Facts
The assessee, an engineering consultant, filed an ITR for AY 2011-12. His case was reopened under Section 148, and the AO added Rs.3,80,170/- for professional fees which, according to the AO, should have been offered for tax on an accrual basis for AY 2011-12, given the mercantile system of accounting. The assessee had offered part of this income in a later AY on a receipt basis. Subsequently, a penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was levied for concealment of income. Both the quantum addition and the penalty were upheld by the CIT(A), leading to these appeals before the Tribunal.
Held
The Tribunal held that since the assessee maintained accounts on a mercantile system, the professional fees of Rs.3,80,170/- accrued in AY 2011-12 as the right to receive the income was vested, making it taxable on an accrual basis. The quantum appeal was allowed for statistical purposes, directing the AO to tax the embedded income while considering corresponding expenditure. Regarding the penalty, the Tribunal, citing the Supreme Court, deleted the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) because the assessee had disclosed all relevant details in the ITR, and merely disallowing a claim does not amount to concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars.
Key Issues
Whether professional fees were taxable on an accrual basis for an assessee following a mercantile system, and if a penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was justified when all relevant details were disclosed but a claim was disallowed.
Sections Cited
198, 147, 143(3), 148, 271(1)(c), 4, 14A
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, DELHI BENCH ‘E’: NEW DELHI
Before: SHRI KUL BHARAT & SHRI AVDHESH KUMAR MISHRA
Appellant by None Respondent by Sh. Subhra Jyoti Chakraborty CIT-DR Date of Hearing 21/08/2024 Date of Pronouncement /08/2024 ORDER PER AVDHESH KUMAR MISHRA, AM These appeals; the quantum appeal and the penalty appeal, are inter-related; therefore, both appeals are being decided together for the sake of brevity and convenience.
Both appeals filed by the assessee for the Assessment Year (hereinafter, the ‘AY’) 2011-12 are directed against the orders dated 31.01.2018 and 15.02.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) National Faceless Appeal Centre(NFAC), New Delhi [hereinafter, the ‘CIT(A)’].
Following grounds were raised in these appeals:-
A.Y. 2011-12 “1. That, the Assessment order was passed based on conjecture and surmises and against the facts and circumstances of the case.
That, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the TDS of Rs.1,00,000/- as appeared in Form 26AS was taken as income under the provision of section 198 but the Assessing Officer has reduced the claim of TDS but did not reduce the corresponding income as shown under the provision of section 198 of Income Tax Act while passing the order u/s 147/143(3) of Income Tax Act, 1961.
That, the Learned Assessing Officer and Hon'ble CIT (Appeals) have mentioned in the order that the Appellant has not shown the income connected to this TDS, their contention is incorrect. The Appellant has added Rs.1,00,000 as additional income as per the provision of section 198 for claiming the deduction of TDS as appeared in Form 26AS. The total professional income from M/s Afcons was Rs.89,90,000, while the Appellant has shown the income from M/s Afcons of Rs. 90,90,000. This additional income shown in the return of Rs.1,00,000 is on account of the figure taken under the provision of section 198 of the Act. Therefore, if the claim of TDS is reduced, the corresponding income should also be reduced which was taken under the provision of Section 198 of Income Tax Act. The actions of the Learned Assessing Officer and Hon'ble CIT (Appeals) are against the facts and circumstances of the case.
That, the appellant has shown the returned income of Rs.87,74,652/-. The Assessing Officer has taken the same figure for the purpose of taxation, while the income should have been taken Rs.86,74,652/- if the provision of section 198 is not invoked.” 2
“1. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the penalty under section 271(1)(c) should not be imposed.”
, A.Y. 2011-12 4. The facts, in brief, relevant for deciding these appeals are that the appellant/assessee, an engineering consultant, filed his Income Tax Return (hereinafter, the ‘ITR’) on 29.09.2011 declaring income of Rs.87,74,652/-. The case was picked up for scrutiny and the original assessment was completed at the income declared in the ITR vide order dated 11.03.2014 passed under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter, the ‘Act’). Later on, this case was reopened under section 148 of the Act on 06.08.2015 based on the details mentioned in 26AS of the appellant/assessee. The re-assessment was completed vide order dated 31.03.2016 passed under section 147/143(3) of the Act. In the re-assessment, the Assessing Officer (hereinafter, the ‘AO’) made one and only one addition of Rs.3,80,170/- on the reasoning that the appellant/assessee who maintained his books of account on mercantile system, had not offered the sum of Rs.3,80,170/- (Rs.4,30,170/- minus Rs.50,000/- already offered for tax in the ITR) accrued to him for services rendered by him in the Month of February, 2011 to M/s. Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture. Aggrieved, the appellant/assessee filed appeal against the quantum addition of Rs.3,80,170/-; however, he did not succeed. On receipt of the CIT(A)’s order on quantum addition, the AO levied penalty vide order dated 19.03.2019 passed under section 271(1)(c) of the Act for concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income of Rs.3,80,170/-. The appeal filed against the penalty order was also upheld by the CIT(A). Hence, these appeals are before the Tribunal.
During the course of proceedings before the Tribunal, the appellant/assessee either sought adjournment or did not pursue appeal though these appeals as detailed; Quantum Appeal – 15.09.2021, 15.11.2021, 20.01.2022, 12.04.2022, 05.07.2022, 04.01.2023, 16.03.2023, 31.05.2023, 07.08.2023, 03.01.2024, 04.03.2024, 22.05.2024 & 21.08.2024 and “Penalty Appeal – 11.10.2023, 05.03.2024, 22.05.2024 & 21.08.2024, are scheduled for hearing. On 21st August, 2024, none attended on behalf of the appellant/assessee. Due to consistent non-prosecution from the appellant/assessee side, we have no option except to decide these cases after hearing the Senior Departmental Representative (hereinafter, the ‘Sr. DR’). Accordingly, we proceeded with.
We have heard the Sr. DR at length who relied upon the orders of the AO and the Ld. CIT(A) in both the cases.
We have heard the Sr. DR and perused the material available on record. The dispute, in quantum appeal, is in respect of professional fee of Rs.3,80,170/- (As per 26AS of the appellant/assessee, Afcons- Gunanusa Joint Venture has deducted tax on the professional fee of Rs.10,00,000/-) charged to tax. As per the details mentioned in the assessment order, it is evident that the appellant/assessee rendered the services to Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture in February 2011; however, he raised the bill of Rs.4,30,170/- (including service tax) in June 2011. Since M/s. Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture was maintaining its account on mercantile system; therefore, it made the provision ofRs.10,00,000/- in its Profit & Loss account and deducted tax at source on the provision of Rs.10,00,000/-, which got reflected in the 26AS of the appellant/assessee. Based on this information, the appellant/assessee has offered the professional receipt of Rs.1,00,000/- out of this sum and claimed the credit of TDS ofRs.1,00,000/- in his ITR.
In the original assessment, the AO taxed professional receipt of Rs.1,00,000/-and allowed the credit of TDS of Rs.1,00,000/-.
However, later the case was reopened on the reasoning that the professional receipt of Rs.10,00,000/- on which TDS was made by M/s. Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture had not been offered for tax in the ITR though the appellant/assessee was maintaining his books of account on mercantile system. During the re-assessment proceedings, the AO made enquiries from M/s. Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture and the appellant/assessee and came to conclusion that the out of the sum of Rs.10,00,000/- on which TDS was made by Afcons- Gunanusa Joint Venture, the sum of Rs.4,30,170/- was the actual claim of professional fees by the appellant /assessee and remaining sum was excess provision made by Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture. Accordingly, he taxed the sum of Rs.3,80,170/- (Rs.4,30,170/- minus Rs.50,000/- already offered for tax in the ITR) on the reasoning that the appellant/assessee who maintained his books of accounts on mercantile system was required to offer the sum of Rs.4,30,170/- instead of Rs.50,000/- for tax on accrual basis. The appellant/assessee received the sum of Rs.4,30,170/- in July, 2012 relevant for the AY 2013-14 and offered the same for tax in the AY 2013-14 on receipt basis. It is evident from the impugned order that the appellant/assessee, on one hand, offered Rs.1,00,000/- out of the sum of Rs.4,30,170/- for tax on accrual basis to claim credit of TDS whereas the remaining sum of Rs.3,30,170/- was not offered for tax. Such contradiction; for the sum of Rs.3,30,170/- not offering for tax in the relevant year, has been explained placing reliance on the decision of the Tribunal, Mumbai in the case of Varsha G. Salunke, 98 ITD 147 (TM).
Admittedly, the appellant/assessee maintains his books of accounts on mercantile system; therefore, the income has to be taxed in his hands on accrual basis. Accrued income is a crucial concept in the realm of accounting. It represents revenue that has been earned but not yet received. This concept is based on the accrual accounting method, which aims to match revenues with expenses in the period they are incurred, regardless of the actual cash flow.
The issue here in this case is that whether the appellant/assessee has the right to receive the amount in question; i.e. Rs.3,80,170/- in the relevant year. If the answer to it is in affirmative, then it has to be taxed in the relevant year otherwise not. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of S P.G.& W.SAWOO Pvt.Ltd. & Another in Civil Appeal No.) 4091 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (Civil)No. 6384 of 2009) (order dated 19.04.2016) has held as under: - “7. The issue is capable of resolution within a short compass. A reading of the decision of this Court in E.D. Sassoon (supra) would 7
go to show that the income to be chargeable to tax must accrue or arise at any point of time during the previous year. This Court in E.D. Sassoon (supra) has held in categorical terms that income can be said to have accrued or arisen only when a right to receive the amount in question is vested in the appellant-assessee. The following extract from the judgment in E.D. Sassoon (supra) amply illustrates the above position:
“The word "earned" has not been used in Section 4 of the Income-tax Act. The section talks of "income, profits and gains" from whatever source derived which (a) are received by or on behalf of the assessee, or(b) accrue or arise to the assessee in the taxable territories during the chargeable accounting period. Neither the word "income" nor the words "is received", "accrues" and "arises" have been defined in the Act. The Privy Council in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Co.1 attempted a definition of the term “income” in the words following:-
"Income, their Lordships think, in the Indian Income-tax Act, connotes a periodical monetary return 'coming in' with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall."
Mukerji, J., has defined these terms in Rogers Pyatt Shellac & Co. v. Secretary of State for India2 "Now what is income ? The term is nowhere defined in the Act.....In the absence of a statutory definition we must take its ordinary dictionary meaning -'that which comes in as the periodical produce of one's work, business, lands or investments (considered in reference to its amount and commonly expressed in terms of money); annual or periodical receipts accruing to a person or corporation "
(Oxford Dictionary) The word clearly implies the idea of receipt, actual or constructive. The policy of the Act is to make the amount taxable when it is paid or received either actually or constructively. 'Accrues', 'arises' and 'is received' are three distinct terms. So far as 8 receiving of income is concerned there can be no difficulty; it conveys a clear and definite meaning, and I can think of no expression which makes its meaning (1925) 1 I.T.C. 363 at 371 plainer than the word 'receiving' itself. The words 'accrue' and 'arise' also are not defined in the Act. The ordinary dictionary meanings of these words have got to be taken as the meanings attaching to them. 'Accruing' is synonymous with 'arising' in the sense of springing as a natural growth or result. The three Expressions 'accrues', 'arises' and 'is received' having been used in the section, strictly speaking 'accrues' should not be taken as synonymous with 'arises' but on the distinct sense of growing up by way of addition for increase or as an accession or advantage; while the word 'arises' means comes into existence or notice or presents itself. The former connotes the idea of a growth or accumulation and the latter of the growth or accumulation with a tangible shape so as to be receivable. It is difficult to say that this distinction has been throughout maintained in the Act and perhaps the two words seem to denote the same idea or ideas very similar, and the difference only lies in this that one is more appropriate than the other when applied to particular cases. It is clear, however, as pointed out by Fry, L.J. in Colquhoun v. Brooks, [this part of the decision not having been affected by the reversal of the decision by the House of Lords] that both the words are used in contradistinction to the word 'receive' and indicate a right to receive. They represent a stage anterior to the point of time when the income becomes receivable and connote a character of the income which is more or less inchoate.
One other matter need be referred to in connection with the section. What is sought to be taxed must be income and it cannot be taxed unless it has arrived at a stage when it can be called 'income'."
The observations of Lord Justice Fry quoted above by Mukerji J. were made in Colquhoun v. Brooks4 while construing the provisions of 16 and 17 Victoria Chapter 34, Section 2 , Schedule'D'. The words to be construed there were “profits or gains, arising or accruing” and it was observed by Lord Justice Fry at page 59:-
"In the first place, I would observe that the tax is in respect of 'profits or gains arising or accruing.' I cannot read those words as meaning 'received by'. If the enactment was limited to profits and gains 'received by' the person to be charged, that limitation would apply as much to all Her Majesty's subjects as to foreigners residing in this country. The result would be that no income-tax would be payable upon profits which accrued but which were not actually received, although profits might have been earned in the kingdom and might have accrued in the kingdom. I think, therefore, that the words 'arising or accruing' are general words descriptive of a right to receive profits."
To the same effect are the observations of Satyanarayana Rao J. in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Anamallais Timber Trust Ltd., and Mukherjea J. in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai& Co., Bombay , where this passage from the judgment of Mukerji J. in Rogers Pyatt Shellac & Co. v. Secretary of State for India7, is approved and adopted. It is clear therefore that income may accrue to an assessee without the actual receipt of the same. If the assessee acquires a right to receive the income, the income can be said to have accrued to him though it may be received later on its being ascertained. The basic conception is that he must have acquired a right to receive the income. There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. There must be as is otherwise expressed debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro; See W. S. Try Ltd. v. Johnson (Inspector of Taxes8), and Webb v. Stenton and Others, Garnishees9. Unless and until there is created in favour of the assessee a debt due by somebody it cannot be said that he has acquired a right to receive the income or that income has accrued to him.” (1950) 18 I.T.R. 333 at 342 (1950) S.C.R. 335 at 389: 18 I.T.R. 472 (1925) 1 I.T.C. 365 at 372 (1946) 1 All E.R. 532 at 539 11 Q.B.D. 518 at 522, 527
Viewed from the aforesaid perspective, it is clear that no such right to receive the rent accrued to the assessee at any point of time during the assessment year in question, inasmuch as such enhancement though with retrospective effect, was made only in the year 1994. The contention of the Revenue that the enhancement was 10
with retrospective effect, in our considered view, does not alter the situation as retrospectivity is with regard to the right to receive rent with effect from an anterior date. The right, however, came to be vested only in the year 1994.”
[Emphasized by us.] 11. In the case of Varsha G. Salunke, 98 ITD 147 (TM) relied upon by the appellant/assessee, the Tribunal, Mumbai, has held as under: “8. We considered the matter in detail. There is no dispute regarding the method of accounting followed by the assessee. He is following the Mercantile System of Accounting. Therefore, whenever income is recognized, the assessee has credited the same in his books of account, irrespective of its actual receipt. This accrual of income is something different from raising bills against the services rendered by the assessee from month to month. The question of following either Accrual System of Accounting or Cash System of Accounting arises only when the income is recognized. In the method of billing employed by the assessee, income is recognized only on raising of bills. The assessee raised the bills after the expiry of the month in which the services are rendered. In one way that alone is possible. The assessee can raise bills for the services rendered in March only in the month of April because the assessee has to wait till the end of the month of March. As far as the assessee is concerned, the income is to be recognized on issue of bills for services rendered. For the services rendered by the assessee in the month of March 1997, he has raised the bills in the succeeding month, i.e., April 1997. Therefore, the income could be recognized only in the month of April 1997 and not in the month of March 1997. Once the bill has been raised in the month of April 1997, the assessee has to credit bill amount as his receipts for the month of April 1997 irrespective of the fact whether he received amount or did not receive the amount immediately. Even if the assessee did not receive the amount till March 1998, still the assessee had to show it as its receipt in the books of account.
In the present case, the assessee has strictly followed the above pattern. In fact the assessing authority as well as the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) misconstrued the distinction between the recognition of income on the basis of the issue of bills and the accounting of income. In fact the income accrued to the assessee only on the recognition of income which is based on the raising of bills. Therefore, it is not possible here to hold that the assessee has deviated from the regular method of accounting followed by him. We should notice the distinction between the raising of bills and accounting of receipts.
As rightly pointed out by the learned Chartered Accountant, if the addition is sustained, the assessee would be subject to tax for the income relating to 13 months, which is not justified. In the preceding assessment year 1996-97 also, the assessee had offered the receipts for the 12 months period from March 1995 to February 1996. In the present assessment year, he has shown the receipts for the month of March 1996 to February 1997. He has followed the consistent method of billing. Once bills are raised and the income is recognized, he has again followed the Mercantile System of Accounting.” 12. The present case is different. It is surprising to note that the appellant/assessee who rendered the services to Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture in February 2011 and raised the bill of Rs.4,30,170/- (including service tax) for the same in June 2011, has not offered the receipts for tax in AY 2012-13 even after raising the bill (the appellant/assessee received the sum of Rs.4,30,170/- in July, 2012 and offered the same for tax in the AY 2013-14 on receipt basis). It is undisputed fact that the appellant/assessee, out of the sum of Rs.4,30,170/-, has offered the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- in the relevant year. It means that the appellant/assessee has considered part of incomeof Rs.4,30,170/-, to the extent of TDS claim, in the relevant year and remaining not even before raising the bill.
Raising of bill in the relevant year or in the subsequent year is the choice of the appellant/assessee. The case relied upon by the appellant/assessee is held distinguishable on the facts and thus is held not applicable. We are unable to understand the reasoning of not raising the bill even after a month. Not offering the entire receivables of February, 2011 in the relevant year means disclosing income for eleven months only when previous year consists of 12 months. Further, it is more surprising to note this income was not offered for tax even in the subsequent year after raising the bill in June 2011.
It is evident from the assessment order that Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture has categorically given in writing that the appellant/assessee has not rendered any service in March 2011. It cannot be ruled out that the appellant/assessee has not debited any expenditure relating to the disputed receipts from Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture in his Profit & Loss account and has not shown the same in the balance sheet either as liability in respect of payable expenses or asset in respect of paid expenseswhen he has maintained his books of accounts on mercantile system. In case there is no such liability and asset, it means that all such expenses have already been debited/ claimed as revenue expenses.
We are of the considered view that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case is squarely applicable here. In view of the above facts, circumstances and observations, we are of the considered opinion that one month time to raise bill is reasonably a good time. Thus, we hold that the appellant/assessee has right to receive the professional fee of Rs.3,80,170/- from Afcons- Gunanusa Joint Venture in the relevant year and therefore, the same would have been offered for tax when appellant/assessee has maintained his books of accounts on mercantile system and offered part of this receivables as income in the relevant year. Further, we are of the considered view that the sum of Rs.3,80,170/- is the gross receipt and not the income. At most, the income embedded in the receipt of Rs.3,80,170/- is taxable on accrual basis in the relevant year. In case the appellant/assessee has debited corresponding expenditure relating to the services to Afcons-Gunanusa Joint Venture in his Profit & Loss account and shown the same in the balance sheet either as liability (in respect of payable expenses) or asset (in respect of paid expenses) and added back the same while 14 computing the income in the ITR of the relevant year (Out of the receipts of Rs.3,80,170/-, the assessee has offered Rs.1,00,000/- in his ITR and not Rs.50,000/- as held by the AO); then the expenditure and income whose credit was not given by the AO while computing income have to be allowed as expenditure/deduction against the receipts of Rs.3,80,170/- to avoid double taxation. In case there is no such liability and asset, it means that all such expenses have already been debited/claimed as revenue expenditure and the question of allowance of any expenditure on this score therefore, does not arise. The AO is accordingly directed to allow/not allow such claim of expenditure against the receipts of Rs.3,80,170/- and tax the income embedded therein as per the law.
We find that the appellant/assessee has furnished all the relevant details in his ITR of income including claim of TDS on the receipts of Rs.3,80,170/-, which is not only disclosed in 26AS of the appellant/assessee buy also in the original ITR. The AO has levied penalty for concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. It is not the case where the details furnished by 15 the assessee were found to be incorrect. Even, this income was not taxed in the original assessment even after having all details in the ITR. If the claim of the appellant/assessee after disclosing all the relevant information relating thereto is found to be unacceptable by the Revenue, under such circumstances penalty provision under section 271(1)(c) is not attracted. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts Pvt. Ltd. 322 ITR 158 (SC) held: ‘It was tried to be suggested that Section 14A of the Act specifically excluded the deductions in respect of the expenditure incurred by the assessee in relation to income which does not form part of the total income under the Act. It was further pointed out that the dividends from the shares did not form the part of the total income. It was, therefore, reiterated before us that the Assessing Officer had correctly reached the conclusion that since the assessee had claimed excessive deductions knowing that they are incorrect; it amounted to concealment of income. It was tried to be argued that the falsehood in accounts can take either of the two forms; (i) an item of receipt may be suppressed fraudulently; (ii) an item of expenditure may be falsely (or in an exaggerated amount) claimed, and both types attempt to reduce the taxable income and, therefore, both types amount to concealment of particulars of one's income as well as furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. We do not agree, as the assessee had furnished all the details of its expenditure as well as income in its Return, which details, in themselves, were not found to be inaccurate nor could be viewed as the concealment of income on its part. It was up to the authorities to accept its claim in the Return or not. Merely because the assessee had claimed the expenditure, which claim was not accepted or was not acceptable to the Revenue, that by itself would not, in our opinion, attract the penalty under Section 271(1)(c). If we accept the contention of the Revenue then in case of every Return where the claim made is not accepted by Assessing Officer for any reason, the assessee will invite penalty under Section 271(1)(c). That is clearly not the intendment of the Legislature.’ 16
In facts of the case as detailed above and in light of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we hereby delete the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) of the Act.