ITO 27 (2)(3), MUMBAI vs. SHRI. LAXMICHAND A DABHI, MUMBAI

The present Appeal has been filed by the revenue against the order of Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) - 25 in short referred as ‘Ld. CIT(A)’, Mumbai, dated 24.01.19 for Assessment Year (in short AY) 2011-12. Shri Laxmichand A. Dabhi 2. The brief facts of the case are that assessee filed its return of income on 13.09.11 declaring total income of Rs. 3,60,076/-. The return was processed u/s 143(1) of the Act. Subsequently, information was received from the sales tax Department that assessee has indulged in bogus purchases. The Assessment was accordingly reopened. The assessing officer in this case has made addition @ 100% on account of bogus purchases.

Aggrieved by the above order of AO, assessee preferred appeal before Ld. CIT(A) and Ld. CIT(A) after considering the submission of assessee, Ld. CIT(A) agreed with the AO that this purchases were not genuine and does not mean that purchases made from these parties are genuine. The courts have held that payment made by cheque itself is not sacrosanct so as to prove the genuineness of the purchases when the surrounding circumstances are suspect. However, the assessee has shown onwards sales which has not been doubted by the AO. By relying on various case law, he reduced the disallowance @ 12.5% of bogus purchases and partly allowed the appeal of the assessee.

Considered the rival submission and material placed on record. We are of the considered view that no doubt the purchases made from the suspected parties are not genuine. However, the purchases itself cannot be doubted as rightly adjudicated by Ld. CIT(A) that AO has not doubted sales declared by the assessee, only he suspects the purchases. By respectfully following the decision of Hon’ble Gujrat High Court in the case of CIT vrs. Smith P. Sheth 356 ITR 451 (Guj), we are inclined to agree with the findings of Ld. CIT(A). Therefore, grounds raised by the revenue are dismissed.

In the net result, the appeal filed by the revenue stands dismissed.

However, before we part with the matter, we must deal with one procedural issue as well. While hearing of these appeals was concluded on 7th January 2020, this order thereon is being pronounced today on 14th day of May, 2020, much after the expiry of 90 days from the date of conclusion of hearing. We are also alive to the fact that rule 34(5) of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules 1963, which deals with pronouncement of orders, provides as follows:

Quite clearly, “ordinarily” the order on an appeal should be Shri Laxmichand A. Dabhi pronounced by the bench within no more than 90 days from the date of concluding the hearing. It is, however, important to note that the expression “ordinarily” has been used in the said rule itself. This rule was inserted as a result of directions of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Shivsagar Veg Restaurant Vs ACIT [(2009) 317 ITR 433 (Bom)] wherein Their Lordships had, inter alia, directed that “We, therefore, direct the President of the Appellate Tribunal to frame and lay down the guidelines in the similar lines as are laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Anil Rai (supra) and to issue appropriate administrative directions to all the benches of the Tribunal in that behalf. We hope and trust that suitable guidelines shall be framed and issued by the President of the Appellate Tribunal within shortest reasonable time and followed strictly by all the Benches of the Tribunal. In the meanwhile (emphasis, by underlining, supplied by us now), all the revisional and appellate authorities under the Income-tax Act are directed to decide matters heard by them within a period of three months from the date case is closed for judgment”. In the ruled so framed, as a result of these directions, the expression “ordinarily” has been inserted in the requirement to pronounce the order within a period of 90 days. The question then arises whether the passing of this order, beyond ninety days, was necessitated by any “extraordinary” circumstances.

Let us in this light revert to the prevailing situation in the country. On 24th March, 2020, Hon’ble Prime Minister of India took the bold step of imposing a nationwide lockdown, for 21 days, to prevent the spread of Covid 19 epidemic, and this lockdown was extended from time to time. As a matter of fact, even before this formal nationwide lockdown, the functioning of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai was severely restricted on account of lockdown by the Maharashtra Government, and on account of strict enforcement of health advisories with a view of checking spread of Covid 19. The epidemic situation in Mumbai being grave, there was not much of a relaxation in subsequent lockdowns also. In any case, there was unprecedented disruption of judicial wok all over the country. As a matter of fact, it has been such an unprecedented situation, causing disruption in the functioning of judicial machinery, that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in an unprecedented order in the history of India and vide order dated 6.5.2020 read with order dated 23.3.2020, extended the limitation to exclude not only this lockdown period but also a few more days prior to, and after, the lockdown by observing Shri Laxmichand A. Dabhi that “In case the limitationhas expired after 15.03.2020 then the period from 15.03.2020 till the date on which the lockdown is lifted in the jurisdictional area where the dispute lies or where the cause of action arises shall be extended for a period of 15 days after the lifting of lockdown”. Hon’ble Bombay High Court, in an order dated 15th April 2020, has, besides extending the validity of all interim orders, has also observed that, “It is also clarified that while calculating time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly”, and also observed that “arrangement continued by an order dated 26th March 2020 till 30th April 2020 shall continue further till 15th June 2020”. It has been an unprecedented situation not only in India but all over the world. Government of India has, vide notification dated 19th February 2020, taken the stand that, the coronavirus “should be considered a case of natural calamity and FMC (i.e. force majeure clause) maybe invoked, wherever considered appropriate, following the due procedure…”. The term ‘force majeure’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, as ‘an event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled’ When such is the position, and it is officially so notified by the Government of India and the Covid-19 epidemic has been notified as a disaster under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, and also in the light of the discussions above, the period during which lockdown was in force can be anything but an “ordinary”period.

To sum up, the appeal of the assessee is allowed, and appeal of the Assessing Officer is dismissed. Order pronounced under rule 34(4) of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1962, by placing the details on the notice board.