HARI KISHAN RATHI,NEW DELHI vs. ACIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-14 , NEW DELHI

The word/phrase "written approval is not mentioned in the section 153D of the Income tax Act, 1961. The only phrase used is "the prior approval. Therefore, the contents of the written order of the JCIT/AddI. CIT are legally not required to be examined or considered, for meeting the legal or factual requirements of the approval under section 153D

The order by the Addl. CIT/JCIT under section 153D is an Administrative Order, by the higher authority i.e. JCIT/AddI. CIT to the lower authority, i.e. AO. Such an order is not a quasi- judicial or judicial order. Therefore, the legal requirements and benchmarks regarding the principles of "the application of mind" and "the speaking order" are not as strict or high, as they are in the case of quasi-judicial or judicial order. 3. In respect of the legal requirements and the benchmarks regarding the administrative orders / approval / sanctions, the Hon. Supreme Court has given many comprehensive judgments, three of which are enclosed and the relevant portions/parts are quoted as under for kind consideration:-

Whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers? 2. Committed an error of law. 3. committed a breach of the rules of natural justice, 4. reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or, 5. abused its powers.

It could thus be seen that the scope of judicial review of an administrative action is very limited. Unless the Court comes to a conclusion, that the decision maker has not understood the law correctly that regulates his decision-making power or when it is found that the decision of the decision maker is vitiated by irrationality and that too on the principle of "Wednesbury Unreasonableness" or unless it is found that there has been a procedural impropriety in the decision-making process, it would not be permissible for the High Court to interfere in the decision making process. It is also equally well settled, that it is not permissible for the Court to examine the validity of the decision but this Court can examine only the correctness of the decision-making process.

This Court recently in the case of West Bengal Central School "31. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an ITA Nos.2566 & 2822/Del/2022 5 | P a g e obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court, in the present matter, could have come to a conclusion that it was empowered to exercise the power of judicial review to prevent arbitrariness or favoritism on the part of the State authorities, as has been observed by it in paragraph 13. We are also unable to appreciate the finding of the High Court in para 17 wherein it has observed that the impugned decision of the authorities are found not to be in the ITA Nos.2566 & 2822/Del/2022 6 | P a g e public interest. We ask the question to us, as to whether directing re- tendering by inviting fresh tenders after giving wide publicity at the National level so as to obtain the best price for the public property, would be in the public interest or as to whether awarding contract to a bidder in the tender process where it is found that there was no adequate publicity and also a possibility of there being a cartel of bidders, would be in the public interest. We are of the considered view that the decision of the Commissioner which is set aside by the High Court is undoubtedly in larger public interest, which would ensure that the Municipal Council earns a higher revenue by enlarging the scope of the competition. By no stretch of imagination, the decision of the State Government or the Commissioner could be termed as illegal, improper, unreasonable or irrational, which parameters only could have permitted the High Court to interfere. Interference by the High Court when none of such parameters exist, in our view, was totally improper On the contrary, we find that it is the High Court, which has failed to take into consideration relevant material.

In the result, the impugned Orders are not sustainable in law. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed and the impugned orders dated 31.08.2017 and 05.07.2018 are quashed and set aside. The petition of respondent No. dismissed 1 stands

We have given our thoughtful consideration to the assessee’s and the Revenue’s respective vehement contentions regarding the first and foremost issue of validity of the impugned assessment as lacking valid approval under section 153D of the Act. The assessee’s paper-book dated 19.01.2024 at pages 1 & 2 has filed the learned prescribed authority’s common approval granted in 28 ITR 186 (Del.) have already settled the issues in assessee’s favour and against the department that such an approval under section 153D has to be accorded separately for each and every assessment year even if it involves a single assessee. We thus accept the assessee’s instant first and foremost legal grounds/arguments to quash the impugned assessment herein framed by the Assessing Officer on 31st December, 2019 in very terms. That being the case,