reliance was placed upon the decision
of the Tribunal in the case of Income Tax Officer vs M/s
Diamond Investment & Properties (ITA No.
3 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 5537/Mum/2009) order dated 29/07/2010. On the other
hand, Shri Vimal Punamiya, ld. counsel for the assessee
filed written submissions defending the conclusion drawn in the impugned order by explaining the facts. Reliance was placed upon the decision from Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K. P. Verghese vs Income Tax Officer (1981) 7
taxman. 13(SC) by submitting that the factum of payment of cash as on money is upon the Revenue and the assessee has never accepted or tendered in the statement that cash
money was transacted for purchase of the property. Our
attention was invited to the factual finding recorded by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal). Further, reliance
was made upon the decision in the case of CIT vs Gulshan
Kumar (2002) 257 ITR 703 (Del.), CIT vs P. V.
Kalyansundaram (2007) 294 ITR 49 (SC), Dua Auto
components Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No.4802/Del./2009), CIT vs
Indication Instruments Ltd. (ITA NO.603/2011) and Pramod
Pandey vs ACIT (ITA No.4295/Del./2012) and various other
decisions mentioned in the written submissions. The crux
of the argument is in support of the impugned order.
4 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 2.1. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The facts, in brief,
are that the assessee purchase a property at Delhi, did not start any business activity and was also not having any other source of income. The assessee acquired loan of `40
lakhs from Strategic Group Trust for purchase of this property worth of ` 39,25,000/-. The assessee declared loss
of ` 7276/- in its return, which was processed u/s 143(1) of the Act. There was no scrutiny assessment in the present
assessment year. The Ld. Assessing Officer received
information from DRI, Mumbai, with respect to demand
draft/cash transaction for purchase of the said property vide
letter dated 15/03/2013. Search was carried out at the residential premises of M/s Zaver Cyrus Dadina, Nitco’s Dy.
Manager (Accounts), wherein, a hard disc and a pen drive
were recovered. In the hard disc, there were details of purchase and purchase of property /payments in Maidan
Gadi (Popularly known Sanik Farm) in Delhi. As per the information, certain portion of cash was transacted along
with demand draft for purchase of the property. The Ld.
5 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. Assessing Officer, on the basis of the information, reopened
the assessment and made the addition.
2.2. On appeal, before the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal), the factual matrix was considered and ultimately the addition made by the Assessing Officer was not found sustainable, resultantly deleted, which is under challenge before this Tribunal.
2.3. If the observation made in the assessment order,
leading to addition made to the total income, conclusion
drawn in the impugned order, material available on record,
assertions made by the ld. respective counsel, if kept in juxtaposition and analyzed, it seems that the whole addition
was made by the Assessing Officer on the basis of information received from the investigation wing and was purely based upon presumption, because, no documentary
evidence was brought on record substantiating that any cash was transacted in the purchase. The information
received by the Assessing Officer was expected to be corroborated with evidence. It is an established law that the conditions of taxability or the presumption of on money
6 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. transaction has to be proved by the Revenue and the burden
so lies upon the Department was never discharged. In such a situation the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in K.
P. Verghese vs Income Tax Officer clearly supports the case
of the assessee. The relevant portion from the aforesaid
order is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
“13. Thus, it is not enough to attract the applicability of sub-s. (2), that the fair market value of the capital asset transferred by the assessee as on the date of the transfer exceeds the full value of the consideration declared in respect of the transfer by not less than 15% of the value so declared, but it is furthermore necessary that the full value of the consideration in respect of the transfer is understated or, in other words, shown at a lesser figure than that actually received by the assessee. Sub-s. (2) has no application in the case of an honest and bona fide transaction where the consideration in respect of the transfer has been correctly declared or disclosed by the assessee, even if the condition of 15% difference between the fair market value of the capital asset as on the date of the transfer and the full value of the consideration declared by the assessee is satisfied. If, therefore the Revenue seeks to bring a case within sub-s. (2), it must show not only that the fair market value of the capital asset as on the date of the transfer exceeds the full value of the consideration declared by the assessee by not less than 15% of the value so declared, but also that the consideration has been understated and the assessee has actually received more than what is declared by him. There are two distinct conditions which have to be satisfied before sub-s. (2) can be invoked by the Revenue and the burden of showing that these two conditions are satisfied rests on the Revenue. It is for the Revenue to show that each of these two conditions is satisfied and the Revenue cannot claim to have discharged this burden which lies upon it, by merely establishing that the fair market value of the capital asset as on the date of the transfer exceeds by 15% or more the full value of the consideration declared in respect of the transfer and the first condition is, therefore, satisfied. The Revenue must go further and prove that the second condition is also satisfied. Merely by showing that the first condition is satisfied, the Revenue cannot ask the Court to presume that the second condition too is fulfilled, because even in a case where the first condition of 15% difference is satisfied, the transaction may be a perfectly honest and bona fide transaction and there may be no understatement of the consideration. The fulfilment of the second condition has, therefore, to be established independently of the first condition and merely because the first condition is satisfied, no inference can necessarily follow that the second
7 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. condition is also fulfilled. Each condition has got to be viewed and established independently before sub-s. (2) can be invoked and the burden of doing so is clearly on the Revenue. It is a well- settled rule of law that the onus of establishing that the conditions of taxability are fulfilled is always on the Revenue and the second condition being as much a condition of taxability as the first, the burden lies on the Revenue to show that there is an understatement of the consideration and the second condition is fulfilled. Moreover, to throw the burden of showing that there is no understatement of the consideration, on the assessee would be to cast an almost impossible burden upon him to establish a negative, namely, that he did not receive any consideration beyond that declared by him.”
The Hon'ble Apex Court finally held as under:-
“The object of imposing the condition of difference of 15% or more between the fair market value of the capital asset and the consideration declared in respect of the transfer clearly is to save the assessee from the rigour of sub-s. (2) in marginal cases where difference in subjective valuation by different individuals may result in an apparent disparity between the fair market value and the declared consideration. It is a well-known fact borne out by practical experience that the determination of fair market value of a capital asset is generally a matter of estimate based to some extent on guess work and despite the utmost bona fides, the estimate of the fair market value is bound to vary from individual to individual. It is obvious that if the restrictive condition of a difference of 15% or more between the fair market value of the capital asset as on the date of the transfer and the consideration declared in respect of the transfer were not provided in sub-s. (2), many marginal cases would, having regard to the possibility of difference of opinion in subjective assessment of the fair market value, fall within the mischief of that sub-section and the statutory measure enacted in that sub-section for determining the consideration actually received by the assessee would be applicable in all its rigour in such cases. This condition of 15% or more difference is merely intended to be a safeguard against the undue hardship which would be occasioned to the assessee if the inflexible rule of thumb enacted in sub-s. (2) were applied in marginal cases and it has nothing to do with the question of burden of proof, for, the burden of establishing that there is an understatement of the consideration in respect of the transfer always rests on the Revenue. The postulate underlying sub-s. (2) is that the difference between one honest valuation and another may range upto 15% and that constitutes the class of marginal cases which are taken out of the purview of sub-s. (2) in order to avoid hardship to the assessee.
2.4. If the observation made by Hon'ble Apex Court are analyzed with the facts of the present appeal, the case of the 8 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. Revenue is that the assessee did not explain that cash was transacted for purchasing the property. It is well settled rule of law that the onus of establishing that the conditions of taxability are fulfilled is always upon the Revenue and the onus is upon the Revenue to show that there is under statement of consideration and the assessee cannot be fastened with the liability to establish the negative, namely
that the assessee did not transacted in cash beyond the declaration made by him. In such a situation no addition can
be sustained in the absence of corroborative material. The Assessing Officer neither stated nor provided any evidence that the assessee paid any on money for purchase of land. There is no material on record to show that the sale consideration was understated or the assessee received anything directly or indirectly over and the above the declared value. Thus, the decision from the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the ratio laid
down therein CIT vs Gulshan Kumar (2002) 257 ITR 703 (Del.)
comes to the rescue of the assessee. Identical ratio was laid
down by Hon'ble Apex Court in CIT vs P. V. Kalyansundaram
(2007) 294 ITR 49 (SC). The relevant portion from the order is reproduced hereunder:-
9 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. “3. The respondent assessee vide a registered sale deed dt. 26th Oct., 1998 purchased certain land at Brindavan Road, Fairlands, Salem for a sum of Rs. 4.10 lakhs. During a search of the office and residential premises of Polimer Net Work, certain notes on loose sheets allegedly in the hands of the respondent were found and seized by the Department. In his statement recorded on 8th Dec., 1998, the assessee submitted that he could not remember as to why the notings had been made. The statement was further confirmed by another statement on 11th Dec., 1998. The Department also recorded the statement of the vendor Rajarathinam on 8th Dec., 1998 which too was confirmed on 11th Dec., 1998 in which he admitted that he had in fact received a total consideration of Rs. 34.35 lakhs and that the sum of Rs. 4.10 lakhs reflected in the sale deed had been received by him by way of a demand draft and the balance in cash. Rajarathinam however retracted from his statement on 8th Jan., 1999 and filed an affidavit deposing that the sale price was Rs. 4.10 lakhs only and that his statements earlier given to the authorities were incorrect. In a subsequent statement recorded on 20th Nov., 2000 Rajarathinam again reverted to his earlier portion and deposed that the sale price was Rs. 34.85 lakhs. The AO concluded that the sale consideration was actually Rs. 34.85 lakhs and not Rs. 4.10 lakhs as had been recited in the sale deed. He accordingly adopted the aforesaid enhanced figure for the purpose of assessment and made an addition of Rs. 3,75,005 as undisclosed income for the broken period 1st April, 1998 to 8th Dec., 1998. The matter was thereafter taken to the CIT(A), who after examining the entire matter, observed that the statements given by Rajarathinam could not be relied upon more particularly as the floor price fixed by the authorities for such property was much lower than the value which would result if the sale deed had been registered at Rs. 34.85 lakhs. The CIT accordingly deleted the addition made. An appeal was thereafter preferred by the Revenue against the order of the CIT before the Tribunal. The Tribunal in its order dt. 6th July, 2005 held that the notings on the loose pieces of paper on the basis of which the initial suspicion with regard to the undervaluation had been raised were vague and could not be relied upon as it appeared that the total area with respect to the sale deeds and that reflected in the loose sheet was discrepant. It was also observed that as per the guidelines for registration the fair value for registration on the relevant date was Rs. 244 to Rs. 400 per sq. ft. and the sale consideration for Rs. 850 per sq.ft. claimed by the Revenue was unrealistic and ignored the ground situation. It was further held that the tax of approximately Rs. 1,84,000 determined on the basis of the addition would not show that the assessee had acquiesced in the addition made by the Department or that it was conclusive evidence of the sale price as the deposit had been made in an obvious effort to save himself from further harassment from the Revenue and to escape a much higher liability to the payment of tax on undisclosed income should proceedings under s. 158BD of the Act be initiated. On these findings, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal. It is in these circumstances that an appeal under s. 260A was filed in the High Court. Before the High Court the following substantial questions of law were raised :
10 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. (a) Whether or not when the returns and the statements of the seller admit higher sale consideration actually received, the Revenue is justified in fixing the sale consideration at the higher amount than what has been declared ?
(b) When the assessee did not give any explanation to the notings found and at the same time the Revenue is able to corroborate the same with the statement of the seller for the purpose of determination of actual sale value, would the lower authority be justified in interfering with the same ?
(c) When consistent sworn (statements) were taken into consideration along with evidences found at the time of search, would (they) all be liable to be rejected on the basis of one statement in between contradicting the earlier ones which was also explained away as a result of intimidation ?
The High Court relying heavily on the order of the CIT and the Tribunal held that no substantial questions of law had been raised and accordingly dismissed the appeal. It is this situation that the present matter is here before us.
Mr. G.N. Vahanvati, the learned Solicitor General has at the very outset raised serious objection to the order of the High Court pointing out that Division Bench had merely plagiarized substantial portions from the order of the CIT and Tribunal in arriving at its conclusion and no independent assessment on the questions of law that arose for consideration, had been made. He also pointed out that several questions of law pertaining to the implications of the statements and the counter statements made by Rajarathinam did arise in the case and the matter had not been dealt with by the High Court in that perspective and it was therefore appropriate that the matter be remitted for fresh decision. The learned counsel representing the assessee respondent has however pointed out that the CIT in particular, had after a very elaborate discussion of the matter, concluded on a finding of fact with regard to the nature of the transaction and this view had been accepted by the Tribunal as well. He has accordingly submitted that no substantial questions of law have been raised in this matter and the issues raised were purely questions of fact.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. It is true that the Division Bench of the High Court has borrowed extensively from the orders of the Tribunal and the CIT and passed them off as if they were themselves the authors. We feel that quoting from an order of some authority particularly a specialized one cannot per se be faulted as this procedure can often help in making for brevity and precision, but we agree with Mr. Vahanavati to the extent that any ‘borrowed words’ used in a judgment must be acknowledged as such in any appropriate manner as a courtesy to the true author(s). Be that as it may, we are of the opinion that the three questions reproduced above can, in no way, be called substantial questions of law. The fact as to the actual sale price of the property, the implication of the contradictory statements made by Rajarathinam or whether reliance could be placed on the loose sheets recovered in the course of the raid are all 11 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. questions of fact. We therefore find no infirmity in the order of the High Court. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.”
2.5. In the aforesaid case, there were allegation of on money transaction, on the basis of non-convincing loose seats
found during the course of search and conflicting statement of the seller. The addition was deleted by the Tribunal which was affirmed by Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble Apex Court.
2.6. Identical ration was laid down in the case of Dua
Auto Components Pvt. Ltd. (ITA No.4802/Del/2009), CIT vs
Indication Instruments Ltd. (ITA NO.603 of 2011), CIT vs Prem
Prakash Nagpal (ITA No.570 of 2012), Pramod Pandey vs ACIT
(ITA NO.1295/Del./2012), CIT vs Vishal Rubber Products
(2004) 136 taxman 151 (P & H). The relevant portion from the order from Hon'ble Punajab Haryana High Court is reproduced
hereunder for ready reference:-
“5. We have heard Dr. N.L. Sharda and perused the record. A reading of the order Annerure A2 passed by the CIT(A), Jalandhar, shows that while deleting the additions made by the AO, he made the following observations :
"On merits however I find substantial force in the submissions of the appellant because no material could be found by the learned Asstt. CIT to corroborate the entries made in the impugned balance sheet. Neither it is supported by the entries in the books of account of the three partnership firms nor by any other material. It could not be established that the impugned balance sheet found in the course of the search from the residential premises of Shri O.P. Sehgal is a genuine balance sheet because no other evidence could be found like account books or any other material from where the balance sheet has been withdrawn. No addition therefore, can be made in the hands of the firms on the basis of that document. The same was the view held by my learned predecessor while disposing of the appeal in the individual
12 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. case of Shri O.P. Sehgal. The learned Asstt. CIT attempted to gather some support from the entries in the individual balance sheets of the firms filed with the return of income which are based on the regular books of account as mentioned by him in paras 5 and 6 of the assessment order, but while examining these points in his presence it is found that the amount and the narrations do not agree. Similarly, the copies of the account called for by him from the four different parties duly agree with the account maintained in the regular books of account which form the basis of filing the return of income except minor variations like the entries made in the books of the party is against the name of Vishal Rubber Products but the assessee has made in the books as Vikas Rubber Roll Products. It is because of such discrepancies that the learned Asstt. CIT has rejected the book version and made the additions on the basis of the entries shown in the impugned balance sheet found in the course of the search. Considering therefore, the facts of the case, I am of the opinion that the impugned balance sheet cannot be relied upon without corroborative material to hold that the balance sheet is a genuine document and is based on either in the books of account found in the course of the search or any document wherefrom it could have been drawn. From the record I find that the learned Asstt. CIT has examined under s. 131 of the IT Act the managing partners of the three concerns and also gathered the copies of the account from third parties in order to have some material to hold that the impugned balance sheet is a genuine document but he could not gather any material adverse to the assessee. In the circumstances the additions made on the basis of the impugned balance sheet cannot be sustained and accordingly the addition of Rs. 7,16,322 (1,54,879 + 4,32,702 + 1,28,741) is hereby deleted. Since the entire addition made is deleted, the other grounds in the appeal become infructuous."
Learned counsel for the Revenue could not point out any patent error in the reasons assigned by the CIT(A) which were approved by the Tribunal. The finding recorded by the AO that the assessee had concealed the income is not supported by any tangible evidence available on record. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the appeal and dismiss the same.”
2.7. (1986) 25 taxman 80K (SC) (1986) 52 CTR 0108 : (1986) 159
ITR 0071, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed/held as under:-
“The onus was on the Revenue to prove that there was understatement in the document not that the goods were sold at undervalue. Understatement of a value is a mis-statement of value. Selling goods at an undervalue to defeat Revenue is different from understating the value in the document of sale. The proviso to s. 12B(2) of 1922 Act provides ‘full value of the consideration for which the sale, exchange, relinquishment or transfer is made' to be taken as the basis for the computation of the capital gains. Therefore, unless
13 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. there is evidence that more than what was stated was received, no higher price can be taken to be the basis for computation of capital gains. The onus is on the Revenue—the inference might be drawn in certain cases but to come to a conclusion that a particular higher amount was in fact received must be based on such material from which such an irresistible conclusion follows. In the instant case, no such attempt was made. The second ingredient that is to say that the word ‘declared' in sub-s. (2) of s. 52 of the 1961 Act corresponding to the first proviso to s. 12B of the 1922 Act is very eloquent and revealing. It clearly indicated that the focus of sub-s.(2) was on the consideration declared or disclosed by the assessee as distinguished from the consideration actually received by him and it contemplated a case where the consideration received by the assessee in respect of the transaction was not truly declared or disclosed by him but was shown at a different figure. Capital gains was intended to tax the gains of an assessee, not what an assessee might have gained. What is not gained cannot be computed as gained. In conclusion the proviso to s. 12B(1) can be invoked only where the consideration for the transfer of capital asset has been understated by the assessee. There is no evidence direct or inferential that the consideration actually received by the assessee was more than what was disclosed or declared by him. The relationship between the parties has been established. The desire to defeat the claims of the Revenue has also been established but that fact that for this the assessee had stated a false fact in the document is not established. What appears from the Tribunal's order was that the real and main object was to safeguard these shares from being taken over by the government in settlement of tax dues, and also that the buyer and seller were indirectly connected with each other. The Revenue has made no attempt to establish that there was any understatement though it might be that shares had been sold at an undervalue. The proviso helps or enables the Department by providing a way to determine the market value. But the proviso is applicable only where the full value for the consideration has not been stated. There is no evidence, direct or inferential, in these cases that the full consideration had not been stated in the document. Capital gains tax was not, therefore, taxable on the present case.—K.P. Vargese vs. ITO & Anr. (1981) 24 CTR (SC) 358 : (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC) : TC22R.105 followed; Shivakami Co. (P) Ltd. & Ors. vs. CIT (1973) 88 ITR 311 (Mad) : TC22R.151 affirmed on different grounds.”
2.8. Likewise, Hon'ble Delhi High Court in CIT vs Navi
Gera (2010) 328 ITR 516 (Del.) held as under:-
“The present appeal has been filed under s. 260A of IT Act, 1961 (for brevity "Act, 1961") challenging the order dt. 11th Sept., 2009 passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (in short "Tribunal") in ITA No. 66/Del/2001, for the block period 1st April, 1988 to 20th Aug., 1998. 2. Briefly stated the relevant facts of the case are that the respondent- assessee had made investment in two plots of agricultural land in December, 1996. The investment in the farm houses were made by the assessee in the name of his father, namely, Mr. L.D. Gera for a total
14 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. consideration of Rs. 41,35,700. The abovesaid properties were brought from Sam Aviation (P) Ltd. of which the assessee was one of the directors. It is an admitted fact that the sources and the investment made thereof in these two plots had been declared by the respondent- assessee under Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme, 1997 (for short "VDIS"). On 20th Aug., 1998, a search and seizure under s. 132 of Act, 1961 was carried out at both the respondent assessee's residential and business premises. The sale deeds of the abovesaid properties were found during the search.
The AO referred the properties for valuation to the District Valuation Officer (in short "DVO") alleging that respondent-assessee had invested huge amount in the purchase of the farm house over and above the investment disclosed in VDIS. On the basis of the DVO's report, the AO made an addition of Rs. 2,24,08,820. 4. On an appeal being filed by the respondent-assessee, the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) [for short CIT(A)] allowed the same and deleted the addition made by the AO. The Revenue challenged the CIT(A)'s order, which was dismissed by the Tribunal by observing as under :
"63....Being aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in the appeal before learned CIT(A) who has deleted this addition on the basis that the assessee in fact has purchased the property from M/s Sam Aviation (P) Ltd. where the assessee was also a director. It is also noted by him that the purchase was made by M/s Sam Aviation (P) Ltd. and in the case of company, there is no action taken for extra payment. It is also noted by him that there is no evidence that action has been taken in the hands of the seller for extra receipts. It is also submitted that there was no material found during the search that any extra payment was made by the assessee to the seller company or by the seller company to the original seller. On this basis, this addition and now, the Revenue is in further appeal before us............
We have heard the rival submissions and have gone through the material available on record and the Tribunal’s decision cited by learned Authorised Representative of the assessee. We find that this is undisputed factual position that no evidence whatsoever was found in the course of the search indicating any undisclosed investment in agricultural land. The factum of purchase of land was disclosed by the assessee before the Department in VDIS, 1997 and in the absence of any adverse material found in the course of search, the addition made by the AO in the present case, on the basis of valuation report of DVO cannot be sustained in the absence of any adverse material found in the course of search. We, therefore, decline to interfere in the order of the learned CIT(A) on this issue."
(Emphasis, italicized in print, supplied)
Ms. Suruchii Aggarwal, learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that both CIT(A) and Tribunal have erred in law in deleting the addition of Rs. 2,24,08,820 made by the AO on the ground that addition based on DVO's report could not be sustained as no adverse material had been found during the search. She also relied upon the Supreme Court's
15 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. decision in CIT vs. Mukundray K. Shah (2007) 209 CTR (SC) 97 : (2007) 290 ITR 433 (SC) to contend that the block assessment of undisclosed income can be based on the evidence found in the search and/or material or information gathered in post-search inquiries made on the basis of evidence found in the search.
Mr. Piyush Kaushik, learned counsel for the respondent-assessee contended that no addition could be made by AO in the absence of any incriminating evidence found during the search. He submitted that no adverse material was found during the search which could show that respondent-assessee had made more investment in the property than what had been declared in the sale deed and consequently, no reference could be made to the DVO.
Mr. Kaushik further submitted that the reference to the Valuation Officer and consequent addition made on the basis of said Valuation Officer's report is itself bad in law as the proviso to s. 142A of Act, 1961 itself stipulates that the said section does not apply in respect of assessments made on or before 30th Sept., 2004. To fortify the said submission, learned counsel relied upon this Court's decision in CIT vs. Jupiter Builders (P) Ltd. (2006) 205 CTR (Del) 553 : (2006) 287 ITR 287 (Del).
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record.
We do not find merit in the submission made by Ms. Suruchi Aggarwal that the concealed income was detected during the course of search or any evidence was found which would indicate such concealment. The seized material containing the sale deeds of the properties, which have been relied upon to make reference to DVO, had already been declared to the Revenue by the respondent-assessee under VDIS. We are also in agreement with the submission made by Mr. Piyush Kaushik that it is settled law that in the absence of any incriminating evidence that anything has been paid over and above than the stated amount, the primary burden of proof is on the Revenue to show that there has been an understatement or concealment of income. It is only when such burden has been discharged, would it be permissible to rely upon the valuation given by the DVO. Further, the opinion of DVO, per se, is not an information and cannot be relied upon in the absence of other corroborative evidence [See K.P. Varghese vs. ITO (1981) 24 CTR (SC) 358 : (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC), Asstt. CIT vs. Dhariya Construction Company, Civil Appeal No. 9468 of 2003, decided by the apex Court on 16th Feb., 2010, [reported at (2010) 236 CTR (SC) 226 : (2010) 47 DTR (SC) 288—Ed.], CIT vs. Smt. Shakuntala Devi
(2009) 224 CTR (Del) 79 : (2009) 316 ITR 46 (Del), CIT vs. Ashok Khetrapal (2007) 211 CTR (Del) 576 : (2007) 294 ITR 143 (Del) and CIT vs. Manoj Jain (2006) 200 CTR (Del) 327 : (2006) 287 ITR 285 (Del)].
Further, the reliance of learned counsel for the Revenue on the Supreme Court's decision in Mukundray K. Shah (supra) is misplaced. In the said case, the entire picture regarding the working of circular trading became apparent only after seeing the cash flow statement which emerged in the inquiry conducted by the Department on the basis of evidence found during the search. In the present case, since the details of the properties had already been disclosed under VDIS, it cannot be 16 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. said that the Department came in possession of any information which it did not possess earlier.
We are further in agreement with the submission made by Mr. Kaushik the proviso to s. 142A of the Act, 1961, has no retrospective effect. The relevant extract of s. 142A of the Act, 1961 reads as under :
"142A. Estimate by Valuation Officer in certain cases.—(1) For the purposes of making an assessment or reassessment under this Act, where an estimate of the value of any investment referred to in s. 69 or s. 69B or the value of any bullion, jewellery or other valuable article referred to in s. 69A or s. 69B or fair market value of any property referred to in sub-s. (2) of s. 56 is required to be made, the AO may require the Valuation Officer to make an estimate of such value and report the same to him.
(2) .......
(3) .......
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply in respect of an assessment made on or before the 30th Sept., 2004, and where such assessment has become final and conclusive on or before that date, except in cases where a reassessment is required to be made in accordance with the provisions of s. 153A."
(Emphasis, italicized in print, supplied)
It is pertinent to mention here that the assessment was made by the AO on 30th Aug., 2000 and the CIT(A) decided the appeal on 30th Jan., 2001, which is clearly prior to the cut off date of 30th Sept., 2004. Consequently, it was not open to the AO to order valuation of the property by DVO.
Accordingly, the present appeal, being bereft of merit, is dismissed in limine.”
2.9. Totality of facts, if kept in juxtaposition, with the facts and the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases are analyzed, the Ld. Assessing Officer is asking the assessee to prove the negative which is not permitted and the whole
assessee of the Department is based upon the presumption
that the assessee could not explain that no cash was transacted in the sale consideration. It is also noted that the 17 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) has duly analyzed
the statement of Shri Atul Sud, Ms. Zaver Cyrus Dadina, Dy.
Manager (Accounts) of NITCO, from whose premises the hard
disc was found and seized and Shri Atul Sud admitted to have purchase the land from the concerned two parties on a consideration of `39 to 40 lakhs and payments was made by demand draft he has nowhere admitted/tendered that any cash payments was made. Likewise, Ms. Zaver Cyrus Dadina
has specifically tendered that she had no role to play either to issue cheque or cash. In reply to question no.12, whether any cash payment was made, she specifically denied of any transaction. A commission u/s 131(1)(d) of the Act was issued
and the assessee was not able to provide any details/information/confirmation in this regard. Totality of facts clearly indicates that the Ld. Assessing Officer could not collect any evidence to substantiate that in fact any cash was transacted for purchase of property. The case of the assessee
is further fortified by the facts that the demand drafts issued
for purchase of property were reflected in the documents, no statement was recorded by DRI either of Ms. Zaver Cyrus
Dadina or of any other person during the course of search in respect of the details contained in the hard disc. Even, the 18 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. information received from the investigation wing was never
corroborated with any evidence, statement that any cash
changed hands for the transaction. When the Ld. Assessing
Officer recorded the statement of Shri Atul Sud, Director of the assessee company, though he admitted the transaction to be made through demand draft but he never tendered that any cash was transacted. Ms. Zaver Cyrus Dadina completely
expressed or ignorance with regard to details of land dealings
as has been alleged. The efforts of Assessing Officer to record
the statement of Miss Damini Vadhwa, and Miss Reeta Bhatia
also could not provide any information leading to the addition.
The seized material/print out was not in the handwriting of the assessee and even there is no material to suggest that the seized material was maintained either by the assessee or it’s of or employees. Even the statement of Rajaratanam was discarded by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal) as the floor price, fixed by the authorities, for such property was found much lower than the value. Considering the factual
matrix and the judicial pronouncements, discussed
hereinabove, we find no infirmity in the conclusion of the Ld.
First Appellate Authority. Our view is further fortified by the fact that the concerned data was even not found from the 19 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. premises of the assessee and further the assessee has not started any substantial business activity and for acquisition of the land to inter corporate loan of ` 40 lakh from Strategic
Capital Corporation. Thus, the presumption of the Ld.
Assessing Officer for making the addition on presumptive basis
was rightly deleted by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax
(Appeal). Thus, addition cannot be made on the basis of presumption, which cannot be sustained in law. Even
otherwise, presumption cannot take the shape of the evidence
however strong it may be unless and until such presumption
or statement, if any, is corroborated with material evidence.
The ratio laid down in Dr. Anita Sahai vs DIT 266 ITR 597
(All.), Dheerajlal Girdharilal vs DCIT 26 ITR 734 (SC), CIT vs
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. 91 ITR 8(SC), CIT vs Raman & Co.
67 ITR 11 (SC), Modi Creations Pvt. Ltd. vs Income Tax Officer
(2011) 13 taxman.com 114(Del.), CIT vs Shree Rama Multitech
Ltd. (2013) 34 taxman.com 32 (Guj.) and CIT vs Devine
Leasing and Finance Ltd. 158 taxman 440 (Del.) supports our
view. Thus, we affirm the stand of the First Appellate
Authority, resulting into dismissal of the impugned grounds,
raised by the Revenue.
20 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 3. The next ground pertains to holding that the dividend income is taxable only in the registered share holders,
ignoring the deeming fiction that it can be taxed in the hands
of the recipient concern though may not be share holder
ignoring the provision of section 2(22)(e) of the Act, since, the Director of the assessee company was holding more than 10%
of the voting power in the company which advance loan to the assessee.
3.1. The ld. DR advanced arguments, which is identical
to the ground raised. On the other hand, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee defended the impugned order by contending that the assessee is having less that 10% of the voting power/share
and it is merely a trust and not a company and the assessee is having only 9% share. In turn, the Ld. DR, relied upon the decision in the case of Gopal & Sons (HUF) vs CIT (Civil Appeal
No. 12274 of 2016) (arising out of SLP(c) No.22059 of 2015).
3.2. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The facts, brief, are that the assessee was incorporated and was not having any business, borrowed loan of `40 lakh on 17/01/2006. The assessee repaid the borrowed funds. During reassessment
proceedings, applied section 2(22)(e) of the Act on the funds
21 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. acquired by the assessee from SCCPL. The assessee vide letter
dated 11/12/2013 explained that the provision of the deem
dividend is not attracted and further vide letter dated
30/01/2014 asserted that the trust is not a private limited
company therefore the provision is not applicable. However,
the Ld. Assessing Officer assessed ` 40 lakh as deemed
dividend on the plea that the common directors hold more
than 10% share holding even though the assessee is not registered share holder of the company. Before adverting
further, we are expected to analyze section 2(22)(e) of the Act,
which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:-
“2(22)(e) Any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) [made after the 31st day of May, 1987, by way of advance or loan9 to a shareholder9, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern)] or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits: We are also analyzing the shareholding of SCCPL and the assessee which is as under:-
Name of the share Holder % of Holding in % of Holding in Saturn SCCPL Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. Atul Sud 9% 99.89% Sneha Jain .01% Kamya Sud 2% Rayan Sud 2%
22 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. Strategic Trading 27% Growell Consultants 3% Colva Trade Place 21% Strategic Group Trust .10% Ketan Patel 2% Velerian Inv. & Cons. Pvt. 34% Ltd.
3.3. If the aforesaid table is analyzed, it is clear that the assessee is not a shareholder in SCCPL, therefore, section 2(22)(e) of the Act is not applicable in the present appeal. Our
view find support from the decision of the jurisdictional High
Court in the case of CIT vs Universal Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (2010)
190 taxman. 144 (Bom.). The relevant portion from the order is reproduced hereunder:-
“3. The first and second questions are now taken up. Briefly stated, the admitted facts are that an amount of Rs. 32,00,000 was transferred from the bank account of a company by the name of Capsulation Services (P) Ltd. (CSPL) to the account of the assessee maintained in the Chembur Branch of the SBI. Mr. Vikram Tannan was a director of CSPL. He held over 10 per cent of the equity capital of CSPL and over 20 per cent of the equity capital of the assessee. The AO, in the course of the order of assessment, relied on the provisions of s. 2(22)(e) and treated the amount of Rs. 35,00,000 as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee and directed that the amount be added back to its total income. The assessee contended that one Mr. Teredesai, Vice President (Finance) had misappropriated large sums of money by opening bank accounts and the transaction by which an amount of Rs. 32,00,000 was transferred from CSPL was part of the misappropriation. According to the assessee, the amount was not reflected in the books of the assessee since it had been misappropriated by the Vice President (Finance). The fact that the amount has been defalcated could not, according to the assessee, be disputed in view of the fact that it has been allowed by the AO as a business loss during the asst. yr. 2006-07. Hence, the contention of the assessee was two- fold. First, according to the assessee, for s. 2(22)(e) to apply the amount ought to have been received as an advance or loan from a company to a concern in which the shareholder had substantial interest. This condition, according to the assessee, was not met since the amount was neither an advance nor a loan to the assessee
23 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. but represented misappropriation of funds by the Vice President (Finance). Consequently, even if the amount is treated as deemed dividend within the meaning of s. 2(22)(e), it is taxable in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands of the assessee. Secondly, even on the assumption that this was an amount advanced to the assessee by the CSPL, for the purposes of taxation, a deemed dividend would be taxable in the hands of the shareholder and not the assessee to whom the payment was advanced.
The AO came to the conclusion that the provisions of s. 2(22)(e) are attracted the moment a loan or advance is made and the subsequent defalcation of funds was immaterial. The AO held that the loan was received from the bank account of CSPL; the money was deposited in the bank account of the assessee and the subsequent defalcation of the funds after the receipt of moneys by the assessee was an extraneous circumstance which made no difference to the application of s. 2(22)(e). The AO found that Mr. Vikram Tannan who was a director of the assessee held more than 20 per cent of the equity capital of CSPL. The AO came to the conclusion that all the conditions for the application of s. 2(22(e) were fulfilled and the loan of Rs. 35,00,000 from CSPL would have to be treated as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee.
In appeal, the CIT(A) affirmed the order of the AO, save and except with a modification that the actual amount which has been received by the assessee was held to be Rs. 32,00,000 and not Rs. 35,00,000 as determined by the AO.
The Tribunal in appeal has reversed the findings of the CIT(A) on two counts. Firstly, the Tribunal held that the provisions of s. 2(22)(e) would be attracted if a loan was taken by the shareholder from any closely held company. In the present case, the Tribunal noted that the amount was part of a fraud committed on the assessee and the transaction was not reflected in its books of account. In the circumstances, s. 2(22)(e) was held not to apply. Secondly, the Tribunal held that even otherwise, the amount would have to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder who obtained the benefit and not in the hands of the assessee.
Under s. 56, income of every kind which is not to be excluded from the total income under the Act is chargeable to income-tax under the head 'Income from other sources', if it is not chargeable to income-tax under any of the heads specified in items (a) to (e) of s. 14. Under cl. (1) of sub-s. (2), income by way of dividend is chargeable to income-tax under the head 'Income from other sources'. Sec. 2(22) provides an inclusive definition of the expression 'dividend' for the purposes of the Act. Sec. 2(22)(e) is as follows :
"(22) ‘dividend’ includes—
(a) to (d) ...........
(e) any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, or any sum (whether as 24 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) made after the 31st May, 1987, by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern) or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits;"
Clause (e) of s. 2(22) is not artistically worded. For facility of exposition, the contents can be broken down for analysis : (i) Clause (e) applies to any payment by a company not being a company in which the public are substantially interested of any sum, whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise made after the 31st May 1987; (ii) Clause (e) covers a payment made by way of a loan or advance to (a) a shareholder, being a beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power; or (b) any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest; (iii) Clause (e) also includes in its purview any payment made by a company on behalf of or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder; (iv) Clause
(e) will apply to the extent to which the company, in either case, possesses accumulated profits. The remaining part of the provision is not material for the purposes of this appeal.
By providing an inclusive definition of the expression 'dividend', cl. 2(22) brings within its purview items which may not ordinarily constitute the payment of dividend. Parliament has expanded the ambit of the expression 'dividend' by providing an inclusive definition.
In order that the first part of cl. (e) of s. 2(22) is attracted, the payment by a company has to be by way of an advance or loan. The advance or loan has to be made, as the case may be, either to a shareholder, being a beneficial owner holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power or to any concern to which such a shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest. The Tribunal in the present case has found that as a matter of fact no loan or advance was granted to the assessee, since the amount in question had actually been defalcated and was not reflected in the books of account of the assessee. The fact that there was a defalcation seems to have been accepted since this amount was allowed as a business loss during the course of asst. yr. 2006-07. Consequently, according to the Tribunal the first requirement of there being an advance or loan was not fulfilled. In our view, the finding that there was no advance or loan is a pure finding of fact which does not give rise to any substantial question of law. However, even on the second aspect which has weighed with the Tribunal, we are of the view that the construction which has been placed on the provisions of s. 2(22)(e) is correct. Sec. 2(22)(e) defines the ambit of the expression 'dividend'. All 25 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. payments by way of dividend have to be taxed in the hands of the recipient of the dividend namely the shareholder. The effect of s. 2(22) is to provide an inclusive definition of the expression dividend. Clause (e) expands the nature of payments which can be classified as a dividend. Clause (e) of s. 2(22) includes a payment made by the company in which the public is not substantially interested by way of an advance or loan to a shareholder or to any concern to which such shareholder is a member or partner, subject to the fulfilment of the requirements which are spelt out in the provision. Similarly, a payment made by a company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder is treated by cl. (e) to be included in the expression 'dividend'. Consequently, the effect of cl.
(e) of s. 2(22) is to broaden the ambit of the expression 'dividend' by including certain payments which the company has made by way of a loan or advance or payments made on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a shareholder. The definition does not alter the legal position that dividend has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder. Consequently, in the present case, the payment, even assuming that it was a dividend, would have to be taxed not in the hands of the assessee but in the hands of the shareholder. The Tribunal was, in the circumstances, justified in coming to the conclusion that, in any event, the payment could not be taxed in the hands of the assessee. We may in concluding note that the basis on which the assessee is sought to be taxed in the present case in respect of the amount of Rs. 32,00,000 is that there was a dividend under s. 2(22)(e) and no other basis has been suggested in the order of the AO.
For the aforesaid reasons, the first and second questions will not give rise to any substantial questions of law.”
In the aforesaid case, held that the first part of cl. 3.4. (e) of s. 2(22) is attracted, the payment by a company has to be by way of an advance or loan. The advance or loan has to be made, as the case may be, either to a shareholder, being
a beneficial owner holding not less than 10% of the voting
power or to any concern to which such a shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial
interest. The Tribunal in the present case has found that as a matter of fact no loan or advance was granted to the 26 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. assessee, since the amount in question had actually been defalcated and was not reflected in the books of account of the assessee. The fact that there was a defalcation seems to have been accepted since this amount was allowed as a business loss during the course of asst. yr. 2006-07. Consequently, according to the Tribunal the first
requirement of there being an advance or loan was not fulfilled. The finding that there was no advance or loan is a pure finding of fact which does not give rise to any substantial question of law. Even on the second aspect
which has weighed with the Tribunal, the construction
which has been placed on the provisions of s. 2(22)(e) is correct. Sec. 2(22)(e) defines the ambit of the expression
'dividend'. All payments by way of dividend have to be taxed
in the hands of the recipient of the dividend namely the shareholder. The effect of s. 2(22) is to provide an inclusive
definition of the expression dividend. Clause (e) expands the nature of payments which can be classified as a dividend.
Clause (e) of s. 2(22) includes a payment made by the company in which the public is not substantially interested
by way of an advance or loan to a shareholder or to any 27 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. concern to which such shareholder is a member or partner,
subject to the fulfilment of the requirements which are spelt
out in the provision. Similarly, a payment made by a company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder is treated by cl. (e) to be included in the expression 'dividend'. Consequently, the effect of cl. (e) of s.
2(22) is to broaden the ambit of the expression 'dividend' by including certain payments which the company has made by way of a loan or advance or payments made on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a shareholder. The definition
does not alter the legal position that dividend has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder. Consequently, in the present case the payment, even assuming that it was a dividend, would have to be taxed not in the hands of the assessee but in the hands of the shareholder. The Tribunal
was, in the circumstances, justified in coming to the conclusion that, in any event, the payment could not be taxed in the hands of the assessee.
3.5. If the facts and the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case are analyzed with the facts of the present
appeal, the first requirement of section (2(22)(e) of there
28 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. being and advance or loan was not fulfilled and even
assuming that it was a dividend, it has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholders and not in the hands of the assessee. The ratio laid down in CIT vs Impact Containers
Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 48 taxman.com 294 (Bom.); 367 ITR 346
(Bom.), wherein, certain companies advance money to the assessee company in which one director of the assessee was holding more than 10% of equity shares and since the assessee itself was not the shareholder of those lending
companies, the addition made by the Assessing Officer
invoking section 2(22)(e) of the Act was not sustainable. The relevant portion from the order is reproduced hereunder:-
A bare perusal thereof, would indicate that term “dividend” includes any distribution by a company of accumulated profits, any distribution to its shareholders by a company of debentures, debenturestock, or deposit certificates in any form, whether with or without interest, any distribution made to the shareholders by the company on its liquidation, any distribution made to the shareholder by a company on the reduction of its capital and all this is dealt with by clauses (a) to (d) of Section 2(22) of the I. T. Act.
Then comes clause (e) which says that any payment by a company and not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) made after 31st May 1987, but by way of advance or loan to a shareholder being a person who is the beneficial owner of the shares not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits holding not less than 10% of the voting power. This is one category and second one is a payment by way of advance or loan to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or partner and in which he has substantial interest. The third category is any payment by any such company for individual benefit of any such shareholders to the extent of which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits.
29 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 15. Later part of this definition states as to what is not included in “dividend” and the legislature has carefully specified that any advance or loan made to a shareholder or concern in which shareholder is a member or partner and in which he has substantial interest, by the company in ordinary course of his business where the lending of money is a substantial part of the business of the company or any dividend paid by a company which is set off by the company against the whole or any part of sum previously paid by it and treated as a dividend within the meaning of subclause (e) to the extent to which it is so set off, is not dividend within the meaning of this definition.
We are strictly not concerned with clauses (iv) and (v) which payments are not termed as dividend or Explanations 1 and 2. Explanation (3) states that for the purpose of this clause namely clause
(a) "concern” means a Hindu undivided family or a firm or an association of persons or a body of individuals or a company. The explanation also states and explains that a person shall be deemed to have a substantial interest in a concern, other than a company, if he is, at any time during the previous year, beneficially entitled to not less than 20% of income of such concern.
We would, for the sake of appreciation of the rival contentions note the facts in the Appeal which is styled as Income Tax Appeal No.114 of 2012. There, return of income was filed by the assessee declaring total income of Rs.3,77,11,467/. The return was processed under Section 143(1) of the I. T. Act. The assessment was subsequently rectified determining the assessed income at Rs.3,32,31,204/ . The case was selected for scrutiny. The assessee company is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of printed Aluminum Collapsible Tubes and Auxiliary Machine used in manufacture of tube. What is relevant and material for our purpose is disallowance under Section 2(22)(e) of the I. T. Act. During the assessment year under consideration namely 20062007, credit entries were found in the books of the assessee company. M/s Bhavin Containers Pvt Ltd, M/s Patel Aluminium Pvt Ltd, M/s. Lans Metal Pvt Ltd and M/s. Patcart Packaging Pvt Ltd had lent an advanced monies to the assessee company. One M. I. Patel, Director of the Assessee company holds more than 10% of equity shares in all the companies noted above. He also holds more than 20% of the shares of the assessee company. The Assessing Officer perused the balance sheet of the respective companies and it revealed that the reserves and surpluses in all these companies are more than the amount standing to the credit of these companies. This is the position in the case of all companies except M/s. Patcart Packaging Pvt Ltd and that is how he arrived at the conclusion that the requirement of Section 2(22) (e) of the I. T. Act is satisfied and the balance namely credit entries found in the books of the assessee company were considered for disallowance under Section 2(22)(e) of the Act.
Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the adverse order passed by the Assessing Officer also to the above effect so also initiation of proceedings for imposition of penalty that the matter was carried in Appeal interalia on this ground. We are not concerned with the other disallowances made by the Assessing Officer and which were also subject matter of the Appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai. In the appellate order, the Commissioner noted ground no.6
30 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. which is the addition made of Rs.96,16,924/ as deemed dividend. The Commissioner referred to the factual position and the arguments and found that the impugned credit balances are not the sums received from the related concern, having common shareholders as a loan or advance so that it could attract the provisions of Section 2(22) (e) of the I. T. Act. The credit balances represent cost of goods or services received by the Appellants and which cannot be treated as an advance or loan. Holding thus, he could have concluded that the credit entries are not covered by this provision and the payment does not fall therein. However, he assumed that the share holding pattern is such that the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) will be attracted, but concluded that the other argument, namely, deemed dividend can be assessed only in the case of a person who is a shareholder of the lender company and not in the hands of the person other than the shareholder, deserves acceptance. That is how paragraph nos.6.3 and 6.4 of the order of the Commissioner would read. In coming to this conclusion, he relied upon the order of the special bench of the Tribunal in the case of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v/s
The result of this discussion was that the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals) partly allowed the Appeal of the assessee.
The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax(Revenue) carried the matter in Appeal. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in Income Tax Appeal No.1597 of Mum/2010 and in dealing with this ground, in paragraph no.6 of the order dated 13th April 2011, held as under:
“The second ground is that the CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs.96,16,924/ made under section 2(22) (e) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. On this point there is an order of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT v/s M/s. Patel Aluminium Pvt Ltd in ITA No.1598/Mum/2010 dated 19.01.2011. The controversy in this case was whether an addition for deemed dividend can be made in the hands of the recipient of the amount even though he is not a shareholder of the lender company. It was held, following the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of ACIT v/s Bhaumik Colour P. Ltd (2009) 313 ITR (AT) 146 (Mum)(SB) that in order to attract the applicability of section 2 (22) (e) the recipient of the amount from the company has to be a registered shareholder of the company. In the present case the following credit balances were shown in the assessee's account in the following companies:
(i)M/s. Bhavin Containers P.Ltd Rs.38,75,412/
(ii)M/s.Patel Aluminium Pvt Ltd Rs.93,978/
(iii)M/s Lans Metal Pvt Ltd Rs.28,94,357/
(iv)M/s.Patcart Packaging Pvt Ltd Rs.44,31,466/
31 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd.
The finding of the CIT(A) is that the assessee is not a shareholder in any of the aforesaid companies. According to the Assessing Officer, one M. I. Patel who was a director of the assessee company held more than 10% of the equity shares of the above four companies and he also held more than 20% of the shares of the assessee company. But even the Assessing Officer has not found that the assessee company was a shareholder of any of the four companies. In such circumstances the CIT(A) was right in deleting the addition made under section 2(22)(e) following the order of the Special Bench cited above. It is also to be noted that the reasoning of the Special Bench has been upheld by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. Universal Medicare Private Limited (2010) 324 ITR 263(BOM). Both the order of the Special Bench and the judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court have been noticed and followed in the order of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Patel Aluminium Pvt Ltd(supra). Respectfully following the judgment of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court, we confirm the decision of the CIT(A) and dismiss the second ground.”
As a result of the above quoted conclusion the Revenue's Appeal was dismissed.
We find that in identical factual position, the Revenue in the case of Universal Medicare formulated two questions and termed them as substantial questions of law. They were posed for consideration and determination of this Court. They were pressed during the course of arguments, as well. The judgment in the case of Universal Medicare takes note of the questions of law and particularly, question no.2. The ratio of the decision of the special bench of the Tribunal in the case of Bhaumik Colour Pvt Ltd., was also a question posed for answer by this Court in Universal Medicare (supra).
Thereafter, the Tribunal's findings have been referred to at page no.267 of the report. In paragraph no.7, the Division Bench referred to the definition of the term “dividend” as appearing in the I. T. Act and which we have reproduced above, and then held as under:
“The Tribunal in Appeal has reversed the findings of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) on two counts. Firstly, the Tribunal held that the provisions of Section 2(22)(e) would be attracted if a loan was taken by the shareholder from any closely held company. In the present case, the Tribunal noted that the amount was part of a fraud committed on the assessee and the transaction was not reflected in its books of account. In the circumstances, Section 2(22)(e) was held not to apply. Secondly, the Tribunal held that even otherwise, the amount would have to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder who obtained the benefit and not in the hands of the assessee.
Under Section 56, income of every kind which is not to be excluded from the total income under the Act is chargeable to income tax under the head income from other sources, if it is not chargeable to income tax under any of the heads specified in items (a) to (e) of Section 14. Under Clause (1) of subsection (2), income by way of dividend is chargeable to income tax under the head income from other sources.
32 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. Section 2(22) provides an inclusive definition of the expression 'dividend' for the purposes of the Act. Section 2(22)(e) is as follows: (22) "dividend" includes - (a) to (d)....
(e) any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, or any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) made after the 31st day of May, 1987, by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power, or to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern) or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits; 8. Clause (e) of Section 2(22) is not artistically worded. For facility of exposition, the contents can be broken down for analysis: (i) Clause (e) applies to any payment by a company not being a company in which the public is substantially interested of any sum, whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise made after the 31 May 1987; (ii) Clause (e) covers a payment made by way of a loan or advance to (a) a shareholder, being a beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power; or (b) any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest; (iii) Clause (e) also includes in its purview any payment made by a company on behalf of or for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder; (iv) Clause (e) will apply to the extent to which the company, in either case, possesses accumulated profits. The remaining part of the provision is not material for the purposes of this Appeal. By providing an inclusive definition of the expression 'dividend', Clause 2(22) brings within its purview items which may not ordinarily constitute the payment of dividend. Parliament has expanded the ambit of the expression 'dividend' by providing an inclusive definition.
In order that the first part of Clause (e) of Section 2(22) is attracted, the payment by a company has to be by way of an advance or loan. The advance or loan has to be made, as the case may be, either to a shareholder, being a beneficial owner holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power or to any concern to which such a shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest. The Tribunal in the present case has found that as a matter of fact no loan or advance was granted to the assessee, since the amount in question had actually been defalcated and was not reflected in the books of account of the assessee. The fact that there was a defalcation seems to have been accepted since this amount was allowed as a business loss during the course of assessment year 20062007. Consequently, according to the Tribunal the first requirement of there being an advance or loan was not fulfilled. In our view, the finding that there was no advance or loan is a pure finding of fact which does not give rise to any substantial question of law. However, even on the second aspect which has weighed with the Tribunal, we are of the view
33 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. that the construction which has been placed on the provisions of Section 2(22) (e) is correct. Section 2(22)(e) defines the ambit of the expression 'dividend'. All payments by way of dividend have to be taxed in the hands of the recipient of the dividend namely the shareholder. The effect of Section 2(22) is to provide an inclusive definition of the expression dividend. Clause (e) expands the nature of payments which can be classified as a dividend. Clause (e) of Section 2(22) includes a payment made by the company in which the public is not substantially interested by way of an advance or loan to a shareholder or to any concern to which such shareholder is a member or partner, subject to the fulfillment of the requirements which are spelt out in the provision. Similarly, a payment made by a company on behalf, of for the individual benefit, of any such shareholder is treated by Clause (e) to be included in the expression 'dividend'. Consequently, the effect of Clause (e) of Section 2(22) is to broaden the ambit of the expression 'dividend' by including certain payments which the company has made by way of a loan or advance or payments made on behalf of or for the individual benefit of a shareholder. The definition does not alter the legal position that dividend has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder. Consequently in the present case the payment, even assuming that it was a dividend, would have to be taxed not in the hands of the assessee but in the hands of the shareholder. The Tribunal was, in the circumstances, justified in coming to the conclusion that, in any event, the payment could not be taxed in the hands of the assessee. We may in concluding note that the basis on which the assessee is sought to be taxed in the present case in respect of the amount of Rs. 32,00,000/ is that there was a dividend under Section 2(22)(e) and no other basis has been suggested in the order of the Assessing Officer.”
We are of the opinion that the Revenue cannot urge before us that the conclusion rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Universal Medicare on the second aspect which had weighed with the Tribunal in that case, is merely an observation or in the nature of obiter dictum and that cannot be said to be the ratio of the judgment is the first contention before us. We are unable to accept this contention for more than one reason. The Universal Medicare's case also was a Revenue's appeal. In Universal Medicare, the Court was dealing with three questions termed as substantial questions of law on behalf of the Revenue. The Revenue specifically urged that the Tribunal's findings on the first as well as the second aspect are erroneous and raised substantial questions of law. It was contended that the Tribunal could not have arrived at a factual conclusion that Section 2 (22) (e) could not be attracted. If a loan was taken by a shareholder from any closely held company and findings of fact are that the amount was a part of the fraud committed on the assessee and the transaction was not reflected in its books of accounts would not mean that Section 2(22)(e) is not applicable or attracted. The Tribunal held that it does not apply in the light of such factual position. However, it was also urged that the Tribunal's second conclusion that even if the factual aspect denotes payment within the meaning of Section 22(2) (e) of the I. T. Act, that would have to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder who obtained the benefit and not in the hands of the assessee, raises substantial questions of law.
34 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 24. It is in that regard that the above reproduced observations of the Hon'ble Division Bench have been made. The Division Bench held that even on the second aspect, the construction which has been placed on the provision (Section 2(22)(e)) by the Tribunal is correct. All payments by way of dividend have to be taxed in the hands of the recipient of the dividend namely the shareholder. The section provides inclusive definition of term dividend and rather explaining the nature of payment which can be classified as such, therefore, the Division Bench concluded that this definition does not alter the legal position that dividend has to be taxed in the hands of the shareholder. In the facts of the case noted by the Division Bench assuming the payment was dividend, it would have to be taxed not in the hands of the asseessee namely Universal but in the hands of the shareholder.
Once the correctness of this conclusion is put in issue before us and it is strenuously urged that it requires reconsideration, then, we cannot accept the first contention of the Revenue that the observations in the Division Bench judgment on the second aspect are mere obiter dictum and not a ratio and thus binding on us. They are a binding precedent as the Division Bench was directly called upon to answer the question based on the second aspect or the conclusion on the second point/ground urged before the Tribunal.
It is then urged that the Division Bench judgment in Universal Medicare does not take into consideration the amendments that have been made to the statute from time to time. It is urged that the amendment specifically refers to a person who is a beneficial owner of the shares. It is submitted that there are several words which have been substituted by the amendment. The words “ being a person who is a beneficial owner of share”, therefore, cannot be given the same meaning as is assigned to it in the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwarlal Samwarmal Vs. CIT (Assam) reported in (1979) 122 ITR page 1. In other words, any interpretation of the provision prior to its amendment cannot serve as a guide even if the same fall for interpretation again. The Court will have to bear in mind that the legislature stepped in to amend the sub- clause with some definite intent and purpose. The purpose was not to allow circumvention or bye passing a statute like the I. T. Act 1961. Therefore, any reference to the position of the shareholders/members of a company as is to be found in the Indian Company Act, 1956 is wholly unwarranted and uncalled for. The words “shareholder being a person who is the beneficial owner of the assessee”, therefore, must receive an interpretation in consonance with the legislative intent. That being not to restrict it to a shareholder registered as such, that we will have to take a second look at the view taken by this Court in Universal (supra). This argument is opposed by the counsel of the assessee by pointing out not only the judgment in the Universal Medicare takes care of all these aspects but interpretation placed on the provision in that judgment has found favour with several High Courts and the leading judgment of the Delhi High Court which follows the view taken in Universal Medicare is relied upon.
We have perused the provision carefully and equally the judgment in the case of Universal Medicare and the view following the same rendered by several High Courts. We are of the opinion that there is no merit in the contentions of the Revenue that Universal Medicare was 35 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. either erroneously decided or that the view taken in Universal Medicare requires reconsideration. In that regard, we must not brush aside the binding precedent or the judgment of a coordinate bench simply because some of the arguments canvassed before us were either not canvassed or if canvassed were not considered. The binding precedent can be ignored only if it is per-incuriam. Such is not the stand before us. All that is urged is several facets and which emerge from a reading of section namely Section 2(22) together with its sub-clauses have not been noticed by the Division Bench while deciding Universal's case.
We are unable to agree with the Revenue in this behalf. What we have noted is that the legislature has incorporated and inserted the definition of the term “dividend”. It is made inclusive of distribution of profits, any distribution to the shareholders by a company of debentures, debenture-stock, or deposit certificate in any form, or distribution made to the shareholders upon liquidation of a company. Equally, amount distributed on reduction of capital is termed as dividend. What is also then included is a payment made by a company to its shareholder. That is by way of advance or loan to him. This is included so as to visit the shareholder with a liability to pay tax. It is eventually, the shareholder who will pay tax on the same. The shareholder cannot escape that liability merely because the loan or advance has been made over to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has substantial interest. Earlier, legislature noted that the shareholder would receive the sum from a company and which is not strictly falling within the concept of “dividend”. Firstly, because that was received by way of advance or loan, secondly, an attempt was made to show that the advance or loan is not to the shareholder who is registered as such but to a concern in which he is a member or a partner and in which he may have a substantial interest but that cannot be termed as advance or loan to the shareholder. With a view to take care of such stand of the shareholders and not allow them to escape the liability to pay tax that the definition came to be broadly worded by indicating therein the reference to any concern. Equally, any payment made by such company on behalf of the shareholder or for individual benefit of any shareholder to the extent to which the company in other case possesses accumulated profits has also been brought in. Thus, in addition to distribution of accumulated profit, debenture stock or deposit certificate etc, a payment of the aforesaid nature has been termed as “dividend” and included in the definition. At the same time, the legislature has taken care not to include any advance or loan made to a shareholder or the said concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has substantial interest in the ordinary course of the business of the company and where lending of money is substantial part of the business of the company. Equally, any dividend paid by the company which is set off by the company against the whole or any part of any sum previously paid by it and treated as a dividend within the meaning of subclause (e), to the extent to which it is so set off, is also excluded advisedly.
We are also of the opinion that any reference to Explanation 3 and particularly the definition of term “concern” will not advance or carry the Revenue's case any further. Eventually, it is the shareholder who is registered as such who is entitled to receive the dividend. Merely because the payment is made to him by way of advance or loan was 36 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. not termed as such earlier that the legislature has inserted such a payment in the definition of the term “dividend” and made the definition wide and broad so also inclusive.
We do not see how with this legal position and the status of the shareholder recognized in law can be ignored while interpreting Section 2 (22) (e) of the I. T. Act. Precisely, this is what has been done by this Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Universal Medicare. It is not necessary for us to make a detailed reference to the order of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Bhaumik Colour Pvt Ltd. Suffice it to hold that the view taken by this Court in the case of M/s. Universal Medicare does not require any reconsideration. We are not in agreement with Shri Gupta that the definition does not contemplate or does not stipulate any requirement of assessee being a shareholder of the assessee like the one in the present case. The view taken in the present case that the recipient/assessee was not a shareholder, thus is in consonance with the legal position noted by us hereinabove.
We are of the further view that this Court merely restated this principle and which remains unaltered throughout from the case of Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal v/s Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 1980 (122) I. T. R. page 1 (SC). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is only where a loan is advanced by the company to the registered shareholder and other conditions set out in Section 2 (6A) (e) of the then prevailing I.T. Act 1922 are satisfied that the amount of the loan would be liable to be regarded as deemed dividend within the meaning of that provision. The loan granted to the beneficial owner of the share, who is not registered shareholder would not fall within the meaning of Section 2 (6A) (e) of the I. T. Act. What the section is designed to strike at is advance or loan to a shareholder and the word shareholder can mean only the registered shareholder. The Hon'ble Supreme Court following the judgment in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v/s C. P. Sarathy reported in 1972
(83) ITR 170(SC) held that the beneficial owner of shares whose name does not appear in the register of the shareholders of the company cannot be said to be a shareholder though he may be beneficially entitled to the shares but he is not a shareholder. Mr. Gupta, appearing before us for the Revenue would submit that much water has flown after the decision in the case of Rameshwarlal and C. P. Sarathy(supra) because the provision has been amended since then. The fiction therefore must be carried to its logical end and its purpose should not be defeated by narrow construction as was placed on the provision prior to its amendment. In other words, the amendment was brought in only because of such view having taken earlier, is his submission.
We are unable to accept it because of the consistent view taken and that even if the words as noted by us hereinabove have been inserted in the definition so as to make reference to the beneficial owner of the shares, still the definition essentially covers the payment to the shareholder and the position of the shareholder as noted in the Supreme Court's decision, cannot undergo any change. That legal position and status of the shareholder being the same, we do not see how the view prevailing from Commissioner of Income Tax v/s C. P. Sarathy(supra) is in any way said to be changed. That is how all the judgments subsequent thereto have been rendered. The reliance
37 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. placed by Ms. Vissanjee on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Patiala v/s Shahzada Nand and Sons and Ors, reported in (1966) 177 ITR 393, is therefore, apposite. Equally, her reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court is well placed. We have noted that the Delhi High Court and even after exhaustive amendment to Section 2(22)(e) held that the payment made to any concern would not come within the purview of this subclause so long as it contemplated shareholders. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court has made detailed reference to all the decisions in the field. It has also referred to the order passed by the Special Bench of the Tribunal in arriving at the same conclusion. In the Commissioner of Income Tax v/s Ankitech Pvt Ltd reported in 2012 (340) ITR page 14, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court referred to both Sarathy Mudaliar and Rameshwarlal Sanwarmal (supra), extensively. It also referred to the arguments of the Revenue which are somewhat similar to those raised before us. It is in dealing with these arguments that the Division Bench concluded that all the three limbs of the section analyzed in Universal Medicare denote the intention that closely held companies namely companies in which public are not substantially interested which are controlled by a group of members, even though having accumulated profits would not distribute such profit as dividend because if so distributed the dividend income would become taxable in the hands of the shareholders. Instead of distributing accumulated profits as dividend, companies distribute them as loan or advances to shareholders or to concern in which such shareholders have substantial interest or make any payment on behalf of or for the individual benefit of such shareholder. In such an event, by the deeming provision, such payment by the company is treated as dividend. The purpose is to tax dividend in the hands of the shareholder.
We do not see how such a view taken by the Delhi High Court and which reaffirms that of this Court in Universal Medicare can be said to be contrary to the legal fiction or the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting it. The view taken by the Delhi High Court in the Commissioner of Income Tax v/s Ankitech Pvt Ltd (supra) has thus our respectful concurrence.
We do not make reference to the other judgments because this line of reasoning has been followed in the same. It is not necessary to multiply our judgment by making reference to each of the orders following the judgment in Ankitech Pvt Ltd and rendered by Delhi High Court or by the Allahabad High Court and Gujrat High Court.
We are of the view that so long as the Tribunal in the matters and the Appeals which are brought before us holds that the assessee company before it was not a shareholder in any of the entities which have advanced and lent sums, then, the addition is required to be deleted and following the judgment in Universal Medicare(supra) of this Court. Such a view taken in the present case by the Tribunal, therefore, cannot be termed as perverse or vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of record. The Appeal, therefore, does not raise any substantial question of law.
Our judgment passed today, shall cover all such cases in which recipient is not shareholder of the lender company. The Appeals raising
38 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. such grounds, therefore, would follow this order and even they would stand dismissed as they do not raise any substantial question of law.
Equally, if the payment cannot be termed as loan or advance to the shareholder, then, even such a view cannot be termed in the given facts and circumstances and without anything more as perverse or vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the record. Even the Appeals impugning such orders of the Tribunal, therefore, will have to be dismissed and they accordingly stand dismissed.”
3.6. In other cases, it was held that the deem dividend
cannot be taxed in the hands of person who are not shareholders of the company. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIT vs Mukundray K. Shah (2007) 290 ITR 433 (SC) held as under:-
“3. Aggrieved by the assessment order dt. 29th Nov., 2002, the assessee went in appeal to Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) [for short, ‘CIT(A)’] under s. 158BC(c) r/w s. 143(3) of the Act. By the order dt. 21st Feb., 2003, it was held by CIT(A) that the assessee did not possess any substantial interest in MKTPL or in SCPL during financial year 1999-2000; that MKF and MKI had no substantial interest in MKSEPL, SCPL and MKTPL during financial year 1999- 2000; that SCPL did not make any loan to MKI during the financial year 1999-2000; that SCPL had borrowed money from MKI and all payments made by SCPL during financial year 1999-2000 were repayments of loans advanced by MKI; that the assessee had 16 per cent share in MKF; that MKSEPL had a current account in the books of MKF and that in most cases MKF had advanced loans to MKSEPL. According to CIT(A), MKSEPL have repaid those loans to MKF in which the assessee had substantial interest. According to CIT(A), the nature of transactions between MKF and MKSEPL consisted of a running account; it consisted of giving of loans and repayments thereof. According to CIT(A), none of the two firms had any substantial interest in MKSEPL, SCPL and MKTPL. According to CIT(A), all withdrawals made by the assessee from MKF and MKI including the impugned sum were debited to the assessee’s capital account in the books of MKF and MKI. According to CIT(A), MKSEPL and SCPL had a regular account in MKF and MKI even before the purchase of the said Bonds and that the said two firms had advanced loans to MKSEPL and SCPL even in the earlier years as well as in the financial year 1999- 2000 and, therefore, there was no motive in the debtor companies repaying their debts to MKF and MKI. According to CIT(A), merely because repayments were made by MKSEPL and SCPL through MKF and MKI in January/February, 2000 and merely because the said amounts were partly utilized by the said two firms in making payments to the assessee who bought 9% RBI Relief Bonds
39 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. therefrom, did not necessarily mean that the assessee had routed the funds of MKSEPL through MKF and MKI for his individual benefit. According to CIT(A), MKF and MKI were two separate entities; that there was no material to show that MKF and MKI were used as conduits for routing the money from MKSEPL to the assessee. According to CIT(A), while the total investment made by the assessee in purchase of Bonds during financial year 1999-2000 was Rs. 26.35 crores, the Department has sought to assess only Rs. 5.99 crores as deemed dividend and, therefore, according to CIT, the allegation made by the AO was baseless. According to CIT(A) there was no material to show that MKSEPL and SCPL had made payments to the said two firms for the benefit of the assessee enabling him to purchase the said Bonds in financial year 1999-2000. According to CIT(A), MKSEPL and SCPL were the debtors of MKF and MKI in the regular course of business and, therefore, payments made by MKSEPL to MKF and MKI were repayments of loans and that the said payments were not for purchase of Bonds by the assessee. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed by CIT(A).
Aggrieved by the decision dt. 21st Feb., 2003, the matter was carried in appeal by the Department to the Tribunal. By the judgment dt. 28th Jan., 2005, the Tribunal held that in this case s. 2(22)(e) was attracted since disbursement was made by MKSEPL (company); that SCPL had no independent existence in law in January/February, 2000 when payments were made by MKI and MKF to the assessee who bought the said Bonds; that SCPL disbursed Rs. 2.04 crores and Rs. 75 lakhs in January, 2000; that SCPL stood merged in MKSEPL vide order of the High Court dt. 5th July, 2001 with retrospective effect, i.e. 18th May, 1998; that in January, 2000 SCPL had no legal existence since the merger had taken place w.e.f. 18th May, 1998; that merger had taken place under a voluntary scheme in which every shareholder of the two companies agreed; that, therefore, there was no merit in the contention of the assessee that his shareholding in SCPL and the accumulated profits of SCPL were not liable to be taken into account; according to the Tribunal, in the aforestated circumstances, all payments should be taken to have originated from MKSEPL; the Tribunal further found that the accumulated reserves of MKSEPL was Rs. 55 crores, nearly ten times in excess of Rs. 5.99 crores taxed as deemed dividend. It is not in dispute that the assessee had more than 10 per cent of the total voting power in MKSEPL. In the circumstances, the Tribunal took the view that MKSEPL made payment to the said two firms for the benefit of the assessee who thereafter bought the said Bonds. According to the Tribunal, MKSEPL was the only company which made the disbursement through MKF and MKI. According to the Tribunal, it is true that the assessee bought the said Bonds for Rs. 26.35 crores but the AO had taxed only a fraction of Rs. 5.99 crores. However, according to the Tribunal, for the purposes of applicability of s. 2(22)(e) of the said Act payment has to originate from a company. After excluding known company sources, according to the Tribunal, the AO was right in restricting the deemed dividend amount to Rs. 5.99 crores since known company sources had to be eliminated. According to the Tribunal, the AO was right in identifying MKSEPL as the originating company, the identity of the ultimate beneficiary, the amount to be taxed, that is, Rs. 5.99 crores and the sufficiency of accumulated profits of MKSEPL in which the assessee had more than 40 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 10 per cent voting power. Accordingly the Tribunal allowed the Department’s appeal.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal dt. 28th Jan., 2005, the assessee carried the matter in appeal to the High Court under s. 260A of the said Act. By the impugned judgment the High Court held in favour of the assessee on two counts. According to the High Court, the assessee had declared the primary facts in the returns. According to the High Court, the present case did not fall under Chapter XIV-B of the said Act. According to the High Court, this was not the case of undisclosed income. According to the High Court, this was a matter of regular assessment. According to the High Court, none of the authorities below have held that the entries in the books of accounts were fictitious. According to the High Court, full details were disclosed during the block period in the returns filed by the assessee. According to the High Court, all payments were made by cheque. According to the High Court, moneys were lent and advanced by MKSEPL to MKF and MKI in normal course of business. According to the High Court, the Tribunal had erred in holding that MKF and MKI were conduits for routing the money from MKSEPL through the two firms to the assessee; that there was no evidence in that regard; that the two firms did not have substantial interest in MKSEPL; that there was no evidence to show that payments were made by MKSEPL for the individual benefit of the assessee and to enable him to purchase 9% RBI Relief Bonds; that CIT(A) was right in holding that when Rs. 26.35 crores was invested in the above financial year then AO had no reason to treat Rs. 5.99 crores as deemed dividend under s. 2(22)(e) and for the above reasons the High Court set aside the judgment of the Tribunal dt. 28th Jan., 2005. Hence this civil appeal.
According to Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Addl. Solicitor General appearing for the appellant (Department), the High Court should not have interfered with the findings of facts recorded by the Tribunal; that there was no substantial question of law; that no perversity in the findings recorded by the Tribunal so as to warrant interference under s. 260A of the Act; that the Department had searched the premises, it had seized the diary "ML-20" which contained entries subsequently corroborated by cash flow chart which indicated that money had originated from MKSEPL to the two firms through which it had gone to the assessee and, therefore, the Department was right in assessing Rs. 5.99 crores as deemed dividend in the hands of the assessee under s. 2(22)(e). Learned counsel urged that the five entries discovered in the search represented five transactions/payments for purchase of 9% RBI Relief Bonds. These, according to the learned counsel, were not repayment of loans, they were payments for purchase of the said bonds during the financial year 1999-2000. 7. On behalf of the assessee (respondent), Mr. N.K. Poddar, learned senior counsel, submitted that the impugned block assessment was wholly without jurisdiction having regard to the fact that the alleged deemed dividend of Rs. 5.99 crores relate to transactions recorded and reflected in the regular books and tax records even before the search; that no incriminating document or evidence was found by the Department during the search which falsify such transactions entered into by the assessee in the normal course; that the expression
41 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. "undisclosed income" has been defined in s. 158B(b) of the said Act and since block assessment was relatable to such evidence recovered during search in the present case s. 158BB(1) was not applicable in this case since no such evidence was recovered during the search. Learned counsel submitted that Chapter XIV-B was put on the statute book to enable assessment of undisclosed income detected on evidence found during the search. According to the learned counsel, the block assessment was intended to be an assessment in addition to the regular assessment. Learned counsel submitted that in the present case for want of such evidence, the Department was not entitled to make additions on account of deemed dividend to the tune of Rs. 5.99 crores. During the search, according to the learned counsel, nothing except a cash flow chart giving details of investments made by the assessee in purchase of the said Bonds of the value of Rs. 26.35 crores was furnished. According to the learned counsel, the diary "ML-20" was the ledger copy of the investment account in 9% RBI Relief Bonds which copy was a print-out from the regular accounts of the assessee; that the investment of Rs. 26.35 crores, reflected in ML-20, was made by the assessee out of his disclosed funds and through regular books of accounts, and that the seized diary did not contain any incriminating information. Learned counsel urged that in the course of block assessment proceedings the AO directed the assessee to furnish details as to the source of funds out of which Rs. 26.35 crores was made and when it was explained to the AO that the assessee had made such investments in 9% RBI Relief Bonds out of the moneys withdrawn from MKF and MKI and that books of accounts maintained regularly by the said two firms indicated such withdrawals the AO directed the Authorized Representatives of the assessee to prepare a statement indicating the source from which moneys came in the hands of the two firms and out of which withdrawals were made by the assessee to make investment in the 9% RBI Relief Bonds, therefore, according to the learned counsel, no incriminating material whatsoever was found in the course of the search which could enable the AO to invoke s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, in the above circumstance, Chapter XIV-B dealing with block assessment was wrongly invoked by the AO.
On the nature of the transactions, learned counsel urged that during the financial year 1999-2000, the assessee had invested Rs. 26.35 crores in the purchase of bonds; that the said investment was made out of the disclosed sources through cheques and that the said investment was mentioned in the bank accounts and in the tax records of the assessee long before the search. Learned counsel urged that the immediate source of investment was the withdrawal of Rs. 26.35 cores from the partners’ capital account with MKF and MKI. It was urged that the cash flow statement was not an admission on the part of the assessee and, therefore, it was not open to the Department to invoke Chapter XIV-B. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal had erred in holding that the fact that SCPL had a running current account with MKI in the usual course of business, was irrelevant. Learned counsel submitted that SCPL had borrowed substantial amounts from MKI and in January, 2000 SCPL repaid Rs. 2.79 crores to MKI which were not on behalf of or for the benefit of the assessee. It was urged that MKI had never borrowed money from SCPL at any time. Learned counsel urged that the Tribunal was wrong
42 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. in holding that the fact that MKI had never borrowed money from SCPL, was irrelevant. Learned counsel urged that Rs. 2.79 crores were withdrawn by the assessee from his firm styled MKI on 28th Jan., 2000 and such withdrawal was debited by MKI to the capital account of the assessee. It was urged that MKSEPL had borrowed substantial amounts from MKF; and MKSEPL had made repayments to MKF during the financial year 1999-2000 against the earlier debt owed by MKSEPL to MKF. Learned counsel submitted that the assessee had a credit balance of Rs. 6.72 crores in his capital account standing in the books of partnership firm of MKF as on 1st April, 1999. Learned counsel urged that the withdrawals made by the assessee from MKF were only out of his capital account with MKF and that the said withdrawals were debited by MKF to the capital account of the assessee. Learned counsel further urged that there was no evidence on record to show that payments by SCPL to MKI and/or the payment by MKSEPL to MKF was for the benefit of the assessee. Learned counsel submitted that payments were made by each of the two companies, namely, SCPL and MKSEPL to MKI and MKF respectively in liquidation of their respective dues owed by each of the two companies to the said two firms. Learned counsel urged that no payment was ever made by SCPL and MKSEPL to the assessee. Learned counsel urged that the existence of reserves in the balance sheet of MKSEPL in the sum of Rs. 55 crores as on 31st March, 1999 is wholly irrelevant for the purposes of s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. Learned counsel urged that similarly the fact that the assessee owed Rs. 8.18 crores to MKI as on 31st March, 2000, was wholly irrelevant for the purposes of s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. Learned counsel submitted that s. 2(22)(e) had no application in the matter of the above two facts. Learned counsel urged that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that the assessee did not hold any shares in SCPL on or after 1st April, 1999 and, therefore, he did not have any interest in SCPL on the dates when Rs. 2.79 crores were repaid by SCPL to MKI.
Learned counsel contended that the accumulated profits of MKSEPL could not be treated in law as the accumulated profits of SCPL in spite of the order dt. 5th July, 2001 passed by the High Court approving the merger of SCPL with MKSEPL, even when such merger was made effective from 18th May, 1998. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal had failed to appreciate that MKSEPL had not merged with SCPL but it is SCPL which had merged with MKSEPL. As a result of the said merger the accumulated profits of MKSEPL did not vest in SCPL. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the subsequent event of the Court’s order dt. 5th July, 2001 approving merger of SCPL with MKSEPL cannot enable the Revenue to treat the accumulated profits of MKSEPL as part of the accumulated profits of SCPL. Learned counsel further submitted that MKF never held any shares in MKSEPL. Learned counsel urged that Rs. 2.04 crores were paid on 11th Jan., 2000 and Rs. 75 (lakhs) were paid on 28th Jan., 2000 by SCPL to MKI. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, if SCPL wanted to declare dividends it could have done so only to the extent of accumulated profits in its own hands and since SCPL on the above two dates could not have declared dividends in excess of its accumulated profits, the Department was wrong in treating the accumulated profits of MKSEPL as accumulated profits of SCPL merely because the merger became effective retrospectively w.e.f. 18th May, 1998. 43 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 9. We find merit in this civil appeal. The companies having accumulated profits and the companies in which substantial voting power lies in the hands of the person other than the public (controlled companies) are required to distribute accumulated profits as dividends to the shareholders. In such companies, the controlling group can do what it likes with the management of the company, its affairs and its profits. It is for this group to decide whether the profits should be distributed as dividends or not. The declaration of dividend is entirely within the discretion of this group. Therefore, the legislature realized that though funds were available with the company in the form of profits, the controlling group refused to distribute accumulated profits as dividends to the shareholders but adopted the device of advancing the said profits by way of loan to one of its shareholders so as to avoid payment of tax on accumulated profits. This was the main reason for enacting s. 2(22)(e) of the Act.
In the case of CIT vs. L. Alagusundaram Chettiar 1977 CTR (Mad) 410 : (1977) 109 ITR 508 (Mad), the Madras High Court held that the word "payment" in the said section means the act of paying and, therefore, in that case it was held that payment by the company to Karuppiah Chettiar was for the benefit of the assessee, the managing director of the company, L. Alagusundaram Chettiar, and was therefore assessable as dividend in the hands of the assessee. In the said judgment it has been held that the basic test to be applied in such cases is not whether loan given is a benefit but whether payment by the company to Karuppiah Chettiar was for the benefit of the assessee who was the managing director of the paying company. Applying the above test to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding, on examination of the cash flow statement, that MKSEPL had made payments to MKF and MKI for the benefit of the assessee which enabled the assessee to buy 9% RBI Relief Bonds in the financial year 1999-2000. It is in this sense that the Tribunal was right in holding that the two firms were used as conduits by the assessee. It is not in dispute that the assessee had more than 10 per cent of voting power in MKSEPL during the block period. It is not in dispute that the assessee had substantial interest of about 16 per cent in MKF. It is not in dispute that the three companies were the controlled companies. There is one more point which needs to be mentioned. The timing of so-called repayments by the company to MKF and MKI and the immediate withdrawal of the funds by the assessee-cum-director-cum- shareholder-cum-partner and the timing of investment in purchase of Bonds were around the same time. Moreover, in MKSEPL the assessee is not only a shareholder having more than 10 per cent of total voting power, he is also a director of that company. The said company is also a partner in MKF and MKI which explains why the amount of Rs. 5.99 crores was routed by splitting the said amount into two parts of Rs. 2.79 crores and Rs. 3.20 crores. In the present case, the most important aspect, which has not been considered by the High Court, was that withdrawal of money by the assessee from his capital account, in the books of MKI, during financial year 1999- 2000 led to a debit balance of Rs. 8.18 crores as on 31st March, 2000. To this extent, the finding given by the AO and by the Tribunal remains unchallenged. Lastly, on the maintainability of the block assessment, we are of the view that the Department was right in assessing the said amount as deemed dividend in the hands of the 44 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. assessee under s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. The impugned assessment order was passed under s. 158BC. That assessment originated on account of a search conducted under s. 132(1) of the Act. In that search the diary "ML-20" was identified. That identification was the starting point of connected enquiries resulting in the detection of undisclosed income of Rs. 5.99 crores. In other words, undisclosed income, in the nature of deemed dividend, did not arise from any scrutiny proceedings, tax evasion petitions, surveys, information received from external agency, etc. The undisclosed income was detected by the AO wholly and exclusively as a result of a search and, therefore, the Department was right in invoking the provisions of Chapter XIV-B. There is one more aspect in this regard. From the facts, indicated above, the Department has established a sort of circular trading in this case. One of the important features of circular trading is to route the funds through conduits. In such cases the picture emerges only after seeing the cash flow statements. In the present case, ML-20 made the AO to hold enquiries and in that enquiry the cash flow statement emerged, therefore, the Department was right in invoking the provisions of Chapter XIV-B in the present case. The five payments had direct co-relation with Rs. 5.99 crores paid by MKSEPL to MKF and MKI and payments by the said two firms to the assessee who used the said money to buy 9% RBI Relief Bonds. Therefore, the said payment by the company through the two firms was for the benefit of the assessee. Therefore, the said funds were not repayment of loans, they were for purchase of 9% RBI Relief Bonds by the respondent.
As regards the contention advanced on behalf of the assessee that the accumulated profits of MKSEPL could not be treated as the accumulated profits of SCPL in spite of the order of merger w.e.f. 18th May, 1998, we agree with the view expressed by the AO that on merger the accounts of the two companies had merged and, therefore, the reserves had to be taken on the basis of merged account. Moreover, the assessee had substantial interest in MKSEPL right from the inception. Lastly, in the present case, we are concerned with the block assessment which covers the period 1st April, 1990 to 24th Aug., 2000. 12. Before concluding, we quote hereinbelow the relevant paragraphs from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Nandlal Kanoria vs. CIT, (1980) 122 ITR 405 (Cal) at p. 415 :
"The only question which remains to be considered is that whether the said company made the payments of the said sum of Rs. 75,000 and Rs. 4,80,000 to Indira & Co. for the benefit of the assessee. So far as Rs. 75,000 is concerned it is found by the Tribunal, though not very clearly, that this amount was received by Indira & Co. from the said company and the same amount was given to the assessee by Indira & Co. The Tribunal inferred from the said facts that this was a payment by the said company meant for the benefit of the assessee. This conclusion involves two findings of fact, namely, the factum of payment by the company and the motive or intention of the company making such payment, namely, a benefit accruing to the assessee. These are essentially findings of fact and have not been challenged by the assessee by an appropriate question."
45 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. (emphasis, italicised in print, supplied)
We also quote hereinbelow para 19 and para 21 of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. P.K. Badiani (1970) 76 ITR 369 (Bom) :
"19. Now, the assessee’s account for 1st April, 1957, to 31st March, 1958, shows that there are credits as well as debits. What has to be ascertained is whether the debits are ‘loans’, so that they can be deemed as dividends. The account is a mutual, open, and current account. Every debit, i.e., every payment by the company to the assessee, may not be a loan. To be treated as a loan, every amount paid must make the company a creditor of the assessee for that amount. If, however, at the time when the payment is made by the company is already a debtor of the assessee, the payment would be merely a repayment by the company towards its already existing debt. It would be a loan by the company only if the payment exceeds the amount of its already existing debt and that too only to the extent of the excess. Therefore, the position as regards each debit will have to be individually considered, because it may or may not be a loan. The two basic principles are, that only a loan, which would include the other payments mentioned in s. 2(6A)(e), can be deemed to be dividend and that too only to the extent that the company has at the date of the payment ‘accumulated profits’ after deducting therefrom all items legitimately deductible therefrom.
xxxx
As regards question Nos. 3 and 4, Mr. Rajgopal contended that the debit balance, if any, at the last date of the assessee’s accounting year 1st April, 1957 to 31st March, 1958, should be taken as the amount to be treated as dividend and as the assessee’s account is on the last day to his credit, no amount can be deemed to be dividend. As already pointed out, the position has to be ascertained at the date of each payment by the company to the assessee and this contention must, therefore, be rejected. If Mr. Rajgopal’s contention was to be accepted, the result would be that if a shareholder borrows a large amount during the year, but repays it on the last day of the year, it would not be considered to be a loan, though the facts show that he did borrow a loan. Such a contradiction of the real fact would result if Mr. Rajgopal’s contention were to be accepted. Mr. Rajgopal further contended that in any event the highest amount to the assessee’s debit on any day of the year should be the amount to be deemed to be dividend. This argument, again, ignores the principle laid down by us, that the position at the date of each payment must be considered. Moreover, there is another reason and that is that if it were to be so done, it would not enable the position of the balance of the ‘accumulated profits’ being taken into account, as more than one shareholder may have borrowed loans from the company in an account similar to that of the assessee. All these contentions of Mr. Rajgopal ignore the basic fact that s. 2(6A)(e) uses the words ‘any payment’ which means, every payment, and s. 2(6A)(e) requires the determination of two factors, viz., whether the payment is a loan and whether at the date when the payment is made there were ‘accumulated profits’ and that these two factors are to be correlated
46 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. and the result must be ascertained at the date of each such payment."
(emphasis, italicised in print, supplied)
The above two judgments indicate that the question as to whether payment made by the company is for the benefit of the assessee is a question of fact. In this case, the Tribunal has concluded that the payment routed through MKF and MKI was for the benefit of the assessee. This was a finding of fact. It was not perverse. Therefore, the High Court should not have interfered with the said finding. Further, the above two judgments lay down that the concept of deemed dividend under s. 2(22)(e) of the Act postulates two factors, namely, whether payment is a loan and whether on the date of payment there existed "accumulated profits". These two factors have to be correlated. This correlation has been done by the Tribunal coupled with the fact that all withdrawals were debited in the capital account of the firm leading to the debit balance of Rs. 8.18 crores. The High Court has erred in disturbing the findings of fact.
For the above reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.”
3.7. If the judicial pronouncements are analyzed with the facts of the present appeal, the addition made by the Assessing Officer is on the assumption that the common
director hold more than 10% in SCCPL, which is factually
incorrect. Both companies have common directory namely Shri
Atul Sud, who is having 9% stakes in SCCPL (sister concern)
which has given loan to the assessee to bring this amount
within the ambit of deemed dividend u/s 2(22)(e) it has to be established that the same has to be given to shareholders out
of the accumulated profit and further it was in the nature of loan or advance. The ratio laid down by the Special Bench in CIT vs Bhaumik Colour Lab, [2009] 118 ITD 1 (MUM.) (SB)
47 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. favours the assessee, the relevant portion of the order is reproduced hereunder:-
“Section 2(32) defines the expression ‘person who has a substantial interest in the company’, in relation to a company, means a person who is the beneficial owner of shares, not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits, carrying not less than twenty per cent of the voting power. [Para 15] Under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, two categories of payment were considered as dividend, viz., (a) any payment by way of advance or loan to a shareholder was considered as dividend paid to shareholder or (b ) any payment by any such company on behalf or for the individual benefit of a shareholder was considered as dividend. [Para 16] In the 1961 Act, the very same two categories of payment were considered as dividend, but an additional condition, that payment should be to a shareholder being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares and who has a substantial interest in the company, viz., shareholding which carries not less than twenty per cent of the voting power, was introduced. [Para 17] By the 1987 amendment with effect from 1-4-1988, the condition that payment should be to a shareholder who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power was substituted. Thus, the percentage of voting power was reduced from twenty per cent to ten per cent. By the very same amendment a new category of payment was also considered as dividend, viz., payment to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest. Substantial interest has been defined to mean holding of shares carrying 20 per cent of voting power. [Para 18] The provisions of section 2(22 )(e) create a fiction bringing in amounts paid otherwise than as dividend into the net of dividends. Therefore, clause (e) of section 2(22) must be given a strict interpretation. In the instant case, there was no dispute that the companies which gave the loan or advance were one in which public was not substantially interested. Nor was there any dispute that these companies possessed accumulated profits to the extent of the loan or advance. [Para 19] In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of CIT v. C.P. Sarathy Mudalian [1972] 83 ITR 170 and Rameshwarlal Sanwarlal v. CIT [1980] 122 ITR 1/3 Taxman 1 (AP), it is clear that to attract the first limb of the provisions of section 2(22 )(e) the payment must be to a person who is a registered holder of shares. As already mentioned the condition under the 1922 Act and the 1961 Act regarding the payee being a shareholder remains the same and it is the condition that such shareholder should be beneficial owner of the shares and the percentage of voting power that such shareholder should hold has been prescribed as an additional condition under the 48 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 1961 Act. The word ‘Shareholder’ alone existed in the definition of dividend in the 1922 Act. The expression ‘Shareholder’ has been interpreted under the 1922 Act to mean a registered shareholder. This expression ‘Shareholder’ found in the 1961 Act has to be, therefore, construed as applying only to registered shareholder. [Para 22] In the 1961 Act the word ‘Shareholder’ is followed by the following words ‘being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’. This expression used in section 2(22)(e ) both in the 1961 Act and in the amended provisions with effect from 1-4-1988 only qualifies the word ‘Shareholder’ and does not in any way alter the position that the shareholder has to be a registered shareholder. These provisions also do not substitute the aforesaid requirement to a requirement of merely holding a beneficial interest in the shares without being a registered holder of shares. The expression ‘being’ is a present participle. A participle is a word which is partly a verb and partly an adjective. In section 2(22)(e ), the present participle ‘being’ is used to describe the noun shareholder like an adjective. The expression ‘being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’ is, therefore, a further requirement before a shareholder can be said to fall within the parameters of section 2(22)(e ). In the 1961 Act, section 2(22 )(e) imposes a further condition that the shareholder has also to be beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power. Thus, it was not possible to accept the contention of the revenue that under the 1961 Act there was no requirement of a shareholder being a registered holder and that even a beneficial ownership of shares would be sufficient. [Para 23] The expression ‘Shareholder being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares’ referred to in first limb of section 2(22 )(e) refers to both a registered shareholder and beneficial shareholder. If a person is a registered shareholder but not the beneficial shareholder than the provisions of section 2(22)( e) would not apply. Similarly if a person is a beneficial shareholder but not a registered shareholder then also the first limb of provisions of section 2(22 )(e) would not apply. [Para 24] The new category of payment which was considered as dividend introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1-4-1988 by the second limb of section 2(22)(e ) is payment ‘to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest’. [Para 25] The following conditions are required to be satisfied for application of the above category of payment to be regarded as dividend : (a)There must be a payment to a concern by a company. (b)A person must be shareholder of the company being a registered holder and beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power. This is because of the expression ‘Such Shareholder’ found in the relevant provision. This expression only refers to the shareholder referred to in 49 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. the earlier part of section 2(22 )(e), viz., a registered and a beneficial holder of shares holding 10 per cent voting power. (c)The very same person referred to in (b) above must also be a member or a partner in the concern holding substantial interest in the concern viz., when the concern is not a company, he must at any time during the previous year, be beneficially entitled to not less than twenty per cent of the income of such concern; and where the concern is a company he must be the owner of shares, not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits, carrying not less than twenty per cent of the voting power. (d)If the above conditions are satisfied then the payment by the company to the concern will be dividend. [Para 26] In the case of the assessee, aforesaid conditions (b ) and (c) were not satisfied inasmuch as NNT held shares in UPPL and BCPL only as a legal and registered owner but not as a beneficial owner. The three trustees of NNT held shares in UPPL and BCPL only as a legal and registered owner. They held shares for and on behalf of 5 beneficiaries of the trust who were different individuals. They were, therefore, not beneficial owners of the shares. Trust ownership is a peculiar instance of duplicate ownership. Trust property is, in fact, owned by two persons simultaneously in the sense that one is under an obligation to use the property for the benefit of the other. The ownership of the trustee called trust ownership is nominal rather than real. The beneficiary interest is called the beneficial interest. The trustee is to administer the property of another person but the ownership right in the trustee is to be used only on behalf of the real owner. As between trustee and third party ownership conferred on the trustee fictitiously by law prevails, that is, the trustee is clothed with the rights of the beneficiary and is so enable to personate or represent him in dealings with the world at large. The main purpose of Trusteeship is to protect the rights and interest of persons who for any reason are unable effectively to protect them for themselves. Such protection is required for four classes of people, (a) unborn persons; (b) infants, lunatics, or other disqualified persons; (c) a large number of persons who are interested in common; and (d) persons having conflicting interest in the same property, i.e., an owner and an encumbrancer or different kinds of encumbrancers. Therefore, the first requirement of holding of shares both as a legal registered owner and beneficial owner of such shares was not satisfied in the case of the assessee. Therefore, provisions of section 2(22)(e ) would not be applicable at all to the case of the assessee. [Para 27] The provisions of section 2(22 )(e) which brought in a new category of payment which was to be considered as dividend as introduced by the Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1-4-1988, viz., payment by a company ‘to any concern in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest’ do not say as to in whose hands the dividend has to be brought to tax, whether in the hands of the ‘concern’ or the ‘shareholder’. [Para 30] The intention behind enacting provisions of section 2(22 )(e) are that closely held companies (i.e., companies in which public are not substantially interested), which are controlled by a group of members,
50 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. even though the company has accumulated profits would not distribute such profit as dividend because if so distri-buted the dividend income would become taxable in the hands of the shareholders. Instead of distributing accumulated profits as dividend, companies distribute them as loan or advances to shareholders or to concern in which such shareholders have substantial interest or make any payment on behalf of or for the individual benefit of such shareholder. In such an event, by the deeming provisions such payment by the company is treated as dividend. The intention behind the provisions of section 2(22 )(e) is to tax dividend in the hands of shareholder. The deeming provisions as it applies to the case of loans or advances by a company to a concern in which its shareholder has substantial interest, is based on the presumption that the loan or advances would ultimately be made available to the shareholders of the company giving the loan or advance. The intention of the Legislature is, therefore, to tax dividend only in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands of the concern. [Para 35] The basis of bringing in the amendment to section 2(22 )(e) by the Finance Act, 1987 with effect from 1-4-1988 is to ensure that persons who control the affairs of a company as well as that of a firm can have the payment made to a concern from the company and the person who can control the affairs of the concern can draw the same from the concern instead of the company directly making payment to the shareholder as dividend. The source of power to control the affairs of the company and the concern is the basis on which these provisions have been made. It is, therefore, proper to construe those provisions as contemplating a charge to tax in the hands of the shareholder and not in the hands of a non-shareholder, viz., concern. A loan or advance received by a concern is not in the nature of income. In other words, there is a deemed accrual of income even under section 5(1)( b) in the hands of the shareholder only and not in the hands of the payee, viz., non-shareholder (Concern). Section 5(1)(a ) contemplates that the receipt or deemed receipt should be in the nature of income. Therefore, the deeming fiction can be applied only in the hands of the shareholder and not the non-shareholder, viz., the concern. [Para 36] The definition of dividend under section 2(22 )(e) is an inclusive definition. Such inclusive definition enlarges the meaning of the term ‘dividend’ according to its ordinary and natural meaning to include even a loan or advance. Any loan or advance cannot be dividend according to its ordinary and natural meaning. The ordinary and natural meaning of the term ‘dividend’ would be a share in profits to an investor in the share capital of a limited company. To the extent the meaning of the word ‘Dividend’ is extended to loans and advances to a shareholder or to a concern in which a shareholder is substantially interested deeming them as dividend in the hands of a shareholder the ordinary and natural meaning of the word ‘Dividend’ is altered. To this extent the definition of the term ‘Dividend’ can be said to operate. If the definition of ‘Dividend’ is extended to a loan or advance to a non-shareholder, the ordinary and natural meaning of the word ‘dividend’ is taken away. In the light of the intention behind the provisions of section 2(22)(e ) and in the absence of indication in 51 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. section 2(22)(e ) to extend the legal fiction to a case of loan or advance to a non-shareholder also, the loan or advance to a non- shareholder cannot be taxed as deemed dividend in the hands of a non-shareholder. [Para 37] The basic characteristic of dividend is a share of profits of the company given to its shareholders. Further, section 206 of the Companies Act, 1956 prohibits payment of dividend to any person other than the registered shareholder. If one was to break up the natural meaning the following components emerge (a) dividend is a share of profits of the company (b) paid to its shareholders. Section 2(22) artificially extends the scope of dividend from being more than only a distribution of profits to cover certain other types of disbursements such as loans paid etc. (the first ingredient mentioned above). It does not, however, alter the second component of its natural meaning, viz., paid to its shareholder. In other words all that section 2(22) seeks to do is to expand the various types of payments that may be regarded as dividend. The contention of the revenue that provisions of section 8(a ) created a fiction by which even payments to non-shareholders could be construed as dividend could not be accepted. Those provisions merely fix the year in which dividend has to be taxed. It is, therefore, clear that the shareholder alone can, if at all, be subjected to tax for having earned dividend. [Para 38] Further, in the event of the payment of loan or advance by a company to a concern being treated as dividend and taxed in the hands of the concern then, the benefit of set off cannot be allowed to the concern, because the concern can never receive dividend from the company which is only paid to the shareholder, who has substantial interest in the concern. The above provisions also, therefore, contemplate deemed dividend being taxed in the hands of a shareholder only. [Para 40] In view of aforesaid, it was opined that deemed dividend can be assessed only in the hands of a person who is a shareholder of the lender company and not in the hands of a person other than a shareholder. Further, the expression ‘shareholder’ referred to in section 2(22)(e ) refers to both a registered shareholder and beneficial shareholder. If a person is a registered shareholder but not the beneficial shareholder then the provisions of section 2(22)(e ) would not apply. Similarly, if a person is a beneficial shareholder but not a registered shareholder then also the provisions of section 2(22)(e ) would not apply. [Para 41] In view of aforesaid, there was no merit in appeal filed by the revenue and, therefore, same was to be dismissed. [Para 42]”
The Ld. Assessing Officer made the addition u/s 2(22)(e)
of the Act of ` 40 lakh, taken as a loan by the assessee from sister concern, SCCPL by holding that the shareholding is 52 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. more than 10%. It is undisputed fact that the assessee is not a shareholder in the sister concern (SCCPL). However, before
invoking section 2(22)(e) of the Act, it has to be established
that the same was given to the shareholder out of the accumulated profit and further it was in the nature of loan or advance. This issue has been elaborately dealt with by Hon'ble
Ltd.(supra). Thus, the deemed dividend cannot be invoked in the hands of the present assessee, resultantly, we affirm the stand of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeal).
Finally, the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
This Order was pronounced in the open court in the presence of ld. representatives of both sides at the conclusion of the hearing on 12/09/2017. (G. Manjunatha) (Joginder Singh) लेखा सद"य / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER "या"यक सद"य / JUDICIAL MEMBER मुंबई Mumbai; "दनांक Dated :-12/09/2017 f{x~{tÜ? P.S /"नजी स"चव आदेश क" ""त"ल"प अ"े"षत/Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथ" / The Appellant 2. ""यथ" / The Respondent. 3. आयकर आयु"त(अपील) / The CIT, Mumbai.
53 M/s Saturn Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. 4. आयकर आयु"त / CIT(A)- , Mumbai 5. "वभागीय ""त"न"ध, आयकर अपील"य अ"धकरण, मुंबई / DR, ITAT, Mumbai 6. गाड" फाईल / Guard file.
आदेशानुसार/ BY ORDER, स"या"पत ""त ////
उप/सहायक पंजीकार (Dy./Asstt.