SUSI CHARITABLE TRUST,KHURDA vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX(EXEMPTION), HYDERABAD, HYDERABAD

It was submitted by the Ld.AR that the assessee has been granted registration u/s.12A of the Act. It was the further submission that the ld. CIT(E) has also asked the details on merits, which have no adverse inference. It was the submission that the authority who has granted power to adjudicate the issue has also granted the authority to condone the delay whereas the Act specifically does not exclude such power of condonation of delay. It was the submission that provision of Section 80G of the Act does not exclude the power to condone the delay. It was the 2 prayer that the issue may be restored to the file of ld. CIT(E) to condone the delay and to consider the assessee’s prayer for registration u/s.80G of the Act.

In reply, ld. CIT-DR submitted that he had no objection if the issue is restored to the file of ld. CIT(E) to consider the reasons for the delay and to consider the prayer of the assessee.

We have considered the rival submissions. Here we should consider the decision of the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of Society for Community Organization and People Education (SCOPE), passed in order dated 03.10.2025, wherein the coordinate bench of the Tribunal has taken a stand that the timeline u/s.80G(5) of the Act are directory in nature and had consequently directed the ld.CIT(E) to treat the delayed application filed by the assessee having been filed under clause (iii) to the first proviso to Section 80G of the Act and to decide in accordance with law. Here, it would also be worthwhile to draw attention to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.K.Mohammed Kunhi, reported in 1969 AIR 430 (SC), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- There can be no manner of doubt that by the provisions of the Act of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 powers have not been expressly conferred upon the Appellate Trismal to stay proceedings relating to the recovery of penalty or tax due from an assessee. At the same time it is significant that under s. 220 (6) the power of stay by treating the assessee as not being in defast during the pendency of an appeal has been given to the Income-tax Officer only when an appeal has been presented under s. 246 which will be to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and not to the Appellate Tribunal. There is no provision in s. 220 under which the Income-tax Officer or any of his superior departmental officers can be moved for granting stay in the recovery of penalty or tax. It may be that under s. 225 notwithstanding that a certificate has 3 been issued to the Tax Recovery Officer for the recovery of any tax (the position will be the same with regard to penalty) the Income tax Officer may grant time for the payment of the tax. In this manner he can probably keep on granting extensions until the disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal. It may also be that as a matter of practice prevailing in the department the Commissioner or the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in exercise of administrative powers can give the necessary relief of staying recovery to the assessee but that can hardly be put at par with a statutory power as is contained in s. 220(6) which is confined only to the stage of pendency of an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant before us that in the absence of any express provisions in ss. 254 and 255 of the Act relating to stay of recovery during the pendency of an appeal it must be held that no such power can be exercised by the Tribunal, suffers from a fundamental infirmity inasmuch as it assumes and proceeds on the premise that the statute confers such a power on the Income-tax Officer who can give the necessary relief to an assessee. The right of appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to review by the Appellate Tribunal. Indeed the Tribunal has been given very wide powers under s. 254(1) for it may pass such orders as it thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties to the appeal. If the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner have made assessments or imposed penalties raising very large demands and if the Appellate Tribunal is entirely helpless in the matter of stay or recovery the entire purpose of the appeal can be defeated if ultimately the orders of the departmental authorities are set aside. It is difficult to conceive that the Legislature should have left the entire matter to the administrative authorities to make such orders as they choose to pass in exercise of unfettered discretion. The assessee, as has been pointed out before, has no right to even move an application when an appeal is pending before the Appellate Tribunal under s. 220 (6) and it is only at the earlier stage of appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the statute provides for such a matter being dealt with by the Income- tax Officer. It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory, power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Third Edition, Arts. 5401 and 5402). The powers which have been conferred by a. 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers, fully effective. In Domat's Civil Law Cushing's Edition, Vol. 1 at page 88, it has been stated: It is the duty of the Judges to apply the laws, not only to what appears-to be regulated by their express dispositions, but to all the cases where a just application of them may be made, and which 4 appear to be comprehended either within the consequences that may be gathered from it." Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, contains a statement at p. 350 that "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdiction data est, ea quoque concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit." An instance is given based on Ex. parte Martin(x) that "where an inferior court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced."