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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “A” BENCH, MUMBAI
आदेश / O R D E R
महावीर ससुंह, उपाध्यक्ष / PER MAHAVIR SINGH, VP:
These cross appeals are arising out of the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-5, Mumbai in Appeal No. IT-11/10-11 dated 08.03.2016. The Assessment was framed by the Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 23(1) Mumbai (in short ACIT/ITO/ AO) for AY 2008-09 vide dated 29.03.2010, under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter ‘the Act’). 2. At the outset it is to be mentioned that these cross appeals were fixed for hearing before “G” Bench and “G” Bench adjourned this matter on 25th March, 2019. Consequent to this adjournment, the Revenue moved a petition for transfer to this matter from “G” Bench to any other Bench because “G” Bench was not functioning during that week. Hence Revenue moved transfer petition and early hearing petition before the Vice President, ITAT, Mumbai. The relevant text of the letter dated 20.03.2019 reads as under: - “Appeal Nos. – ITA 3680/M/17, ITA 3882/M/17 ITA 3644/M/16, ITA 3645/M/16 ITA 4563/M/16, ITA 4564/M/16
3 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Sir,
It is brought to your kind notice that hearing in the above mentioned matters was fixed by the Hon'ble Members of the G-Bench, ITAT for the 25th and 27th of March, 2019. However, it is learnt that the G Bench is not functioning on the above mentioned dates. You are hence requested to kindly transfer the above mentioned appeals to an appropriate bench of the honourable Tribunal so that the above appeals are heard on 25th March, 2019. I shall be obliged for kind consideration of this request.”
Consequent to the same, this application was put up before the Bench on 22.03.2019 and the Bench passed the order transferring these appeals to “A” Bench and posting on the same day, i.e. 23.05.2019 and the relevant order of the Bench reads as under: -
“ITA Nos. 3680, 3882/Mum/2017, 3644, 3645, 4563 & 4564/Mum/2016
State Bank of India
For the assessee: K.K. Ved
For the Revenue: Satish Chandra Rjore
4 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 The appeals had come up last for hearing before ‘G’ Bench on 20th March 2019. It is explained by the parties before us that certain clarifications were to be obtained by the assessee bank and, accordingly, the then Bench adjourned the matter to 25th March 2019, as consented by the parties.
Presently, Revenue has filed an application dated 20th March 2019 pointing out that the exercise of listing the appeals on out of turn basis would be rendered infructuous by posting the matter on 25th March 2019 since ‘G’ Bench is not functioning in the next two weeks. Therefore, it has been requested that the appeals fixed on 25th March 2019 be transferred and assigned to another Bench, so as to facilitate early adjudication. The learned representative appearing for the Bank does not dispute the factual matrix asserted by the learned DR.
Considering the aforesaid, it is deemed fit that the appeals listed before ‘G’ Bench in the case of Sate Bank of India in ITA Nos. 3680, 3882/Mum/2017 and 3644, 3645, 4563 & 4564/Mum/2016 are transferred to come up for hearing before ‘A’ Bench on 25th March, 2019.
5 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Above was announced in the court.
Sd/- Sd/- (MS) (GSP) JM VP”
In terms of the above, these appeals were heard after the consent of the parties.
The first issue in this appeal of the assessee is as regards to the order of the CIT(A) confirming the disallowance made by AO in respect to assessee’s claim of deduction on account of provisions for pension amounting to Rs. 3724/- crores. For this the assessee raised the following ground No. 1: -
“1. Provision for pension of ₹3724,00,00,000/-.
The learned CIT(A) erred in upholding the action of the Assessing Officer in disallowing the appellant’s claim in respect of provisions for pension amounting to Rs.3724,00,00,000.”
Brief facts of the case are that the assessee during the financial year 2007-08 relevant to A.Y. 2008-09 adopted Accounting Standard (AS) 15 – Employee Benefits (Revised 2005) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). The assessee bank in accordance with the transitional provisions of AS (15), based on actuarial valuation provided a sum of Rs. 3724/- crores towards pension benefits and Rs. 532.70 crores towards other employee benefits by adopting
6 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 revenue reserves. The assessee claimed these amounts under Section 37(1) of the Act. During the course of scrutiny assessment proceedings, the AO noted and set out the defined benefit Pension Plan and Gratuity Plan required under AS 15. The relevant portion reads as under: -
Particulars Pension Gratuity Plans Change in the present value of the defined benefit obligation Opening defined benefit obligation at 15929.00 3527.00 1st April, 2007 Current Service Cost 423.14 126.15 Interest Cost 1290.00 285.00 Actuarial losses (gains) 219.62 (72.97) Benefits paid (1051.76) (321.00) Closing defined benefit obligation at 16810.00 3544.18 31st March, 2008 Change in Plan Assets Opening fair value of plan assets at 12205.26 3527.00 1" April, 2007 Expected Return on Plan assets 976.42 269.72 Contributes by employer 884. 14 5.00 Benefit Paid (1051.76) (321.00) Actuarial gains 7074 63.46 Closing fair value of plan assets at 13084.80 3544.18 31st March, 2008 Reconciliation of present value of the obligation and fair value of the plan assets Present value of Funded obligation at 16810.00 3544.18 31st March, 2008 Deficit (Surplus) 13084.80 3544.18 Unrecognized Past Service Cost Nil Nil New Liability/(Asset) 3725.20 Nil Amount Recognised in the Balance Nil Sheet
7 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Liabilities 3725.20 Nil Assets Nil Nil Net Liability/(Asset) recognized in 3725.20 Nil Balance Sheet Net Cost recognized in the Profit and Loss Account Current Service Cost 423.14 126.15 Interest Cost 1290.00 285.00 Expected return on plan assets (976.42) (269.72) Net actuarial losses (Gain) recognized 148.88 (136.43) during the year Total costs of defined benefit plans 885.60 5.00 included in Schedule 16 “payment to and provisions for employees” Reconciliation of expected return and actual return on Plan Assets Expected Return on Plan Assets 976.42 269.72 Actuarial gain/(loss) on Plan Assets 70.74 63.46 Actual Return on Plan Assets 1047.16 333.18 Reconciliation of opening and closing net liability/(asset) recognized in Balance Sheet Opening Net Liability as at 1st April, 3723.74 Nil 2007 Expenses as recognized in profit and 885.00 5.00 loss account Net liability (Asset) recognized in 3725.20 Nil Balance Sheet 6. The AO, after discussing provisions of Sections 36(1)(iv), 36(1)(v), 40A(7) and 40(9) of the Act, noted that since these specific provisions are applicable for allowability of the above noted expenditure and expenditure of similar nature, they cannot be allowed under the general provisions of section 37(1) of the Act. The AO further noted that even the conditions as per Section 43B of the Act would be applicable to similar expenditure. The AO, finally after discussing elaborately,
8 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 disallowed the claim towards pension benefit by observing on the following 4 issues: -
“a. In view of the language of Section 37(1) itself, it is clear that it is a residual section for allowability of various expenses in the computation of income if there is no other specific provision relating to allowance of any expenditure u/s 30 to 36 of the I.T. Act.
b. Otherwise also, it is an established principle that the general provision (like section 37(1)) will not be applicable to such an item falling within the ambit of any specific provision. c. Further the expenditure should be relatable to the previous year. d. In the mercantile system the liability shall be an accrued liability and not a provisional liability to be allowed. Provisions of section 36 (1) (iv) and 36 1(v) allow provisional liabilities but they are subject to certain including applicability of section 438 of the I.T. Act. However, similar provisional liabilities cannot be allowed u/s 37(1) of the I.T. Act. In any case, the liability should be relatable to the revenue realized during the year.”
9 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 7. In view of the above, the AO noted that the provision for pension relates to accumulated impact of services of employees till 31.03.2007 as a result of change in accounting policy adopted by the assessee bank. According to the AO, these so called expenses claimed by the assessee represents accumulated liability of earlier years which cannot be matched with the current year’s revenue and the assessee itself has taken to Reserves account and not to the Profit & Loss Account. According to him, the same indicates that the management and the Auditor itself considered that these liabilities relate to earlier years. The AO further noted that even otherwise these liabilities are dependent on other relevant events, conditions and other statutory conditions or events to happen and hence are contingent in nature. The AO noted that allowance of these liabilities or provision of similar nature is actually made under the specific provisions by the Statute under Sections 36(1)(iv) and 36(1)(v) of the Act subject to other conditions as prescribed in the provisions of Section 40A(7) and 40A(9) of the Act. He noted that since these specific provisions are applicable to the assessee bank’s case, the allowability of pension benefit expenditure, which is of similar nature, they cannot be allowed under the general provisions of Section 37(1) of the Act. Accordingly, he noted that the assessee has created these transitional liabilities as a result of adoption of revised AS-15. Hence, he disallowed the defined benefit Pension Plan claim by the assessee of Rs. 3724/- crores. Aggrieved assessee preferred appeal before the CIT(A).
10 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 8. The CIT(A), after considering the submission of the assessee and the detailed discussion carried out by the AO in the assessment order and also the decision of the DRP for A.Y. 2012-13 vide para 62, extracted hereunder, affirmed the order of the AO: -
"The assessee has made a provision of 1663.41 crores towards pension liability. The plea of the assessee is that the said provision is allowable under section 37(1) of the Act. We are unable to accede to this plea of the assessee. Though it had been claimed the said provision was on actuarial valuation, it could not be ascertained before this Panel as to how it is an ascertained liability which has been ascertained at the time it has been debited to the books and it is not contingent in nature. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the contention that if a business liability has arisen in the relevant year, a deduction has to be allowed though the liability may be actually discharged at a later date. But then the onus is on the tax payer to demonstrate that how the said liability had arisen in the relevant year. We also agree with the view taken by the AO in this regard that when there are specific provisions dealing with the contribution to welfare funds, the same are allowable under the general provision of 37(1)”.
11 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Aggrieved, assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal.
Before us, the learned Senior Counsel for the assessee, Shri P.J. Pardiwalla, stated the facts first. He stated that during the financial year 2007-08 the bank adopted AS-15 Employees Benefit (Revised 2005) issued by the ICAI and in accordance with the provisions of AS-15 the bank has claimed/provided and made provision of Rs. 3724/- crores towards pension benefit. The learned counsel for the assessee filed copy of AS–15 and particularly drew our attention to clause 4 of Employees benefit and argued that even the pension is included in this clause where specifically AS-15 applies to pension also, i.e. employees benefit including retirement benefits. He then took us through the assessment order and narrated that the AO has made disallowance only on the above noted 4 items. He particularly stated the following: -
(i) The liability is not for the relevant year rather it relates to earlier year.
(ii) If at all it is allowable it falls under Section 40A (4/5) and 40A(7)/(9) of the Act.
(iii) Even this provision can be allowed subject to condition of payment as prescribed under Section 43B of the Act.
In view of the above, he stated that the entire premise of the AO is without any basis and argued that during year under consideration financial year 2007-08, as per the mandatory
12 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 provision of AS-15 issued by the ICAI, the assessee has computed the pension benefit, i.e. defined employees benefit which was estimated on actuarial basis as per the valuation certificate issued by the Valuer and the provision for the same was made in the books of account by the assessee bank. He stated that no deduction on account of such provision was claimed in the earlier years and this expenditure was booked during the year under consideration, because of change in the accounting method AS-15 issued by the ICAI. He stated that the said expenditure in the previous year as a liability was quantified and as accrued during the year notwithstanding the fact that the same had to be discharged at a later date.
He stated that provisions of Section 37(1) of the Act grants a deduction from the profit of the business in respect of any expenditure not been in the nature of capital expenses or personal expenses laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. He stated that provisions of Section 43B of the Act are not applicable for the reason that the provisions are in relation to expenditure and not towards contribution towards welfare fund and are accordingly governed by provisions of Section 37(1) of the Act. The learned counsel for the assessee also brought to our notice the provisions of Section 37(1) of the Act and stated that Section 37(1) of the Act applies only to the expenditure which is expenditure not in the nature prescribed in Sections 30 to 36 of the Act. He referred to provisions of Section 37(1) of the Act which read as under: -
13 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 “37. (1) Any expenditure (not being expenditure of the nature described in sections 30 to 36 and not being in the nature of capital expenditure or personal expenses of the assessee), laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the business or profession shall be allowed in computing the income chargeable under the head "Profits and gains of business or profession".
The learned counsel for the assessee stated that the claim made by the assessee is on account of defined benefit Pension Plan and not on any recognized fund or superannuation fund or contribution to any approved gratuity fund. He stated that the assessee’s case does not fall in any of the provisions of Sections 36(1)(iv) or 36(1)(v) of the Act. He stated that the crucial issue to be examined is whether in the present case the provisions made by the assessee bank for pension is a liability in the present or payable in future or is it a contingent liability. He stated that in the present case the provisions are in respect of actual liability which is ascertained at the time it is debited in the books of account of the assessee bank and is not contingent upon happening of any future event. He referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers Vs. CIT (2000) 245 ITR 428 (SC) held as under: -
“The law is settled: if a business liability has definitely arisen in the accounting year, the
14 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 deduction should be allowed although the liability may have to be quantified and discharged at a future date. What should be certain is the incurring of the liability. It should be certain is the incurring of the liability. It should also be capable of being estimated with reasonable certainty though the actual quantification may not be possible. If these requirements are satisfied the liability is not a contingent one. The liability is in praesenti though it will be discharged at a future date. It does not make any difference if the future date on which the liability shall have to be discharged is not certain.
In Metal Box Company of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1969) 73 ITR 53 (SC), the appellant-company estimated its liability under two gratuity schemes framed by the company and the amount of liability was deducted from the gross receipts in the profit and loss account. The company had worked out on an actuarial valuation its estimated liability and made provision for such liability not all at once but spread over a number of years. The practice followed by the company was that every year the company worked out the additional liability incurred by it on the
15 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 employees putting in every additional year of service. The gratuity was payable on the termination of an employee’s service either due to retirement, death or termination of service- the exact time of the occurrence of the later two events being not determinable with exactitude before hand. A few principles were laid down by this court, the relevant of which for our purpose are extracted and reproduced as under:-
(i) For an assessee maintain his accounts on the mercantile system, a liability already accrued, though to be discharged at a future date, would be proper deduction while working out the profits and gains of his business, regard being had to the accepted principles of commercial practice and accountancy. It is not as if such deduction is permissible only in the case of amounts actually expended or paid;
(ii) Just as receipts, though not actual receipts but accrued due are brought in for income-tax assessment, so also liabilities accrued due would be taken into account while working out the profits and gains of the business;
16 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 (iii) A condition subsequent, the fulfilment of which may result in the reduction or even extinction f the liability, would not have the effect of converting that liability into a contingent liability;
(iv) A trader computing his taxable profits for a particular year ay properly deduct not only the payments actually made to his employees but also the present value of any payments in respect of their services in that year to be made in a subsequent year if it can be satisfactorily estimated.
So is the view taken in Calcutta Co. Ltd. v. cit (1959) 37 ITR 1 (SC) wherein this court has held that the liability on the assessee having been imported, the liability would be an accrued liability and would not convert into a conditional one merely because the liability was to be discharged at a future date. There may be some difficulty in the estimation thereof but that would not convert the accrued liability into a conditional one; it was always open to the tax authorities concerned to arrive at a proper estimate of the liability having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
17 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Applying the abovesaid settled principles to the facts of the case at hand we are satisfied that the provision made by the appellant company for meeting the liability incurred by it under the leave encashment scheme proportionate with the entitlement earned by employees of the company, inclusive of the officers and the staff, subject to the ceiling on accumulation as applicable on the relevant date, is entitled to deduction out of the gross receipts for the accounting year during which the provision is made for the liability. The liability is not a contingent liability. The High Court was not right in taking the view to the contrary.
The appeal is allowed. The judgement under appeal is set aside. The question referred by the Tribunal to the High Court is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.”
In view of the above, it was stated that in case where the expenses have been accrued and the same can be estimated on a reliable basis the assessee is entitled to claim deduction in respect of the same irrespective of the fact that the same has been estimated and remained unpaid. The learned counsel for the assessee stated that as per provisions of Section 145 of the Act income chargeable under head “profit and gains of business
18 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 or profession” or “income from other sources” is required to be computed in accordance with either cash or mercantile system of accounting regularly employed by the assessee. The assessee bank has followed mercantile system of accounting and in terms of the guidelines of the RBI, the assessee bank was required to follow AS-15 from financial year 2007-08 relevant to A.Y. 2008- 09. He argued that the provision made on account of pension liability may relates to earlier years but it is well settled principle in law that such liabilities are allowable in the year in which they are crystallized. In the present case the liability in respect of pension has been crystallized in the relevant previous year 2007-08 relevant to A.Y. 2008-09 pursuant to adoption of AS-15 and accordingly allowable as a deduction. He stated that assessee’s case is also covered by the decision in the case of State Bank of Saurashtra in ITA NO. 4949/Mum/2013 dated 23.12.2016 for A.Y. 2009-10, which has since merged with assessee bank and referred to Para 18.1 of the order. He then took us through the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT vs. Ranbaxi Laboratories Ltd 334 ITR 341 (Del) and stated that the issue is covered by the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court because wherein a superannuation claim of its employees was under litigation and the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has noted that this claim was non funded and applicable to the managerial employees and hence the liability on account of superannuation of its employees for financial year 2001-02 was provided following AS-15 based on actuarial valuation and this provision was disallowed by the AO by
19 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 invoking provisions of Section 43B(b) of the Act on the ground that even if it was an ascertained liability the deduction should not be allowed in the provision to pension fund. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court also held that where the liability on account of pension accrued from year to year, which were payable on retirement of eligible employees and the same cannot be disallowed under Section 43B of the Act.
On the other hand, Ld. CIT DR Shri Anadi Verma argued that the AO during the course of scrutiny proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act disallowed the deduction claimed by the assessee on account of provision for pension. The CIT(A) upheld the decision of the AO. The assessee bank has claimed that the provision for pension made by it in its books of account is an accrued liability that should be allowed under section 37(1) of the Act. The assessee bank has also claimed that such provision for pension is independent of, and is not hit by the provisions of Section 36(1)(iv) and Section 40A(7) and 40A(9) of the Act. However, the bank regularly contribute towards superannuation fund, gratuity fund, P.F. etc. for meeting the requirement of post-employment benefits which comprises of defined benefit plan and other long term employee benefits. The contribution made by the assessee towards superannuation funds are allowed u/s.36(1)(iv) of the Act, contribution towards approved gratuity funds are allowed u/s.36(i)(v) of the Act subject to several conditions. Further, u/s.40A(7)(a) of the Act, no deduction shall be allowed in respect of any provision (whether called as such or by any other name) made by the
20 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 assessee for payment of gratuity to its employees on their retirement or on termination of their employment for any reason except provision made by the assessee for the purpose of payment of a sum by way of contribution towards an approved gratuity fund, or for the purpose of payment of any gratuity that has become payable during the previous year. Sec 40A(9) of the Act also puts several restrictions on allowing several expenses incurred by an assessee as an employer except in accordance with provision of Sec.36(1)(iv) and (v) of the Act. Under these circumstances, the assessee's claim of deduction for provision for meeting the similar liabilities under section 37(1) of the Act is not acceptable because the section itself bars expenses of the nature provided under section 30 to 36 of the Act. Otherwise, such action will circumvent these specific provisions. It may be mentioned that it is a well established legal principle that special provision prevail over general provision. It is submitted that in a recent judgement in the case of Pricol Limited, the Hon’ble Madras HC has explain the definition of the word "gratuity" by borrowing from the Hon'ble SC's decision AIR 2004 SC 1426 and stated that gratuity is a gratuitous payment given to an employee on discharge superannuation or death. Thus, the Hon'ble court has brought out the encompassing nature of the word "gratuity." The Court in the present case was deciding on the allowability of "provision for service weightage of the employees." The Court held that such provision, which is in effect, a scheme for gratuity, is only a mere arrangement between the employer
21 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 and the employee and hence stands clearly hit by provisions of Section 40A (7) (a) of the Act. He argued that the assessee bank has made a provision for pension on the basis of an "actuarial valuation" and has also submitted during the course of hearing that the valuation is based on the number of years served by the employee and similar criteria. He stated that the provision for "pension" as claimed by the assessee is nothing but provision made for a gratuitous payment and is hit by 40A(7) of the Act. Without prejudice to the above, the provision for pension made by the assessee is hit by Section 40A(9) of the Act.
We have heard rival contentions on this issue and gone through facts and circumstances of the case. We have also perused the material placed before us including assessment order, order of CIT(A) and case laws. We noted that the assessee provides post-employment benefits such as pension, gratuity, etc. to its employees, under a “Defined Benefit Plan”. In terms of the said Plan, the assessee operates a Provident Scheme, Gratuity scheme and Pension Scheme. The Pension scheme comprises of two parts, (i) where the assessee makes a contribution to an approved Pension Fund, and (ii) where the assessee provides for pension payable to vested employees on retirement, on death while employed or on termination of employment, etc. The issue in the present appeal is only with regard to (ii) above i.e. provision for pension payable to employees. Based on the employment policy, the assessee provides pension benefits to its employees under a defined
22 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 benefit plan. The provision is in respect of the agreed benefits payable to its employees on retirement in respect of the services rendered by the said employees. The assessee has been measuring its liability for such benefits actuarially and obtains a valuation report every year and, on basis thereof, makes a provision in accordance with the Accounting Standards. During the year under consideration, the assessee has adopted AS-15 issued by the ICAI. Accordingly, an actuarial valuation was obtained to determine the additional obligation of the assessee towards pension liability. In accordance with the transitional provisions of AS-15, a provision of Rs. 3,724 crores were made based on the actuarial valuation by debiting the revenue reserves. The details are filed by the assessee in its note filed vide note 18.9 (a)(v)(I) of the financial statements at page No. 73 of the Paper Book – I, filed by assessee.
We noted that the above amount was debited to revenue reserves, the assessee claimed a deduction for the same separately in the computation of total income and the relevant details are filed by the assessee at Sr. No III.14 of the computation of total income on page 2 of the Paper Book – I filed by assessee. As consideration for availing of the benefit of the services of the employees during the year it in addition to the salary, bonus, allowances, perquisites, etc. is also obliged to provide various retirement benefits such as pension, gratuity, etc. to the employees. These liabilities although to be discharged in the future relate to the rendering of the services during the year and because of the various imponderables
23 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 determined based on an actuarial valuation. The assessee explained this by an example stating that, if as per employee policy an amount of Rs. 250/- is payable to each employee towards pension and there are 10,000 employees, the total pension payable would be Rs. 25,00,000/-. However, based on actuarial valuation, which takes into consideration entry into service, length of service and date of retirement of all employees, attrition before retirement, etc. the pension liability amounts to Rs. 18,00,000/-. Accordingly, a provision of Rs. 18,00,000/- is required to be created in the books. Therefore, the pension liability has definitely arisen during the year as the services of the employees are already availed, and they are eligible for the said pension. It is also possible to estimate the pension liability with reasonable certainty. Hence, the provision made is for a present actual liability, payable in future, and not a contingent liability. It is clearly an ascertained liability and has been recognised in the books of account on a scientific basis, based on actuarial valuation. The Supreme Court in the case of Metal Box Co. of India (supra) and Bharat Earth Movers (supra) and several other cases, have held that if a business liability has definitely arisen in the accounting year, a deduction should be allowed if the liability could be reasonably estimated though actually discharged at a later date. Also, the Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi Flour Mills Vs. CIT [1974] 95 ITR 151 (Delhi), while allowing the provision for gratuity, observed as under:
“The gratuity payable to an employee represented a part of the emoluments payable
24 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 to him for rendering service during each year. The right to receive gratuity accrued to the employee as soon as he completed one year of service and, as a corollary, the liability to pay the gratuity to the employee arose to the assessee at the end of each year. The amount of the liability was also ascertainable and there was no question in the instant case of the discounted present value of the liability being not ascertainable. It was no doubt true that the actual payment of the gratuity was deferred to a later date on the happening of a certain event, namely, death or voluntary retirement of the employee. But, these were not uncertain events. Therefore, the provision made by the assessee for the payment of gratuity under the agreement dated 14-2-1956, was in the nature of a revenue expenditure in respect of the assessment years under reference”.
Accordingly, a deduction was claimed in respect of provision for pension liability based on the principle laid down by the Courts, as discussed above. The claim was further supported by the Accounting Standard 1 notified by the Central Government in terms of section 145(2) of the Act, which mandates the adoption of a policy of prudence pursuant to which a provision is to be made for every known liability even though the amount cannot be determined with certainty and
25 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 represents only a best estimate in the light of available information. But, the Revenue before the Tribunal has emphasised on the following contentions: a. expenditure does not relate to the year under consideration; b. Specific provision of sections 36(1)(iv)/36(1)(v) and 40A(7)/40A(9) of the Act are applicable to the pension liability. Further, the same should only be allowed on payment basis as per section 43B of the Act. Hence, a general provision like section 37(1) of the Act cannot apply.
We noted that, in the present case, the provision of Rs. 3,724 crore relates to the transitional liability and has arisen on account of adoption of Revised AS-15 relating to employee benefits issued by the ICAI. The allowability of such transitional provision has been upheld by the Hyderabad Bench of the Tribunal in the case of NMDC Ltd. vs. JCIT (2015) 56 taxmann.com 396 (Hyderabad - Trib.) and Chandigarh Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Ltd. vs. ADIT being order dated 2.04.2013 (ITA No. 1148/Chd/2011). Both the aforesaid cases were specifically concerned with similar provision created towards post retirement employee benefits on account of revision of AS-15. In both the cases the Tribunal has allowed a deduction for a liability which the revenue alleged did not pertain to the year,
26 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 created as in consequence of an adoption of the revised accounting standard.
The fact that in year of change of accounting method there may be a distortion was accepted by the Bombay High Court in CIT vs. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd. [1992] 193 ITR 349 (Bombay). The Court was concerned with a case where the assessee changed its method of accounting for claiming deduction of bonus payments to employees from cash to mercantile. Consequently, in the year of change it claimed such deduction in respect of the cash payment for the past year accounts as well as for the provision made for the current year’s liability. The High Court held that whenever there is a change in the method of accounting, something of this kind is bound to happen. In the present case also, liability has arisen on account of change in the policy that was thrust on the assessee as a consequence of the revised accounting standard that was mandated to adopt by the Reserve Bank of India. Therefore, no disallowance could be made on this ground.
The assessee is under an obligation to pay pension to their employees as per the agreed terms. With the rise in salary levels and reduction in interest rates and the fact that pension payments will have to made, based on the salary last drawn before retirement, a huge gap existed between the amount funded to the approved scheme and the actuarial valuation of such liability. With a view to bridge the gap a provision of Rs. 3,724 crores have been made during the year. The basis of
27 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 arriving at this amount is referred by the AO at pages 22 and 23 of his assessment order. The provision in the present case is not for making contribution to any Fund, but for payment of pension to employees on their retirement over and above what they will be entitled to claim from the approved scheme. A bare perusal of sections 36(1)(iv)/36(1)(v) of the Act shows that, they would apply when deduction is claimed of any sum paid by an assessee as an employer towards a recognised provident fund or an approved superannuation fund or an approved gratuity fund. The amount of Rs. 3,724 crores are clearly not a contribution towards any recognised provident fund or approved superannuation fund or approved gratuity fund. Similarly sections 40A(7)/40A(9) of the Act would apply to provision made as an employer towards contribution to fund, or trust or any other entity. We also noted that the amount of Rs. 3,724 crore is not a provision made for contribution to any fund or trust or any other entity. Similarly, section 43B of the Act deals with contribution to any provident fund or superannuation fund or gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of employees. The amount of Rs. 3,724 crores are not a contribution to a pension fund and is a provision towards pension liability. We are of the view that only the prescribed items can be disallowed in terms of section 43B of the Act. Therefore, the above provisions are clearly not applicable in the present case.
It also requires consideration that this aspect of the matter has not been controverted by the Revenue in their submissions before the Tribunal. The aforesaid provision
28 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 represents the liability arising on account of the availment of services during the tenure of the employment recognized as a consequence of the transitional provisions of AS-15. The aforesaid provision does not represent contribution to any pension fund, and hence, the provisions of sections 36(1)(iv)/36(1)(v) or 40A(7)/40A(9) or 43B of the Act are not applicable.
In CIT vs. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. [2011] 334 ITR 341 (Delhi), the Delhi High Court was concerned with a case where the assessee had introduced a pension scheme for its managerial employees which was over and above the benefits available under the superannuation scheme of the company. The Delhi High Court held that the pension scheme of the assessee does not envisage any regular contribution to any fund or trust or any other entity and, therefore, allowed the deduction on the basis that liability in this regard accrues year on year. Further, reliance is placed on the decision of Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs. ACIT [2013] 22 ITR(T) 737 (Mumbai), wherein the issue of allowability of pension payable to employees over and above the amount payable under the LIC scheme was restored to the file of the AO since additional evidence was filed by the assessee. However, in a subsequent decision by an order dated 30.10.2014 in ITA No. 4449/Mum/1999, the Tribunal has allowed the deduction after noting that the deduction was allowed by the AO while giving effect to the earlier year’s order wherein the matter was restored back.
29 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 23. The issue is also squarely covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Bench of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of erstwhile State Bank of Suarashtra (which has merged with the Assessee) vs. DCIT in ITA No. 4502/Mum/2013 dated 23.12.2016. The findings of the Tribunal are reproduced below:
“It is not disputed that the assessee has made the provision on the basis of actuarial valuation towards the pension of the employees in accordance with Accounting Standard 15, which was applicable from the impugned assessment year. The liability has therefore, definitely arisen during the impugned assessment year although it has to be discharged on a future date. The case of the assessee, in our view, is duly covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers v. CIT [2000] (245 ITR 428) in which it was held as under:
“…………………
……………………”
The provision of section 43B will not apply to the same as this does not represent the sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to pension fund. We, therefore, respectfully, following the decision of
30 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Hon’ble Supreme Court delete the disallowance”
Hence, this issue is also covered by the Tribunal decision in the case of State Bank of Suarashtra (supra), which has merged with the Assessee. 24. The reliance placed by the learned Departmental Representative at the time of the hearing on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Pricol Limited is completely misplaced since the same deals with a case of disallowance of provision towards gratuity which was squarely covered by the provision of section 40A(7) of the Act. Further, it is clarified that section 40A(9) of the Act will not be applicable since the provision is not towards contribution to any pension fund. We are of the view that sections 36(1)(iv) and 36(1)(v) of the Act specifically deal with contribution to a recognized provident fund or an approved superannuation fund or an approved gratuity fund. The said sections do not deal with providing for a liability vis-à-vis pension or any other retirement benefits. Thus, the aforesaid provision for pension made on the basis of an actuarial valuation ought to be allowed as a deduction under section 37(1) of the Act. Since there are specific provisions dealing with contribution to pension fund/ gratuity fund, etc., the provision for pension (which doesn’t represent any contribution to fund) falls under the purview of section 37(1) of the Act and ought to be allowed as deduction. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the
31 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 case of CIT vs. Kalyanji Mavji & Co. [1980] 122 ITR 49 (SC), wherein it was held that if expenditure incurred by the assessee was not covered by the specific provision under section 10(2)(v) of the Act, then, benefit should be given to the assessee under the residuary clause i.e. section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. Moreover, Instruction No. 17/2008 dated 26.11.2008, relied upon by the CIT DR is also not applicable to the facts of the case. As regards, para ix of the aforesaid instruction, it is applicable to deduction towards contribution to provident fund or superannuation fund or gratuity fund or any other fund for the welfare of the employees. Whereas the provision for pension of Rs. 3,724 crore is not towards contribution to any fund, but it is payable to the employees directly. Also, Sr. no. xi of the aforesaid instruction states that contingent liability cannot constitute deductible expenditure. As elaborated above, provision towards pension of Rs. 3,724 crore is not a contingent liability. It is an ascertained liability and has been provided for in the books of account on a scientific basis, as per the actuarial valuation. Further, it would also be contrary to the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Metal Box Co. of India (supra) where the Supreme Court observed that contingent liabilities properly discounted were to be allowed as a deduction. In view of the above factual discussion, legal position based on various decisions, we are of the view that this deduction claimed by the assessee is allowable and hence, allowed. This issue of assessee’s appeal is allowed.
32 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 25. The next common issue in these cross appeals is as regards to the order of CIT(A) restricting the disallowance on account of provision for other employee benefit. For this assessee has raised the following ground No.2: -
“2. Provision for other employee benefits
2.1 The learned CIT(A) erred in not allowing the deduction of ₹471,31,00,000 for provision on account of transactional provisions of accounting standard 15 in respect of other employee benefits comprising of leave travel & home travel concession, sick leave and casual leave.
2.2 The learned CIT(A) erred in not allowing the deduction of ₹41,50,00,000/- for provision for the year under construction in respect of other employee benefits comprising of leave travel & home travel concession, sick leave and casual leave.
2.3 The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the aforesaid provisions were covered under clause(f) of section 43B without appreciating that the provisions in respect of casual leave and sick leave is not encashable.”
Revenue has raised the following ground No. 4: -
33 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 “4. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in allowing the provision for other long term employee benefits, holding that these are employee costs which are not disallowable under section 43B, without appreciating that these expenses are in fact contingent in nature and hence not allowable as enunciated in the decision of the Hon. Supreme court in the case of CIT vs. Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation [65 ITR 643].”
We noted that the AO has made disallowance but the CIT(A) has restricted the disallowance as under: -
“6.1 According to the appellant, during the assessment year 2008-09, the Bank had adopted Accounting Standard (AS) 15 - Employee Benefits (Revised 2005) issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. In accordance with the transitional provisions of AS 15 (Revised 2005), the Bank has based on actuarial valuation provided Rs. 3,724 crore towards pension benefits and Rs 532.70 crore towards other employee benefits by debiting the revenue reserves. The said amounts have been claimed as deduction by the Bank under section 37(1) in the year under consideration.
34 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 The AO disallowed the provisions of pension and other employees benefits of Rs. 3,724 crore and Rs. 532.70 crore respectively on the ground that liability relates to earlier years and therefore not allowable and hence the provisions are applicable under section 43B, only it is allowed if it is paid and further according to AO it is in the nature of contingent liabilities.
6.2 ……………………………….. With regard to Other employees benefits which are as under:
Sr. Long Term Employee’s Benefits Amount No. (In crore) 1. Privilege Leave (Encashment) including leave 88.00 encashment at the time of retirement 2. Leave Travel and Home Travel Concession 25.12 (Encashment/ Availament) 3. Sick Leave 18.4 4. Silver Jubilee Award 1.22 5. Resettlement Expenses on superannuation 3.73 6. Casual Leave (2.02) 7. Retirement Award (1.05) 8. Total 133.40 There was direction of DRP for the A.Y. 2012- 13 which is reproduced as under:
We have considered the matter. We agree with the contention of the assessee that only prescribed items can be disallowed under section 43B of the Act. The items that have been disallowed by the AO being provision
35 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 made towards employee benefits, silver jubilee awards etc. are part of employee cost and none of these items are disallowable under section 43B of the Act. The AO is directed to delete the proposed disallowance under section 43B
6.3 In the direction of the DRP they have allowed claim of benefits for silver jubilee awards and only retirement award. Regarding other disallowance i.e. leave travel and home travel, sick leave, casual leave, this will come under section 43B(f) where deduction is not allowed, any sum payable by assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employee. As three of the claim like leave travel and home travel, sick leave, casual leave are in lieu of the leave and which come under the purview of section 43B, hence claim of the appellant is disallowed. Only as per DRP direction silver jubilee awards, resettlement expenses on superannuation and retirement award is allowed. Ground of appeal is partly allowed.”
Aggrieved, assessee as well as revenue came in appeal before Tribunal.
We have heard rival contentions and gone through facts and circumstances of the case. We have also perused the
36 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 material placed before us including assessment order, order of CIT(A) and case laws. We noted that the assessee in accordance with the transitional provisions of AS-15, made provision of Rs. 532.70 crore based on actuarial valuation by debiting the revenue reserves. The details of other employee benefits are as under [see page 23 of the assessment order]:
Sr. Particulars Amount No. (Rs. In crore) 1. Leave Travel and Home Travel 232.64 Concession (Encashment/ Availment) 2. Silver Jubilee Award 9.66 3. Resettlement Allowance 35.89 4. Sick Leave 208.00 5. Retirement Award 15.84 6. Casual Leave 30.67 TOTAL 532.70
The assessee claimed a deduction for the above in the computation of total income and the details can be seen from sr. no III.13 of the computation of total income on page 2 of the Paper Book – I filed by the assessee. The AO disallowed these provisions on the basis that this provision represents accumulated liability of earlier years which cannot match with current year’s revenue and the same is contingent in nature. Further, the AO stated that since there are specific provisions
37 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 dealing with contributions to employee welfare funds, the same cannot be allowed under section 37(1) of the Act and the provisions of section 43B of the Act are applicable. We were taken to the facts of the case and noted that out of the sum of Rs. 532.70 crore, the CIT(A) allowed items mentioned at Sr. Nos. 2, 3 & 5 aggregating Rs. 61.39 crore and upheld the disallowance of items mentioned at Sr. Nos. 1, 4 & 6 aggregating Rs. 471.31 crore. The assessee challenges CIT(A)’s order where by provision in respect of other employee benefits comprising of leave travel and home travel concession, sick leave and casual leave aggregating Rs. 471.31 crore stands disallowed. 29. We have gone through the facts and noted that assessee has also made provisions for various long term employee benefits, which were debited to the profit and loss account – the details whereof are given hereunder [see page 33 of the assessment order]:
Sr. Particulars Amount (Rs. No. In crore) 1. Privilege Leave (encashment) 88.00 2. Leave Travel and Home Travel Concession 25.12 3. Sick Leave 18.40 4. Silver jubilee award 1.22 5. Resettlement expenses on Superannuation 3.73 6. Casual Leave (2.02) 7. Retirement award (1.05) TOTAL 133.40
38 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 30. The assessee claimed a deduction for the items mentioned at Sr. Nos. 2,3,4 and 5 above in the computation of total income and offered to tax the write back for items at Sr. Nos. 6 and 7. The assessee filed the details vide note No. 9 to the revised return of income on page 7 of the Paper Book – I. The AO disallowed these provisions on the basis that the same cannot be allowed under section 37(1) of the Act and the provisions of section 43B of the Act are applicable.
Out of the above, the CIT(A) allowed items mentioned at Sr. Nos. 4, 5 & 7 aggregating Rs. 3.90 crore and upheld the disallowance of items mentioned at Sr. Nos. 2, 3 & 6 aggregating Rs. 41.50 crore. With respect to item mentioned at Sr. No. 1, a separate ground of appeal viz. ground of appeal No. 3 has been raised in the captioned appeal, whereas ground of appeal No. 2.2 has been raised with respect to items mentioned at Sr. Nos. 2, 3 & 6 aggregating Rs. 41.50 crore.
Provision for Leave Travel and Home Travel Concession represents provision towards actual payments to be made by the assessee to its employees for the travel costs incurred by them such as rail fare, air fare, etc. on availment of the leave the employees are entitled to. It is not towards any encashment of leave at the credit of the employee so as to fall within the scope of section 43B(f) of the Act. Further, provision for casual leave and sick leave represents provision for the loss of services of the employees for the period of such leave which the employees of the assessee are entitled to, but not availed
39 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 during the year. The above category of leave can only be availed by them and cannot be encashed. Therefore, these provisions are also not in lieu of any leave, but in respect of services of the employees utilised in respect of the leave not availed by the employees and which leave will be availed in future.
With respect to ground of appeal No. 2.1, the arguments put forth for ground of appeal No. 1 shall apply mutatis mutandis since the AO has disallowed Rs. 471.13 crore arising on account of transitional provisions of AS-15 in respect of other employee benefits on the same basis as for provision for pension. The CIT(A) however, has upheld the aforesaid disallowance by holding that provisions of section 43B(f) of the Act applies.
We noted that Section 43B(f) of the Act seeks to allow on cash basis any sum payable by an assessee as an employer in lieu of any leave at the credit of his employee i.e. it covers a provision for leave salary which is only encashable by the employees. Hence, we are of the view that the provision for leave can be discharged in two manners i.e. one by availing the leave and other by way of encashment. In so far as availment of leave is concerned, the salary paid to the employee is known as leave with pay and it does not amounts to salary paid in lieu of leave and, hence, the provisions of section 43B(f) of the Act to that extent do not apply. Leave fare concession/Leave travel concession is in respect of actual payment made to the
40 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 employees for the travel cost incurred by them on availment of the leave entitled to employees. The same is not towards any leave encashment, and hence it cannot be considered as a sum payable in lieu of any leave to which alone section 43B(f) of the Act applies. As stated above, the provision in respect of unavailed casual leave and sick leave is not encashable and, hence, is not covered by section 43B(f) of the Act. Reliance in this regard is placed by the assessee on the decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Robert Bosch Engineering & Business Solutions Ltd. v/s. DCIT [ITA No. 336/Bang/2014 dated 21.04.2017. Further, the provision made is for an ascertained liability based on an actuarial valuation and is to be allowed as a deduction under section 37(1) of the Act while computing the total income. It is provided towards an ascertained liability, based on actuarial valuation, on a scientific basis and is not contingent in nature. In view of the above factual discussion, legal position based on various decisions, we are of the view that this deduction claimed by the assessee is allowable and hence, allowed. This issue of assessee’s appeal is allowed and that of the revenue is dismissed.
The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in disallowing provision for privilege leave encashment. For this assessee raised the following Ground No.3: -
“3. Provision for privilege leave encashment of Rs.88,00,00,000
41 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 The learned CIT(A) ought to have allowed the deduction of Rs.88,00,00,000 in respect of provision for privilege leave encashment.”
We have heard rival contentions and gone through facts and circumstances of the case. We have also perused the material placed before us including assessment order, order of CIT(A) and case laws. We noted the contention of the assessee that the employees of the assessee are entitled to privilege leave encashment in terms of which they can either avail the privilege leave or encash it. Hence, it was claimed that it is entitled to deduction for provision made towards privilege leave encashment based on the following decisions:
Exide Industries Ltd vs. UOI [2007] 292 ITR 470 (Calcutta)
Bharat Earth Movers v/s. CIT [2000] 245 ITR 428 (SC)
The learned Counsel argued that the Calcutta High Court in the case of Exide Industries (supra) has held section 43B(f) of the Act to be struck down the validity of section 43B(f) being arbitrary and unreasonable. However, subsequently, the Supreme Court has granted a stay of the operation of the aforesaid judgment of the Calcutta High Court. Without prejudice to the argument that provision for privilege leave encashment doesn’t fall under the ambit of 43B(f) of the Act, it was claimed that the AO may be directed to give effect to the
42 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 aforesaid claim as and when the Supreme Court decides this issue in the case of Exide Industries Ltd, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling. We direct the AO accordingly on this issue. This issue of assessee’s appeal is set aside and allowed for statistical purposes.
The next common issue in these cross appeals is as regards to the order of CIT(A) in disallowing expenses relatable to exempt income by invoking the provisions of section 14A of the Act read with the rule 8D of the Income Tax Rules,1962 (hereinafter the ‘Rules’). For this assessee has raised the following ground No.4: -
“4. Disallowance under section 14A
4.1 The learned CIT(A) erred in not specifically directing the Assessing Officer to compute disallowance under section 14A in respect to tax-free bonds, shares (other than strategic investment) and units of mutual funds as nil, as these investments of the Bank are stock-in-trade.
4.2 The learned CIT(A) in holding that the disallowance shall not be below the amount disallowed by the appellant himself in the computation of total income.
4.3 Without prejudice to the above, the learned CIT(A) erred not accepting the claim of
43 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 the appellant that only 1% of the exempt interest and dividend income is to be disallowed under section 14A. 4.4 Without prejudice to the above, the learned CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that income of yielding any exempt income during the year will not be considered for the purpose of computing disallowance under section 14A.”
Revenue has raised the following ground No. 7 & 8 as under: - “7. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in holding that no disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) is called for, there by granting relief to the assessee, overlooking the fact that the AO had correctly made the disallowance, as the assessee could not establish the nexus between its own funds and investments made in tax free income.
On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in directing the AO to restrict the disallowance under section 14A rw.r. 8D(2)(iii) by the excluding the long term investment in subsidiary/ group concerns relying on the decision of ITAT in the case of Garware Wall
44 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Ropes Ltd. (65 SOT 86), without appreciating the fact that the decision of ITAT has not been accepted by the department and appeal has been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court.”
Since both the grounds of Assessee and Department are dealing with the same issue of disallowance under section 14A of the Act relating to the disallowance of expenses relatable to exempt income, and submissions in respect of both the appeals are dealt with together.
The facts are that the assessee earned dividend income from equity shares in respect of which the benefit under section 10(34) of the Act was claimed and interest on tax free bonds amounting to Rs. 325 crore which was claimed exempt in terms of section 10(15) of the Act. In the original computation of total income, the assessee suo-moto made a disallowance of Rs. 201 crore in terms of rule 8D(2)(ii) and Rs. 20.37 crore in terms of rule 8D(2)(iii). In the revised computation of total income, the suo-moto disallowance was restricted to Rs. 20.37 crore in terms of rule 8D(2)(iii). Further, in the notes to the revised return of income, it was submitted that in case of equity shares held as stock-in-trade, the generation of income by way of dividend is only incidental. The AO computed the disallowance under section 14A of the Act in accordance with rule 8D(2)(ii) & (iii) of the Rules amounting to Rs. 394.73 crore. The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the AO under rule 8D(2)(ii) of the Rules on the basis that the total interest free funds of the
45 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 assessee are Rs. 49,032.66 crore and investment earning exempt income is Rs. 8755 crore i.e. owned funds are more than investments and hence, no disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii) of the Rules can be made. In this regard, the CIT(A) relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT vs. HDFC Bank (2014) 366 ITR 505 (Bom). In respect of disallowance made by the AO as per rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules, the CIT(A) directed the AO to re-compute the disallowance by excluding the investments held as stock-in-trade and strategic investments in subsidiaries and fully owned bank subsidiary. However, the CIT(A) also directed that the disallowance cannot go below the suo-moto disallowance made by the assessee in the revised computation of total income. Aggrieved, assessee as well revenue came in appeal before Tribunal.
We noted from the CIT(A)’s order with regards to disallowance as per Rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules for not specifically directing the AO to exclude tax-free bonds, shares (other than strategic investments) and units of mutual funds, as these investments are stock-in-trade and for holding that the disallowance cannot go below the suo-moto disallowance made by the assessee. Further, the investments not yielding exempt income during the year should also not be considered.
The assessee contended that only those investments which have yielded exempt income during the year are to be considered for computing average value of investments in terms
46 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 of rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules. Reliance is placed on the following decisions:
ACIT vs. Vireet Investments (P.) Ltd. [2017] 58 ITR(T) 313 (Delhi - Trib.) (SB)
Cox and Kings Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA No. 2066/Mum/2017 dt. 3.01.2019] [Mumbai Tribunal]
It was contended that no disallowance under section 14A of the Act is called for based on the judicial precedents on the subject. Even the suo-moto disallowance made by the assessee in its revised return of income ought to be deleted. With respect to the CIT(A)’s direction that the disallowance u/s 14A of the Act should not go below the amount suo-moto disallowed by the assessee. It was argued that there is no provision in the Act justifying this direction of the CIT(A). Merely because a disallowance is made in the return based on a particular understanding of the law does not preclude an assessee from contesting to the contrary in the course of further proceedings and, if such contention is accepted, then, full relief ought to be given and the allowance of the same cannot be fettered in any manner. This is based on the principle that there is no estoppel against the statute and acquiescence cannot take away from a party the relief that he is entitled to, where the tax is levied or collected without authority of law. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decisions of CIT vs. Milton Laminates Ltd. (2013) 37 taxmann.com 249 (Gujarat) wherein, Hon’ble High Court
47 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 upholding the findings of the Tribunal, has approved that pursuant to giving effect to an appellate order, the assessed income can go below the returned income. Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Nirmala L. Mehta vs. CIT (2004) 269 ITR 1 (Bom).
As regards to the ground Nos. 7 and 8 of the Department’s appeal challenges the finding of the CIT(A) deleting the disallowance as per rule 8D(2)(ii) of the Rules and directions in connection with applicability of rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules. It was contended that the investments held by the assessee are stock-in-trade and, hence, no disallowance under section 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules ought to be made.
Reliance in this regard is placed on the following decisions:
CIT v. India Advantage Securities Ltd [380 ITR 471] [Bombay High Court]
State Bank of Patiala [78 taxmann.com 3] [Punjab and Haryana High Court] [see pages 647 to 657 of Paper Book – I It was stated by Ld Counsel for the assessee that the appeal filed by the department has been dismissed by the Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. v/s. CIT [402 ITR 640]
48 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Punjab National Bank v/s. ACIT [ITA No. 1519/ Del/ 2016 dt. 28.11.2018] [Delhi Tribunal] In this case, the Delhi Tribunal relying on the findings given by the Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. & State Bank of Patiala has specifically held that where the assessee is a Bank, shares are held as stock-in-trade and therefore it becomes business activity of assessee. Hence, these investments made by Bank should not be considered for calculating disallowance in terms of rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules– [refer para No. 8 on page No. 7 of the aforesaid Order] State Bank of Hyderabad [63 taxmann.com 322] [Hyderabad Tribunal] [see pages 634 to 646 of Paper Book – I]
It was stated that the Supreme Court has also recalled the decision in the case of ACIT v/s. Jamnalal Sons Pvt. Ltd. wherein the appeal filed by the Department was initially dismissed on the issue of disallowance under section 14A of the Act on investments which are held as stock- in-trade. The said issue has also been
49 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 decided in favour of the assessee by the Mumbai Tribunal in [ITA NO. 3789/Mum/2013] [erstwhile State Bank of Saurashtra which has since merged with the assessee] vide its Order dated 23.12.2016 for AY 2008-09 (see pages 613 to 623 of the Paper Book - I)
Reliance is also placed on the CBDT Circular No. 18/2015 dated 2.11.2015, wherein it is discussed that investments made by a banking concern are part of the business of banking and therefore, the income arising from such investments is attributable to business of banking falling under the head 'Profits and gains of business and profession”.
It was also argued that no disallowance can be made in relation to interest expenses as the assessee’s own/non-interest bearing funds far exceed the investments. Reliance in this regard is placed on the following decisions:
CIT vs. Reliance Industries Limited [Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2019] [ Supreme Court] CIT vs. HDFC Bank Ltd. (2016) 383 ITR 529 (Bom.)
CIT vs. HDFC Bank (2014) 366 ITR 505 (Bom.)
50 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 The following decisions laying down the same principle have been referred to in the tabulation filed before the Tribunal on 25.03.2019: PCIT vs. Spanco Ltd. [ITA No. 488/2016 dt. 26.11.2018] [Bombay High Court] PCIT vs. JSW Power Trading Co. Ltd. [ITA No. 1075/2015 dt. 14.02.2018] [Bombay High Court] CIT vs. Tin Box Co. [2003] 260 ITR 637 (Delhi) Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd [Tax Appeal No. 82 of 2013] [Gujarat High Court] CIT vs. UTI Bank Ltd. [2013] 32 taxmann.com 370 (Gujarat) JCIT vs. Pudumjee Industries Ltd. [ITA No. 1933/Mum/2018 dt. 13.03.2019] Cox and Kings Ltd. vs. ACIT [ITA No. 2066/Mum/2017 dt. 3.01.2019] 46. Alternatively, also it was argued that where there are mixed funds consisting of own funds and customer’s funds/borrowed fund, it cannot be assumed that a payment for investment purpose came out of borrowed funds and not out of own funds. Reliance in this regard is placed on the following decisions:
51 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 CIT vs. Reliance Utilities & Power Limited [2009] 313 ITR 340 (Bombay) Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. CIT [1982] 134 ITR 219 (Calcutta) Reckitt & Coleman of India vs. CIT [1982] 135 ITR 698 (Calcutta) India Explosives Ltd. vs. CIT [1984] 147 ITR 392 (Calcutta) Alkali & Chemical Corporation of India Ltd. vs. [1986] 161 ITR 820 (Calcutta) British Paints (India) Ltd. vs. CIT [1991] 190 ITR 196 (Calcutta) Consolidated Investments Ltd. vs. DCIT [1996] 57 ITD 286 (Madras) Durametallic (India) Ltd. vs. IAC [1991] 38 ITD 211 (Madras)
East India Pharmaceutical Works vs. CIT [1997] 224 ITR 627 (SC)
We also noted the fact that the assessee receives interest income on tax free bonds which investment is made to fulfil of the SLR norms. The primary intention of the assessee is not to earn tax free interest from investment in such bonds but to
52 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 comply with the SLR requirements. Accordingly, the expense incurred in relation to earning of the interest income should not be disallowed under section 14A of the Act. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Cochin Tribunal in the case of State Bank of Travancore [318 ITR (AT) 171]. The argument to exclude investment made in subsidiaries/strategic investments while computing disallowance u/s 14A of the Act is decided against the assessee by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. (supra). The assessee contended that those strategic investments which have not yielded any exempt income during the year ought to be excluded for the purpose of computing average value of investment, as elaborated above.
We Noted from the above discussion that, the issue of disallowance under section 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D(2)(ii) of the Rules in regard to interest, is covered by the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of HDFC Ltd. (supra), wherein it is clearly held that no disallowance can be made in the relation to interest expenses as assessee’s own non-interest bearing funds far exceed the investment as details are noted above and hence, this issue of the Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
As regards to the issue of disallowance u/s 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules, the administrative expenses the investment made in subsidiaries / strategic investment while computing disallowance is decided against the
53 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 assessee in view of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Maxopp Investment Ltd. (supra). However, it is to clarify that those strategic investment which have not yielded any exempt income during the year are to be excluded for the purpose of computing average value of investment. Even otherwise, now the law is settled that the investment which are giving exempt income during the year are to be considered for the purpose of disallowance u/s 14A of the Act read with Rule 8D(2)(iii) of the Rules, i.e. the administrative expenses for the purpose of computing average value of investment. We direct the AO accordingly. The AO will go into the details and will compute the disallowance in view of these observations. This issue is remanded back to the file of the AO.
The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in disallowing depreciation on leased assets. For this assessee raised ground No. 5 as under: -
“5. Depreciation on leased assets of ₹18,72,80,782
5.1 The learned CIT(A) erred in upholding the action of the Assessing Officer in disallowing the appellant’s claim in respect of deprecation of ₹18,72,80,782/- on leased assets.”
Brief facts are that the assessee claimed that during the course of business it has entered into lease agreements with
54 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 various parties whereby assets were granted on lease to them. In certain cases, the transactions were in the nature of sale and lease back i.e. the parties sold the assets to the Bank and in turn the Bank leased the assets to the parties. The Bank is the owner of the assets given on lease to the aforementioned parties. Accordingly, the Bank had claimed depreciation to the tune of ₹19,03,43,315/- in respect of such assets given on lease. The AO disallowed the assessee's claim of Rs. 18,72,80,782/- in respect of depreciation on leased assets and CIT(A) also confirmed the same on the ground that bank had not assumed any risk of ownership of the leased assets and was therefore not the owner, held as under: -
“12.3 I have considered the appellant's submissions. This is a recurring issue and this issue was considered by CIT(A) in appellant's own case for A.Y. 2007-08 and by ITAT for A.Y. 1996-97 which are reproduced as under:
It is noticed that identical issue had arisen in earlier years. On the issue, in AY 2006- 07, the relevant part of the observation finding of my predecessor CIT(A), as contained in order dated 30.03.2013 in appeal No. IT-241/09-10, is reproduced hereunder:
No new leases have been entered during the year. Some of the leases have expired
55 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 during the year and some of the leases have been renewed on the same terms and conditions. In r/o the leases which have expired the appellant has stated that the same have been transferred to the lessee on residual value. During the course of appeal proceedings, the appellant was required to produce any documentary evidence of the Registered Valuer to show the market value of the underlying assets at the time of expiry of the lease/renewal of the lease. No such documentary evidence of the Registered Valuer to show the market value of the alleged leased assets on the date of expiry of the lease/ renewal of the lease could be produced by the appellant during the appellate proceedings. It is thus clear that the lessor had no intention to recover and repossess the assets after the end of the lease period. The assets were never re possessed. The lease was certainly not an operating lease. As held in the case of Asea BrownBover Ltd V/s Industrial Finance Corporation of India (2006) 154 Taxman 512 (Supreme Court) and confirmed in Indus Ind Bank 135 lTD 165
56 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 (Special Bench) - in the appellant's case, the assets were user specific/risk and rewards incident to ownership were passed on to the lessee. The lessee bore the risk of obsolescence. The lessor was interested only in his rentals not in the asset The lease was non-cancellable. The lessor entered into the transaction only as a financier, lie did not bear the cost of repairs/ maintenance or operations. The lessor is typically a financial institution and cannot render specialized service in connection with the asset. A perusal of the aforesaid facts and the earlier year's assessment orders/ appellate orders gives to the inescapable conclusion that the lessee was the real owner. A simple loan transaction was made to adorn the garb of lease to avoid the rightful tax due to the exchequer. The lessee is the actual or real owner, the lessor assessee is only nominal or symbolic or the so called perceived owner. The law permits tax planning and not tax avoidance. If within the four corners of law a person arranges its affair in such a way that his overall tax liability is
57 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 reduced, there cannot be any embargo on such tax planning. If however dubious means are adopted to reduce the incidence of tax by artificially inflating expenses or reducing income, it cannot be described as anything other than tax avoidance. The law permits only tax planning and not tax avoidance. When we consider the reality of the situation in the present case, it becomes abundantly manifest that a simple loan transaction was made to adorn the garb of lease to avoid the rightful tax due to the exchequer. Therefore, genuineness of the so called lease agreement itself is not proved and was a sham agreement to give the colour of finance lease. In the appellant's case it was not even a case of finance lease. The facts and circumstances of the case show' that it was a case of mere advancing of loan by the assessee. As such under the present facts and circumstances of the case, when the genuineness of the lease agreement itself is not proved and was a shorn agreement to give the colour of finance lease to mere advancing of loans by the
58 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 assessee - the ratio laid down and relied upon by the appellant in the case of M/s ICDS Ltd. V/s CIT Mysore Et. Another Civil Appeal No. 3282 of 2008 (Supreme Court) shall not apply to the facts of the case. There was no genuine leasing. Accordingly, no depreciation is admissible to the assessee lessor.
The issue has been decided against the assessee by CIT(A) in assessment years AY 1999-2000 to 2006-07. Disallowance were confirmed even in the years prior to that. The decision of Hon’ble ITAT for AY 1996-97 in ITA No. 5470/Mum/2002 [order dated 26.07.2013] on the issue is also against the assessee. Following that, the disallowance of Rs.+++/- on account of deprecation on leased assets is confirmed. This ground of appeal is therefore dismissed.”
Before us also the assessee contended that during the course of its business, assessee enters into lease agreements with various parties whereby assets were granted on lease to them. During the year under consideration, it has not entered into any new lease transactions. The assessee has claimed income-tax depreciation on the leased assets under section 32
59 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 of the Act since these assets are owned by the assessee. In the earlier years, certain lease agreements were considered as finance transaction and hence, depreciation was disallowed on these assets in the earlier years. In the year under consideration, the AO has disallowed the depreciation in respect of leased assets, where depreciation was disallowed in earlier years. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance made by the AO following the earlier years. It was fairly agreed that this issue is decided against the assessee in its own case by the ITAT in following Orders:
“Order dated 26.07.2013 for assessment Year 1996-97 [ITA 5470/Mum/2002] [see pages 450 to 496 of the Paper Book - II]
Order dated 29.04.2016 for assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99 [ITA 3823- 24/Mum/2005] [see pages 501 to 528 of the Paper Book - I]”
However, we noted that the jurisdictional Bombay High Court vide its Order dated 23.08.2016, upon appeal by the assessee against the Tribunal’s Order for assessment year 1996- 97, has admitted the assessee’s appeal but the operation of the order of Tribunal for earlier year was not stayed and hence, taking a consistent view as in AY 1996-97, in the present assessment year 2008-09 also, we decide this issue against the assessee. This issue of assessee’s appeal is dismissed.
60 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 54. The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in disallowing deduction claimed by assessee under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act being the amount of Bad Debts written off (other than in respect of rural advances). For this assessee raised the following ground No. 6: -
“6. Deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of ₹1026,23,30,375/-
6.1 The learned CIT(A) erred in not allowing deduction of ₹1026,23,30,375 under section 36(1)(vii) being the amount of bad debts written-off (other than in respect of rural advances)
6.2 The learned CIT(A) erred in relying on explanation 2 to section 36(1) as inserted by the Finance Act, 2013 which is applicable from assessment years 2014-15 onwards.”
Brief facts are that the assessee has claimed write-off of bad debts in connection with non-rural advances under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act amounting to Rs. 1026,23,30,375/- by way of note 18 to the revised return of income. The AO did not allow the claim of the assessee on the basis that deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act is available towards rural and non- rural advances and in view of the proviso to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, the deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act is
61 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 limited to excess of the amount written off over the credit balance of provision for bad and doubtful debts under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. The CIT(A) confirmed the disallowance following the order of the CIT(A) for the assessment year 2007- 08, wherein the CIT(A) had held that Explanation 2 to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act inserted w.e.f 01.04.2014 which states that the proviso to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act and section 36(2)(v) of the Act relates to all types of advances i.e. rural and non- rural advances, is clarificatory in nature. Accordingly, the CIT(A) held that the assessee cannot be allowed double deduction i.e. one on provision basis and then again on actual write-off basis. The CIT(A) observed as under: -
“14.3 I have considered the appellant's submissions. This is a recurring issue and this issue was considered by CIT(A) in appellant's own case for A.Y. 2007-08 which are reproduced as under: "3.11.1 This is also a recurring issue and has been decided by the CFI(A) in AY 2002-03 to 2006-07 against the assessee. The decision dated 30.03.2013 of CIT(A) for AY 2006-07 in appeal no IT-241/09-10 is placed on record. As discussed therein, the Finance Act, 2013 has inserted explanation-2 to Sec 36(1) which reads as under the removal of doubts it is hereby clarified that for the purposes of the
62 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 proviso to clause (vii) of this sub section of clause (v) of sub-section 2 the account referred to therein shall be only one account in r/o provision of bad and doubtful debts under clause (viiia) and such account shall relate to all types of advances including advances made by rural branches". This explanation, though inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2014, is "clarificatory" in nature. It states that proviso to clause (vii) and clause(v) of sub-section2 shall relate to all types of advances including advances made by rural branches. The proviso to clause (vii) of Sec.36(1) therefore shall limit the application to both rural advances and non-rural advances. Therefore, there cannot be double deduction i.e. one on provision basis and then again on actual write-off basis separately and independently. The disallowance is accordingly confirmed. This ground of appeal is dismissed."
14.4 In view of the above decision of CIT(A), claim of the appellant is disallowed. This ground of appeal is disallowed.”
We noted that for the year under consideration the assessee has not claimed any deduction for bad debts written- off. However, it should be allowed deduction in respect of write- offs of non-rural branch advances amounting to Rs. 1026 crore.
63 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Before us Revenue has emphasised that deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act is available to both rural and non- rural debts and accordingly, the restriction as per the proviso to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act is also applicable. The learned Counsel argued that as per the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) of the Act, a bank is eligible to avail deduction in respect of provision made for bad and doubtful debts, of an amount not exceeding 7.5% of total income and of an amount not exceeding 10% of the aggregate average advances made by the rural branches of the bank. Accordingly, the assessee is eligible to claim deduction of an amount lower of the provision made for bad and doubtful debts or the amount calculated as per the prescribed methodology. As per the proviso to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act is limited to excess of the amount written off over the credit balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts accounts made under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. Further, as per section 36(2)(v) of the Act, where a debt made by the assessee to which section 36(1)(viia) of the Act applies, no deduction shall be allowed unless the assessee has debited the amount of such debt to the provision for bad and doubtful debts account made under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can be inferred that sections 36(1)(viia) and 36(2)(v) of the Act and the first proviso to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, apply only to rural advances.
We noted that, as reliance placed by assessee, this issue is decided in favour of the assessee by the Supreme Court
64 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 judgment in the case of The Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd. vs. CIT [2012] 343 ITR 270 (SC). The Supreme Court was concerned with a case where the assessee had claimed a deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act pertaining to urban advances. The deduction was not allowed to the assessee on the basis that deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act can be allowed only to the extent it is in excess of the provisions created and allowed as a deduction under clause (viia). The Supreme Court held that if the bad debts actually written off in the accounts of the assessee-bank represents only debts arising out of urban advances, allowance thereof is not affected, controlled or limited in any way by the proviso to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act. The relevant extract of the judgement of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:
“41. To conclude, we hold that the provisions of Sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) of the Act are distinct and independent items of deduction and operate in their respective fields. The bad debts written off in debts, other than those for which the provision is made under clause (viia), will be covered under the main part of Section 36(1)(vii), while the proviso will operate in cases under clause (viia) to limit deduction to the extent of difference between the debt or part thereof written off in the previous year and credit balance in the provision for bad and doubtful debts account made under clause
65 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 (viia). The proviso to Section 36(1)(vii) will relate to cases covered under Section 36(1)(viia) and has to be read with Section 36(2)(v) of the Act. Thus, the proviso would not permit benefit of double deduction, operating with reference to rural loans while under Section 36(1)(vii), the assessee would be entitled to general deduction upon an account having become bad debt and being written off as irrecoverable in the accounts of the assessee for the previous year. This, obviously, would be subject to satisfaction of the requirements contemplated under Section 36(2).” 58. Reliance in this regard is also placed on the following decisions, wherein the aforesaid issue has been decided in favour of the assessee:
CIT vs. City Union Bank Ltd. [2007] 291 ITR 144 (Madras) DCIT vs. Karnataka Bank Ltd. [2012] 349 ITR 705 (SC) Punjab & Sind Bank vs. ACIT [2008] 23 SOT 103 (Delhi)
Further, it was contended that Explanation 2 to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2014 which states that proviso to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act and section 36(2)(v) of the Act relates to all types of advances i.e. rural and non-
66 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 rural advances, is Clarificatory in nature. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case CIT vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466 (SC), wherein it was held that one established rule for interpretation of legislation is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. In the present case, the legislature stipulated a fixed date i.e. 01.04.2014 while inserting Explanation 2 to section 36(1)(vii) of the Act. In view of the above, we are of the view that assessee is entitled to deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act being the amount of bad debts written off (other than in respect of rural advances). This issue of assessee appeal is allowed. 60. The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in disallowing deduction claimed by assessee on account of reducing depreciation/ taxing appreciation in the value of securities held as Available For Sale(AFS) and Held For Trading(HFT) category. For this assessee has raised the following ground No. 7: - “7. Depreciation on securities
The learned CIT(A) erred in upholding the action of the Assessing Officer in reducing deprecation/ taxing appreciation in the value of securities held as Available for Sale (AFS) ad Held for Trading (HFT) category.”
67 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 61. Brief facts are that as per assessee from FY year 2004-05 the Bank has been valuing investments in 'Available for Sale' (AFS) and 'Held For Trading' (HFT) in books after netting off classification-wise depreciation and appreciation, computed scrip-wise and providing for net deprecation in each classification while ignoring net appreciation, as required by RBI guidelines. However, for tax purposes, investments in AFS and HFT categories are being valued scrip wise and depreciation, if any, was provided scrip wise while ignoring appreciation. Valuation of investments in AFS and HFT categories has consistently been done scrip-wise for tax purposes in earlier years. Therefore, for tax purposes valuation is done on the basis of lower of cost or market value computed scrip-wise and providing for depreciation in each classification while ignoring any appreciation. The assessee has claimed the deduction by way of notes to the computation of total income. The AO, however, has rejected the claim of the assessee. The CIT(A) also confirmed the action of the AO by observing as under: -
15.3 I have considered the appellant's submissions. This is a recurring issue and this issue was considered by CIT(A)in appellant's own case for A.Y. 2007-08 which are reproduced as under: …………………………..
68 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 15.4 In view of the above decision of CIT(A), claim of the appellant is disallowed. This ground of appeal is disallowed. 62. Before us it was argued that from the financial year 2004- 05, the assessee has been valuing investments in ‘Available for Sale’ (AFS) and ‘Held for Trading’ (HFT) in books after netting off classification-wise depreciation and appreciation, computed scrip-wise and providing for net deprecation in each classification while ignoring net appreciation, as required by RBI guidelines. However, for tax purposes, investments in AFS and HFT categories are being consistently valued scrip wise and depreciation, if any, was provided scrip wise while ignoring appreciation. Valuation of investments in AFS and HFT categories has consistently been done scrip-wise for tax purposes in earlier years. The same has also been accepted by the AO upto assessment year 2004-05 i.e. prior to the change in the treatment given in books of account. Therefore, for tax purposes valuation is done on the basis of lower of cost or market value computed scrip-wise and providing for depreciation in each of the scrip, while ignoring any appreciation. The assessee has claimed a deduction on this account vide note 24 to the revised return of income.
We noted that revenue rejected the claim of the assessee following the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Deutsche Bank AG. The CIT(A) upheld the disallowance made by the AO following the earlier years order of CIT(A) for
69 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 assessment year 2007-08. The Revenue before the Tribunal has emphasised on the applicability of Mumbai Tribunal’s decision in the case of Deutsche Bank AG and that the valuation is as per RBI guidelines. It was contended by the assessee that it is a well settled principle of law that unrealised gains on stock are not to be brought to the tax net. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Chainrup Sampatram vs. CIT [1953] 24 ITR 481 (SC), wherein it is held that profit cannot "arise out of the valuation of the closing stock". The relevant extract of the judgement of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:
“While we agree with the conclusion that no part of the profits of the firm in the accounting year can be said to have accrued or arisen at Bikaner, the reasoning by which the learned Judges arrived at that conclusion seems to us, with all respect, to proceed on a misconception. It is wrong to assume that the valuation of the closing stock at market rate has, for its object, the bringing into charge any appreciation in the value of such stock. The true purpose of crediting the value of unsold stock is to balance the cost of those goods entered on the other side of the account at the time of their purchase, so that the cancelling out of the entries relating to the same stock from both sides of the account would leave only the
70 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 transactions on which there have been actual sales in the course of the year showing the profit or loss actually realised on the year's trading.
….. While anticipated loss is thus taken into account, anticipated profit in the shape of appreciated value of the closing stock is not brought into the account, as no prudent trader would care to show increased profit before its actual realisation. This is the theory underlying the rule that the closing stock is to be valued at cost or market price whichever is lower, and it is now generally accepted as an established rule of commercial practice and accountancy. As profits for income-tax purposes are to be computed in conformity with the ordinary principles of commercial accounting, unless of course, such principles have been superseded or modified by legislative enactments unrealised profits in the shape of appreciated value of goods remaining unsold at the end of an accounting year and carried over to the following year's account in a business that is continuing are not brought into the charge as a matter of practice, though, as already stated, loss due to a fall in price below cost is allowed even if such loss has not been actually realised.
71 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 …. Again, it is a misconception to think that any profit "arises out of the valuation of the closing stock" and the sites of its arising or accrual is where the valuation is made. As already stated, valuation of unsold stock at the close of an accounting period is a necessary part of the process of determining the trading results of that period, and can in no sense be regarded as the "source" of such profits.”
The Supreme Court in the case of A.L.A. Firm vs. CIT (1991) (189 ITR 285) (SC) has observed that closing stock cannot be valued at a market value higher than the cost as that will result in taxation of the notional profits which the assessee has not realised. The relevant extract of the judgement of the Supreme Court is reproduced below:
“The valuation of the closing stock at market value invariably will create a problem. For if the market value is higher than cost, the accounts will reflect notional profits not actually realised. On the other hand, if the market value is less, the assessee will get the benefit of a notional loss he has not incurred. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the ordinary principles of commercial accounting permit valuation 'at cost or market price, whichever is the lower'. [para 27]
72 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 The proper practice is to value the closing stock at cost. That will eliminate entries relating to the same stock from both sides of the account. To this rule custom recognises only one exemption and that is to value the stock at market value if that is lower. But on no principle can one justify the valuation of the closing stock at a market value higher than cost as that will result in the taxation of notional profits the assessee has not realised. [para 28]”
In Sanjeev Wollen Mills vs. CIT [2005] 279 ITR 434 (SC), the Supreme Court was concerned with a case where the assessee had valued its finished goods at market value. For assessment year 1992-93, the opening stock was valued at Rs. 90 per kg (market price as on 1.4.1991 was Rs. 98 per kg) and the closing stock at Rs. 130 per kg. For assessment year 1993- 94, the opening stock was valued at Rs. 130 per kg and there was no closing stock. The assessee returned a loss of Rs. 54,420 for the second year. The AO held that the profits were artificially inflated in assessment year 1992-93 to claim higher deduction under section 80HHC of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the profit earned by valuing finished goods is notional imaginary profit which could not be taxed. In view of the above, it is argued that appreciation in value of investments cannot be taken into account. The netting off of appreciation against the depreciation within a classification is therefore contrary to the
73 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgements.
In context of netting off depreciation against appreciation, the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. Chari & Ram [1949] 17 ITR 1 (Madras) has held that there would be no assurance that there would be a market for the entire stock of articles of which the market value is higher and therefore, it would be hazardous to assume that the entire stock could be sold at the prevailing market rate and necessarily bring in a profit. The High Court also held that there is no provision of law or principle according to which the assessee could be compelled to adopt either the average cost for all the items or the market rate for all the items. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of United Commercial Bank vs. CIT [1999] 240 ITR 355 (SC) has held that there is no such question of following two different methods for valuing its stock-in-trade (investments) because bank was required to prepare balance sheet in the prescribed form and it had no option to change it and for the purpose of income-tax, what is taxed is the real income which is to be deduced on the basis of the accounting system regularly maintained by the assessee. In view of the above, it was claimed that the assessee be allowed a deduction in respect of depreciation on each securities, scrip wise, while ignoring the appreciation.
Further, the assessee claimed that it has consistently been following the method of valuation of lower of cost or market
74 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 price in respect of securities. Accordingly, the method of valuation followed by the assessee is required to be accepted. Reliance in this regard is placed on the following decisions:
CIT vs. Bank of Baroda [2003] 262 ITR 334 (Bombay) CIT vs. Corpn. Bank Ltd. [1988] 174 ITR 616 (Karnataka) Further, the issue was not disputed upto financial year 2003-04 and hence, the AO is not justified in taking a different view.
The assessee also relied on the judgement of the Bombay High Court in the case of Union Bank of India dated 08.02.2016 in ITA 1977 of 2013. The assessee in this case for the purpose of its books was netting off the depreciation in its securities against appreciation in other securities while for tax purpose, the assessee has been claiming gross depreciation that is without netting of the appreciation in other securities held as a part of investment. The Bombay High Court has dismissed the appeal of the Revenue and has decided the issue in favour of the assessee. It is argued that the facts of the present case are exactly same as in the aforesaid case of Union Bank of India. This issue stands covered by the judgement of the jurisdictional High Court. The facts of the assessee’s case and the facts in the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CIT [1994] 207 ITR 901 (Bombay), relied by the AO are different. In the aforesaid decision, the assessee had changed the method of valuing stock in the year under consideration, whereas in the assessee’s case, there is no
75 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 change in the method of valuation. Also, in that case, sugar was valued differently by bifurcating the stock into 'levy sugar' and 'free sugar'. The Court’s conclusion is based on the fact that there was no justification for bifurcation of sugar between free and levy sugar. The Mumbai Tribunal in the case of DCIT vs. Majestic Holdings And Finvest (P.) Ltd. [2010] 2 ITR(T) 407 (Mumbai) has noted that the reliance of the Departmental Representative on the judgement of the Bombay High Court in the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. is misconceived inasmuch as in that case there was nothing to show the bifurcation of the closing stick of sugar into levy sugar and free sugar and hence, the assessee was obligated to value the entire stock at one value. In the assessee’s case as well, each scrip is different and therefore requires independent valuation. The CIT DR placed reliance on the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of JCIT vs. Dena Bank [2012] 20 taxmann.com 278 (Mumbai). In the aforementioned case, the security was purchased in year 1 at Rs. 100 and the market price at the end of the year was Rs. 90. Accordingly, the stock was valued at market price of Rs. 90 being lower than the cost. In year 2, the market price went upto Rs. 95. Accordingly, the stock was valued at market price of Rs. 95 being lower than the cost. However, suppose in year 3, the market value rises to Rs. 120, in such a situation, the stock would be valued at cost i.e Rs. 100, being lower than the market price. The Mumbai Tribunal held that excess of appreciation over the cost price would not be considered for valuing the closing stock. In the present case, we are not
76 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 concerned with a scenario where in the later year the depreciation provided in earlier years is reduced. Further, the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Deutsche Bank A.G vs. DCIT [2003] 86 ITD 431 (Mumbai), relied by the AO is in connection with valuation of foreign exchange forward contracts. In this case the assessee did not account for in the financial statement the anticipated/contingent profits from the contracts to the extent not settled as on the last day of the accounting year whereas any loss on such contracts was provided for by a charge in the profit and loss account on the best estimates. The Department brought to tax the profit on such forward exchange contracts and stated that one method for valuation of the entire stock of securities should be followed. This resulted in a situation of taxing appreciation of stock, which goes against the general and settled principle of non-taxation of notional income, as laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Wollen Mills vs. CIT [2005] 279 ITR 434 (SC) and others discussed supra. Hence, we are of the view that this disallowance of depreciation/ reducing of depreciation on appreciation in the value of securities held as available for sale and held for trading category are allowable. We direct the AO accordingly.
The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in disallowing deduction claimed by assessee under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act being the amount of standard assets. For this assessee raised the following ground No. 8: -
77 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 “8. Deprecation under section 36(1)(viia) of Rs.566,96,68,537 8.1 The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the provision for standard assets amounting to Rs.566,96,68,537 is to be excluded for determining the deduction under section 36(1)(viia). 8.2 The learned CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that even in respect of assets that are classified as standard assets, a part of the debts are doubtful of recovery and accordingly qualifies for deduction under section 36(1)(viia).” 70. Brief facts are that the assessee is claiming deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act for provision for bad and doubtful debts including provision made for standard assets of Rs. 566,96,68,537/-. The AO has held that the provision for standard asset amounting to Rs. 566,96,68,537/- is to be excluded for determining the deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. The CIT(A) also confirmed the action of the AO by observing as under: - “16.3 I have considered the appellant's submissions. This is recurring issue and this issue was considered by CIT(A) in appellant's
78 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 own case for A.Y. 2007-08 which are reproduced as under:
The issue is considered. The arguments and the plea so raised by the assessee is misplaced. The section 36(J)(viia) is for providing provision in respect of bad and doubtful debts only and not in respect of the standard assets. In view thereof, it is held that the AO has rightly excluded the amount of provision of Rs. 589,18,98,060 onto standard assets out of the claim made by the assessee under section 36( l)(viia). The addition is accordingly confirmed.
16.4 In view of the above decision of CIT(A) In view of the above decision of CIT(A), claim of the appellant is disallowed. This ground of appeal is disallowed.”
We have noted the facts that the assessee has claimed that provision for standard assets should be taken into consideration for computing the deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. The assessee has also filed the details vide note 17 and Annexure 6 to the revised return of income on pages 8, 9 and 20 of Paper Book – 1 filed by assessee. As per the provisions of section 36(1)(viia) of the Act, a bank is eligible to avail deduction in respect of provision made for bad and doubtful debts, of an amount not exceeding 7.5% of total income and 10% of the aggregate average advances made by
79 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 the rural branches of the bank. The provision is created by the assessee on the basis of RBI Guidelines. The assessee is required to create provision on non-performing assets on the basis of the classification of assets into the four prescribed categories i.e. loss assets, doubtful assets, substandard assets and standard assets [refer para 5.1.2 of the RBI Guidelines].
The Revenue before us emphasized that the provision for standard assets is not same as provision for bad and doubtful debts and the same is contingent in nature, since it is created only out of abundant caution. We noted from the provisions that the assessee is required to make a provision on all its debts ranging from 0.25% to 100% depending upon the categorization of the loan in terms of the guidelines issued by RBI. The provision on debts made by the assessee is in line with the RBI guidelines and section 36(1)(viia) of the Act does not have a requirement that the provision for debts should be in respect of specified debts only. Section 36(1)(viia) of the Act provides for a deduction to the bank in respect of ‘any provision made for bad and doubtful debts’ subject to certain ceiling. It does not specify the methodology for calculation of provision for bad and doubtful debts. The banks are required to make provision for bad and doubtful debts in accordance with the RBI guidelines. All the loan assets are initially classified as ‘Standard’. Later on depending upon the problems arising, if any, and symptoms of sickness shown including delays in the repayment of the principal and interest, deterioration of security, etc., they may be shifted to other categories. A
80 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 provision made on any loan assets is a provision for ‘bad and doubtful debts’ irrespective of the category in which the loan falls. This is to provide for the inherent risk of loan losses which the bank may suffer in subsequent years.
We noted from the provision of Section 36(1)(viia) of the Act that the same allows a deduction to banks in respect of any provision made ‘for’ bad and doubtful debts. It does not restrict the allowance to provision made ‘on’ bad and doubtful debts. Even in respect of assets that are classified as standard assets, a part of the debts are doubtful of recovery. The fact that a provision is made for standard assets by itself indicates that a part of the standard assets are doubtful of recovery. Accordingly, the entire provision made by the assessee, including in respect of standard assets, is for bad and doubtful debts as envisaged by section 36(1)(viia) of the Act. Thus, in light of above, the assessee is eligible to claim deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act even in respect of the provision made for standard assets. This issue was considered by the ITAT in assessment year 2006-07 in ITA 3145/Mum/2009 dated 6.09.2016, in an appeal against the revision order of the CIT passed under section 263 of the Act, wherein it is held as under:
“So, however, we may also clarify that we are in principle in agreement that a provision for bad and doubtful debts cannot include that against standard assets i.e. which the bank
81 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 (assessee) itself regards as good for receipt and, therefore with the decision by the tribunal in Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd. (supra) relied upon by the Revenue. A provision by definition a charge against profits, while that in respect of an asset, considered good, would be more in the nature of an appropriation of profit i.e. a reserve. This is precisely what the Tribunal in Bharat Overseas Bank Ltd. (supra) means when its states of the deduction being not in the nature of a standard allowance. No contrary judgement by the Tribunal or a higher court has even otherwise been brought to our notice. At the same time, the provision as per RBI guidelines – which are contended to have been followed / adopted, provide for the minimum provision, and the bank is free to make a higher provision, i.e., than that prescribed by the RBI norms. Provisioning, it may be noted, is a management function, made reflecting its risk assessment qua different assets. If therefore, the assessee-bank is able to satisfy the assessing authority that the provision as made is justified with reference to the debts considered by it as bad and doubtful, we see no reason as to why the same cannot be allowed. The matter is accordingly restored back to the
82 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 file of the A.O. for fresh determination by issuing definite findings of fact. Even as the primary onus would be on the assessee, the A.O. cannot substitute his own judgement with regard to the risk assessment qua a particular asset and, correspondingly, the provision in its respect. His purview would be to examine the reasonableness of the assessee’s claim in light of the facts and circumstances qua each asset/s in respect of which provision is made. In arriving at our decision, we have taken a holistic view of the matter, placing due emphasis on the words ‘provision’ preceding the words ‘for bad and doubtful debts’ as well as the words ‘not exceeding’ occurring in the section, and which stand highlighted for the purpose. We decide accordingly.”
In view of the above discussion, arguments of both the sides, we are of the view that the assessee is eligible for claim of deduction u/s 36(1)(viia) of the Act on standard assets and this issue is covered by Tribunal’s decision in assessee’s own case for AY 2006-07 in ITA No.3145/Mum/2004 vide order dated 06.09.2016. Hence, we allow this issue of assessee’s appeal.
The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in making
83 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 addition of interest on non-performing assets(NPAs). For this assessee raised the following Ground No. 9: -
“9. Taxation of interest on non-performing assets (NPAs) of ₹ 11,37,42,857/-
The learned CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the Assessing Officer in making an addition of ₹11,37,42,857/- in respect of interest on sticky advances that had been classified as NPAs by the Bank in terms of RBI guidelines.”
Brief facts are that the assessee, based on criteria as per the RBI guidelines (i.e. 90-day overdue norm), has classified its advances as NPA. The interest income on such NPAs is recognised on realisation basis, as per the RBI guidelines i.e. the interest income on NPAs is credited to the profit and loss account in the year in which it is received. During the year, the assessee, as per the RBI guidelines for non-recognition of interest on advances classified as NPA, did not credit interest amounting to Rs.11,37,42,857/- on bad and doubtful debts in its profit and loss account. Consequently, the assessee did not offer the same to tax in terms of the consistent policy adopted by the assessee. Section 43D of the Act provides that in the case of a scheduled bank, income by way of interest in relation to prescribed categories of bad or doubtful debts, having regard to the guidelines issued by the RBI in relation to such debts, shall be chargeable to tax in the previous year:
84 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 a. in which it is credited by the scheduled bank to its profit and loss account; or b. in which it is actually received by the bank; whichever is earlier.
Rule 6EA of the Rules inter alia provides the categories of advances that may be classified as bad and doubtful debts (i.e. 180 days norm). Clause (e) of rule 6EA also includes therein debts recoverability whereof has become doubtful on account of shortfalls in value of security, difficulty in enforcing and realising the securities, or inability or unwillingness of the borrower to repay the banks dues, partly or wholly.
We noted that the assessee does not offer to tax, the interest income on NPAs, classified in terms of RBI guidelines, on accrual basis. The same is offered to tax in the year in which the same is received and credited to the profit and loss account in terms of the RBI guidelines. Presently, the period to recognise an advance as a NPA as per RBI guidelines is where interest and/ or instalment of principal remained overdue for 90 days whereas as per Rule 6EA, the same is 180 days. The AO has brought to tax the notional interest on sticky advances having irregularities for the period between 90 days to 180 days on accrual basis, relying on section 43D of the Act and rule 6EA of the Rules. The CIT(A) has upheld the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer following the directions of the DRP for the assessment year 2012-13.
85 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 79. The Revenue before the Tribunal has emphasized on the applicability of the criteria prescribed as per rule 6EA and that the interest on NPAs cannot fall under the exception provided in clause (e) of rule 6EA. But, the assessee argued that the action of the lower authorities cannot be sustained due to the following three reasons viz.,
a. section 43D of the Act would not apply in cases where interest is neither received nor credited to the profit and loss account; b. RBI guidelines are the primary criteria for determining whether a debt is bad or doubtful and the rule should be framed having regard to the guidelines; c. without prejudice, a deduction should be allowed of such interest as bad debts.
In relation to the above, it was argued that the provisions of section 43D of the Act provide that the categories of bad or doubtful debts would be prescribed having regard to the guidelines issued by the RBI in relation to such debts. In other words, the Legislature envisages that the RBI guidelines are the primary criteria for determining whether a debt is bad or doubtful and the categories prescribed in rule 6EA necessarily have to follow the RBI guidelines. Accordingly, rule 6EA operates in a very narrow scope and has to be read in conjunction with RBI guidelines.
86 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 81. We have gone through the case law in American Express Bank Ltd. vs. Addl. CIT [2012] 25 taxmann.com 572 (Mumbai), wherein the Mumbai Tribunal was considering a case where the loans on which interest/principal remained unpaid for 90 days were classified as no-accrual loans. The unpaid interest in respect of such loans was reversed to an account called Reserve for Doubtful Interest (RFDI) account. All subsequent interest accruals of such loans were credited to RFDI account and not to the profit and loss account. The assessee offered to tax the net amount credited to the RFDI account i.e. the interest accruals in the RFDI account net of recoveries. However, it was argued that such tax treatment leads to offering interest on non-accrual loans to tax on accrual basis, even if the same is not credited to the profit and loss account. The Mumbai Tribunal held that where the AO has not contested that the policy adopted by the assessee is not in accordance with RBI guidelines, the incidence of taxation of interest on bad and doubtful debts will be either when the same is credited to the profit and loss account for the year or in the year in which it is actually received. Mere crediting of the interest to a reserve cannot be said to be an incidence by which the said interest could be charged to tax. The aforesaid decision has been affirmed by the Bombay High Court in the case of DIT vs. American Express Bank Ltd [2015] 235 Taxman 85 (Bombay). In the present case the assessee argued that there is no credit entry in the books of the account in respect of the interest on such NPAs and, accordingly, the addition made cannot be sustained. Hence according to
87 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 assessee the issue stood covered by the first proposition in terms of the Bombay High Court in assessee’s favour and hence, no further submissions were made on other two propositions.
We noted that this issue is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of American Express Bank Ltd (supra), wherein it is held that there is no credit entry in the books of the account in respect of the interest on such NPAs, no addition can be made. Further, even the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of American Express Bank Ltd. (supra) has considered this issue and held that where the AO has not contested that the policy adopted by the assessee is not in accordance with RBI guidelines, the incidence of taxation of interest on bad and doubtful debts will be either when the same is credited to the profit and loss account for the year or in the year in which it is actually received. Mere crediting of the interest to a reserve cannot be said to be an incidence by which the said interest could be charged to tax. Hence, we delete the addition of interest income and allow this issue of assessee’s appeal.
The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in making addition of interest on non-performing Investments(NPIs). For this assessee raised the following Ground No. 10: -
“10. Taxation of non-performing investments (NPIs) of Rs.12,97,00,000
88 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 The learned CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the Assessing Officer in making an addition to ₹12,97,00,000 in respect of interest on NPIs.”
Brief facts are, similar to NPAs, the assessee did not recognise interest on non-performing investments such as debentures, bonds, etc. amounting to Rs. 12,97,00,000/- in accordance with the RBI guidelines. The AO taxed the notional interest on non-performing investments on which income is to be received on accrual basis. The CIT(A) upheld the addition made by the AO following the directions of the DRP in assessment year 2012-13.
We noted that the RBI guidelines require interest on non performing securities also to be reckoned as income on realisation basis and the same has regularly been recognised in the books of account accordingly. The case law cited by the learned Counsel for the assessee before us in the case of CIT vs. Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd. [2011] 330 ITR 440 (Delhi), the Delhi High Court had to consider a case where the assessee, being a NBFC, treated the inter corporate deposits as an NPA, in terms of the directions of the RBI and, hence, did not recognise interest income in respect of the same. The Delhi High Court has recognised the real income theory and this was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Sothern Technologies and held that provisions of other enactment which contain a non obstante clause, would override the provisions of the Act. In view of the
89 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 above, the Delhi High Court held that the interest on inter corporate deposits recognised as NPA, in terms of the directions of RBI was not taxable. The aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd. (supra) has been affirmed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd. [2019] 410 ITR 244 (SC).
In view of the above decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Vasisth Chay Vyapar Ltd. (supra), which was affirmed by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the facts and circumstances are exactly identical in the present case before us and hence, respectfully following the same, we delete the addition of interest income from non-performing Investments made by the AO. This issue of assessee’s appeal is allowed.
The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in not allowing claim of the Bank in respect of non-taxability of recovery of Bad Debts written off in earlier years. For this assessee raised the following Ground No.11: -
“11. Recovery of bad-debts written off in earlier years
11.1 The learned CIT(A) erred in not allowing the claim of the Bank in respect on non- taxability of recovery of bad debts written off in earlier years.
90 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 11.2 The learned CIT(A) erred in not directing the Assessing Officer to not to tax the recovery of bad debts written off in terms of section 41(4), as the appellant had not claimed a deduction under section 35(1)(vii).
11.3 The learned CIT(A) erred in not directing the Assessing Officer to verify and allow the claim of the appellant.”
Brief facts are that during the year under consideration the assessee has recovered bad debts written off in earlier years, in respect of which no claim for deduction was made under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in the past. The assessee raised an additional ground before the CIT(A) in this regard. But, the CIT(A) has dismissed the additional ground raised on the basis that a similar issue was decided against the assessee by the CIT(A) in assessment year 2007-08 and that the facts of this issue are not verified during the assessment proceedings and appellate proceedings.
The Revenue before the Tribunal has emphasized that the claim made for deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act and also under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, to the extent the write off exceeds the opening credit balance for the provision made for bad and doubtful debts and that even if the assessee has not claimed deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act, but has claimed a deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act, the same will be hit by the provisions of section 41(1) or
91 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 41(4) of the Act. In relation to the above, the assessee argued that the provisions of section 41(4) of the Act are applicable only when the recovery of bad debts are in relation to a debt for which a deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act is allowed. The assessee has been allowed a deduction in relation to provision made for bad debts under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act in the earlier years. This provision, as if by a fiction deems something to be income, has to be strictly construed. Therefore, the provisions of section 41(4) of the Act, do not apply.
We noted from the above arguments of both the sides and case law cited by the parties, that the issue is squarely covered by a decision of the Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in the case of State Bank of Mysore Vs. DCIT [2009] 33 SOT 7 (Bangalore), now merged with assessee. We noted that the Tribunal in the case of State Bank of Mysore (supra) narrated the facts and the facts in the present case are exactly the same as in the case of State Bank of Mysore. In the case of State Bank of Mysore (supra), the assessee had claimed deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act and not under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act. Accordingly, the Bangalore Tribunal has held that section 41(4) of the Act cannot be invoked. Sections 41(1), 41(2), 41(3) and 41(4) of the Act operate in different spheres. Each of the sub-sections to section 41 of the Act deals with different and distinct circumstances. Each of the sub-sections deals with different and distinct topics and one cannot read recoupment under one sub-section into another. We have considered the decision relied on in this regard of Supreme Court in the case of
92 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Nectar Beverages (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT [2009] 314 ITR 314 (SC) wherein the Supreme Court has dealt with the specific section 41(2) of the Act for taxing balancing charge versus taxing the same under section 41(1) of the Act and has concluded that section 41(1) of the Act shall not be applicable.
As the aspects of bad and doubtful debts is dealt with specifically under section 41(4) of the Act, as laid down by the Supreme court in Nectar Beverages (supra), section 41(1) of the Act is not applicable in case of the assessee. Further, the primary condition to be satisfied for taxing an amount as deemed income under section 41(1) of the Act is that a deduction/allowance should have been claimed by the assessee in respect of a loss, expenditure or trading liability. A deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act is not for a loss, expenditure or trading liability, but for a provision for bad and doubtful debts. We noted that the learned CIT Departmental Representative had raised a contention that the CIT(A) and AO have not perused the details and, hence, the matter may be restored back which was opposed. In relation to the above contention, without prejudice to the assessee’s objection in the event the matter is proposed to be remanded back to the AO, a direction may be given to the AO to delete the addition, if the recovery of the amount is in respect of a write off claimed and allowed as a deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act and not under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in the earlier years.
93 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 92. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that principally the assessee is entitled for claim of deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act, which has rightly been claimed. The assessee has not made claim under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in this regard. Hence, we allow the claim of assessee but the matter is restored back to the file the AO for verification purposes. This issue of assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.
The next issue in this appeal of assessee is as regards to the order of CIT(A) confirming the action of AO in not allowing claim of the Bank in respect of non-taxability of income from foreign branches. For this assessee raised the following Ground No.12: -
“12. Non-taxability of income from foreign branches
12.1 The learned CIT(A) erred in not allowing the claim of the Bank in respect of non- taxability of income earned by its foreign branches.
12.2 The learned CIT(A) erred in not directing the Assessing Officer to not tax the income earned by the foreign branches of the appellant, based in countries with whom India has entered into a tax treaty.
94 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 12.3 The learned CIT(A) erred in not directing the Assessing Officer to verify and allow the claim of the appellant. 12.4. The learned CIT(A) erred in observing that no facts were on record, without appreciating that the claim of Double Taxation Relief was verified by the Assessing Officer and hence significant facts were available on record.” 94. Brief facts are that the income earned by the foreign branches of the assessee should not be liable to tax in India in terms of the relevant tax treaties in light of various judicial pronouncements. Assessee claimed before CIT(A) that necessary directions may be given to the AO to not tax income of foreign branches based in countries with which India has a tax treaty. The CIT(A) held as under:-
“23.2.4 I have considered the appellant's submissions. Here the additional ground filed by the appellant is considered in view of decision of Mumbai High Court in the case of Pruthvi Brokers vs. CIT 349 ITR 336. In the above case, it is clearly held that if the facts are verified by the AO, this legal claim may be considered in the appellant's case. Regarding this issue the appellant had not submitted any facts and quantified the amount which falls
95 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 under this category and what is the amount received by the appellant and this amount was neither verified by the AO during the assessment proceedings nor the facts are not placed before me, claim of the appellant cannot be allowed. Similar issue was decided against the Bank by the CIT(A) for AY 2007-08.”
Now before us assessee claimed that income earned by the branches of the assessee located outside India is not to be taxed in India in light of the tax treaties between India and the countries where the branches are located, as the income has been subject to tax in foreign countries. The details of the income earned by foreign branches were submitted to the AO vide Annexure 1 of letter dated 19.02.2010 and now enclosed in assessee paper book 1 at page 325. It was contended that the assessee raised an additional ground before the CIT(A) in this regard. However, the CIT(A) dismissed the additional ground raised by the assessee on the basis that a similar issue was decided against the assessee by the CIT(A) in assessment year 2007-08 and that the facts of this issue are not verified during the assessment proceedings and appellate proceedings.
The Revenue before the Tribunal emphasized that no details were filed before the AO in connection with income from foreign branches and that the Notification No.91/2008 dated 28 August 2008 issued under section 90(3) by the CBDT is
96 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Clarificatory in nature and applicable to the assessee for the year.
During the course of the hearing, it was pointed out that the details of income earned by foreign branches were submitted to the AO vide Annexure 1 of letter dated 19.02.2010. In fact, based on the said details, the AO has allowed relief for the tax credit in respect of taxes paid in the foreign branches as can be verified from the assessment order. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Mumbai Tribunal in the case of Bank of India vs. ACIT [2012] 27 taxmann.com 335 (Mumbai.Trib), wherein it has been held that income attributable to foreign branches being permanent establishments outside India cannot be taxed in India having regard to the mandate contained in Article 7(1) of the relevant double taxation avoidance agreements. The aforesaid decision has been affirmed by the Bombay High Court [2015] 64 taxmann.com 215 (Bombay). When under the relevant tax treaty it is provided that tax ‘may be’ charged in a particular State in respect of the specified income, it is implied that tax will not be charged by the other State. Once an income is held to be taxable in a particular jurisdiction under a tax treaty, unless there is a specific mention that it can be taxed in the other jurisdiction, the other tax jurisdiction is denuded of its powers to tax the same. As regards the learned CIT DR’s reliance on the Notification No.91/2008 dated 28 August 2008 issued under section 90(3), it is submitted as under:
97 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 section 90(3) empowers the Central Government to define any term which is not defined in the Income-tax Act, 1961 or in the relevant tax treaty. The legal meaning of ‘term’ is any expression or phrase which has a fixed or known meaning in art, science, or profession. Accordingly, it is submitted that sale, transfer, gift, etc. could be regarded as terms; however ‘may be taxed’ cannot be regarded as a term. Hence, the said notification, is not applicable The Notification does not define any ‘term’; it only gives a result / clarification. Section 90(3) empowers the Central Government to define any term which is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Income- tax Act, 1961 or the tax treaty. As the Supreme Court has already interpreted the meaning of the phrase ‘may be taxed’ in the case of CIT v/s. PAVL Kulandagan Chettiar [267 ITR 654], the notification cannot give a meaning to ‘may be taxed’ which is inconsistent with the views of the Supreme Court. The Notification cannot survive as it directly contradicts the judgment of the Supreme Court.
98 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 98. Without prejudice to the above argument made was that even if it held that the above notification is applicable, the same can be said to be applicable prospectively (i.e. from assessment 2009-10 onwards) and, hence, is not applicable for the year under consideration. Reliance in this regard, is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case CIT vs. Vatika Township (P.) Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466 (SC), wherein it was held that one established rule for interpretation of legislation is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. Similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in V.R.S.M Firm [1994] 208 ITR 400 (Madras).
We noted from the above discussion that this issue is squarely covered by the decision of Bank of India (supra), wherein the co-ordinate Bench held that income attributable to foreign branches being permanent establishment outside India cannot be taxed in India, having regard to the mandate given in Article 7(1) of the DTAA. This view has been affirmed by Hon’ble Bombay High Court. Since, the issue is squarely covered by the decision of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Bank of India (supra), respectfully following the same, we allow this issue in favour of assessee.
The next issue raised by assessee by way of additional ground is as regards to claim of deduction on account of write- off of bad debts under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in terms of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
99 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Vijaya Bank Vs. CIT [2010] 323 ITR 166 (SC). For this, assessee raised additional ground.
The assessee by this additional ground claimed that the deduction should be allowed on account of write-off of bad debts under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in terms of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijaya Bank (supra). During the year, the assessee has created a provision for non-performing assets of Rs. 2000.94 crore (excluding the provision for standard assets of Rs. 566.97 crore). The assessee filed these details vide note no 18.9(k) of the financial statements on page 81 of Assessee Paper Book–I. The assessee had claimed a deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act in the revised computation of total income amounting Rs. 2567 crore. The AO recomputed the deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act on the basis of the assessed income to Rs. 3652 crore.
We noted that the assessee now raised an additional ground, to claim a deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in respect of the provision for bad debts of Rs. 2000.94 crore (excluding the provision for standard assets of Rs. 566.97 crore), in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vijaya Bank (Supra). The assessee claimed that if the aforesaid claim is allowed, the deduction under section 36(1)(viia) of the Act as allowed by the AO may be withdrawn. In relation to the Departmental representative’s stand on non- admission of additional grounds by relying on the decision of the
100 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Bombay High Court in the case of Ultratech Cement Ltd. Vs. ACIT [2018] 408 ITR 500 (Bombay), the Ld. Counsel of assessee argued that whether or not to allow an additional ground to be raised before the appellate authority is to be decided by the appellate authority in exercise of its discretion considering the facts and circumstances of the case before it.
We noted that in the assessment years 1996-97 to 1998- 99, the assessee had raised a similar additional ground of appeal. The said ground of appeal was admitted by the Tribunal in those years and the matter was restored to the Assessing Officer. The Revenue has not filed an appeal challenging the admission of the additional ground raised by the assessee in the AYs 1996-97 to 1998-99. Hence, according to us the additional ground be accepted even in the current year under consideration because it is only a pure question of law arising from facts which are already on record. The only information required for adjudicating this ground is the assessee’s Annual Accounts which already forms part of the record.
We noted that as per the Supreme Court judgement, the twin conditions for eligibility of deduction under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act are as under:
debit to profit and loss account; and reduction of loans and advances from the asset side of balance sheet
101 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 both of which conditions are satisfied in the assessee’s case.
The assessee has debited provision for bad and doubtful debts to the profit and loss account and also reduced the same from loans and advances in the Balance Sheet, and only the net amount of loans and advances is indicated. The details are filed by assessee before AO as well CIT(A) and these are now available in note no 18.6 of the financial statements which are on page 68 of Assessee Paper Book–I. Hence, it was argued that as both the aforementioned conditions are duly satisfied, therefore, the assessee is entitled to a deduction for write off of bad debts under section 36(1)(vii) of the Act in accordance with the Supreme Court judgement in the case of Vijaya Bank (Supra). Further, we noted that this issue has been remanded back to the AO for fresh examination and adjudication by the Tribunal in the assessee’s own case vide its Orders dated:
3.01.2014 (in MA. No. 371/M/14) for the assessment year 1996-97 (para No. 5), where the AO has allowed the deduction in the order giving effect to the Tribunal’s order. 29.04.2016 for the assessment years 1997-98 and 1998-99 (refer para 10 and para 21), where the AO allowed the deduction in the order giving effect to the Tribunal’s order. However, the CIT exercising power of revision under section 263 of the Act, set aside the
102 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 matter. The appeal filed by the assessee before the Tribunal against the aforesaid order under section 263 of the Act is heard on 14 March 2019 and the Tribunal’s order is awaited. 31.01.2018 for assessment year 1999-00 (refer para 34 to 36 on page 43 to 45), where the AO is yet to pass the order giving effect to the Tribunal’s order. Moreover, the AO in the assessee’s own case, while passing the assessment orders for AYs 2011-12 to 2015-16 has allowed the claim of deduction under section 36(1)(vii) as per Supreme Court’s ruling in the case Vijaya Bank.
Hence, we are of the view that this issue needs to be set aside to the file of the AO and AO will decide the issue after examining the facts afresh. Hence, this issue of assessee’s appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and matter remanded back to the file of the AO.
The next issue in this appeal of revenue is as regards to the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by AO on account of interest on securities on accrual basis as the assessee is following mercantile system of accounting. For this revenue has raised the following Ground No. 2:-
“2. On the facts and circumstances of the case, in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in allowing the assessee’s plea that the interest
103 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 income on securities has to be taxed on the due basis only without appreciating that as per the mercantile system of accounting followed by the assessee, interest on securities has to be taxed on accrual basis.”
Brief facts relating to this issue are that the AO made addition in respect of interest of securities on accrual basis instead of due basis of Rs. 3,804,07,30,799/-. The facts are interest on securities is payable six-monthly on the coupon date i.e. 30th June and 31st December. While closing the books as on 31st March, there is accrued interest on securities of 3 months i.e. from 1st January to 31st March. However, the bank is not eligible to receive such interest as on 31st March, as the payment of interest gets due only on the coupon date i.e. 30th June. It is the practice of the Bank to account for the interest on securities on accrual basis while arriving at the book profit. However, in the return of income, the interest on securities is taxed on due basis since the right to receive interest on securities arises on due date only which falls after the accounting year. Accordingly, for the AY 2008-09, the interest on Government securities of Rs.771.67 crore that had not become due to the Bank as on 31st March 2008 has not been offered for tax. However, AO considered it as interest accrued and taxed the total amount which bank claimed in the book profit as income and Rs. 771.67 crore was taxed by the AO on accrual basis. The CIT(A) allowed the claim and deleted the addition by observing as under: -
104 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 “4.3 In the case of the appellant, the facts are discussed above. Here appellant had offered the income based on the principle of right to receive interest on securities. In the case of securities there are two coupon dates on which interest is received i.e 3oth June & 3151 December. As the bank has to close its books on 313t March, there is accrued interest on securities from 15, January to 31St March. Bank had not offered interest which has to be received on 301h June as it has no right to receive any income tax return, but while calculating the book profit bank had offered the interest on accrual basis. However, AO had assessed the total interest due to the bank in the A.Y. This issue is recurring in nature which has arisen in appellants own case in A.Y. 1999- 00 to 2007-08 and also ITAT's order in appellant's own case for the A.Yrs 1991-92 to 1996-97 which are in favour of the appellant and which are as under:
…………………………………….
4.4 In view of the above decision of CIT(A) and ]TAT, claim of the appellant is allowed. This ground of appeal is allowed.
Aggrieved, revenue came in appeal before Tribunal.
105 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 109. We have heard rival contentions and gone through the facts and circumstances of the case. We noted that interest on securities is payable six-monthly on the coupon date i.e. on 30th June and 31st December. While closing the books as on 31st March, there is interest on securities of 3 months i.e. from 1st January to 31st March is accounted for. However, the assessee is not eligible to receive such interest on 31st March, as the payment of interest accrues and becomes due only on the coupon date i.e. 30th June. It is the practice of the assessee to account for the interest on securities for the period upto 31st March while arriving at the book profit on the basis that interest accrues from day to day for accounting purposes. However, in the return of income filed for tax purposes, the interest on securities is taxed on accrued and due basis since the right to receive interest on securities arises on the due date only which falls after the accounting year.
The AO has taxed such interest which has neither accrued nor become due as on 31st March 2018 of Rs.3804,07,30,799/-. The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance following Tribunal’s order in assessee’s own case for AYs 1991-92 to 1996-97 and the CIT(A) order for AY 2007-08. The Revenue before the Tribunal emphasized on the fact that the income has been accrued in the books of account of the assessee and based on the matching concept, the interest income should be taxable.
But assessee contended that the issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee in its own case for assessment years
106 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 1991-92 to 1994-95 by the order of Tribunal dated 19.05.2008, which is filed in Assessee Paper Book- II, which was followed by the Tribunal in the subsequent assessment years. Moreover, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court on appeal by Revenue for assessment year 1996-97 has upheld the decision of Tribunal vide its order dated 01.08.2016.
The facts of the case in the year under consideration are same as the facts of the earlier years. In view of the above, this ground of appeal is covered in favour of the assessee vide the aforementioned orders of the Tribunal and Bombay High Court. The right to receive interest on securities arises on due date only, which falls after the accounting year and, accordingly, it cannot be taxed in the accounting year itself. In DIT vs. Credit Suisse First Boston (Cyprus) Ltd. [2013] 351 ITR 323 (Bombay) Hon’ble Bombay High Court was concerned with a case wherein the tax officer had taxed interest accrued but not due on securities held as on 31st March. The Bombay High Court held that right to receive the interest vested only on the due date mentioned in the securities and, hence, the same cannot be taxed since interest was not payable on the 31st March as per the terms of the said securities.
The learned CIT DR referred to several decisions such as State Bank of Travancore Vs. CIT [1986] 158 ITR 102 (SC), U.P Chalchitra Nigam Ltd. Vs. CIT [2015] 370 ITR 379 (Allahabad) and Mahindra Telecommunication Investment P. Ltd Vs. ITO [2016] 69 taxmann.com 431 (Mumbai). He argued that the
107 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 facts are not applicable to the present issue as in the said cases there was no dispute that as per the terms of contract between the parties, income had accrued but the dispute was with respect to its taxability based on the financial difficulty of the debtor parties. However, in the present case, the issue is with respect to whether the interest has become due and payable as per the terms of securities. The present is not a case wherein the right to receive the interest on securities exists and there is improbability of realisation of such interest. Even in such a case, the courts have held that no real income has accrued to the assessee. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Excel Industries Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR 295 (SC), wherein the benefit of an entitlement to make duty free imports could not be taken until the goods are imported and made available for clearance, also there was no liability on part of the other party to pass on the benefit to the assessee and, hence, it was held that only hypothetical income had accrued to the assessee. The Court has equated the right to receive with a corresponding liability to pay which does not exist in the present case as the obligation of the issuer to pay arises only on the coupon date. The learned CIT DR also relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Taparia Tools Ltd. Vs. JCIT [2003] 260 ITR 102 (Bombay). It is to be clarified that the matching concept theory referred by the CIT DR in the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Taparia Tools Ltd. (supra) has been reversed by the Supreme
108 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Court in the case of Taparia Tools Ltd. Vs. JCIT [2015] 372 ITR 605 (SC).
We noted that this ground of appeal is covered in favour of the assessee vide the aforementioned orders of the Tribunal and Bombay High Court. The right to receive interest on securities arises on due date only, which falls after the accounting year and, accordingly, it cannot be taxed in the accounting year itself. Hence, in view of the above discussion, we decide this issue in favour of assessee and accordingly, this ground of Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
The next issue in this appeal of revenue is as regards to the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by AO on account of interest for Broken period. For this revenue has raised the following Ground No. 3:-
“3. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in allowing the broken period of interest holding that it is revenue in nature and in the process failing to appreciating that it is in the nature of cost of securities and therefore, capital in nature.”
Brief facts are that broken period interest (BPI) refers to interest on Government and other approved securities relatable to the period from last due date (upto which interest was paid) till the date of purchase or sale. Thus, when the Bank purchases
109 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 a security, it pays the market price of security plus BPI to the seller, because seller is entitled to interest till the date of sale. This is an old practice in the Government securities market. The purchasing banker treats the BPI paid as expenditure and the selling banker treats the BPI received as income. According to the assessee, this is as per Accounting Standards 9 and 13 framed by the ICAI. However, AO had disallowed BPI claim deduction of the assessee for Rs.2150,10,16,116/- for the year under consideration on the ground that this goes against the theory of real income as well as matching concept which are fundamental to the accounting. The CIT(A) allowed the claim by observing as under: -
5.3 The facts of the case are discussed above. Here AO had disallowed claim of deduction of Rs.2150,10,16,116/- for the year under consideration on the ground that it is against the theory of real income as well as matching concept which are fundamental to the accounting. This issue is recurring in nature in as per CIT(A)'s order in appellants own case in A.Yrs. 1997-98 to 2007-08 and also ITAT's order in appellant's own case for the A.Yrs. 1991-92 to 1996-97 which are in favour of the appellant and which are as under: ………………………….
110 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 5.4 In view of the above decision of CIT(A) and ITAT, claim of the appellant is allowed. Disallowance in relation to BPI is against the law and question of making any addition in relation to BPI either protective or substantive does not arise. This ground of appeal is allowed.
We noted that BPI refers to interest on Government and other approved securities relatable to the period from last due date (upto which interest was paid) till the date of purchase or sale. Thus, when the assessee purchases a security, it pays a price which is calculated having regard to two components, viz., the market price of security plus BPI to the seller. In this case, the assessee treats the BPI paid as expenditure. Similarly, when the assessee sells a security, such interest is treated as income of the assessee.
The Revenue before us emphasized on the fact that interest income is offered to tax on due basis and, hence, the corresponding expenses cannot be allowed, on the basis of the matching concept.
We noted that this ground of appeal is covered in favour of the assessee by the order of the Tribunal in its own case for the AYs 1991-92 to 1994-95 (Order dated 19.05.2008), which was followed by the Tribunal in subsequent AYs. Further, the Bombay High Court on the appeal by Revenue for the assessment year 1996-97 upheld the decision of Tribunal, vide its order dated
111 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 01.08.2016. From these facts we noted that this issue is covered in favour of assessee and hence, this ground is decided against Revenue. This issue of Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
The next issue in this appeal of revenue is as regards to the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by AO on account of provision for other long term employee benefits holding contingent in nature. For this revenue has raised the following Ground No. 4: -
“4. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in allowing the provisions for other long term employee benefits, holding that these are employee costs which are not disallowable under section 43B, without appreciating that these expenses are in fact contingent in nature and hence not allowable as enunciated in the decision of the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Gemini Cashew Sales Corporation [65 ITR 643].”
We noted that this ground is similar to ground nos. 2.1 to 2.3 of the Assessee’s appeal. The Department has filed an appeal against the CIT(A)’s order wherein deduction has been allowed in respect of provision towards silver jubilee award, resettlement allowance and retirement award on the basis that the same are not covered under section 43B of the Act. Accordingly, the CIT(A) had allowed transition provision
112 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 amounting to Rs. 61.39 crore and net provision of Rs. 3.90 crore (after considering write back of retirement award of Rs. 1.05 crore). Silver jubilee award is a benefit payable to the employees as per the employment guidelines on completion of 25 years of service with the assessee. Resettlement allowance is payable to the employees as per the employment terms in cases where the employees are posted from one jurisdiction to other. Retirement award is a benefit payable to the employees as per the employment guidelines on retirement. The provision towards these employee benefits is created on the basis of actuarial valuation and in accordance with the Accounting Standards.
The Revenue before the Tribunal emphasised that these expenses are contingent in nature and questioned the basis of quantification of these expenses.
Assessee argued that the department in its appeal has only contested that the said expenses are contingent in nature. It is not the case of the AO that the said provision is not on a reasonable basis. Therefore, the contentions raised by the Department Representative on the basis of quantification are not justified and cannot be accepted. These costs are part of employee cost and, hence, should be allowed as deduction as normal business expenditure. These costs are incurred based on the employee guidelines and have been quantified on a scientific basis as per actuarial valuation. As submitted in Assessee’s appeal ground 2.1 to 2.3, the said provision is an ascertained
113 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 liability, determined based on reasonable certainty and hence, clearly allowable. Reliance in this regard is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Earth Movers Vs. CIT [2000] 245 ITR 428 (SC), wherein it is held that the liability is not a contingent one if the liability has been incurred during the accounting year and an estimate with reasonable certainty can be made, even if the liability is to be discharged at a future date. We accordingly, dismiss this issue of revenue’s appeal.
The next issue in this appeal of revenue is as regards to the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by AO on account of disallowing the provision for wage revision. For this revenue has raised the following Ground No. 5:-
“5. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in allowing the provision for wage revision without appreciating that provision in respect of an unascertained liability which has not be quantified or a liability which has not accrued, does not qualify for deduction and such additions are covered under the CBDT Inst. No. 17 of 2008 dated 26/11/2008.”
Brief facts are that the assessee enters into agreements with its employees (officers and other staff) union in respect of revision of wages. The Eighth Bipartite Settlement entered into by the Indian Banks' Association on behalf of the member Banks
114 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 with the All India Unions of Workmen expired on 31st October 2007. The employees union had placed a fresh charter of demands before the management of the Bank for inter alia, revision of wages. Discussions had taken place between the Government, IBA, the Bank and Employees Unions/Associations. The Bank is required to revise the wages of its employees from 1st November 2007. For this assessee bank had claimed for wage revision for Rs.575 crores which AO has disallowed on the ground that quantification of liability will be done later and agreement is not finalized till the date of passing assessment order and the claim of assessee is merely based on certain expectations and not on the basis of any definite material and the employees are not in position to claim the upward wage from the bank till the above process is complete. The CIT(A) allowed the claim of assessee by observing as under: -
“8.4 I have considered the appellant's submission. This identical issue had come up before Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited (2010) (26 taxmann.com 202) which is reproduced as under: -
"The Tribunal had noticed that there was no dispute as regards the terms of employment of the workers and officers. The only question was the exact quantification of the compensation or wage revision. The Tribunal also held that
115 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 provision for wage revision was based on past experience, interim Pay Commission of Government employees, previous Pay Commission's reports of public sector employees, union demands and other relevant factors. The Tribunal also held that with the expiry of one wage settlement or agreement, invariably, there is a time lag when deduction cannot be termed as contingent vision or rates of revision would be …………………..the quantification, however, had not happened. In view of these facts, this Court holds that there is no infirmity with the reasoning of the Tribunal about the deduction claimed on account of wage revision being permissible. In the above case Delhi High Court held that though it is not fully quantified, liability cannot be considered as contingent and provision for wage revision was based on past experience, interim Pay Commission of Government employees, previous Pay Commissions reports of public sector employees, union demands and other relevant factors. The Tribunal also held that with the expiry of one wage settlement or agreement, invariably, there is a time lag when another fresh wage revision agreement is
116 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 negotiated and entered. Though it is not fully quantified, this amount is real in nature and claim of the organization has to be allowed. In view of the above decision of Delhi High Court, provision for wage revision of Rs. 575 Crs is allowed. This ground is allowed.”
We noted that the assessee enters into agreements with its employees (officers and other staff) union in respect of revision of wages. The Eighth Bipartite Settlement entered into by the Indian Banks’ Association (IBA) on behalf of the member Banks with the All India Unions of Workmen expired on 31.10.07. The employees union had placed a fresh charter of demands before the management of the assessee for, inter alia, revision of wages on 07.11.07. Discussions had taken place between the Government, IBA, the assessee and Employees Unions/Associations. In light of the ongoing trend of wage revision since the past several years and charter of demands, the assessee was required to create a provision of increase in wages for its employees from 01.11.2007. Accordingly, the assessee has made a provision of Rs. 575 crore for the estimated liability in respect of additional wages payable for the period 01.11.2007 to 31.03.2008. The said additional wages were computed, considering 13.25% increase in salary and allowances on salary slip component (i.e. based on the percentage increase finalised during the earlier Eighth Bipartite Settlement). On 27.04.2010, IBA signed an industry level Bi- partite settlement/ Joint Note (effective from 1.11.2007) with
117 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 representative Unions, Associations of workmen & officers, following which a 17.5% wage increment was decided to be given to the employees.
We noted that revenue before us argued that the provision for wage revision is contingent in nature. But assessee’s contention is that the liability in respect of wage revision has accrued during the year under consideration, as the contracted wages is payable to the employee from 01.11.2007. It is an ascertained liability and not a contingent one. Further, based on past experience and practise, the assessee was reasonably certain that an upward revision of wages was inevitable. In fact, as evident from the facts, the wage revision agreement was finalised on 27.04.2010, whereby the wages were revised with effect from 01.11.2007. Also, the provision for wage revision is debited to the profit and loss account following the general accounting standard followed by the assessee. Accordingly, the entire provision of Rs. 575 crore ought to be allowed as a deduction under section 37(1) of the Act. Reliance in this regard is placed on the following:
CIT vs. Mahindra Ugine & Steel Co. Ltd. [2000] 245 ITR 428 (SC) (Bom.) [see para 2 on page 2] CIT vs. United Motors (India) Ltd. [1990] 181 ITR 347 (Bombay) (Bom.) [last para page 3-4]
In fact on exact similar issue of deductibility of wage revision relating to the same Agreement, pending finalisation of
118 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 wage settlement, is also decided in favour of the assessee by the Tribunal in the case of other Bank’s. In the case of Bank of India vs. DCIT [ITA No. 3082/Mum/2015] [Mum. Trib] the assessee had claimed a deduction for provision created toward wage revision arrived at based on indicative increase for assessment year 2009-10. The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal allowed the claim on the basis that the provision was for services rendered by the employees and there was no doubt that the assessee has to make payment once the negotiations were over. We may mention that Bank of India is also a part of the same Bipartite settlement as in the present case of the assessee.
Similarly, in the case of Bank of Baroda [ITA/4619/Mum/2012] [Mum. Trib] the Mumbai Tribunal held that the date of effective commencement of the agreement is relevant and not the date of signing of the agreement or date of approval by DRE. The Mumbai Tribunal allowed the claim of the assessee for the assessment year 2008-09 on the basis that the wage revision was certain and could have been reasonably estimated. We may mention that Bank of Baroda is also a part of the same Bipartite settlement as in the present case of the assessee. Hence, we are of the view that CIT(A) has rightly allowed the claim of assessee.
The next issue in this appeal of revenue is as regards to the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by AO on
119 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 account of disallowing the staff welfare expenses. For this revenue has raised the following Ground No. 6: -
“6. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the disallowance of Rs. 32,51,664/- incurred by the assessee on reservation of seats in the schools for the children of the bank officers without appreciating the amount was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of its business.”
Brief facts are that the assessee has paid a sum of Rs. 32,51,664/- to various schools towards reservation of seats for the children of the officers of the Bank. These payments were included in the staff welfare expenses as the payments were towards the welfare of the staff. These payments are made with a view to ensure that certain seats in various schools all over India are reserved for the children of the officers of the Bank so that the hardship otherwise faced by the officers of the Bank for children's education during transfer / re-location may be reduced. The AO disallowed the expenditure on the ground that payments made was donations and was not acceptable as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business. The CIT(A) allowed the claim by observing as under: -
“10.3 I have considered the appellant's submissions. This is a recurring issue and this issue was considered by CIT(A)in appellant's
120 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 own case for A.Y. 2007-08 and by ITAT for A.Y. 1996-97 which are reproduced as under:
…………………………
10.4 In view of the above decisions of CIT (A) and ITAT, following the Rule of consistency, AC's disallowance is deleted and claim of the appellant is allowed. This ground of appeal is allowed.”
We noted that this ground of appeal is squarely covered in favour of the assessee in its own case for assessment years 1992-93 to 1994-95 by the order of Tribunal dated 19.05.2008, which was followed by the Tribunal in subsequent assessment years:
- Order dated 17.09.2009 for assessment year 1995-96 - Order dated 26.07.2013 for assessment year 1996-97 - Order dated 31.01.2018 for assessment year 1999-00
Further, the Bombay High Court on an appeal filed by the Revenue for the AY 1996-97, upheld the decision of Tribunal, vide its order dated 01.08.2016. The facts of the case in the year under consideration are same as the facts on the earlier years. In view of the above, this ground of appeal is covered in favour of the assessee vide the aforementioned orders of the Tribunal and Bombay High Court. The payment for reservation of seats was done by the assessee for its employees under the
121 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 assessee’s Staff Welfare Scheme and hence, should be allowed as normal business expenditure. This issue is also covered by the decision in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. CIT [2003] 261 ITR 501 (Bombay), wherein it was held that payment made to schools where children of its employees studied were incurred predominantly for staff welfare and consequently, is an allowable business expenditure. Hence, this issue of Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
The next issue in this appeal of revenue is as regards to the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by AO on account of disallowing the depreciation provided for investments classified under the HTM category. For this revenue has raised the following Ground No. 9: -
“9. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the CIT(A) has erred in treating loss on account of depreciation of securities in HIM category/amortization of securities in HIM category without appreciating that no depredation is to be provided for investment classified under the HIM category.”
Brief facts are that during the year the assessee has provided Rs.1020,21,51,476 being loss on account of amortisation of premium paid on investments held under HTM category. The above provision is made in accordance with the RBI guidelines, wherein it has been stated that investments in HTM category should be carried at acquisition cost. In case the
122 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 purchase price is higher than the face value, the premium should be amortised over the remaining period of maturity of the security. The AO disallowed the aforesaid provision on the basis that RBI guidelines do not decide taxability. The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the AO following the Tribunal order in assessee’s own case for AYs 1995-96 to 1996-97 and the CIT(A) order for AYs 2002-03 to 2007-08. The Revenue before the Tribunal emphasised that there is no section under the Act that allows deduction for such amortisation of premium on securities.
It was contended that the issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by assessee’s own case for assessment year 1995-96 by the order of Tribunal dated 17.09.2009, which was followed by the Tribunal in subsequent assessment year 1996-97 vide order dated 26.07.2013. Further, the Bombay High Court on the appeal by revenue in assessment year 1996- 97, has upheld the decision of Tribunal, vide its order dated 01.08.2016.
We noted that the facts in the year under consideration are same as the facts in the earlier years. In view of the above, this ground of appeal is covered in favour of the assessee vide the aforementioned orders of the Tribunal and Bombay High Court. This issue of Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
The next issue in this appeal of revenue is as regards to the order of CIT(A) deleting the addition made by AO on account of disallowing the discount on issue of Employee Stock
123 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 Option. For this revenue has raised the following Ground No. 10:-
“10. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the CIT(A) has erred in allowing the discount on issue of Employee Stock Purchase Scheme in accordance with the principle laid down by the Bangalore Special Bench in the case of Biocon Ltd. (IIA No. 368 to 371 & 1206/Ban/2010), when the decision has not been accepted and further appeal has been filed before the Karnataka High Court on this issue.”
Brief facts are that the Central Board of the assessee has adopted the Employees Share Purchase Scheme (the Scheme), duly approved by the Central Government, and accordingly has approved the offer of 86,17,500 equity shares of Rs. 10 each at a premium of Rs. 1580 as part of its rights issue to the employees of the Bank including the Chairman and Managing Directors. The Scheme is in accordance with the provisions of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Employee Stock Option Scheme and Employee Stock Purchase Scheme) Guidelines, 1999. The said scheme has since closed on 30th April 2008. In view of the above scheme, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 11 crore for provision for Employee Stock Purchase Scheme. The AO disallowed the claim of the assessee considering that the provision is merely a contingent liability
124 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 and further relying the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Goetz (India) Ltd. Vs. CIT [2006] 284 ITR 323 (SC) denied the claim as the claim is made only in the note to the return. The CIT(A) allowed the claim by observing as under:-
“20.3 I have considered the appellant's submissions. In this case Bank adopted the Employees Share Purchase Scheme as per the approval of Central Government and accordingly approved the offer of 86,17,500 equity shares of Rs.10 each at a premium of Rs.1580/-. For this bank had claimed a deduction of Rs. 11 Crore which was disallowed by the AO on the round that it was claimed only in the note to the return in view in view of Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Goetz India Ltd. (284 ITR 323) and also AO considered it as merely a contingent liability. Appellant has placed reliance on decision of Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. PVP Ventures Ltd. (23 taxmann.com 286) wherein it is held as under:
As far as the Employees Stock Option Plan is concerned, as rightly pointed out by the Tribunal, the assessee had to follow SEBI direction and by following such direction, the assessee claimed the ascertained
125 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 amount as liability for deduction. We do not find that there exists any error to disturb the order of the Tribunal and in turn the Assessing Authority. In the circumstances, we agree with the submission of learned senior counsel appearing for the assessee in this regard by upholding the order of the Tribunal.
and also decision of the Bangalore Tribunal Special Bench in the case of Biocon Ltd v. CIT (35 taxmann.com 335) wherein it was held as under:
'It is a trite law that deduction is permissible in respect of an ascertained liability and not a contingent liability. From the stand point of the company, the options under ESOP vest with the employees at the rate of 25 per cent only on putting in service for one year by the employees. Unless such service is rendered, the employees do not qualify for such options. In other words, rendering of service for one year is sine qua non for becoming eligible to avail the benefit under the scheme. Once the service is rendered for one year, it
126 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 becomes obligatory on the part of the company to honour its commitment of allowing the vesting of 25 per cent of the option. It is at the end of the first year that the company incurs liability of fulfilling its promise of allowing proportionate discount, which liability would actually be discharged at the end of the fourth year when the options are exercised by the employees.
20.4 In view of the above two decisions, here the claim of the appellant for provision of Employee Stock Purchase Scheme is allowed.”
We noted that the assessee during the year created a provision for Employee Stock Purchase Scheme amounting to Rs. 11 crore in accordance with SEBI Guidelines. The AO disallowed the claim of the assessee on the basis that the same is contingent in nature. The CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made by the AO. The Revenue before the Tribunal emphasised that the same is contingent in nature and that the deduction was claimed by way of a note by the assessee and not by filing a revised return. The facts were submitted before the AO vide letter dated 5.02.2010. It is a well settled principle that deduction may be claimed by the assessee during assessment proceedings, even if the same was not claimed in the revised return. Also, the ground of appeal filed by the department does
127 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 not challenge the findings of the CIT(A) admitting the additional claim made by the assessee at the time of the assessment. Hence, the said contentions of the learned Department Representative ought to be rejected. 141. It was contended that the discount on Employee Stock Purchase Scheme is an allowable deduction under section 37(1) in view of the Special Bench decision of the Bangalore Tribunal in the case of Biocon Ltd. v/s. DCIT [2013] 25 ITR(T) 602 (Bangalore - Trib.) (SB). As this issue is squarely covered in favour of assessee and against Revenue, we find no infirmity in the order of CIT(A). This issue of Revenue’s appeal is dismissed. 142. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed and the appeal of the Revenue is dismissed, as indicated above. Order pronounced in the open court on 03.02.2020. Sd/- Sd/- (महावीर स िंह /MAHAVIR SINGH) (जी. मंजुनाथ /G MANJUNATHA) (लेखा दस्य / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) (उपाध्यक्ष / VICE PRESIDENT) मुिंबई, ददनािंक/ Mumbai, Dated: 03.02.2020. स दीप सरकार, व.ननजी सधिव / Sudip Sarkar, Sr.PS
128 | P a g e State Bank of India ITA Nos.3644&4563/Mum/2016 आदेश की प्रनिसलपप अग्रेपिि/Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथी / The Appellant 2. प्रत्यथी / The Respondent. 3. आयकर आयुक्त(अपील) / The CIT(A) 4. आयकर आयुक्त / CIT 5. ववभागीय प्रनतननधर्, आयकर अपीलीय अधर्करण, मुिंबई / DR, ITAT, Mumbai 6. गार्ा फाईल / Guard file.
आदेशान सार/ BY ORDER, त्यावपत प्रनत //True Copy// उप/सहायक पुंजीकार (Asstt. Registrar) आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण, मुिंबई / ITAT, Mumbai