SHREE SHIVAM ATTIRES PVT. LTD.,DURG vs. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CIRCLE-2(1), BHILAI

On the date of hearing, Ld. Counsel Shri Yash Jain, CA (in short “Ld. AR”) on behalf of the assessee and Smt. Anubhaa Tah Goel (“Ld. Sr. DR”) representing the revenue have raised their respective contentions and made necessary submissions. After hearing the Ld. Counsel of both the sides the matter was taken as heard.

Ld. Sr. DR on the other hand, submitted that the issue is squarely covered by the judgment of Hon’ble Jurisdictional HC in the case of BPS Infrastructure vs ITO in TAXC No. 87 of 2024 dated 12.04.2024, therefore, the contention raised by the Ld. AR have no substance to be hold good in the eyes of law, consequently, the appeal of assessee is liable to be dismissed.

We have considered the rival submission perused the material available on record and case laws relied upon by the parties. The sole controversy in the present case is whether deduction claimed u/s 36(1)(va) r.w.s 43B qua the employee’s contribution towards EPF & ESIC can be denied in a case where the payment was made after the due date in the respective statutes 2018-19) Shree Shivam Attires Pvt. Ltd. Vs ACIT, Circle-2(1), Bhilai but was made before filing of the return u/s 139, especially in a case, where the return of the assessee is processed u/s 143(1)(a) as the issue was debatable in nature because of the divergent decisions of different High Court’s ruling the field as on the date of impugned adjustment.

As far as the issue involved pertaining to claiming of deduction under section 36 (1) (va) of the IT Act 1961 on delayed payment of employees share of contribution towards ESI/PF of Rs. 19,84,415, in the instant case is concerned is no more res integra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has decided the legal issue on merits in the matter of Checkmate Services P. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax-1, {Civil Appeal No. 2833 of 2016, decided on 12.10.2022}, wherein at paragraphs 51 to 54, it was observed as under:

When Parliament introduced Section 43B, what was on the statute book, was only employer’s contribution (Section 34(1)(iv)). At that point in time, there was no question of employee’s contribution being considered as part of the employer’s earning. On the application of the original principles of law it could have been treated only as receipts not amounting to income. When Parliament introduced the amendments in 1988-89, inserting Section 36(1)(va) and simultaneously inserting the second proviso of Section 43B, its intention was not to treat the disparate nature of the amounts, similarly. As discussed previously, the memorandum introducing the Finance Bill clearly stated that the provisions – especially second proviso to Section 43B - was introduced to ensure timely payments were made by the employer to the concerned fund (EPF, ESI, etc.) and avoid the mischief of employers retaining amounts for long periods. That Parliament intended to retain the separate character of these two amounts, is evident from the use of different language. Section 2(24)(x) too, deems amount received from the employees (whether the amount is received from the employee or by way of deduction authorized by the statute) as income - it is the character of the amount that is important, i.e., not income earned. Thus, amounts retained by the employer from out of the employee’s income by way of deduction etc. were treated as income in the hands of the employer. The significance of this provision is that on the one hand it brought into the fold of “income” amounts that were receipts or deductions from employees income; at the time, payment within the prescribed time – by way of contribution of the employees’ share to their credit with the relevant fund is to be treated as deduction (Section 36(1)(va)). The other 2018-19) Shree Shivam Attires Pvt. Ltd. Vs ACIT, Circle-2(1), Bhilai important feature is that this distinction between the employers’ contribution (Section 36(1)(iv)) and employees’ contribution required to be deposited by the employer (Section 36(1)(va)) was maintained – and continues to be maintained. On the other hand, Section 43B covers all deductions that are permissible as expenditures, or out-goings forming part of the assessees’ liability. These include liabilities such as tax liability, cess duties etc. or interest liability having regard to the terms of the contract. Thus, timely payment of these alone entitle an assessee to the benefit of deduction from the total income. The essential objective of Section 43B is to ensure that if assessees are following the mercantile method of accounting, nevertheless, the deduction of such liabilities, based only on book entries, would not be given. To pass muster, actual payments were a necessary pre-condition for allowing the expenditure.

The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under law – in terms of Section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the later retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) - unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under Section 43B.

In the opinion of this Court, the reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non-obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee’s income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non-obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from 2018-19) Shree Shivam Attires Pvt. Ltd. Vs ACIT, Circle-2(1), Bhilai their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such interpretation were to be adopted, the non- obstante clause under Section 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee’s contribution on or before the due date as a condition for deduction.”

Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Checkmates Services (supra), the present appeal filed by the appellant is not only devoid of merits but also barred by limitation as provided under Section 253 of the Act. The learned ITAT has rightly dismissed the appeal of the assessee. We, therefore, are not persuaded to differ with the view taken by the ITAT and the reason assigned thereof.