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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Judgment Delivered on: April 20, 2011 + LPA No. 316 Of 2011 IPS College of Education Research & Technology .....Appellant Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate. Versus National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. Respondents Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh Kumar, Advocates. CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA Whethr reporters of the local papers be allowed to see the judgment? YES To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES 3 Whçther the judgment should be reported in the Digest? YES DIPAK MISRA,CJ For orders, see LPA 242/2011. CHIEF JUSTICE APRIL 20, 2011 pk SANJIV KHANNA, J. Digitally Signed By:AMULYA Certify that the digital file and physical file have been compared and the digital data is as per the physical file and no page is missing. Signature Not Verified
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DElHI AT NEW DFLffl Judgment Delivered on: April 20 2011 +1. LPA No. 242 Of 2011, Saheed Capt. DJK. .Khola College of Education ..... .Appellant Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawa.t, AdVocate. Versus National Council for Teacher Education & Ani. ......Respondents Thiough Mi Mayank Manish wil Li M Amitch IKurnar, Advocates. 2 LPA No. 243 Of 2011 •. Kalparia Chawla College of Education for Women & Ors. . ......Appellants • . Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate. • Versus • National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. :..: Respondents Thiough Mi Mayank Manish with Mi Aimlesh • . .• . . Kumar, Advocates. 3: • LPA No. 313 Of 2011 • • LB. Women College of Education &.Management ..... .Ape11ant • . Through: Mr.Sanjay.Sharawa;t, Adyocate. Versus . Nadnal Council for Teacher Education & Aur. ....... .Respondents Through: Mr.Mayarik Mnish withMrAntitesh Kumai, Advocates LPA 24212011 with conected matters • . page 1 of 50
4 No; 314 Of 201 IPS SchQol of Management and Education .... Appellant Tlrough: Mr. Sanjay Sharawit, Advocate. Versus National Council for Teachei Education & Am Respoi-iderils
Through: Mr.Mayank Manish wi!;h Mr.AmiLesh Kumar,Advocaes. LPA No. 315 Of 2011 IP College of Education Appellant Through Mi Sanjay Shaiawat, Advocate Veisus • Naiona1 Council for Teacher Education & Anr. Respondents Through: Mr.Mayank Maiish with M.r.Amitesh Kumar, AdvOcates. • PA No. 316 Of 2011 . S IFS College of ducaon Research & Technology Appeilat Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawt, Advocate. S • •• Versus • . • • National Council for Thacher Education & Anr. .....Respobdents Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Arnitesh • .• Kumar, Advocates. 7 LPA No 318 Of . 2011 Shanfi Niletn College of Education & Ors. Appellants S • Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advocate. • •, • Versus • • • S • • National Council for Teachr Education & Ani. Résondents Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr .Amitesh S Kumar, Advocates. LPA 24212011 with connected matters • page 2 of SO
LPA No. 320 Of 2011 Rao Kehär Shgh Elementary Instite of Education & Am Appellant.s Through: Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, Advoc.at.e. Versus National Council for Teacher Education & Am Respondents Through: Mr.Mayartk Manish with Mr.Amitesh IKumar, Advocates. . 9.: LPA No 358 Of 2011 Rao Udmi Ram Memorial ,ollege of Education . . .. Appe11ait Through.: Mr.Raj K. Ruhil and Mr.Vivek 1\4alik, Advocates. Versus • National Codncil for Teacher Education & Anr. .....Respondd.nts Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Athitesh * Kumar, Advocates. . 10. LPA No 359 Of 2011 B M P College of Education Appellant. Though Mi Raj K. Ruhil and Mi Vivek Mahk, . Advocates. . .• Versus . National Council for Teacher Education & Anr. Respondents • •. . .. Through: Mr.Mayank Manish with Mr.Amitesh Kumar, Advocates. CORAM: . • . HON'BIJE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANIIVKHANNA 1 Aether reporters of the local papers be allowed to see the judgmeit? YES • . . To be referred to the Reporter or not? • YES • • 3 • Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? YES LPA 24212011 with connected motters page 3' of 50
Not for nothing it has been said, frainhg is the first foundation of life and bettei than an abstiact concept Tiatning is fundamentally governed by reason *hich is tested on the touchstone of logic and rational acceptubility. It distafces itself from desire, habitual disobedience and unfettered feelings. in a cultured society which is governed by Rule of :Law, the coimnnd of law is an imperative prescription. The coll.edive at large is assured, of what is just and right. It ostacises any reason based on ignorance as 'well as pretence. It does not countenance any allowance to any deviation or artificially contrived path. In a State where the Rule of 'Lawis supreme, it is not expected to have any kind of conflict and hazard which is hostile 'to it. Warren E. Burgern, in one of his addresses, had spoken thus - "Rule of law places restraints on individtials and on goverents alike. This is a delicate, a fragile balance to maintain. It is fragil because it is sustained otily by an ideal that requires each person in sociely, by an exercise of free will, to accept and abide the iestrain±s of:. a structure of laws." . 2 It is apt to note here that sometimes, some individuals. and a t other . times, some institutions, managed . by individuals, scandalise the role atfri.bited to them for imparting education and training. Sometimes, as the factual exposé would uncurtain, the private institutions, which impart training to the students who, in turn, become teachers and teach the students, endeaVour, to create a state of instability in the name 'of Rule of LPA 24212011 with conhected matters page 4 of 50
Law. One may not be very much wrong if it is called inadacy and • starvation of intellect;. One is reminded. of the saying that if one is totally truthfii, he shall always be coura-eous and not labour .hard to take • recourse to the over-stretched concepts and unnecessary labyrinths, of interpretation. . . . I. The . question, a pivotal and a spinal one, that arises for dtern'ination in this batch of aipeals is whether the stand, and stance .ssi.duously pyramided.by the appellants to the extent that the Northern Regional Comiñittee (NCR) constituted. by the Central Council under the National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 (for brevity 'the Act') is 4f), devoidcof power and authority to carry any inspection after the recognition is .graned under Section 14 of the Act, or whether the submission of the NCTE that the Act was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the establishment of a National Council for Teachers Education: with a view to achieving planned land coordinated development of the teachOrs educa Lion system throughoUt the Countly, the regulation and proper ntain.tenance of noims and standards in teacheis education system and for matteis :• connected therewith, an, therefore, the power of inspection has to be an 'integral part of the schethe of SectiOn 17 of the Act. 4 The pioposition that has been canvassed by the institutions • . , un.damentally is that once the Regional Committee grants .recognitlon, it • , •
has no power to do anything relating to inspection as • the powei page 5 of 50
LIM excfusively vests with the National Council for the same and,, Lherefore, any actioi for inspection by the Regiona.i Committee is. [ota.lIv sans th.e authority of law and deserves to be lanc,eted in exerd,s.e of irther0ri jurisdiction of this Court. The proponement of NCTE is that the • . . friterpretation that is placed by the 'institutions exposes a d.i.ftirhing phenomenon that corrbdes the tharrows of the educational institLitlions which, are 'concerned with imparting education to the sucients who, in. turti, become teachers and eventually the system of education is slaughtered or throwh to the abysmal depth so that the term "teaching", as is understood in the 'proper paradigm, would lose importance, for a vicious atmosphere is delibeiately cieated 5. ' The aforesaid confroversy, as we proceed with our deliberations, shall gradually. get unfurled and uncurtained. We may note with profit that regard beirig had to the commonality of issue involved in these appeals, they are dispos.d by a singulai order. For the sake.of clarhy and convenience, the facts in LFA No.242/2011 arising out of order claed 28.2.20,11 passed by the learned Singie'Judge in W..P.(C) No.9703/2009 are exposited'hereiri.
The appellant, Saheed Capt. D.K. Khola College of Education, was granted recognition by the National Council for Teacher Educatioti (for 'short '.NCTE')' and its functionaries, for conducting four courses, namely, B Ed, B Ed [Add], D Ed and M Ed, in the year 2007-2008 The lecognilion LPA 24212011 with connected matters ' page 6 of 50 .. '
(9 for each course was granted by the respondents after conducting itispection each. time and after duly verifying the availability of the •requisite infrastructural and instructional facilities. The affiiiatio:n was • granted by the University after due inspection and the appellant iris I fitut ion was ubject to nuilaerous inspections before affiliation was granted. On 4.6.2009, the NCTE conducted inspection of the appellant institution under Section 13 of the Act. Thereafter, the respondent No.2, namely, Northern Regional Committee (for short 'NRC'), desired to conduct inspection of the appellant and constituted an inspection. tea.ri.. When the appellant institition got the information about the inspection, a request was made to defer the date. That apart,.it was also stated that NCTE had already conducted the inspection under Section 13 of the Act. On 4.6.2009, a show cause hotice was issued under Section 17 of the Act • • purporting to withdraw the recognition of the appellant in respect of all courses on the ground that the inspecting team was not allowed to conduct the inspection. Thereafter, the appellant submitted its reply a.ncireuested • • the NRC that it was open 10 inspection any time. Despite the sid request, C the NRC withdrew the recognition of the appellant in respect of all • courses. • 7. Being dissatified with the said order, the appellant preferred the writ petition challenging the power of the Regional Committee to conduct inspection of any recognized institution after recognition is granted. undei the Act. It wa contended before the learned Single Judge that the
Regional Connttee does not have the powor under Section 17 of the Act \ry or under any other provision of the Act, Rules and Regulat:ions to conduct an inspection once the recognition is granted by it. It was urged that the Regional Committee is a subordinate body which exercises limited, powers • utider Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the Act being a nodal regulatory body of NCTE and, herige, ouid not have thought of inspecting the institution. The further stad was when there is an express conferment of power on the Council, the tegional coirnittee cannot assume the said power and inspect the instihition for the reasoti that if a statute rquires .i particular thin.g to be done in a particular maniner, the same shall be done in 'tha t • maru-ler 'or not done at all. It was also put.forth that the doctrine of implied power does not get attracted while interpreting Section 17 of the Act. • 8. A counter affidavit was filed, by the repondents cortending, inter alia, that the Regional Committees have been empowered to grant recognition and 'permissions to the institutions desirous of conducting teachers training courses and the power also rests with the Regional Committees to derecognize a particular institution inder Section 17 of the Act which provides for contravention of the provisions of. the Act and consequences thieof. The stand that there is no provision in Section 17 for' 'causing inspection is totally devoid of substance inasmuch as the Regional Conimitee, on its own motiOn, or on any representation received from any • person, on being satisfied that any institution has contravened any of the provisions of the Ads 01 the Rules, Regulations, Oideis made or issued LPA 24212011 with connected hatters • . , , , • page 8 of 50 'I
thereuider, or any conditions subject to which recognition under sub- sectin (3) of Section 14 or permission under sub-section (3) of Section 15 was gianted, may withdiaw iecognthon of such iecognized instiftition for : easo1s to be recorded in writing. The satisfaction can be arrived at by causinginspection of the institutionby a team consitirig of professionals / experts in the field who, after inspection, submit their report which is ultimately considered by the Regional Committee before proceeding further in terms of the procedures laid down under Section 17 of the Act. If the Regional Committee without inspection would arrive at a conclusion that the recognition granted is to be withdrawn, the said proccdure can be termed as arbitrary. The inspction is caused in the interest of the instjtution and the purpose of inspectiot is for fair àsscssment and • objective satisfaction. 9: it was centended that the writ petition had beeti preferred to preempt and prevent the NCTE and NRC from going ahead with the process of inspection in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Iules and Regulations fratued thereunder. A recogrdzed institution can. \(> neither deny for obstruct the NRC from causing inspection for .sceitaining as to whether the institution concerned is complying with the povisions of the Act and the Regulations framed therdunder. The assertion that casing of an hspection tatamounts to coercive action is devoid. of any substance and, in fact, it is an Act of preemption from conducting an inspection. There is no right irthered as claimec in the writ LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 9 of 50
\ pefitioh and, therefore; the question of infringement of the.same toes not arise. It is urged that when the Regional Committee intended to cause inspection, the institutions held a. large demonstration outside the offic of the NCTE. Headquarters at New Delhi and about hundred persns barged into the room of the Chair Person of NCTE .and started thumping the table and made wild gestures against him. They wanted an assurance that NCTE. / NRC would not go ahead. The situation became vëry tense and the aiithorities were constrained to report the matter to the police authorities for lodging an FIR against the persons concerned. A..copy of the complaint dated 16.6.2009 written by the Under Secrety to the SHO, I.P. Estate .Polie Statipu was brought on record as Annexue R-2. h was put forth that the institution had already been inspected by, the expert committee constituted by the NRC on 2.7.2009 and submitted its report to the NRC and the NRC, after considering the reports, issued sho' cause notice on 4.8.2009 under Section 17 of the Act and the reply to the same was awaited. 10 . if was the stand in the return that the power of withdrawal as engrafted under Section 17 of the Act empowers the NRC to iiitiate the pic'cess for ascertaining whether a particular institution is complying with the prbvisions. of the Ad and the provisions framed thereunder and, the Regional Committee may initiate such a process either on its own tion or on a representation made by any person. It was also put forth that the same is done so that tlire is no hraction of the statutory' provisions and
further to erLsure that the provisions of the Act, the Rules, Regulations and the norms are appropriately followed. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the writ petition, the NRc, in its 155th meeting held from 23rd to 25'' January, 2010, decided to withdraw the recognition of the appellants in respect of all the three courses and pursuant to the said decisibn, the NRC passec[ a formal order of withdrawal of recognition of all the three courses vide Amexure A-13. A corrigendum was issued by the NRC on 26.2.2010 deciding to keej the oder of withdi'hwai of recognition of the appellants in abeya±ice till the outcome of the writ petition which has been pending before the learned Single Judge. At this juncre, we may reproduce the question c posed by the learned Single Judge: "Whether under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, the Regional Committee has any power to inspect an Institution granted tecognition under the said Act or whether the power of suh • inspection is only with the Council constitution under the said Act." After posing the said question, the learned Single Judge referred to 'various provisions of the Act and certain decisions in the field and carrie to holci that the contentions of the writ petitioner did not deserve acceptance and the inspection by the Regional Committee could not be faulted because of lack of authority as the said Committee has the power to mspect the insttutionto which recog1tition has been granted. LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 11 ofSO
We have heard Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, learned counsel for the ppellthit, and Mi Mayank Manish with Mr,Amitesh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents. Mr. Sharawat, learned counsel for the appellant ha raised the • following contentions: (a) When the language of the piovision is cleai and unambiguous, it was unwarranted On the part of the learned Single Judge to incorporate sornetling which is not tjere in Section 17 and thereby entred into the field of legislation. (h) Under the scheme of the NCTE Act, there are two statutory bodies, • . namely, the Central Council and the Regional Committee. The Council is the nodal regulatory body entrusted with, vast functions. and powers under Sections 12, 13, 18 and 32 of the Act which is the heart and soul of the state and responsible for laying clown th J norms and standards and ensuring for their coiplianceand further • the power to conduct . inspection is conferred expres1y upon the Council under Sectibn 13 and this power is available to the Council. alone and can be exercisedaftèr recognition has been granfed to the institions. There is no other provision in.the Act which speaks of • • • • inspection and, hence, the post-recognition inspection would lie • • with the Central Council. The said legislative intent i clear, nianifest and unambiguous and, hence, the learned Single Ju dge has clearly erred in his interpretation.of Section 17 of the Act. . \6 •LA 24212011 with connected matters : • • poge 12 of 50
Section 31 of the Act confrs power on the Central Government to make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act and there is a specific provision in subsection (e) under which the rules are requiied to be framed for the purpose of regulating the power o'f inspecon mer Secon 13. lJnder Section 32 of then 4ct, NCTE is vested, with the powers to frame regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act and none of the provision.s confer any power on the Central Goverment or the NCTE to frame rules or regulaons for conferment of power on' the Regional Committee relating to post recognition inspection., When the power is absent in Section 17, the doctrine of implied power cannot be implanted into it inasmuch as the said doctTine can only be invoked in cases where when an Act confers jurisdiction to do a pait'iculai thing, it also conleis, by implication, the powei of doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary for its execution. The said doctrine can legitimately he invoked when it is found' that the duty has been imposed or the power conferred on an authority by a statute and it is furtheT found that the duty cannot he discharged or the power cannot be exercised • . 'unfes some auxiliary or incidental ppwer. is presumed to exist. When the learned Single Judge has not opined that it is ibsoiuLeiy essential that the 'Regional Committee must possess power to conduct iispection of recozed institutions in order to effectively LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 13 of 50
discharge its statutory obligation, to implant such power in the language of Section 17 of the Act causes violence to the basic tenets of statutoty interpretation. The learned Single Judge has erred in holding that a stafti tory body, i.e.,. regulatory in character, has to be given full play and, hence, to • be held to be empowered to do all things necessary to enable it to • effectively regulate what it has been constituted to regulate though the concept of invocation of herent power by a statutory body is 'ui<nown to law. The NCTE Act is a self-contained code and expressly deals with all • aspects fbr. regulating teacher education system in the country and, af.ter grant of recognition, the Regional Committee does not have any power to conduct inspection in order to ascertain whether the said institution is complying with the provisions of the Act or not. The recognition of an institution can be withdrawn. strictly in accordance with the express provisions of the Act 'which has been spelt out in SectLion 17 of the Act and the words used underSection 17 are capable of ordy singular interpretation and, hence, t.he interpretation placed by the learned Single Judge is absolu t:ely unacceptable. The learned Single Judge by the order impugned maae...an effort to • . • supply the statutory omission which is not permissible. The order of the learned Single Judge suffers from incurable infirmity as he J.m,s LPA 24212011 wi/i connected matters . . • page 14. of 50
\cl • . . ndeavoured to p'erceive a coilict between two provisions in a stainte and harmonise them to bring in consistency though there is no inconsistency in the provisions. That apart, when the provisions are absolutely plain, clear and unambiguous, the interpretation should have been placed regard being had to be language employed. (h) The learned Single Judge misinterpretated SectiOn 20(6) of the Act to come to the conclusion that the Central Council can assign certain powers to the Regional Comrnittee in addition to the functions which are given under Sections 14, 15 and 17 but the statutory authorities are required to function within the staintoy, framework and there cannot be conferral of additional power which travels beyond the statutory parameters. That apart, when the legislature • has vested the power with a superior body, the said power canaot be carried out by a subordinate body, that is, the Regional Coimnittee. The learned counsel for the appellant, to bolster the aforesaid dontentions, has placed reliaice on number of citations to a 'few of which we shall ref er.td while dwelling upon the fundamental issues. • 15; Mr.', Mayànf Mahish1 learned counsel for the respondents, per- contra; has propoundedthe following contentions: (1) The term. 'Council' which has been defined in the dictionary clause Secon 1(c) to mean National Council for Teacher Education as per Sction 3(1) of the Act has to be read in a comprehensive.manner to LPA 24212011 with connected matte/-s page 15 of 50
• cover Regional Committee as the Regional Committees are constituted and established by the Council. Section 2(1) clef i.ns reçogtiize institution to mean an institution recognized by the Council under Section 14 and, therefore, the term 'Council' cannot be re.sicted to the Cenfral Council as is contended by the learned • . counsel for the appellant. (ii). Section 17 of the Act empowers the Regional Committee to . . withdraw the recoition if thereis conavention of the provisions of the Act and, hence, it would be totally incompatible and absurd if • . .. it is interpreted that the inspection has to be done only by the National council after the Tecognition is granted. (iii) Sections 13, 14, 15 and 17 are to be read in a purposive manner to give effect to and to. carry on the purposes of the Act and not to create impedimnt. (iv). Section 20(6) empowers the Rgiona1 Committee to perform such other functions as may be determined by the Regulations and, therefore, to deny the said authority the power of inspection once it 'had granted recoition is wholly inconceivable and, therefore, the interprettion placed by the learned counsel for the appellant is unaccëptble. (v) Section 21 of the Act empowers the Council to terminate the Regional Committee and to reconstitute the Regional..' Committee and till the Committe is in existence, it is inappropriate to hold that LPA 242/2011 Mth connected matters page 16 of 50
the said Committee, despite being its original character, ca:i.not carry out an inspetion and become a sileit spectator. The reliahce on Section 31(e) is a procedural one ttnd does not compete or cannot be allowed to compete with the substantive power conferred on the Regional Committee under Section 17 of the Act. If is difficult to thi1K of a si.tion wherein only the National • Council can inspect and not the Regional Committee. On the contrary, it would be apposite to construe that despite inspection by • the Reionl Conmiittee, the National Council can also proceed for inspection foi the purpose of achieving planned and coordinated • developi±tent of the teacher education system and n.ay i:ecommend for implementation of certain aspects or to take appro1Tiate action as required; There may be a situation when the Regional Committees are disbandedor terminated, and then the Council can carry on the inspedion. To apprepiate the rival submissions raised at the bar, it is necessary to sean the anatomy of the Act Section 2(c) defines 'Council' as follows "(c) "Council" means the National Council for Teacher Education etablished uPder sub-section (1) of section 3;" Section 2(1) defines 'recognised institution' as follows: • F "(1) "iecognised institution" means an institution recognised by the Council under section 14;" ItA LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 17of5O
411/ • 18. Section 2) defines "Regional Committee" as follows:: "(j) 'Regional Committeç" means a committee established under section 20;" 19.. Section 3 which occurs in Chapter II deals with the etablishment of the.Council. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 reads as follows: "3 (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government hlay, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint there shall be established a Council to be called the Natiohal Council for Teacher Education." 20. Section 12 deals with the functions of. the Council. The said Irbvision, being relevant, is reproduced below: "12. FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL • It:hall be the duty of the Council to take all such steps as • it may think fit for ensuring planned and qo-odinated dec1opment of teacher education and for the determination and maintenance of standards for teacher education and for the purposes of performing its functions under this Act, the Council may - undertake surveys and studies relating to various • aspects of teacher education and publish the result thereof; make recortimendations to the Central and State Government, Universities, University Grants Commission and recognised institutions in th ixiatter of • preparation of suitable plans and programmes in the field of teacher education; co-ordinate and monitor teacher education and its development in the country; • lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualifications for a person to be employed as a teacher in schools or in recognised institutions; • (e) lay down norms for any specified oategory of courses or trainings in teacher education, including the minimum LPA 242/2011 with coaaected matters page 18 of 50
eligibility criteria for admission thereof, and the method of selection of candidates, duration of the course, course contents and mode of curriculum;. lay down guidelines, for conpliance by recognised institutions, for starting new cOurses or training,and for providing physical and . instructional facilities., 'staffing pattern and staff qualifiation; lay, down standards in respect of examinations lead:ing to teacht education qualifications, criteria for admission to such examinations and schemes of courses or tiaining; lay, down guidelines regarding tuition fees and other fees chargeable'by recognised institutions; (i). promote and conduct innovation and research ii11
various areas of teacher education and dissemiiate the result's thereof; 'examine and review periodically the implementation of the norms, guidelines and standards laid down by the Council, and to suitably advise the recognised institution; evolve suitable performance appraisal systen, norms and ' mechanism for enforcing accountability on reoognised institutions; '(1) "formulate schemes for 'various levels of , teacher education and identify recognised institutions and set up new iustitutions for teacher development programmes; (m) take all necessary steps to prevent commerciaiisation of teacher educatioi; and . (n)..perform such other functions as may be entrusted to it by the Central Government. ' l. On a perusal of Section 12, it is clear as crystal that the statute casts a duty on the Council to take all such steps as it may thiic fit for ensuring. planned and coordinated development of teacher education' and for determination and 'maintenance of standards for teacher education. The rp page 19 of SO
Council has been authorized by the Act to do certain things which are • basically in the realm of policy decisions. It is also recpiired to iJrevent commcrcialisati.on of teacher education and to carry out such 'functions as entrusted,to it by the Central Government. 22. Section 13, which deals with inspection, reads as follows: "13. INSPECTION For the purpose of ascertaining, whether the reeonised institutions are functioning in accordance with the provision of this Act, the Council may cause inspection of any such institution, to be made by. such person as it may direct, and in such manner as may be prescribed. The Council shall communicate to the institution the date on which inspection under sub-section (1) is to be made and the institution shall be entitled to be associated with the inspectiOn in such manner as may be prescribed. The Council shall communicate to the said institution, its views in regard to the results of any such inspection and may, after ascertaining the opinion of that institution, recommend to that institution the action to be taken as a result of such inspection. (4). All. communications to the institution imder this section shall be made to the executive authority thereof, and the executive authority of the institution shall report to the,Council the action, if any, which is proposed to be taken for the purposes of implementing any such S recommendation as is referred to in sub-section (3)." • ;:' • 23. The learned counsel for the appellant has laid emphasis on the aforesaid provision to highlight that the Council alone is empowered to cause an inspection for the purposes of ascertaining whether the recogHzed institutions are 'fttnctioning in accordance with the provisions of the Act and, therefore, no other authority has the power to cause inspection after the LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 20 of 50 • •
institution is recognized. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) to Section 13, submits the learned counsel for the appellant, basically deal with the role ascribed to the CQuncil. The learned counsel for the respondent would contend that the Council can direct such an inspection to be caused by such person as it may direct and in such manner as it may prescribe. In this context, it is necessary to tefer to Section 14 whiCh deals vith recognition of institutions offering course or training in teachr. education. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 requires an institution offering or intending to offer to make an application to the Regional Committeeconcerued. Sub-section (3) deals. with the things that shall be considered by the Regional Committee. The said provision reads as follows: "(3) On receipt of an application by the Regional Comthittee from any institution under sub-section (1), and after obtaining from the institution concerned such other particulars as it may consider necessary, it shall- if it is satisfied that such institution has adequate financial I resources, accommodation, library, qualified staff, laboratory and that it fulfils such other conditions required for proper functioning of the institution for a course or training in teacher education, as may be determined by regulations, pass an order granting recognition to such institution, subject to such conditions as may be determined by regulations; or if it is of the opinion that such institution does not fulfill the requireift laid dowii in sub-clause (a)) pass an order refusing recognition to such institution for reasons to be recorded in writing; Provided that befoie passing an order under sub- clause (b), the Regional Committee shall provide a reasonable opportunity to the concerned institution for making a written representation." LPA 242/2011 with connected matters page 21 of 50
Sub-section (4) to Section 14 requires publication in the Gazette. it reads as follows: "(4) Every order granting or refusing recognition to an institution for a course -.or training in teacher education under sub-section (3) shall be published in the Official Gazette and cOmmunicated in writing for appropriate acioh to such institution and to the concerned eçamining body, the local authority or the State Government and the Central Government." On a scanning of the anatomy of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear as dày that an application has to. be submitted in such a man..nei is may be deterthined by the Regulations and the application shall be considered by the Regional 'Cothmittee which shall, record its satisfaction that sucli an institution has adequate financial resources, accommodation., . library, qualified staff, laboratory and it fulfills other such conditiois required for the proper . functioning of the institution to offer a course or training in teacher education as may be determined by the Regulations and thei,eafter pass an order granting recognition to such institution subject to such condition as may be dtermined by the Regulations. Sub-section (4) postulates that grant or refusal of the order shall be published in the official I gazette and communicated in writing for appropriate action to such • institution and to the concerned examining body, the local authority or the S tate Government and the Central Government. Sub-s ectiori '(6) stipulates that on receipt of the order under sub-Section (4) the examining body shall .gra.nt affiliation to .the institution where recognition has been granted. LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 22 of 50
Sebtidñ 15 deals with permission for a new course or training by a "17. Cntraventon of provisions of the Act and cousequences thereof -
(1) Where the Regional Committee is, onits ownmOtion. or on any , representation received from any person, • satisfied that a recognised institution has contraiened any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules, regulations, • : orders made or issued thereunder, or any condition subject to which recognition under sub-sectio.n (3) of section: 14 or permission uuder sub-section (3) of section • 1 5 was granted, it may withdraw recognition of such reeognied institution, for reasons to be recorded M. • . writing; • Provided that no such order against the recognised institution shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of making representation against the proposed Order has been given to such recognised. institution: recognized institution. Sub-sectiQn (1) stipulates that where any recognized insl:itution intends to starf any new course or training in teacher education, it my n-lake an application to seek permission therefor to the Regional i,Committee concelned. Sub-section (3) deals with the role of the Regional :Cobmitte. .27. Section 16 requires the affiliating body to grant affiliation after recognition or permission by the Council. Section 17 deals with the contravention of the provisions of the Act and consequences thereof; For the sake of completeness, sub-sections (1) to (3), being relevant, are reproduced below: Provided further that the order withdrawing or refusing recognition passed by the Regional Committee sha.l.1 come into force only with effect from the end of the bage 23 ofSO
academic session next following the date of • . . communication of such order. A copy of every order passed by. the Regional • . . . Coniyittee under sub-section (1), - (a) shall be communicated to the recognised institution concerned and a copy thereof shall also be forwarded sithultaneously to the University or the examining, body to which such institution wa.s affiliated for cancelling affiliation; and . • . . '(b) shall be published in the Official Gazette for general information. Once the recognition of a recognised institution is withdrawn under sub-section (1), such institution shall discoittiniii'e the course or training in teacher education, and the conertied University or the examining body shall cancel affiliation, of the institution in accordance with the order passed under sub-section (1), with 'Cffect • ". from the end of the academic session next following the date of communidation of the said order." 28'. Section 32 deals with the power of the Council to make regulations. Sub-section (1) of the said Section is as follows: "32. Power to make regulations. (1) The Council may; by, notification in the Official. Gazette, . make, regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, generally to 'carry out the provisions of this Act. • . . .. Sub-section (2)(n) of the said Section provides as.. follows: "(r) additiofial ftinctions to be performecL by the Regional Committee under sub-section (6) of section 20" 29. At this juncture, we may refdr witiT profit to the RuICs, namely, the • National CQuncil for Teacher Education Rules, 1997' (for short thc Rules') •'LPA 24212011 with connected matters ' . page 24 of SQ
le i which have been framed under Section 31 of the Act. Rule 8, which deals with inspectioh, reads, as follows: • ' . 8. Inspection - (1) The Council may inspect the recognized institutions in the manner specified 'in sub- • rules (2) to (8). . ... The Council shall approve a panel of names of' experts in teacher education or educationi.i administration who may be able to inspect the recognizod 'institutions. The Chairman shall nominate at least two persons out of the panel ofexperts to a inspectioii team. The Council shall give a notice of its intention to the institutiOn .,alongwith a questionnaire in Form - 'TV seeking informaion within fifteen days on all rlevan.t matters relating to the institution. On receipt of the completed questionnaire, the Council shall coinrnunicte the names of the members of • inspection team and the date of inspection to the institution. . . The institution to be inspected shall nominate its one, officer, or employee, to be associated with the inspection team. . The inspection team shall ascertain as to whether • the institution is functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations made • thereunder. The members of the inspection team may, if deem necessary, interact with the faculty members and other employees of the institution. (8)',The inspection team shall submit its report to the Council within a period of fifteen days from the:Iast cla.y of the inspection. . .30. At this stage, we may usefully state that a set of Regulations, name1, the National Council for Teacher Education (Recogniti.oi Norms and • LPA 242/2011 withconnected matters' .. . page25 of 50 IM
Procedures.) Regulations, 2009 has come into force on 31.8.2009. The relearit part of Rgu1ation 7 is reproduced below: S "7. Processing of Applictions.- XXX• XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX (1 Furnishing any wrong infoimation or concealment of facts in the application, which may have bearing on the decision making process or the decision pertaining to grant of recognition, shall result in withdrawal of recognition Of the institution besides other legal action against its management; order of withdrawal of recognition shall be passed after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing through a show cause notice to the institution. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX.(XX (4) . . . .After consideration of the recommendation of the State Government or on its own merits, the Regional Comthittee concerned shall decide that institution shall be inspected by a team of experts called visiting team With a yiev to •assess the level of preparednes. of the institution to commence the course. Inspection shall not be subject to the cousent of the institution, rather the decision of the Regional Committee to cause the inspection shall be communicated to the institution with the direction that the inspection shall be caused on any day after 10 days from the date of communication by the Regional Office. The Regional Committee shall ensure that 'inspection is conducted ordinarily within 30 days from the date Of this communication to the 'institution. The institution shall be required to provide details about the infrastructure etc. on the duly filled up proforma available on National Council for Teacher Education web-site to the visiting team, at the time of inspection along with building completion certificate issued by the competent civil authority, if not submitted. earlier.. The Regional Committee shall organise such iispections strictly in chronological order of the receipt of LPA 24212011 with connected matters . page 26 of 50
8 • application for the cases approved by the Regional Committee for Iispection. Th& members of the visiting team for inspection shall be • decided by the Regional Committee, out of the panel of experts dpproved by it, and in accordance with the visiting team policy of National Council for Teacher Education. (5) At the time of the visit of the team of experts to an institution, the institution concerned shall arrange for .the inspcction to be videographed in a manner that all important infrastructural and instructional facilities are videographed along with interaction with the maii.agement and the faculty, if available at the time of such visit. The visiting teams, as far as possible, shall fin.lise and courier their reports alongwith the video tapes on the same day: Provided that the .videography should clearly establish the outer view of the building, its surroundings, access road and important infrastructure including c1asrooms, labs, resource rooms, multipurpose hall, library etc. The visiting team shall .ensure that the videography is done in •a continuous manner, the final unedited copy of the videography is handed over to them immediately after its recording and its conversion to a CD should be done in the presence of visiting team members:- • . . Provided further that at the time of inspection for new courses or enhancement of intake of the existing course, the visiting team shall verify the facilities for existing teacler education courses •accorded recognition by National Council for Teacher Education and would ascertain the fulfillment and maintenance of Regulations • • and Norms and Standards for the existing courses as well. • . (6) The application and the report alongwith the video tapes or CDs etc of the visiting team shall be placed before the Regional Committee concerned for consideration and appropriate decision. (7) The Regional Committee shall decide rrit of recognition or permission to an institution only after satisfying itself that the institution fulfills all the • •• conditions prescribed by the Natioial • Council for LPA 242/2011 with coanected matters •• page 27of50
Teacher Education under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, Rules or Regulations. incluçjjpg the norms and standards laid down for the •relevant teacher education programme or course. [Emphasis supplied] We have referred to the provisions of the Ad, the Rules and the Regulations to understand the role of the Regional Committee under the scheme of things. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that whatever the compass of powers of the Regional Committed may have, it only covers the period prior to. recognition. Once the action of withdrawal on the prism of Section 17 of the Act is contemplated, it does not eiconpasthe power of inspection by the Regional Committee after giant of iecogmtion undei Section 14 of the Act Regard being had to the scheme of the Act and the role ascribed to thTd Council and the Regional Committees which are constituted by the Council and the, role played by the Regional Committee under the Act, it is • necessary to understand and appreciate the purpose of the Act and to reacT the provisions harmoniously. . .33. Mr. Sharawat, learned counsel for the appellants, has submii:ted with immense zeal and vehemence that Sections 13 and 17 opel•a•te in. different spheres as Section 13 uses the Word 'Council' whereas there is no such reference or mention in Section 17 of the Act. It is urged by him that if povrer of inspection is conferred on the Regional Conmittee after; iecognition is gianted, it will erthench upon the powei ol the Council as LPA 24212011 with connected matters . pcige 28 of 50
ngrafted under Section 13 of the Act. If we understand the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, the, provisions are absd1itely distinct an different and cannot be reconciled. The learned 'counsel for the .repondents would contend that there is basically no conflict and even if there is a conflict and discord, the principle of harmonious consfruction should be applied. - 34. In this context, we may refer to certain authorities in the field. In D. Sanjeevayija v. Election Tribunal, Andhra'.Pradesh and others,. AIR 1967 Sc 1211, their Lordships have expressed thus: "(4) We are unable to accept the argument of the • .. appellant as correct. In our opinion, the provisions of • . 5.150 of the Act must be'interpreted in the context of Sections 8 14 and 98(c) and other relevant provisions of Part III of the same Act. If the interpretation contended. for by the appellant is accepted as correct the vacancy must be filled by a bye-election as soon as a member resigns' his seat notwithstanding the pendency of an. election petition challenging his electioTl. If the candidate who filed the election petition eventually gets .a declaration that the'election of the member is void and that he himself had been duly elected there will be two candidates representing the same constituency at the same time, one of them declared to be duly eldcted at the' General Election and the other declared. 'to have been elected ' at the bye-election and an inipossible situation would arise. It cannot be supposed that Parliameitt contemplated such a situation while 'enacting Section 150 of the Act. Parliament could not have intendd that the provisions of Part VI of the Act pertatntng to election petitions, should stand abrogated as soon as a member resigns his seat in the Legislature. It is a' well-settled rule of construction that the proyisions of a statute should' be so read' 's to liamonise with one another and the provisions of one section cannot be used to, defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. LPA 24212011 with connected matters ' ' . ' , page 29 of 50
The principle stated in Crawford's Statutory Cohsfruchonat p. 260is as follows: 'Hence, the Court should., when it seeks the legislative intent, construe all of the constituent parts of the statute together, and seek to ascertain the legislative intention from the waole Act, considering every provision thereof in the light of the geneal purpose and object .of the Act itself, and endeavouring to make every part effective, • '• harmonious, and sensible. This means, of course, that the Court should attmpt to avoid absurd consequences in any part of the statute and refuse to regard any word, phrase, clatise or sentence superfluous, unless such a result is clearly unavoidable.' [Emplasis supplied 35 In State of Punjab and others v Amar Szngh and onothe;, (1974') 2 sec 70, emphasis was laid on the conspectus of the legislative scheme and the duty of the couit while mtelpietmg a statute to piomole the lcgislauve intent. 36. In this context, we may refer with profit to Krishan Kuinar. v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1992 SC 1789 wherein their Lorciships noticed an apparent conflict between Sections 100(4) and 217 (2)(e) of the • . Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and expressed.thus: 11, it. is settled principle of interpretation that where t'iere appears to be inconsistency in two sections of the same Act, the principle of harmonious construction • should be followed in avoiding a head on clash. It should not be lightly assumed that what the Parliiment has given with one hand, it took away with the other. • The provisions of one section of statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to • , • reconcile the same. In Venkataramana Devaru v. StaLC • of Myore, AIR 1958 SC 225 at p.268, this Court observed: LPA 24212011 with connected matters ' .age 30 of 50
"The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they. should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should he given to both. This is what is kowp as the rule of harmonious construction." The essence of harmonious construction is to give effed to both the provisions Beaiing these punciples in mmd it is legitimate to hold that S. 100(4) prescribed period of limitation of one year in respect of the scheme proposed under the provisions of the new Act, while in the case of a scheme under S. 68-C of the old Act, pending on the date of enforcement of the new Act, namely, 1.7.1989, • the period of one year as prescribed under S. 100(4) should be computed from the date of commencement of the new Act. This interpretation would give full effect to • both. the Sections-S. 100(4) and S. 217(2)(e) of the, new • Act." • [Emphasis added] 37. It is worth noting that Section 17 of the Act specifically confers power o the Regional Committee to withdraw the recognition if a • tecognized institution has contravened any of the provisions of the Act or Rules, Regulations or orders made or issued thereunder. if Section 13 is interpreted to mean that the Regional Committee cannot inspect the. • •• recognized institution and the Council alone is empowered to cause an inspection, such an interpretation would render the provisions of Section 17 nugatory. Sctions 13 and 17 are to be read harmoniously in order to give effect'to the provisions contained in Section 13 as well as Section 17 of the Act. In this context, we may refer with profit to a passage from Sultana Begum .v. Prem Chänd Jam, AIR 1997 SC 1006 wherein the Apex • • Court has opind thus: LPA 24212011 with connected matters •' poge 31 of 50
The statute has to be read as a whole to find out the real intention of the legislature. • 12. In Canada 'Sugar Refining Co. v. R. (1898) .AC 735, Lbrd Davy observed:- "Ever.y clause of a statute should be construed. • with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make, a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relatinR to the subject-matter'." This Court has adopted the same rule in M. ]Pentiah V. Veearnallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107;' Gammazi. India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 960: (1974) 1 5CC 596; Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirza Khasim Ali Beg, AIR 1977 SC 747; Vadldeboyina Tulsamme v. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi; AIF 1977 SC 1944,: (1977) 3 SCC 99; Punjab Beverages Fvf. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, AIR 1978 SC 995; Commissioner of Income-tax v. National Taj Traders, AIR 1980 SC 485; Calcutta cas Co. (Pioperietary) Ltd. v., State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 and T.K. Cotton Spinning and \Ieaving Mills v. State of U.F., AIR 1961 SC 1170, ' This rule of consfruction which is also spoken of as "cx visceribus actus" helps in avoiding any inconsistency either within a Section, or between, two different Sections or provisions of the same statute. On a conspectus of the case law indicated above, the following ptinciples are c1er1y discernible: It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head on clash between two Sections of the Act and to construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner as to harmonise them. The provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat the other provisions unless the court, in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect reconciliation between them. It has to be borne in mind by all the courts all the time that when there are two coinlicting provisions in an' Act, which; cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect 'LPA 24212011 w?th connected matters page 32 of 50
0 1 should be given to both This is the essence of , the rule of"harmonlous construction". The courts have also to keep in mind that an interpretation which reduces one of the provisions as a • . . 'dead letter" or "useless lumber" is not harmonious construction. To harmonise is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it otiose." • .. . . . [Emphasis supplied] In Commissioner of Income Tax v, Mi/s. Hindusta.n Buik Carriers, AIR 2003 Sc 3942, it has been ruled thus: • 24. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be tb secure that object unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1926) AC '37 p. 52 referred to in Commissioner of Income Tax • S. Teja Singh (AIR 1959 SC 352),,. Gursahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab, (AiR 1963 SC 1062). 27. The statute must be read as a whole and one prevision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. 30. . The provisions of one section of the statute cannot he used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a "useless lumber" or 'dead letter' is not a harmonised construction. To harnionise is not to destroy." • . [Emphasis added] In Kailash Chandra and another v. Mukun.dj Lal and 'others, AIR • 2002 SC 829, the said principle was reiterated. LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 33 of 50 (ç •±• ....................................
in Nandkishore Ganesh ]T9shi v. Commissioner1 Municpai Corporation of Kalijan & Dombiva li and others1 (2004) 11 SCC 417 1 it has • been statd as follows: A statute, as is çwell known, must be construed in • ' such a manner whereby the intent and object of the Act can be given effect to. A literal meaning should also be • . avoided if it results in absurdity." in Bairam Kumawa't v. Union of India and others, (2003)7 5CC 628, • - :' it has been held thus: "25.' 'A statute 'must be construed as .a workable instrument. Ut res mgis valeat quam pereat is a well- known pirnciple of law. In Tinsukhia Electiic Supply • Co.' Ltd. v. (1989) 3 SCC 709 this Court stated the law thus: (SCC p.754, paras 118-120) 118. The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to a futility. The provision of a statute must be so • . '.. construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle"ut res magis valeat quam perea.t'. it is, no doubt7 true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intracl:able and absolutely meaningless, the statute co -Lilcl he 'declared void for vagueness. This, is not in judicial review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a cou±t of construction, dealing with the language of a statute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the meaning and, purpose which the legislature intended for it. in Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchster Racecourse Co. (1900) 2 Ch 352, FarweilL J. said (pp. 360-61) , 'Uiess the words were so absolutely senseless thatI could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound 'to find some meaning and not to declare thein void for uncertautty.' , LPA 24212011 with connected matters . ' page 34 of 50 (\6
M .119. In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Comcil (1960) 3 All ER 503 Lord. DenrtIng approving the dictuth of Farwell, J. said: (All ER p.5i6) . 'But when a statute has some uheaning, even though it is obscure, or seieral meanings, even though there is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to' bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.' 120. It is, therefore, the court's duty to ii.ake what it can of the statute, knowing that the statutes are meant to be operative and not inept and that nothing shott of impossibility should allow a court to declare a statute unworkable. in Whitney 'v. IRC 1926 AC 37 Lord Dunedh said: (AC p.52) 'A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.' .26. The courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intentiou of the legislature eVen though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon v. Duncombe (1886) ii AC 627 (AC at p.634)]. Reducing the legislation futility shafl be avoided and ir a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to, the courts Vi'ould accept the bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective reJ. The courts, when rule of . purposive construction is gaining momentum., should be very reluctant to hold that PaJiament has ac}deved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve. . [See BBC Enterprises v. Hi-Tech Xtravision Ltd., (1990) 2 All ER 118 (All ER at pp.122-23)]." [Emphasis supplied] 42. In Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhahd and another, (2005) 3 S(C 551, S.B. Sirtha. J, in his concurring opinion, has opined that a statute rnUS LPA 24212011 with connected matters ' ' page 35 of 50
be oristrued having regard to the scheme and the ordinar state of affairs and consq.uences flowing therefrom. His Lordship restated the principle that the coufts should lean strongly against any constructions which tend to reduce a statute to a futility. When two meanings, one making the statute absolutely vague, wholly intractable, and absolutely meaningless and the otiier leading to certainty and a meaningful interpretation, are given, in such an event, the latter should be followed. • 43. While interpreting the provision of a statute, it is obligatory o.i, the pt' of the court to sustain the validity and place such mening on the prvision which' advances the object sought to be achieved by the enactment. The Act, as we perceive, is meant to achieve planned and cordinated development of the.teacher education systemand to maintain norms and standards thereof. That apart, the 'Act intends to regulate imparting of such education. That being the object and purpose, the Court has a sacrosanct role while interpreting the provisions. In this context, it is apposite to reproduce a passage from Mis. British Airwaijs Plc. V. Union Of'india and others, AIR 2002 SC 391: , "7. •. . The court cannot approach the enactment with view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting which 'make its working impossible. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be' made in construing the different provisions so that each provision will have its play and in the event of any • ' conflict a harmonious construction should be given. The well-known principle of harmoniois construction is that effect shall be given to all the proyisions 'and for 'that any provision of the statute should be cotistrueci "L'PA.242/2011 with connected motters
' page 36 of. 50
H , with reference to the other provisions so asto make it workable. A particular provision cannot be picked u.p and' interpreted to defeat another provision made fri that behalf under the statute. It is the duty of the court to make such construction of a statute which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. While • interpreting a statute the courts are required to keep in mind the consequences which are likely to flow upon the intended interpretation." [Underlining is ours] 44. Ieeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law relating to punciples of mterpietation, we have to scan and sciutmie the object, intent and purpose of the Act and especially the scheme of Section 17 of the Act. The Act has a basic and fundamental purpose. The Apex Court in State of Maharashtra t. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalija and others, (2006) 9 SCC 1 has held thus: ' //63admittedly, Parliament has enacted the 1993 Act, which is in force. The preamble of the Act provides for establishment of National Council for Teacher • Education (NCTE) with a view to achieving planned and cobrdinated development of the teacher-eduation system i:hroughout the country, the regulation and • proper maintenance of norms and standards in the eacher-educátion system and for matters connected therewith..." Again, in'- the said decision, at a later stage, it has been observed as
• 74. , . . . NCTE, therefore, in our opinion, is •expected • to deal with applications for establishing new Bed colleges or allowing increase in intake capacity, keeping in view the 1993 Act and planned and coordinCted development of teacher-education system in the country. It is neither open to the State • LPA 24212011 with connected matters pcige37of5o
Government nor to a universIty to consider the local onditions or apply "State policy" to re' f se such permission. .." 45. .Recently in National Couicil for Teacher Education & Ors..v, Shri • Sh'am Shiksha ]Prashikshan Sansthan & Ors, (2011) 3 5CC 238, their :Lordhips, while dealing with the importance of NCTE Act, have • expressed thus: "2 With a view to achieve the object of planned and coordinated developthent for the teacher education he country and for regulation and system throughout t proper maintenance of norms and standards in the techer education system and for matters connected. • therewith, Parliament enacted the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (for short, 'the. Act'), vhich provides for the establishment of a Couiicil to be called the National Council for Teacher Education (for. short 'the NCTE") with multifarious functions, powers and . duties. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the term • "couitcil" to mean a council established under sub- section (1) of Section 3. Section 2(1) defines the term • . "recognised . institution" to mean an institution recognised undei Section 14 Section 20) dcfines the term ieg1onai omnittee to iiteait t LUll LII LlLLL established under Section 20. Section 3 provides for • . establishment of the Council which compr:i.scs of a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson, a Member-Secretary, • • various functionaries of the Government, thirteen persons possessing experience and knowlecIe in the field of. cdudation or teaching, nine members • representing the States and Jnion Territories administration, three members of Parliament, three mefribers to be appointed from amongst teachers of primay and secondary education and teachers of recognised institutions." LPA 24212011 with connected matters
In the said 'case, their Lordships referred to the decision in Sant Dnjaneshwar Shikslian Shastra Mahavidijalaja (supra) and eventuliy held thus: "41. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the cut- o'ff dates specified in clauses (4) and (5) of Regulation 5 of the 2007 Regulations as also the • . . . amendment made in Regulation 5(5) vide Notification dated 1-72008 are not violative, of Article '14 of the Constitution and the learned Single Judge and the Divisioti Bench of the High Court were not right in recoiding a contialy fuidirig qua the date specified in Notification dated 1-7-2008. We further hold, that the • . . provisions contained in Sction 14 and the 1egiilations framed for grant of , recognition includiig the requirement of recommendation of the State Government/Union Territory Administration are mandatory and an institution is not entitled , to recognition unless it fulfils the conditions specified in vaidus clauses of the Regulations. The Council' is 'dti'ected to ensure that in future no institution is granted recognition unless it fulfils the conditins lai.d down in the Act and the Regulations and the, tihe schedule, fixed for processing the application by 'the Regional Committees and communication of the 'decision on the issue of recognition is strictly adhered '46. We have ferred to the aforesai,d authorities as in the said decisions, 'emp1ais has been laid on the purpose of the Act, the role of the authorities under the Act and the need and the necessity of strict adherence to the Regulations framed under the Act. As we perceive, the, fundamental object of the Act is to iimpart requisite education to the students in the institutions which have proper infrastructure and which follow the norms prescribed by the NCTE. Grant of recognition has its s'acrosanctity. The sustenance of the standard of the institution has its LPA 24212011 with connected matters . page 39 of 50
signification. The statute does not tolerate any deviation. A hierarchy of bodies has been created to look into the matter from many a spectrum. Apart from statutory provisions, detailed Regulations have been fr a maci to require the institutiotis to do certain things so that, there is no failure of standard. Norms have been set out relating to the appointmcnt of facuhy members, number of teaching days and various aspects. The purpose basically pertns to salubribus growth of training for those who are '.ained to teach. Aly institution engaged in such imparting of .trainiig ännot afford to behave in a fanciful manner. The institutions cannot • harbour the notion that they are engaged in any kind of trade. They must bea.r in mind that they are hvolved in the field of education. True t is, no authority can act beyond the statutory provisions but in:Lerpreti.ng the • CoMpass and the prism of the statutory provisions, we are disposed to think, a narrow or a resfricted view is not to be taken. In this backdrop, we have to understand the import of Section 17 of the Act as a colossal grievance has been made that for the purpose of withdrawal, an inspection is impermissibie and further, the Regional Committee is denuded of the power of inspection once recognition is granted. It is wotth notin.g that Section 17 confers specific power on the Regional Committee to take action in case there is any confravention of provisions of the Act on its own motion or on any representation received from any person. If the Regional Coimnittee is satisfied that the recoized institution has contravened any of the provisions of tho Act or the RuleS, Regulations made or issued LPA 24212011 with connected matters • page 40 of 50
therein or any condition subject to which recognition uflder sub-section (3) of Section 14 or permission under 'sub-section (3)of Section 15 was granted, it has the power to withdraw the recognition. The proviso stipulates that the recognized institution has to be afforded reasonable opportunity of making representation; The provision mandates to record a reasoned orde±. Thus, the principle of natural justice has to be adhered to. The term 'representation' is of wider connotation. One can Like a hypothetical example. The NCTE has framed various norms and standaids for B.Ed, M.Ed, B.FED courses, etc. At the time of inspecLion, they are found to be in order. Assuming an hormation is received by the Regional Comñiittee that the faculty members and other staff are really no further engaged by the institution, it would require verification. There is a difference between a paper verification and a spot verification or inspection. If it is consfrued that there is no power of inspection with the Regional Committee while taking action under Section 17, it will lead to absurdity and a limb of the statute would be comatosed to a. dead letLer. That is not the intention of the legislature. An instituLion can also raise a compl.4int that had the institution been inspected, all aspeds could have been revealed and fruth would have come out. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellaits is that if the power of inspecLion is allowed to the Regional Committee after recognition, it is likely tO. be abused. The aforesaid submission is only noted to be rejected. If an institution maintains ithstandard and follows the Act, Rules, RegulaLons 1~6 LPA 24212011 with connected matters . page 41 of 50
4 1 and the norms prescribed by the NCTE, there should be no such apptehension as regards the action of statutory committee. In fact, such appthension is misconcived jai law. That apart, a decision. taken under Section 17 is appealable before the Council under Section 18 of the Act. While hearing the appeal, the Council can take reCourse to inspection under Section 13. There is no prohibition. That apart, if the Council çones to khow from any souce that a recogrdzed institution is not functioning in accordance with the provisions of the Act, it can cause an inspection and as • proyided in the Section, the result of inspection shall be i.:ntirnatec[ to the said hmtitution and it would also recommend to the institutin that action is to be taken as a result of such inspection. The inspection provided under Séctioñ 13 empowers the Council to ascertain whether the hstition is properl guided by the Act, Rules, Regulations and the norms It is meant for conol and regulation. Thus understood, Sections 13 and 17 have.to be read a harmonious and purposive manner to give effect to both the• Sections. If an interpretation is placed on Section 13 tim t bie an instition is recoiized there can be no inspéction by the Regional Committee, it will make Section 17 of the Act absolutely nugatoty and tha4 is defhitely not the legislative htendment. 47; At this juncture, we shall refer to certain authorities. hich have been cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. Mr. Saharawat, learned counel, has conirnended to the decisions, namely, Deewan. Singh and others v. Rajendra Pd. Ardevi and others, AIR 2007- SC 767, M.P. LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 42 of50
Wakf Board v. Subhan Shah, (2006) 10 5CC 696 and Kurmanchal institute of Degree & Diploma, and others v. Chancellor, M.J.P. RohiikJiiend Univer5ity and others, (2007) 6 5CC 35 to buttress the stand that the Council and the Regional Conirnittees have been created by the legislature under the Act andtwo bodies which enjoy statutory powers iiu.st do so in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act. In the case of M.P. Wakf Board (supra), the Apex Court was deahng with the powers of the tribunal constituted under the WalKf Act, 1995 and theix Lordshps dealt with the purpose of constitution of the tribunal under S9ction 83 of. the 1995 Act and opined that it is an adjudicatory body but 40 cannot usurp the jurisdition of the 'Board as there is no provision which empowers the tribunal to frame a scheme. In the absence of any such power vested in the tribunal, it ought to have left the said fur,ction, to the Board which is statutorily emporered therefor. In that context, the Apex Court opined thä:t'where a statute creates different authorities to exercise their respective functions thereunder, each of such authority 'must exercise the functions within the four corners of the statute. In the case at hand, the 'nature and purpose of the enactment is absolutely different and there is no strait jacket comparhent and also cairnot be so thought of. Thus, the said, .dec:ision is distinguishable. The decision in Kurmanchal Institute of Degree & Diploma (supra) dealt with a situation where stud centers wer recoized by the
LPA 24212011 with connected matters , page 41 of 50
University beyond the territorial limit. Their Lordships opined that a fotiori . sttutory authority is requir.d to operate within tile boundary of th territ ries within which it is to operate under the statute. The factual natxix and the context in which the decision was being delivered being different, in our considered opinion, the ratio laid down therein is inapplicable to the case at hand. That apart, it has been laid down that a statutory authority cannot act inconsistent with the provisions of the • statute as the said action could make it void. Be it noted;the same was expressed in. the context of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 which stipulated various acts uhder various provisions and we are disposed to • think that the said decision is totally distinguishable to the us at hand. 50. The learned counel for the appellants, to bolster the contention that as the Act provides inspection to be done by the Council, and hence, it caimot be done in any manner other than the Council itself, has invited. our • attention to the decision in Bhavnagar University v. Palitcna Sugar Miii •(P.) Ltd. and others, (2003) 2 SCC 111. It is also his submission that the Regional Committee being subordinate to the Council and the legislature having vested the power in the superior body, the Conirnittee cannot so • exercise. To buttress the said contention; he has placed reliance on Taylor • v'. Taylor, (1875-76) L.R. 1 Ch.D 426, Nazir Ahmad v, King .Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253; Patna )Tmprovémenf Trust v. Shrimati Lakshmi Devi, AIR 1963 SC 1077, State of U.P. V. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358, Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, (1975) 1 SCC 559, LPA 24212011 with connected matters • page 44 of 50
• Chandrà KishOre Jim v. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266, Surender Pal • SigJi Chuhan v, Bar Council of India, 158 (2009) DLT 697 and Order • dated 20th Septeinbet, 2010 of the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Cpurt at CwaliorinW.P. No.4501/2010 titled Shri Vaishnav Institute of Technologj & Management v. National Council for Teacher Education. As both the submissions are interconnected, we shall deal with the applicability of the said authoiities In Bkavnagai Umvei 9ity (supi a), the Apex Court was considering with regard to the statutory intercic don iinder the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976. In • . that cofltext, a three-Judge Bench stated thus: 40. The statutory interdict of use and enjoymetu of • the property iTlust be strictly construed. it is well settled that when a statutory authority is requird to do a thing in a particular manner, the same must be done in that manner or not at all. The State and; other authorities while acting under the said Act are only creature of statute. They must act within the four corners thereof." . It is worth noting that in the said case, the appellant University under 5ectioi 20 of the said Act was under obligation to take steps for acquisition of land on rceipt of the requisite notice tn terms of sub-sed:ior (2) of Section 20 of the Act but as it failed to take steps for the reservation/; de. - edesign in respect of the land, the notice lapsed. In that con 1:ext their Lordships opined that the power of the State enumerated under su'b section (1) of Section 20 does not become ipso facto applicable in the event of issuance of. a revised plan as the said provision has been specificail LPA 24212011 with connected matters page 45 of.50
mentioned therein o.that the State may use the same power in 'a chanced d I • situation. On a reading of the said decision and the us involved therein, we are of the considered opinion that the reliance placed is absol u (:eiy misplaced. • .53. The next line of decisions basically relate to the proposition that if a • statute provides 'for a thing to be done tu a particular maimer, it has to ;be • done in that manher and tu no other mamer. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that when the National Council has been conferred the power of inspection under. Section 13 of the Act, it has to be done, by the said Council and not by the Regional Committee. It is also • urged by him that the Council is a superior body and an act of a superior body caiot be performed by an herior or subordinate body. As we understand th 'anatomy, the scheme and the purpose of the Ad, we have no trace of doubt tu dur mtud that the said prtuciple is not applicable. The .Regional Con,mittee is created by the Central Council and a Regional committee can be suspended by the Central Council but to import a strait jacket compartmentalized power under all circumstances would defeat the ptirposes of the Act. Quite apart from above, as we have,statecl earlier, there is no prohibition uider Section 17 to inspect. On the contrary, it is a • • • ' necessity. Hence, we distinguish the said line of decision's which have been coiiended to us by the learned counsel for the appellants.
The learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn inspiration from the decisionin Mohd. Sahabuddin v. State of Bihar and others 1 (2010) 4 5CC 653 to highlight that the court cannOt read anything into a s[atu[ory provisiOn which is plain and upambiguous because the knu age employed in a state isa determinative factor of the legislative intent. [he said principle is not applicable to the case at hand as nothing is provided to Section 17 by applying the doctrine of causus omissus. Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, learned counsel for the appellants has drawn immense inspiraOn from a Division Bench decision of the High Cour[ of Madhya Pradesh on 20.9.2010 in W.P. No.4501/2010. In the said case, i[ • has been held that the legislaturehas deliberately enacted Section 13 and the procedure has also been prescribed so that on being advised by the Council, the institution may remove the deficiency and, therefore, it was imperative on the part of the respondents to issue notice under Section 13 of the Act and thereafter to take actiOn under Section 17 of the Ad. We have perused the decision that has been brought on reord. in the said case, notice for inspection was issued under Section 17 of the Act withouL coriductmg an inspection under Section 13 of the Act. The Bench was of the view that there has to be an inspection under Section 13 of [he Act With great nepect, we are not persuaded to agree with the said view as wo are not inclined to. form an opinion that inspection by the Central Council under Section i3 is a condition precedent before steps for withdrawal are taken under SedLion 17 of the Act as the same would lead [0 an anomalous LPA 24212011 with connected matters • page 470/50
cL)CV and absurd siftiation. The basic concept of statutory interpretation, we are disposec to think, does not so permit. 56 The controveisy can also be viewed from the specti urn whetheii the egiotial Committee should be denuded of the power because the term inspection is not specifically mentioned in Section 17 of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that in the absence of any power coierred, the said action cannot be taken recourse fo. Ferconb:a, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that to give effect to Section 17, the same is an imperative necessity. The learned counsel for the responderft would further submit that there is no prohibition for inspection and it is essential to inspect under certain circumstances to exercise the power of withdrawal as the said power is fundamentally an essential power for the proper discharge of the power conferred under the Act. In this context, we may refer with profit to the decision in Sub- Divisional Qfficer, Sadar, Faiza bad v. Shambhoo Narain Singli, AIR 1970 SC 140 wherein it has been held thus: 0' • "8. It is well recosed that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also giants the power of doing • all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. But before implying the • • existence of such a power the court mut he satisfied that the existence of that power is absolutely essential for the discharge of the power conferred and riot irierely that it is convenient to have such a power." 57. Be it noted, the learned counsel for the appe![lànts has also commended us to the said dedsion to highlight that a statutory body has LPA242/2Otlwithconnectedmatters pc/ge 48 of 50
to work within its frarnewdrk and in the absence of a power, the same cnnot b takei recourse to. It is worth noting that theii Lordships, in the aid case,, were dealirg.. with the power of the State Government to suspend a 'Pradhan' of a Gaon Sabha under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (26 of 1947). Their Lordships in para 6 have, stated thus: 6. The Gaon Sabha is the creature of a statute. its powers and duties as well as the powers and. duties of its of,ficeiEs are all regulated by the Act. I-Ience no question of any inherent pover arises for consideration see Sm. 1-lira Devi v. District Board, Shahjanpur, (1952) SCR 1122 = (AIR 1952 SC 362)." In that context, their Lordships have stated that the power to place under susens1bn an officer is not absolutely, essential for the proper exercise of the power conferred under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act. Their tordships for the said purpose scanned the various provisions of the said Act, s aforesaid. If the ratio is properly understood, it conveys that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly grants the power of doing of such acts for its eecution but, the 'court is required to be satisfied that the existence of that power is absolutely essential for the discharge of the power conferred. Their Lordships did not accept the theory of convenience. In the case at hand, as we perceive the language of Section 17, we have no scintilla of doubt in our mind that the powei of inspection has to be ingrained for the exercise of the power of withdrawal. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we concur with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge and consequently, the appeals are LPA24212011 With connected matters , ' pc/ge 49 0150
dismissed. However we direct that the letter / communication / order of withdrawal issued by the Regioial. Committee under Section 17 of the Act can be assailed .under Sedion 18 befoie the appellate authority, if appeals are,preferred within a period of four weeks, the appellate authority shall • entertain and dispose them of in accordance with law within a period of 8 • weeks therefrom. In the facts and circumstances of. the case, the costs in each appeal is assessed at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only). The same shall be paid to the respondent within four weeks hence. / • CHIEF JUSTICE. a "APRIL '20, 2011 SANflV KHANNA, J. dk/pk