RAM NIWAS YADAV,SHAHPURA vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER BEHROR, BEHROR

आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण] जयपुर न्यायपीठ] जयपुर
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR BENCHES,”SMC” JAIPUR

Mk0 ,l- lhrky{eh] U;kf;d lnL; ,oa Jh jkBksM deys'k t;UrHkkbZ] ys[kk lnL; ds le{k
BEFORE: DR. S. SEETHALAKSHMI, JM & SHRI RATHOD KAMLESH JAYANTBHAI, vk;dj vihy la-@ITA No. 275/JP/2025
fu/kZkj.k o"kZ@Assessment Year : 2010-11

Ram Niwas Yadav,
Ward no. 14, Dhani Pinthawali,
Khori, District-Jaipur cuke
Vs.
Income Tax Officer,
Behror
LFkk;h ys[kk la-@thvkbZvkj la-@PAN/GIR No.: ACWPY5809M vihykFkhZ@Appellant izR;FkhZ@Respondent fu/kZkfjrh dh vksj ls@ Assessee by : Sh. Jaideep Malik, Adv.
jktLo dh vksj ls@ Revenue by : Sh. Gautam Singh Choudhary, JCIT lquokbZ dh rkjh[k@ Date of Hearing

: 16/04/2025

mn?kks"k.kk dh rkjh[k@Date of Pronouncement: 08/05/2025

vkns'k@ ORDER

PER: RATHOD KAMLESH JAYANTBHAI, AM

On being aggrieved by the order of the learned National Faceless
Appeal Centre, Delhi [ for short CIT(A) ] dated 23/03/2023 [ for short
CIT(A)] the captioned assessee preferred the present appeal. The dispute relates to the assessment year 2010-11. The said order of the ld. CIT(A) arises because the assessee has challenged the assessment order dated

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30.11.2017 passed under section 144 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [ for short “Act”] by Income Tax Officer, Behror [ for short AO].
2. In this appeal, the assessee has raised following grounds: -

“1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. AO & CIT(A) has clearly erred in deciding the case of assessee as exparte without even providing a proper opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

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for bringing additional evidence on record at appellate stage. However, after the transfer of appeal to the NFAC no communication/notice or order were ever served upon the appellant physically but was only uploaded on the portal.

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9. That, due to the reason mentioned above, delay of 640 days had occurred in the filing the aforesaid appeal. However, it is pertinent to mention that, the delay had occurred due to genuine and bona fide reasons deserves to be treated as a ‘sufficient reason’ preventing the appellant from filing the Appeal in time.

Reliance is placed on following Judgments:
(i)
Shri Ram Bharose Sharma vs. The ITO Ward- 2(4) Jaipur - ITA No.
1066/JP/2016 – ITAT JAIPUR BENCH
(ii)
Ratanlal Dangi v/s ITO (1995) 51 TTJ 611 (JP) and CIT v/s Motilal
(iii)
Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd. (1979) 118 ITR 200 (SC)
(iv)
Vedbai v/s Shantaram Baburam Patil & Others (2002) 253 ITR 798 (SC)
(v)
Collector, Land & Acquisition v/s Mst. Katiji & Others (1987) 167 ITR 471
(SC) has advocated for a very liberal approach while considering a case for condonation of delay. The following observations of the Hon'ble Court are notable:
The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression sufficient cause'
employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted

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Rohtak Co-op. Milk Producer Union Ltd. vs. ACIT (2012) 18 ITR 0310 (Del
Trib) held as under:
“The term "sufficient cause" is quite elastic so as to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. Further, a litigant should not ordinarily suffer for the mistake of the counsel. The delay in this case has been explained by way of the affidavit of the advocate. Since there are plausible reasons for delay as it occurred due to omission on the part of the advocate, the delay should be condoned. — Himachal Pradesh Cricket
Association, Una, ITA Nos 110 and 111/Ch/2004 dated 8 September 2004 relied;
Chief Post Master General & Others v Living Media India Ltd & another 197
Taxman 435 (Del) distinguished”

(vii)
Anand Shankar Mittal v/s DCIT (2010) 34 DTR 589 (JP Trib) (DPB 9-
19)
Therefore, in view of the above, it is humbly prayed that Ld. CIT(A), may be pleased to kindly allow the present application and condone the delay of 640 days occurred in filing the aforesaid Appeal, and direct the listing of the Appeal for hearing.

Any other appropriate order which may be found just and expedient in the facts and circumstances of the case may be passed in favour of the applicant assessee.

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7. Aggrieved from the order of Assessing Officer, assessee preferred an appeal before the ld. CIT(A) who also confirmed the addition. The relevant finding of the ld. CIT(A) reads as follows;
As a result, the AO completed the assessment u/s. 147/144 with an assessed income of Rs. 18,01,600/- and initiated penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(b) of the IT Act, 1961 separately.

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8. As the assessee did not find any favour, from the appeal so filed before the ld. CIT(A) he preferred the present appeal. To support the various grounds raised by the assessee ld. AR of the assessee, has filed the written submissions which is reproduced herein below:
1. That, the assessee is an individual and is engaged as a wholesaler in the supply of vegetables. It is submitted that the assessee purchases the goods i.e., vegetables from farmers and local agents and supplies the same to various nearby mandis.

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13. That, further it is submitted that, as per section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963, delay should be condoned where ‘sufficient cause’ is established by the assessee. It is settled law that, the term ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless and until delay is found to be deliberate / intentional/ grossly negligent or aimed at taking undue advantage by creating groundless litigation, the factor or ‘Delay’ should be considered as only a technical defect and should not be allowed to defeat the cause of substantial justice. Wherever, substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, it is the cause of substantial justice which should be preferred over the other. Meritorious matters should not be thrown away merely on the ground of limitation.

Therefore, aggrieved by the order of Ld. CIT(A), the assessee has preferred this appeal before this Hon’ble Bench.
Written submissions
In elaboration to and in support of the Grounds of Appeal already taken, detailed submission (groundwise) is made as under:-
GROUND OF APPEAL NO. 1 & 1.1:
The ld. ITO, Behror and the CIT(A) have committed a significant procedural error in deciding the case of the assessee on an ex-parte basis, thereby denying the assessee a fundamental right of being heard. The principle of audi alteram partem, which forms the cornerstone of natural justice, was blatantly overlooked as no adequate opportunity was provided to the assessee to present his/her case or rebut the findings. This unjustified haste in passing the order has resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice and has caused irreparable harm to the assessee’s legal rights and interests.
Furthermore, notwithstanding hereinabove, the assesee has duly gave its written submissions and documentary evidence which were not considered and even were not taken on record while passing of the impugned ex-parte order dated
23.03.2023. Reliance is placed upon the following judgements passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Courts :–
1. Commissioner of Income Tax Madras v. Chenniyappa Mudiliar (1969 1
SCC 591)
The Supreme Court in interpreting the section 33(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1922
has held that the appellate tribunal was bound to give a proper decision on question of fact as well as law, which can only be done if the appeal is disposed off on merits and not dismissed owing to the absence of the appellant. There is no escape from the conclusion that under the said provision, the appellate tribunal had to dispose off the appeal on merits which could not have been done by dismissing the appeal summarily for default of appearance. The principles laid down in the said decision would squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, in as much as the petitioner was neither heard nor were his written submissions placed before the ITAT, considered.
2. Vijay Shrinivasrao Kulkarni Versus ITAT, Pune Bench & Ors. (CIVIL
APPELLATE JURI ICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 17572 OF 2024) (Bombay
High Court)
Issue Before the Court:
The primary issue that falls for consideration revolves around the legality and validity of impugned order of ITAT dated 12 March 2024 alleged to be passed without hearing the petitioner and/or his representative and without considering the written submissions filed by the petitioner, in contravention of the well settled jurisprudential principles of natural justice.
Held by the Hon’ble Court:
We accordingly remand the proceedings to the ITAT, i.e., respondent no. 1 for de novo hearing of the petitioner’s appeal filed before it. ITAT shall after hearing the parties, pass fresh orders on merits and in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible not later than within six weeks from the date of this order made available to the ITAT.
3. Kusham Versus ITO, Ward-2, Rewari (ITA No. 599/DEL/2024) (ITAT New
Delhi)
We have heard rival submissions and perused the material available on record.
The stand of the assessee is that in reassessment proceedings, in response to notice u/s 142(1) of the Act, she had appeared and produced relevant documents but the same were refused to entertain by the Assessing Authority. In appeal before the learned First Appellate Authority physical notice of hearing was ever received by the assessee. The learned CIT(A) dismissed the appeal of the 14
GROUND OF APPEAL NO. 2:
The conduct of ex-parte proceedings by the CIT(A) in the present case constitutes a fundamental breach of procedural fairness and justice. Ex-parte decisions are intended to be resorted to only in cases where the party concerned has been given adequate and reasonable notice to appear but has failed to do so without valid justification. However, in the instant case, the appellant was not afforded proper service of notice as mandated under Section 282 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961. The failure to ensure appropriate notice deprived the appellant of the opportunity to present arguments, provide evidence, or challenge the claims made against them. The hasty progression of proceedings in an ex-parte manner also raises serious concerns about the impartiality and diligence exercised by the adjudicating authority. Consequently, the resultant order is procedurally flawed and unsustainable in law, requiring intervention to uphold the sanctity of justice and fairness.
The CIT(A) have further erred in failing to adhere to the prescribed provisions of Section 282 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which lays down the specific methods for service of notices, summons, requisitions, or other communications under the Act. Section 282 mandates that such communications must be served in one of the approved manners, which include delivery by post or authorized courier services, service as per the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, transmission as an electronic record under the Information Technology Act, 2000, or by other means specified by rules formulated by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT). No notice for hearing or copy of the order was provided to the assessee through registered post or via email, contravening statutory requirements, renders the service of the aforesaid notices invalid in law. This procedural lapse not only violates the express provisions of Section 282 but also undermines the transparency and procedural integrity expected from the tax authorities, thereby invalidating the basis of the ex-parte order passed against the Petitioner.
It is pertinent to bring to the attention of the Hon’ble Tribunal that the order dated
23.03.2023 was never received or duly served upon the assessee. The assessee had only received physical notices prior to the transfer of the appeal to the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC). It is submitted that the assessee duly complied with all the notices received during the pre-NFAC regime. However, after the transfer of the assessee’s appeal to the NFAC, none of the notices

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Instead, these notices were merely uploaded onto the Income Tax Portal, which does not constitute effective service of notice as per the mandatory provisions of Section 282 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. This procedural lapse has resulted in a failure of justice and violated the assessee’s right to a fair opportunity to respond.
Furthermore, notwithstanding hereinabove, the assessee has duly filed its written submissions and documentary evidence which were not considered and even were not taken on record while passing of the impugned ex-parte order dated
23.03.2023. Reliance is placed upon the following judgements:
1. Sohum Charitable Trust, Faridabad vs Cit Exemption, Chandigarh (ITA
No. 1487/Del/2023) (ITAT, Delhi)
At the outset, there is a delay in filing the appeal by the assessee before us by 175 days. The ld. AR pleaded that the order passed by the ld. CIT(E) have been uploaded only in the e-filing portal and not served in the email of the assessee.
Accordingly, the same does not constitute valid service of notice or communication in terms of section 282 of the Act. The assessee on coming to know that the order has been uploaded in the e-filing portal rejecting the claim of the Sohum Charitable Trust assessee, had come forward to file this appeal with a delay condonation petition. We find that the assessee is having sufficient cause for not filing appeal before us in time and hence, the delay is hereby condoned and appeal of the assessee is admitted for adjudication.
2. Sant Kabir Mahasabha Versus The CIT (Exemption) Chandigarh (ITA No.
84/CHD/2023) (ITAT, Chandigarh)
Merely uploading of information about the date of hearing on the Income Tax
Portal is not an effective service of notice as per the provisions of Section 282 of the Income Tax Act. The impugned order of the ld.CIT(E) is, therefore, not sustainable in the eyes of law. The same is hereby set aside with a direction to the ld.CIT(E) to decide the appeal of the assessee afresh after giving proper and adequate opportunity to the assessee to present its case. The ld. CIT (E) will serve notice of hearing through physical mode as well as through electronic mode upon the assessee.
3. Munjal BCU Centre Of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Ludhiana Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions, Chandigarh (CWP-21028-2023) (High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh)
In view of the above, it is essential that before any action is taken, a communication of the notice must be in terms of the provisions as enumerated hereinabove. The provisions do not mention of communication to be “presumed”
by placing notice on the e-portal. A pragmatic view has to be adopted always in these circumstances. An individual or a Company is not expected to keep the e-

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GROUND OF APPEAL NO. 3 & 3.1:
The ld. ITO, Behror and the ld. CIT(A) has committed a grave legal and factual error by equating the total turnover of the assessee with his profit for the relevant assessment year. It is a well-settled principle that turnover merely represents the gross receipts of a business entity and cannot be construed as net profit without considering the associated expenditures, deductions, and operational costs incurred during the course of business. The arbitrary and erroneous addition of
18,01,600/- to the assessee’s total income, solely based on turnover, disregards the foundational principles of income determination as per the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Such an approach is not only illegal but also contrary to the established norms of assessing taxable income. It is settled law that entire receipt cannot be treated as income. In light of this gross misapplication of the law, the impugned order passed by the Learned AO deserves to be quashed and set aside as it is unsustainable in law and equity.

Further, the CIT(A) has grossly erred by charging interest under Sections
234A and 234B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, on the entirety of the total turnover, i.e.,
18,01,600/-, without any basis for such calculation. It is pertinent to highlight that the provisions of Sections 234A and 234B pertain to the levy of interest for defaults in furnishing returns or payment of advance tax, respectively, based on the assessed income or tax liability. Interest under Section 234A of the Income Tax Act, which pertains to the levy of interest for the delay in filing the return of income, is not applicable in this case. The assessee's income falls below the mandatory filing threshold as prescribed by the law, and the assessee has declared their income as NIL. Since there is no obligation for the assessee to file a return, the provision for penalizing a delay in filing cannot be invoked.
Therefore, the interest under Section 234A lacks legal grounds in this scenario.
Similarly, interest under Section 234B, imposed for delay or default in the payment of advance tax, is also inapplicable in the case at hand. The obligation to pay advance tax arises only when the total tax liability exceeds
10,000, and the assessee has declared a liability of less than
10,000. Consequently, the assessee is not liable to pay advance tax, making the provision for interest under Section 234B irrelevant. In view of these facts, the application of Sections 234A and 234B against the assessee is both legally and factually untenable.
Reliance is placed upon the following judgements:
1. Commissioner of Income-tax- XII vs. Subodh Gupta [2015] 54
taxmann.com 343 (Del)
In absence of material to show net profit rate, presumptive net profit rate of 8%
The Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh Court held after considering the relevant facts and law and held that the total sale cannot be regarded as the profit of the assessee.
3. Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. President Industries (2002) 258 ITR
0654
The Hon'ble Gujarat High Court held that it cannot be a matter of an argument that the amount of sales by itself cannot represent the income of the assessee who has not disclosed the sales. The sales only represented the price received by the seller of the goods for the acquisition of which it has already incurred the cost.

Therefore, it is humbly prayed that the impugned order dated 23.03.2023
may please be held bad in law and be quashed.
GROUND OF APPEAL NO. 4:
The ld. CIT(A) has legally erred in failing to consider the specific provisions of Section 44AF of the Income Tax Act, 1961, while adjudicating the case of the assessee. Section 44AF provides a presumptive taxation scheme applicable to small businesses, wherein the income is presumed to be a percentage (5%) of the total turnover or gross receipts, subject to certain conditions. This provision is designed to simplify the process of income computation and provide relief to small-scale assessees from the burden of maintaining exhaustive records. By entirely overlooking the applicability of Section 44AF in the case of the assessee—whose business qualifies within its ambit—the ld. CIT(A) has deviated from the legislative intent and subjected the assessee to an incorrect and arbitrary mode of assessment.
Section 44AD of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides a simplified method for computing profits and gains of eligible businesses on a presumptive basis, aiming to ease the compliance burden for small taxpayers. It stipulates that resident individuals, HUFs, and partnership firms (excluding LLPs) engaged in eligible businesses with turnover not exceeding
2 crore in a financial year can declare profits at 8% of turnover. The assessee in this case falls squarely within this framework, having a turnover of Rs. 18,01,600/-, a figure well below the prescribed limit. By declaring profits at 8% of this turnover, the taxable income of the assessee amounts to Rs. 1,44,128/-, as per Section 44AD’s statutory provisions. This scheme not only simplifies tax compliance by eliminating the need for maintaining detailed books of accounts but also explicitly precludes the arbitrary treatment of the entire turnover as profit.

Despite the clear applicability of Section 44AD, the Income Tax Officer
(ITO), Behror, and the CIT(A) have unlawfully disregarded its provisions by treating Rs. 18,01,600/- —the entire declared turnover—as the assessee’s total profit for the assessment year. Such an arbitrary computation is not only contrary to the legislative intent but also amounts to a serious overreach that undermines the taxpayer’s statutory rights. The presumptive taxation scheme was introduced to simplify taxation and foster compliance among small businesses. The authorities' actions in this instance represent a flagrant violation of these principles, necessitating judicial intervention to uphold the statutory framework and protect the assessee’s rights under the Income Tax Act.
Therefore, light of the above, assessee ought to have been subjected to tax
@8% of his total turnover in terms of Section 44AD of the act and thus, the action of ld. AO in treating his total turnover is completely baseless, unreasonable and devoid of any merits and thus, impugned Order whereby, ld. CIT(A) has confirmed the ld. AO Order dated 30.11.2017 without applying his own independent mind deserve to be set aside and quashed.
Reliance is placed upon the following judgements:
1. Swaran Singh v. Income-tax Officer {[2024] 159 taxmann.com 777
(Amritsar - Trib.)}
Admittedly, the assesse was carrying on the business of sale of milk. He had not been filing his returns of income since his income was below the taxable limit; and that this fact stands verified by the department during the course of his proceedings for Assessment Year 2010-11. In that year, its case was also reopened u/s 148 of the Act for verification of cash deposits Rs. 20,96,973/- in its bank from his business of supplying of Milk where the addition made for Asstt.

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Year 2010-2011, by the AO, has been deleted by the Worthy CIT(A), on the basis of report of the Inspector that the assessee had been carrying on the business of sale of Milk by restricting to only 6% profit on the total bank deposits of Rs.
20,96,973/- being treated as Milk Business Turn Over under the provisions of Section 44AD of the Act
In view of the above, the department cannot be permitted to raise an issue in isolation only for immediately succeeding on identical facts in the case of the same assesse. Thus, the source of amount of credit in the assessee's bank account stands explained as milk sale Turn Over for the Assessment Year under consideration. However, as per provisions of section 44AD of the Act, the AO is directed to apply 8% Net profit on the total milk sale of worth Rs. 18,80,000/-.
2. Mansukh K. Vaghasia v. Income-tax Officer [2022] 139 taxmann.com 84
(Surat-Trib.)
Assessee an individual filed his return of income on 15-3-2011, declaring total income of Rs.1.54 lakhs which was accepted - Later on, assessee`s case was reopened under section 147, on basis of information received from AIR that assessee had deposited cash of Rs.13.87 lakhs in bank - Assessee appeared before Assessing Officer and replied that income of Rs. 13.87 lakhs was from proceeds of retail job work - However, ld. Assessing Officer rejected contention of assessee and made addition to tune of Rs. 13.87 lakhs. It was found that assessee was a small trader, having turnover of Rs.16.02 lakhs only, therefore he filed his return of income under section 44AD.
Whether Assessing Officer having just brushed aside these evidences without even a word on why they were not acceptable and how these were fabricated documents, impugned additions were to be deleted - Held, yes

Therefore, it is humbly prayed that the impugned order dated 23.03.2023
may please be held bad in law and be quashed.
GROUND OF APPEAL NO. 5 & 5.1:
Behror without considering the merits of the case or exercising independent judgment. The additions upheld were based on an erroneous surmise and premise and without proper scrutiny of the facts or evidence provided by the assessee. The appellate authority, being a quasi-judicial body, is mandated to apply its own mind and conduct an impartial review of the assessment order.
However, the CIT(A) summarily dismissed the submissions of the assessee and even not taken on record and upheld the arbitrary additions made by the ITO,
Behror, amounting to Rs. 18,01,600/-. Such dismissal, without a reasoned assessment or due application of law, is both legally unsustainable and procedurally flawed. Hence, the arbitrary addition made and upheld in the impugned order deserves to be deleted summarily to rectify the miscarriage of justice caused to the assessee.
Reliance is placed upon the following judgements:
1. Emco Cables (India) (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [2024] 160 taxmann.com
145 (Delhi)
Noted that, the Proper Officer was required to consider the reply on merits and thereafter form an opinion on whether the reply filed by the Petitioner was sufficient or not Further Noted that, even if the Proper Officer was of the view that the reply filed by the Petitioner is incomplete and further details were required, the said details could have been sought from the Petitioner. However, as per the records no such opportunity was granted to the Petitioner.
Opined that, the Proper Officer merely held that, no proper reply/explanation was received which ex-facie shows that, the Proper Officer of the Respondent has not perused the reply submitted by the Petitioner. Held that, the Impugned Order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication.
2. Amitkumar Dhirajlal Joshi v. Income-tax Officer [2024] 166 taxmann.com
310 (Rajkot - Trib.)
GROUND OF APPEAL NO. 6:
It is submitted that the proceedings conducted by the ITO, Behror, were arbitrary, bad in law, and in blatant disregard of the principles of natural justice.
Consequently, the upholding of the action of the ITO in initiating penalty proceedings under Sections 271(1)(b), 271(1)(c), and 274 of the Income Tax Act,
1961, against the assessee in a mechanical and predetermined manner, is also legally unsustainable. The initiation of penalty proceedings, being a separate punitive action, requires the tax authority to exercise due diligence and apply an independent mind in evaluating whether there has been a deliberate default or concealment of income by the assessee. However, in the present case, the penalty proceedings were initiated as a matter of routine, without examining the merits of the case or substantiating the requisite conditions for invoking such penalties.
It is further submitted that penalty proceedings under Sections 271(1)(b),
271(1)(c), and 274 cannot be mechanically appended to an arbitrary and procedurally flawed assessment order. Since the main proceedings conducted by the ITO lack legal and factual sanctity, the consequent penalty proceedings are also rendered invalid and untenable in law. Such mechanical initiation of penalty proceedings not only violates the statutory provisions but also imposes undue hardship on the assessee. Therefore, it is prayed that the Hon’ble Tribunal may kindly hold the penalty proceedings to be bad in law and direct that the same be dropped in the interest of justice and equity.
Reliance is placed upon the following judgement:
1. M/s. Aagam Shares & Commodities Pvt. Ltd. Versus DCIT (/I.T.A. No.
2082/Ahd/2018) (ITAT AHMEDABAD)
It is also well settled that penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act will not be imposed in every case merely because it is lawful to do so. The penalty will not ordinarily to be imposed unless the party obliged, either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of contumacious conduct or dishonest act.
We thus find merit in the plea of the assessee for deletion of penalty on both counts.
PRAYER
Thus, in light of the facts & circumstances of the case, submission made and the case-laws cited it is humbly prayed that Assessment order dated 30.11.2017 and CIT Order dated 23.03.2023 be quashed and the addition of Rs. 18,01,600/- and consequential levy of interest and penalty charges be directed to be deleted.

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Judgements referred to:
1. Commissioner of Income Tax Madras v. Chenniyappa Mudiliar (1969 1
SCC 591)
2. Vijay Shrinivasrao Kulkarni Versus ITAT, Pune Bench & Ors. (CIVIL
APPELLATE JURI ICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 17572 OF 2024) (Bombay
High Court)
3. Kusham Versus ITO, Ward-2, Rewari (ITA No. 599/DEL/2024) (ITAT New
No. 1487/Del/2023) (ITAT, Delhi)
5. Sant Kabir Mahasabha Versus The CIT (Exemption) Chandigarh (ITA No.
84/CHD/2023) (ITAT, Chandigarh)
6. Munjal BCU Centre Of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Ludhiana Versus
Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions, Chandigarh (CWP-21028-2023) (High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh)
7. Commissioner of Income-tax- XII vs. Subodh Gupta [2015] 54
9. Swaran Singh v. Income-tax Officer {[2024] 159 taxmann.com 777
(Amritsar - Trib.)}
10. Mansukh K. Vaghasia v. Income-tax Officer [2022] 139 taxmann.com 84
(Surat-Trib.)
11. Emco Cables (India) (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India [2024] 160 taxmann.com
145 (Delhi)
12. Amitkumar Dhirajlal Joshi v. Income-tax Officer [2024] 166 taxmann.com
310 (Rajkot - Trib.)
13. M/s. Aagam Shares & Commodities Pvt. Ltd. Versus DCIT (/I.T.A. No.
2082/Ahd/2018) (ITAT AHMEDABAD)

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9. To support the contention so raised in the written submission reliance was placed on the following evidence / records / decisions:
S. No.
Particulars
Page No.
1
Written submissions
01-21
2
Medical Prescription
22-32
3
Reply along with supporting documents dated 16.01.2019 submitted by the assessee to ld. CIT(A), Alwar
33-97
4
Additional Evidence dated 09.02.2019 under Rule 46A of Income Tax
Act, 1961, submitted by the assessee to Ld. CIT(A), Alwar
98
5
Commissioner of Income Tax Madras v. Chenniyappa Mudiliar (1969) 1
SCC 591)
99-104
6
Vijay Shrinivasrao Kulkarni vs. ITAT, Pune Bench & Ors. (Civil Appellate
Juri iction Writ Petition no. 17572 of 2024) (Bombay High Court)
105-110
7
Kusham vs. ITO, Ward-2, Rewari (ITA No. 599/Del/2024) (ITAT New
Delhi)
111-114
8
Sohum Charitable Trust, Faridabad v. CIT Exemption, Chandigarh (ITA
No. 1487/Del/2023) (ITAT, Delhi)
115-118
9
84/CHD/2023) (ITAT, Chandigarh)
119-121
10
Munjal BCU Centre of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Ludhiana vs.
CIT, Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions, Chandigarh (CWP-
21028-2023) (High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
122-128
11
Commissioner of Income Tax – XII vs. Subodh Gupta [2015] 54
taxmann.com 343 (Del)
129-132
12
133-137
13
138-139
14
Swaran Singh vs. Income tax Officer [2024] 159 taxmann.com 777
(Amritsar-Trib.)
140-144
15
Mansukh K. Vaghasia vs. Income Tax Officer [2022] 139 taxmann.com
84 (Surat-Trib.)
145-148
16
Emco Calbes (India) (P.) Ltd. vs. Union of Income [2024] 160
taxmann.com 145 (Delhi)
149-150
17
Amitkumar Dhirajlal Joshi v. Income-tax Officer [2024] 166 taxmann.com
310 (Rajkot-Trib.)
151-152
18
M/s Aagam Shares & Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs. DCIT (ITA No.
2082/Ahd/2018) (ITAT Ahmedabad)
153-158

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Ram Niwas Yadav vs. ITO proceedings are ex-parte and ld. AR of the assessee prayed on mercy ground to allow one more chance. Considering that peculiar aspect of the matter we deem it fit to remand the matter to the file of the ld. AO who will consider the factual aspect of the matter as raised by the assessee after due verification of the facts and charge the correct income in hands of the assessee if so to be taxed in accordance with law after affording due opportunity to the assessee. However, the assessee will not seek any adjournment on frivolous ground and remain cooperative during proceedings before the ld. AO.
13. Before parting, we may make it clear that our decision to restore the matter back to the file of the ld. AO shall in no way be construed as having any reflection or expression on the merits of the dispute, which shall be adjudicated by the ld. AO independently in accordance with law.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced in the open court on 08/05/2025. ¼ Mk0 ,l- lhrky{eh ½
¼ jkBksM deys'k t;UrHkkbZ ½
(Dr. S. Seethalakshmi)
(Rathod Kamlesh Jayantbhai)
U;kf;d lnL;@Judicial Member ys[kk lnL;@Accountant Member

26
Tk;iqj@Jaipur fnukad@Dated:-08/05/2025
*Ganesh Kumar, Sr. PS
आदेश की प्रतिलिपि अग्रेf’ात@ब्वचल वf जीम वतकमत वितूंतकमक जवरू
1. The Appellant- Ram Niwas Yadav, Jaipur
2. izR;FkhZ@ The Respondent- ITO, Behror
3. vk;dj vk;qDr@ The ld CIT
4. vk;dj vk;qDr¼vihy½@The ld CIT(A)
5. विभागीय प्रतिनिधि] आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण] जयपुर@क्त्ए प्ज्Aज्ए Jंपचनत
6. xkMZ QkbZy@ Guard File (ITA No. 275/JP/2025) vkns'kkuqlkj@ By order,

सहायक पंजीकार@Aेेज. त्महपेजतंत