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Facts
The assessee, Jonang Buddhist Educational Society, applied for approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) of the Income Tax Act on 31.03.2025. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) denied the application because it was filed beyond the prescribed time limit. The trust had commenced activities on 23.10.2019 and failed to file Form 10AB within six months or the extended time provided by CBDT.
Held
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld the CIT(E)'s decision, ruling that the Tribunal, being a creature of statute, lacks the power to condone delays in filing applications for 80G approval. Such power rests solely with the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), and the Tribunal cannot extend or relax statutory timelines under Section 254 of the Act, as supported by Supreme Court precedents.
Key Issues
Whether the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has the power to condone the delay in filing an application for approval under Section 80G(5)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
Sections Cited
Section 80G, Section 80G(5)(iii), Section 80G(5), Form 10AB, Form 10A, Section 12AB, Section 10(23C), Section 254, Section 144C
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “A” BENCH, CHANDIGARH
Before: HON’BLE SHRI LALIET KUMAR, JM & HON’BLE SHRI KRINWANT SAHAY, AM
O R D E R Krinwant Sahay (Accountant Member) Appeal in this case has been filed by the assessee against the order dated 03.09.2025 passed by the Ld.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Exemptions, Chandigarh [ herein referred to as IT(E)’ Centre (NFAC), Delhi.
Grounds of appeal are as under:
1. That the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) has erred in law rejecting the approval sought under Section 80G holding it to be not maintainable which is arbitrary and unjustified.
2. That the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax has erred in law as well as facts in rejecting the approval sought under Section 80G of the Act only on the basis that the application was not filed within the time limit prescribed in respect of application filed under clause
(iii) of first proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 80G as the trust had commenced activities on 23.10.2019 which is arbitrary and unjustified.
3. That the appellant craves leave to add OR amend the grounds of appeal before the appeal is finally heard or disposed off.
That the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax is erroneous, arbitrary, opposed to law and facts of the case and is, thus, untenable.
Brief facts of the case are that the Assessee trust filed an application for approval u/s 80G(5)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act') on 31.3.2025 which was refused / denied by the Ld. CIT(E) on the ground that the application filed by the Assessee was beyond the prescribed time. In fact, earlier the Assessee had applied and got a provisional registration but for final registration, the Assessee was supposed to file an application in Form 10AB (5) Clause (iii) of section 80G within six months from the commencement of the work or within time prescribed by the Act.
4. The ld. CIT(E) has given her findings on this issue as under: - 7. It is to be noted that w.e.f. 01.04.2021, new provisions relating to Re-registration/Registration of Trust/Company/Institution etc. claiming exemption under Income-tax Act are in effect, whereby all such entities are required to seek re- registration / registration u/s 12AB/80G/10(23C). The entities which were already registered under Income Tax Act are also required to get re-registration under these new provisions. Various time limits have been given for seeking registration/re-registration under the new provisions for different entities, and these time limits have been relaxed/extended several times by CBDT through its various circulars. 8. From the above, it is evident that the time limit prescribed under first proviso to sub-section (5) of section 80G of the Act for filing Form No.10A and 10AB, as the case may be, is mandatory and therefore, after considering the hardship to the applicant the CBDT extended the said time limit on multiple occasions as discussed in Para 6. 9. In the instant case, the applicant has filed the application for approval u/s 80G on 31.03.2025 which is not in the prescribed time limit extended by the Board. The submissions of the applicant to the notice issued on 17.04.2025 have been considered carefully. On perusal of the same, it is observed that the applicant had commenced its activities on 23.10.2019. Thus, application in Form No.10AB has not been filed by the applicant within the time limit prescribed under Clause (iii) of first proviso to sub-section (5) of section 80G of the Act and also the applicant has not filed its application within the extended time limit provided by CBDT as discussed in Para 6 above.”
Per contra, the Ld. CIT DR filed certain case laws in the case of ‘State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra’ AIR 1996 SC 2173, ‘Union of India v. Karloskar Pneumatic Company’ 1996 taxman..com 575 (SC) which clearly bring out that the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay for filing of application u/s 10AB(5)(iii) of the Act. The relevant part of written submission of the ld. DR and case law brought on record by the Revenue is as under: - “On the conspectus of the judicial precedents, it would be clear that the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Income-tax Act, 1961 is not a Court but a Tribunal unless there is express power conferred by the said Act to condone the delay or exclude any period of limitation, the Tribunal would not be clothed with the power to condone the delay. It is trite law that in the absence of any conferment of power by the statute, the Tribunal cannot condone the delay in filing the application in Form 10AB. Thus, the Commissioner (Exemption) had rightly denied the grant of approval under section 80G(5) by placing reliance on the judgment in the case of State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra AIR 1996 Sc 2173 as well as of Indian v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company 1996 taxmann.com 575 (SC).”
It is worth mentioning that the Tribunal is a creation of the statute and derives its jurisdiction and powers strictly from the provisions of the Act. The scope of authority conferred upon the Tribunal is delineated under section 254 of the Act, which empowers it to adjudicate appeals arising from orders passed by the specified income-tax authorities. The Tribunal cannot travel beyond the express limits of the jurisdiction so conferred.
The issue which arises for our consideration is whether, while exercising appellate powers under section 254 of the Act, the Tribunal can extend, relax, or alter a statutory time limit prescribed under the Act or by delegated legislation for filing an application or for availing a statutory benefit before the income-tax authorities. In our considered opinion, no such power vests with the Tribunal.
10.1 The Act expressly vests the authority to prescribe, relax, or extend the time limits for filing returns of income, revised or rectification applications, or for granting relaxation in procedural compliances, with the Central Board of Direct Taxes. Similarly, the timelines prescribed for completion or disposal of proceedings by the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner (Appeals), or other authorities, including those contemplated under section 144C of the Act, are matters governed by the statutory framework itself. The Tribunal, while exercising its appellate jurisdiction under section 254, has no authority to interfere with, modify, or extend such timelines.
10.2 This position is further fortified by the settled principle of law laid down by the Privy Council in Queen v. Emperor and authoritatively reaffirmed in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253], which has been consistently followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that where a statute requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner alone or not at all. Any deviation from the prescribed mode is impermissible. When the legislature has consciously provided the authority, manner, and timeline for performance of a statutory act, the same cannot be diluted or altered by a judicial or quasi-judicial authority in the absence of an express enabling provision.
10.3 Applying the aforesaid principle, when the Act or the Rules framed thereunder vest the power to grant extension, relaxation, or exemption from a statutory timeline exclusively with the Board, the Tribunal cannot, under the guise of exercising powers under section 254 of the Act, assume such jurisdiction. Any such assumption would amount to enlarging the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction beyond what is statutorily contemplated, which is impermissible in law.
Accordingly, drawing the same logic, we are of the considered opinion that even in respect of seeking permanent registration, the timelines prescribed under the Act or by the Board cannot be altered or relaxed by the Tribunal. The power to extend or condone delay, or to grant any exemption or relaxation from such statutory timelines, vests solely with the Board and not with the Tribunal.
We have considered the findings given by the Ld. CIT(E) in her order. We have also considered the arguments of the ld. Counsel for the Assessee and different case laws brought on record by the ld. CIT DR. We find that both the Hon’ble High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court have given very clear findings that the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in case the application has been belatedly filed by the Assessee u/s 10AB (5)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, respectfully following the ratio decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Union of India vs Kirloscar Pneumatic Company’ (supra), the issue raised through aforesaid grounds of appeal in this appeal has no merit and accordingly dismissed.
In the result, Assessee’s appeal is dismissed.