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HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Appeal from Order No. 43 of 2015
The New India Assurance Company Limited ..…Appellant
Versus Shri Mahesh Kanyal and others
.… Respondents
With Appeal from Order No. 42 of 2015
The New India Assurance Company Limited ..…Appellant
Versus Smt. Nanda and others
.… Respondents
Present :
Mr. V.K. Kohli, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Kanti Ram Sharma, Advocate, for the appellant. Mr. Devesh Upreti, Advocate, for respondent No.1. Mr. Neeraj Upreti, Advocate, for respondent No.2.
JUDGEMENT
Hon’ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.
These two Appeal from Orders, preferred by the Insurance Company, are by invoking the provisions contained under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred as an “Act”), whereby they are putting a challenge to the judgement and award, as it has been rendered by the learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal / Additional District Judge, Khatima, District Udham Singh Nagar, in MACP Case No. 308 of 2012, Mahesh Kanyal Vs. Bhure Khan and others, whereby, by the impugned award of 30th September, 2014, as well as the judgment and award dated 30.09.2014, as rendered in MACT Case No. 313 of 2012, Nanda Kanyal Vs. Bhure Khan and
2 others, awarding an amount of Rs.1,38,229/- with an interest @ 7.5% payable w.e.f. 22.08.2012, i.e. date of presentation of the Claim Petition. The learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred as “the Tribunal”), had proceeded to award an amount of Rs.66,89,757/- and Rs.1,38,229/- respectively to the claimants, which has been subjected to challenge to the present Appeal from Order.
Before venturing to answer the questions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, while putting a challenge to the impugned award, some basic facts and features are required to be dealt with by this Court, while adjudicating upon these Appeal from Orders, on its own merits.
Brief fact are that in an accident, which had chanced on 31st December, 2011, at about 5:30 p.m., near village Bastia, the applicant to the Claim Petition, who was travelling in a Santro Car, bearing registration No. UA06G- 5188, is said to have met with an accident with a Canter truck, bearing registration No. UA 04E 3581. At the time, when the accidence chanced, the appellant, along with his family members and other inmates of the Car; were travelling from Shyamalatal to Khatima, and as a consequence of the accident, which has chanced on 31st December, 2011, he had suffered grievous injuries.
At the time of the accident, the applicant of the Claim Petition has submitted, that at the relevant point of time, he was of 45 years of age and was an Advocate by
3 profession, and according to the plea of income, which was accruing to him, he claims that he was earning an amount of about Rs.20,000/- per month approximately. Apart from the injuries which were suffered by the claimants, the other two co-passengers too, who travelling in the Car, were also seriously injured and they also have suffered injuries, which were medically attended, by the doctors, who were providing the medical assistance, to the injured persons of the accident.
As a consequence of an accident, an FIR No. 2 of 2012, was also got registered at Police Station Tanakpur, for commission of the offences under Sections 279, 338 and 427 of the IPC, by the offending vehicle, i.e. Canter, which is said to have dashed against the Car of the present applicant, which was an independent proceedings taken separately, which would not have any bearing on the present Appeal from Orders.
It was contended by the claimants in the Claim Petition, that owing to the nature of injuries, he would be entitled for payment of the compensation, to the tune of Rs.50 lakh, which was claimed by him, as on the date of the institution of the Claim Petition on 13th August, 2012, but, however, later on, the said quantification of the claim was got raised by the claimants, respondents, herein, the same was later on amended by the Court’s order of 29th August, 2014, by enhancing the compensation claimed from Rs.50 lakh to Rs.75 lakh.
At this juncture itself, this Court feels it apt to
4 observe, the issue about the probable enhancement of the claim of the compensation which was permitted to be carried by way of an amendment on 29th August, 2014, which is also one of the limb of arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, which will be answered in the subsequent stage of this judgment, the only aspect, which is attempted to be remarked at this stage is, that whether, at all, the appellant could put a challenge to the enhancement of the claim amount as claimed and incorporated by way of amendment of 29th August, 2014, by a judicial order and that too, particularly, when the appellant has not questioned the propriety of the amendment which was permitted to be carried in the Claim Petition.
The claimants has come up with the case, that as a consequence of the accident, which has chanced on 31st December, 2011, he had suffered major grievous injuries and has fractured D5 and D6 vertebra and had also suffered a fracture of left mastoid with flail chest and B/L Hemothorax, and as a consequence thereto, he submitted that he has suffered a permanent disablement, and in the treatment, which was carried, he has incurred an expenditure of approximately about Rs.5 lacs, and he has claimed for the compensation towards the physical pain, mental agony, the financial future loss, due to the injuries, which he has received, being rendered incapacitated for any future fruitful employment on account of the permanent disability.
The Claim Petition as filed on 13th August, 2012, and same was contested by the opposite parties to the Claim
5 Petition by filing thier respective written statement, for example, written statement being paper No. 14 Ga, which was filed on 25th October, 2010, was by the owner of the Santro Car; the written statement, being paper No. 27 Ga, which was filed by opposite party No.1, to the Claim Petition i.e. the owner of the offending vehicle i.e. the Canter, which was produced before the Court on 8th January, 2013, and the written statement of opposite party No. 2, i.e. the driver of the offending vehicle, i.e. Canter, being paper No. 28 Ga, which too, was filed on 8th January, 2013.
What would be important for consideration of this Appeal would be the stand, which has been taken by the present appellant, who was impleaded therein as opposite party No. 3 before the Tribunal, when he has filed the written statement on 18th December, 2012, being paper No. 29 Kha.
In fact, if the written statement of the present appellant, i.e. being paper No. 29 Kha; that itself is taken into consideration, primarily, at this stage, this Court feels it apt to extract the pleadings which had been raised in para 15 of the written statement towards an aspect of “exclusive negligence” or an aspect of “contributory negligence”. Para 15 is extracted hereunder:- “15. That the allegation that the alleged Canter No.U.A.-04E-3581 was rashly and negligently driven is wrong not admitted and denied. It is wrong that the alleged accident was caused on the alleged date, time and place and in the manner as alleged in the petition.
6 If it is proved that alleged accident took place, the same was caused due to sole negligence and carelessness of the alleged driver of Car No.U.A.-06G- 5188 as it appears from the pleadings of the petition and facts and circumstances narrated therein. If is a fit case of Composite Negligence and it is in the alternative. The petitioners are put to strict proof thereon.”
If para 15 is taken into consideration, in fact, it is a specific case of the appellant, that it was not the Canter, which was being driven rashly and negligently rather the burden of negligence was shifted to the driver of the Car, and which was a fact not denied by the Insurance Company in the written statement.
Apart from it, in the pleading pertaining to the aspect of contributory negligence, the solitary allegation of negligence has been attributed to the driver of the offending vehicle i.e. the Car and the plea of contributory negligence was raised as an alternative plea, in the written statement.
Apart from that, the appellant in his written statement had taken a stand, that the owner /insured, did not choose to appear in the proceedings before the Tribunal and has rather failed to contest the same and hence, in the absence of an adequate contest being given to the claim proceedings, the Claim Petition on merits could not be appropriately and effectively adjudicated.
Apart from that, the opposite party No. 3 i.e. appellant, herein, has raised a plea pertaining to the non compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 134 (c) and Section 158 (6) of the Motor Vehicle Act, as well as the effect of the provisions contained under Section 64 (v) (b) of the Insurance Act.
There have been an independent written statement, being paper No. 33 Ga, which was filed by the opposite party No. 5, to the Claim Petition, i.e. the Insurer of the Santro Car, who had attributed the entire negligence and liability, as per the pleadings raised in para 20 and 21 of the written statement to have been exclusively vested upon the offending vehicle, i.e. Canter No. UA 04E 3581, which was being driven rashly and negligently.
On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, which was exchanged between the parties to the proceedings, the learned Tribunal by its order of 12th September, 2013, had framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Ɛा िदनाँक 31-12-2011 को समय 5.30 बजे पी.एम. स्थान बİˑया, टनकपुर चɼावत राʼŌीय राजमागŊ थाना Ɨेत्र टनकपुर थाना चɼावत मŐ कैȴर नं 0 यू0ए0 04 ई0-3581 के चालक Ȫारा प्रʲगत वाहन को तेजी व लापरवाही से चलाते Šए याची महेश कɊाल की कार संƥा यू.ए. 06 जी- 5188 मŐ टſर मार दी, िजससे कार मŐ बैठे याची व उसकी पȉी व बDŽों को गʁीर चोटŐ आयीं?
Ɛा किथत दुघŊटना की िदनांक को वाहन कैȴर नं० यू०ए० 04ई0-3581 की बीमा पॉिलसी वैध थी एवं इस वाहन से सɾİɀत सभी दˑावेज वैध थे?
Ɛा किथत दुघŊटना की िदनांक को वाहन कैȴर नं० यू०ए०
8 04 ई0-3581 के चालक के पास वैध एवं प्रभावी चालन अनुǒİɑ थी?
Ɛा दुघŊटना वाहन कैȴर नं0 यू0ए0 04ई0-3581 एवं वाहन के चालक एवं वाहन कार संƥा यू.ए. 06 जी-5188 के चालकों की योगदायी उपेƗा के कारण घिटत Šई? यिद हां तो प्रभाव ? 5. Ɛा दुघŊटना के समय वाहन कार संƥा यू.ए. 06 जी-5188 के वाहन चालक के पास चालक अनुǒा पत्र व वैध प्रपत्र नहीं थे, यिद हाँ तो प्रभाव ? 6. Ɛा याची कोई प्रितकर की धनरािश प्राɑ करने का अिधकारी है यिद हाँ तो िकस िवपƗी से तथा िकतनी प्रितकर धनरािश प्राɑ करने का अिधकारी है ?”
In fact, even if the issues, which were framed on 12.09.2013, are taken into consideration, at no point of time, ever the appellant had sought a formulation of an issue of contributory negligence, or with regard to the effect of the non examination of the doctor, which has been pressed by the learned Counsel during the course of the argument of the Appeal from Order, as to what bearing will it have, for the purposes of determining the compensation payable to the claimants as raised therein. Because nothing under law prohibited the appellant, to get proper issues framed, as expected by him, by invoking Order 14 Rule 3/4 of the C.P.C..
The reason being that the proceedings before the Tribunal are Civil proceedings, which are procedurally governed by the provisions contained under Chapter-13 of the Act.
The reference to the procedure, which has been prescribed under Chapter 13, it has been specifically referred
9 by this Court, because apart from the fact, that in the absence of there being any specific pleading in the written statement pertaining to the aspect of contributory negligence in order to attract the finding to be returned by the Tribunal, and particularly, in the absence of the proper issues being got framed to the said effect, there was no prohibition as against present appellant to get an appropriate issue framed by the Court by invoking the provisions contained under Order 14 Rule 3 and 4 of C.P.C., and having not done so, and coupled with the observation, which has been made by the Tribunal in its order of 12th September, 2013, that none of the parties apart from the issues framed on 12th September, 2013, have not pressed any other issues before the Tribunal.
The question would be, that when the appellant had voluntarily, contested the proceedings of the Claim Petition No. 308 of 2012, based on the defence which had been taken by them in the written statement, i.e. paper No. 29 Kha, and particularly, when the vague assertions or the pleadings of defence were taken in the written statement, whether they could be permitted to qualify their defence at the stage, when the award is subjected to scrutiny in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Act, and can be an argument be at all pressed in the absence of pleading and evidence of contributory negligence.
Based on the aforesaid issues, the learned Tribunal has proceeded to decide the Claim Petition by the impugned award and thereby awarding the compensation as referred to above.
The matter was addressed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and he has confined his address limited from the following perspectives:-
A. That the compensation as determined to be made payable by the Tribunal could not be isolatedly fastened upon the present appellant owing to the fact that it was a case of "contributory negligence". Hence, the driver of the Santro Car was equally responsible for the accident.
B. That at the time of determination of the compensation, the learned Tribunal ought to have considered the aspect of 1/3 deduction from the quantum of compensation, to be determined to be made payable owing to the alleged preposition, that the said amount would be deemed to have been utilised by the claimant on himself and that 1/3 of the amount, which has been included in the determination of compensation, cannot be said to be a quantum which could be included towards the dependency of the claimants.
C. He further submitted that the disability certificate, which was produced before the Court below as a piece of evidence, it cannot be read in to evidence, in the absence of the Doctor being produced in the witness box to support the disability certificate, which was issued by the Doctor attending upon the claimant
11 during his treatment, as it finds place on record by way of paper No.47 Ga.
D. He submitted that the proof of income, which was produced by the claimant by way of income tax returns, that cannot be exclusively, be taken as to be a safe yardstick for the purposes of determining the income accruing to the claimants, and hence, he submitted that the quantum of compensation, which was determined by the learned Tribunal, in fact, the TDS deduction made as per the income tax document, which was placed on record was not tenable, to be taken as basis to decide the quantum of compensation.
With all due reverence at my command, I am not in league with the arguments which had been extended by the learned Senior Counsel, on all the above aspects, for the reasons to be followed hereinafter.
The logic is, that whatsoever has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel, in support of his contention in the present Appeal from Order, is even beyond his own pleadings, which were raised before the Court below and this Court even not hesitate to observe that the pleadings has been rather in absolute contravention to the records, which was placed by way of evidence before the Court below.
Apart from it, all this extensive argument, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, would not be tenable or rather it would not be open for him
12 even to argue on these issues, particularly when, a party to a litigation takes a certain defence in relation to the relief claimed in the proceedings, was not a case pressed before principal Court, which could have only been appreciated based on evidence.
The ground of defence, is a burden, which is to be discharged by the defendant by adducing evidence either documentary or oral. But, in view of what has been observed in para 11, of the impugned award, and which is not disputed in the grounds too, which has been taken in the Appeal, it reads that opposite party No. 3 therein, i.e. present appellant “had not led any oral or documentary” evidence in support of their contention.
In that eventuality, the learned counsel for the appellant cannot take the liberty to extend the scope of argument, which was not even attempted to be substantiated by him before the learned Tribunal.
Lastly, he had submitted that the Tribunal, has erred at law by not applying the principle of deduction of 1/3 of the amount from the dependency of the claimants as determined by the learned Tribunal.
This Court feels it to be appropriate to deal with all these issues independently.
Firstly, the aspect as argued is of contributory negligence. For the purposes of substantiating his argument
13 of contributory negligence, apart from the fact that in view of para 15 of the written statement, which was a plea taken as an alternative plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, before the Court below, it would not have been a defence, which would at all be substantiated by them in the absence of there being any attempt made by them before the Tribunal to establish the fact of contributory negligence, i.e. the defence, which has been sought to be pressed by the appellant for denying the payment of the compensation and its adequacy.
An aspect of contributory negligence as per opinion of this Court, it cannot be isolatedly determined exclusively based on the defence raised by way of pleadings or ground before the Appellate Court. It was required to be proved by a party to the proceedings, who draws the defence of contributory negligence.
The contributory negligence, is always an aspect, which could be determined and appreciated by the Tribunal only after producing oral or documentary evidence in support thereto before the Court below, because contributory negligence would be an aspect, which always varies, from case to case which would be depending upon the circumstances of each case. The defence of the contributory negligence, as it has been taken at an appellate stage in the absence of there being any attempt made by the appellant to establish the same before Tribunal by producing oral or documentary evidence before the Court below or even before this Court even, the appellant’s plea cannot be taken into
14 consideration, to come to a conclusion, that it was a case of contributory negligence and that too, particularly when, the learned counsel for the appellant, for the purposes of dealing with an aspect of contributory negligence has referred to the statement of PW1, which was as recorded before the Court below, particularly, while referring to para of 41 of the statement of PW1 as recorded on 20th November, 2014, which has been sought to be attracted by the learned counsel for the appellant, as if, the statement recorded therein in para 41, that itself could be logical conclusion to infer, that it is a case of contributory negligence where in the statement recorded by PW1, he has submitted that he saw the Canter coming from the opposite direction.
Merely seeing a vehicle, coming from the opposite direction and without establishing the fact by evidence whether it was head on collision or not, because there was no site plan also, which has been ever placed on record by appellant to substantiate the case, that it was a case of the contributory negligence, an exclusive statement recorded by PW1 or by PW2, who was a co passenger, who recorded his statement on 20th February, 2014, and particularly, the counsel for the appellant, when he has drawn the attention of this Court to the contents of para 7 and 8 of the statement, which is extracted hereunder:
dkj dks egs”k dU;ky pyk jgs Fksa vkSj esa viuh cxy okyh lhV ij cSBk FkkA esus dsUVj dks 8&10 ehVj dh nwjh ls vkrs gq, ns[k fy;k FkkA nq?kZVuk ....jksM+ lh/kh FkhA
15 8. gekjh dkj viuh lkbM ij Fkh dsUVj okyk pkyd foijhr fn”kk dh rjQ ls vk jgk Fkk ftlus gekjh dkj ds lkeus ls VDdj ekj nhA
In case, if the statement of PW2 is appreciated and taken into consideration, merely because he has asserted, that he has seen the canter coming from the opposite direction, having a distance of about 8 to 10 metres and without there being any other statement to the contrary made as to in what manner, the head on collision could be established by the statement made by PW2, no inference to the contrary could be drawn, that it was a case of contributory negligence and particularly, when the admitted case of the appellant in the written statement is that the aspect of contributory negligence has been taken as an alternative unsubstantiated plea. Hence, this plea of contributory negligence is turned down.
The second issue, which has been raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is, that the disability certificate, which was issued to the claimant by the Doctor attending upon him; cannot be read in evidence, for the reason being, that the doctors were not examined and hence, the certification given of the applicant of having suffered hundred percent disability, cannot be taken as to be the basis for the determination of the future disability or incapacity of the appellant from his future fruitful employment.
It is contended by the appellant, that in the absence of the document being proved by evidence on
16 record, particularly, when there was an endorsement made by opposite party No. 3, submitting thereof that the said disability certificate is not admitted, by the appellant.
At this stage itself, this Courts feels it necessary to observe that yesterday when the proceedings of the present Appeal from Order was heard, there was a pending Application No. 11105 of 2022, filed by respondents, by invoking the provisions contained under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, placing on record the disability certificate, which had been later on issued on 25th October, 2017, in fact, without there being any written objection being filed to the application, an oral objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the said document cannot be read in evidence, for the purposes of the determining the percentage of disability, which was suffered by them rendering him to be incapacitated in his future employment.
What has been harped upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant are the observations, which had been made in the earlier disability certificate on record as evidence, is from two perspectives:-
A. That though it was a certificate of hundred percent disability, which was alleged by the appellant to be not admitted in evidence by the appellant, but till, the appellant’s Counsel had referred in the note clause 1, of the disability certification referring therein “likely to improve".
B. This is being attempted to be interpreted by the learned counsel for the appellant, that as if when there is a possibility of improvement in future, the said certificate of disability cannot be read as a certificate of permanent disability certificate, rendering the claimants to be disabled for all time to come from his profitable engagement.
This plea of the appellant’s Counsel is self contradictory to his own case.
Once again, this Court is constrained to observe that the possibility of an improvement will always fall to be within an exclusive domain of determination which was to be made by the Medical Experts, on the later examination of the claimant, whose opinion cannot be substituted by the Courts and that too, without any credible material on record, by the professionals other than those of medical practitioners. The interpretation given to the terminology used in the disability certificate of “likely to improve”, merely because of by referring to that and without substantiating to prove it, to the contrary by producing any evidence at any of the stage of the proceedings, the philosophy argued pertaining to the effect of likelihood of future improvement would rather result into reduction of the determination of compensation made by the Tribunal is a fact, which is yet again not accepted by this Court, because it was an exclusive burden, which was supposed to be discharged by the appellant in the proceedings which were held before the Court below, which he has not
18 discharged, so in the light of the observations made in para 11 of the impugned judgement.
This issue is also required to be dealt with in the context of the argument extended by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the disability certificate, which was endorsed, to be not accepted by the appellant, could not have been read in evidence in the absence of the doctor being produced before the Court below.
First of all, this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is not accepted, for the reason being, that the disability certificate, which has been issued bearing No. 1/49/2012 dated 24th July, 2012, in fact, it was a certificate, which was issued by Medical Board, who had examined the claimants and later on, the said decision and the determination of the disability owing to the injuries, which was an aspect, which has been dealt with therein, that it is traumatic paralysis (spinal injuries), the same was countersigned by the Medical Superintendent of the Government Hospital, Khatima. Hence, there is no valid reason to disbelieve the disability certificate issued by the Medical Board.
Hence, since the opinion of disability has been expressed by the Medical Experts, and Medical Board’s opinion, no second view can be taken to the document, particularly when, if at all, the appellant attempts to controvert, its content and that too in the absence of he discharging his responsibilities to prove certificate otherwise.
So far as the argument of the appellant is concerned, qua the acceptance of the disabilities certificate, to be read in evidence, in the absence of the Doctors being produced in the witness box to be examined, in support of their contention, supporting the contents of the medical documents, in fact, the learned counsel for the respondents had drawn the attention of this Court to the statement recorded by PW9, i.e. Dr. H.S. Kaithait, who had appeared in the witness box and who recorded his statement on 31st July, 2014, fortifying the fact, particularly the statement, which has been recorded in para 4 and in para 14 and 15 of the statement. He has rather fully supported the nature of injuries which was suffered. He has supported 100% disability certificate, which was issued by the Medical Board. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, that in the absence of the doctor having been examined, the medical certificate cannot be exclusively read in evidence is not tenable, to be accepted at this appellate stage, and that too particularly, when the burden was not discharged by the appellant to prove it to the contrary.
The next question, which was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is qua the plea of 1/3rd deduction, which was required to be made by the Tribunal, while determining the compensation, on the ground, that one third deduction has to be made for the purposes of assessment of compensation, as to be a factum of an amount, which was involved and would be deemed to be utilized for
20 the self use of the claimants and it will not fall to be a part of dependency by the claimant.
This argument is being impressed upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in the light of the judgement reported in (2017) 5 SCC 79, Shivakumar M. Vs. Managing Director, Bengaluru Metropolitan Transport Corporation, wherein, particularly, he has drawn reference to para 6 of the said judgement, which is extracted hereunder:-
“6. In the absence of any serious dispute on the part of the respondent on the avocation and income, we are of the view that the Tribunal and for that matter the High Court should have accepted the evidence of the appellant. Therefore, we assess his monthly income as Rs.15,000/- and after deducting one third towards his personal expenses, the income will be assessed for the purpose of computation of compensation as Rs.10,000/- per month. The income is substituted as Rs.10,000/- in the place of Rs.6,500/- , as assessed by the High Court. The compensation will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the claim petition before the Tribunal. Rest of the award is maintained.”
This case too was a case of injuries, wherein the disability, which was assessed by the doctors was 81% disability of the limb and the whole body disability as only 24.3% and doctor has certified therein as to be an overall disability of 40%, and it was in that eventuality, where the
21 disability was assessed to be a total 40% disability of the whole body, it was under those factual context, the Court in its para 6, has observed that there has had to be a deduction of 1/3 of the amount, because the scope of engagement owing to the percentage of disability suffered by the claimant, was not grievous enough that will disentitle him to be engaged in future engagement.
This principle, with all due reverence at my command, is not the rationale ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, as it would not be a judgment in rem, but it would be a judgment in persona, depending upon the facts of the said case and the logic is not to accept the principle of deduction is that in the instant case as already observed while dealing with the aspect of disability, it is a case of 100% disability and the effect of plea of a likelihood of future progress in improving the condition, is only a hypothetical basis, which is not being established in the instant case, and hence, the co-related deduction, where disability of 40% has been attempted to be read in consonance to the hundred percent disability of the present appellant, the said principle will not be applicable in the instant case.
The learned counsel for the appellant has yet again referred to another judgement as reported in 2005 (2) T.A.C. 297, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Charlie and another, where the learned counsel for the appellant has made reference to para 5, in relation to substantiate his case with regard to the principles of 1/3 of deduction and he has
22 drawn attention of this Court to the contents of para 5 of the said judgement, which is extracted hereunder :-
“5. What would be the percentage of deduction for personal expenditure cannot be governed by any rigid rule or formula by universal application. It would depend upon circumstances of each case. In the instant case the claimant was nearly 37 years of age and was married. Therefore, as rightly contended by learned Counsel for the appellant, 1/3rd deduction has to be made for personal expenditure.”
In fact, if the observation, which had been made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgement is taken into consideration, it was only a contention, which was being dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court, but it was rather not a ratio mandating 1/3 deduction, invariably to be applied in all the cases, irrespective of the involved different facts and circumstances, and since the observation in para 5 relied by the appellant is only a discussion of a case developed by the parties to the proceedings and since it not being a ratio, it cannot be universally made applicable, to envisage the concept of 1/3 deduction to be made even in those cases of permanent disability, as it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Raj Kumar.
In response to the argument, extended pertaining to the expected 1/3 deduction, the learned counsel for the respondents had referred to a judgement as reported in (2011) 1 SCC 343, Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and another, and particularly, he has referred to the observation which has
23 been made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its para 9, which is extracted hereunder:-
“9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%.”
The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgement of Raj Kumar (Supra), where it was also a case of 100% disability, as observed in para 9 of the said judgement, has laid down that the aspect of determination of compensation in para 19 and 27, as to what would be the safe parameters to determine the compensation in the cases, where
24 the claimants had suffered a permanent disability with the reference to the whole body, wherein, it has been observed, that it cannot be assumed to be a disability, which could be developed or recovered later on, and hence, denying the compensation by making, the expected deductions as claimed by the appellant herein, was held not be sustainable.
Rather the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 19 and 27 of the judgement, which is extracted hereunder, has observed that the injured claimant, who has suffered a disability of 100% affecting his future loss of earnings, to the claimant, there is no need to deduct one-third or any other percentage of deduction out of the income accruing to the injured person. Para 19 and 27 are extracted hereunder :- “19. We may now summarize the principles discussed above :
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as percentage of permanent disability).
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured-claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.
25 (iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors. ........
In the case of an injured claimant with a disability, what is calculated is the future loss of earning of the claimant, payable to claimant, (as contrasted from loss of dependency calculated in a fatal accident, where the dependent family members of the deceased are the claimants). Therefore there is no need to deduct one-third or any other percentage from out of the income, towards the personal and living expenses.”
Apart from the aforesaid ratio, this Court is of the view that in the cases of grievous injuries, resulting into 100% disability, the aspect of exclusion of personal expenditure to the extent of 1/3 of the income, it cannot be universally made applicable in all the cases of accident, where claim is raised on account of injury suffered, because 1/3 deduction is not required to be made in those cases, where the victim is survived in an accident, because that amount of 1/3 alleged deduction, would still continue to be an expenditure, which he will have to incur for the purposes, of his existence to meet out his personal needs of day to day life.
In fact, if the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar (Supra), is taken into consideration, particularly, in the light of the observation made in para 9, 19, and 27, which has to be compositely read and which was in correlation to the cases of 100% disability,
26 the principle of deduction as envisaged and relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in the light of the judgment of Raj Kumar (Supra) as well as that of a judgement rendered in 2005 (2) TAC 297, The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Charlie and another, the same would not be applicable, where the person survives after the accident, and had suffered with a hundred percent disability.
At this stage, this Court feel it to be apt to refer to the additional evidence, which has been placed on record by the learned counsel for the appellant, by filing the Application No. 11105 of 2022, along with the disability certificate No. 202/2017, as it was later issued on 25th October, 2017, which has been orally opposed by the learned counsel for the appellant.
In fact, if this certificate of disability is to be taken into consideration by exercising my powers under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, this is a certificate, which has been yet again issued by the Medical Board, which was duly endorsed by the Chief Medical Officer, wherein, on a later examination, which as per the earlier disability certificate on record, which was supposed to be conducted after the lapse of 5 years, where there was an observation made that there is “likelihood of improvement” in future, in fact, in the subsequent disability certificate, which has been issued by the Medical Board and after the medical examination, which was expected to be conducted on the claimant after the lapse of 5 years, as per the certificate of 24th July, 2012, the certificate of 25th October, 2017, observes that the nature of
27 injuries and 100% disability, which has been suffered by the claimant is a physical impairment, which is “not likely to improve in future”.
Hence, for the purposes of deciding the present Appeal from Order, the propriety of the disability certificate and in the context in which it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant by drawing the implications of the observations made of the “likelihood to improve”, has been rather qualified on the subsequent physical examination, which was conducted after 5 years of the earlier disability certificate, as per the observations made in Clause 2 of certificate of 24th July, 2012, and subsequent certificate would have to be read rationally for the purposes of deciding the present Appeal, which has not been opposed by the appellant to read in appeal, where on a later medical examination, it was observed that not likely to improve, meaning thereby, in that view of the matter, the judgement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Raj Kumar (Supra), will come into play for its consideration, where the 1/3 deduction has been denounced not to be made, where there is a future loss of earning for all times to come due to the sufferance of 100% disability.
Thus, this prospect, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is not accepted by this Court, that there has had to be a 1/3 percentage of deduction from the income of the claimant for the purposes of determining the compensation even in the cases of 100% disability, where the victim to the accident had survived.
The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the document, which was produced by the claimant for the purposes of proving the income accruing to the claimant by placing on record the income tax returns, which was submitted by him. He contended that, in fact, TDS deductions, were not taken into consideration while rendering the impugned award by the learned Tribunal, qua the income tax returns, which was filed as evidence, by the claimant before the Court below, to substantiate the income accruing to the claimant.
Yet again, this Court is forced upon to reiterate the observations made above. A. It is not a case which was ever attempted to be developed in the written statement;
B. It is not a case, which has been attempted to be proved based on evidence to the contrary adduced by the appellant; C. It was not a case, which was even pressed by him before the Tribunal by formulation of an appropriate issue, and in that eventuality, he cannot develop a new case altogether at an appellate stage, in the absence of there being any attempt made in the proceedings before the Court below to draw a finding pertaining to the alleged concept of deduction of the TDS to be made from the income tax certificate, which was placed on record before the Court below.
Reverting back to the principal issue pertaining to
29 the scrutinisation of the award rendered by the Court below, in fact, the finding, which has been recorded by the learned Tribunal on the issues had been quite elaborately dealt with, by the Tribunal and both the documentary and oral evidence, and particularly, the observation, which has been made pertaining to the disability certificate in para 13 of the judgement, where the Court has examined PW3 Sandeep Singh, the Medical Record Technician, whose statement was supported by the statement of PW9 Dr. H.S. Kathait, supporting the disability certificate, and that too, this disability will have to be read in consonance to the disability certificate filed with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, which had not been opposed by the appellant in writing.
Coming to an aspect of contributory negligence, establishment of contributory negligence, which always happens to be a variable factor, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, under which, the accident has chanced would always be a factor which is required to be established by the parties to the proceedings, who takes a defence of contributory negligence, to deny the liability upon the person taking a defence of the contributory negligence. Here, since merely by extracting the statement recorded by co-passengers about the vehicle being seen coming from the opposite direction will in itself will not be an exclusive conclusion, to reach to a plausible conclusion of the aspect of contributory negligence.
Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any
30 merit in the Appeal from Order. The Appeal from Order is accordingly dismissed.
The amount, if any, deposited by the appellant in compliance of the interim order passed by this Court would be disbursed to the claimants and the Registry is also directed to remit the statutory deposit made by the appellant at the time of filing of the Appeal to the Tribunal, which in turn, would be ensured to be remitted to the claimant, as a consequence of the today's judgement.
Hence, for the reasons aforesaid, the Appeal from Order fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.
The connected Appeal from Order No. 42 of 2015, would too stand disposed for, for the reason already assigned in the above judgement.
(Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.)
21.07.2022 Shiv