VAVIA TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED ,BANGALORE vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD-7(1)(3), BANGALORE

The assessee has filed this appeal challenging the order dated 08-02-2019 passed by Ld CIT(A)-7, Bengaluru and it relates to the assessment year 2015-16.

None appeared on behalf of the assessee even though the representative of the assessee has taken adjournment on earlier occasion. Hence we proceed to dispose of the appeal ex-parte, without hearing the assessee.

We notice that the assessee has furnished explanation for the delay in filing appeal before Ld CIT(A). In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others (167 ITR 471)SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “the legislature has conferred power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, for that is the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. The learned Judges emphasized on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned

The principles that emanate from the above said decisions are that, in the matter of condonation of delay in filing appeals beyond the limitation period, the courts are empowered to condone the delay, provided the litigant is able to demonstrate that there was “sufficient cause” in preferring appeal beyond the limitation period. The Courts have also held that the expression “sufficient cause” should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Hence the question of condonation of delay is a factual matter and the result would depend upon the facts of the case and the cause shown by the assessee for the delay. It has also been opined that generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice, where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.

From the explanations furnished by the assessee, we are of the view that it cannot be said that there was gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides in it. Accordingly, in the interest of natural justice, we are of the view that the delay in filing appeal before Ld CIT(A) deserves to be condoned. Accordingly, we condone the delay in filing appeal before Ld CIT(A).

In the result, the appeal of the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes.