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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “A” BENCH : BANGALORE
Before: SHRI CHANDRA POOJARI & SMT. BEENA PILLAI
Per Chandra Poojari, Accountant Member This appeal by the assessee is directed against the order CIT(Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre [NFAC], Delhi dated 30.7.2021. 2. The assessee raised the following grounds :- “LEGAL GROUNDS: 1. The order dated 30 June 2021 passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Centre is bad and erroneous and against the facts and circumstances of the case in so far as it is against the Appellant;
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The learned CIT(A) erred in law and on facts in not condoning the delay without appreciating that the delay was not deliberate and was solely due to the reason that the Accountant responsible for filing the appeal had not filed the appeal and thereafter left the organization during which time the Nation was going through the pandemic. 3. The Ld AO erred in summarily dismissing the appeal without providing an effective opportunity of hearing to the Appellant. 4. The Ld CIT (A) has while disposing the condonation application filed by the Appellant erred in dismissing the appeal without appreciating the facts of the case. 5. The Ld CIT (A) erred in not appreciating that a lenient view ought to have been taken when major part of the delay was attributable to the Covid-19 pandemic. GROUND ON MERITS: 6. The Ld CIT(A) and the Ld AO erred in determining the total income of the Appellant for AY 2018-19 at Rs.66,68,662/- against the returned income of Rs.54,95,175/-. 7. The Ld CIT(A) while dismissing the appeal on technical grounds, erred in upholding the addition of Rs, 11,73,481/- made by the Ld AO towards disallowance of PF and ESI contribution of employees paid beyond the due date under section 36(1)(va) read with section 43B of the Act. 8. The Ld CIT (A) and the Ld AO have erred in making the addition despite the fact that the Appellant had made the remittances towards PF and ESI contribution of employees before the due date of filing return under section 139(1) of the Act, which fact has not been disputed by the Ld CIT (A) or Ld AO. 9. The Ld CIT(A) and the Ld AO erred in not appreciating that the issue was covered by the decisions of the Hon'ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v Shabari Enterprises (2008) 298 ITR 141 (Kar), CIT v Spectrum Consultants India Pvt
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Ltd (WA No.4077/2013), Essae Teraoka Pvt Ltd v DCIT (ITA No.480/2013); INTEREST UNDER SECTION 234A: 10. The Ld AO erred in levying interest of Rs.16,003/- under section 23A of the Act, the Ld CIT(A) erred in confirming the same. 11. The Ld CIT (A) and Ld AO erred in not appreciating that the due date for filing return for AY 2018-19 in Audit cases was extended to 31 October 2018 and the Appellant had filed the return of income on 31 October 2018, hence interest under section 234A was not leviable. INTEREST UNDER SECTION 234B AND 234C: 12. The Ld. AO erred in levying interest under section 234B and 234C of the Act. Each one of the above grounds is without prejudice to the other and without prejudice to the grounds of appeal taken earlier. The Appellant reserves the right to further add, alter or amend each one of the above grounds of appeal.”
The assessee is in the business of alloy steel fabrication & design, alloy fabrication and skid mounted process systems. It filed return of income u/s. 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 [the Act] on 31.10.2018 declaring total income of Rs.54,95,175. In the intimation u/s. 143(1) an addition of Rs.11,78,481 was made by the AO on account of delay of deposit of employees’ contribution towards Provident Fund and ESIC. None appeared on behalf of the assessee at the time of hearing. We proceed to dispose of the appeal after perusing the material on record and after hearing the ld. DR. 4. In appeal before the CIT(Appeals), there was a delay of 508 days and the CIT(Appeals) rejected condonation of delay in filing the appeal
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holding that no cogent reasons were given by the assessee for the inordinate delay of 508 days and dismissed the appeal. Against this, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal.
We have heard the rival submissions and perused the record. There was a delay of 508 days in filing the appeal before the CIT(Appeals), NFAC. Therefore, we have to consider whether the Accountant/Auditor /Counsel’s failure is sufficient cause for condoning the delay.
The Madras High Court considered an identical issue in the case of Sreenivas Charitable Trust v. Dy. CIT (280 ITR 357) and held that mixing up of papers with other papers are sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time. The Madras High Court further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” should be interpreted to advance substantial justice. Therefore, advancement of substantial justice is the prime factor while considering the reasons for condoning the delay.
On merits, the issue is in favour of the assessee. But there is a technical defect in the appeal since the appeal was not filed within the period of limitation. The assessee filed an affidavit before the CIT(A) saying that the appeal was not filed because of the Accountant’s inability to file the appeal. The Revenue has not filed any counter-affidavit to deny the allegation made by the assessee. While considering a similar issue the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down six principles. For the purpose of convenience, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder:-
(1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the
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highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 8. When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of nondeliberate delay. In the case on our hand, the issue on merits regarding allowability of deduction u/s. 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 43B of the Act was covered in favour of the assessee by the order of the Tribunal. Moreover, no counter-affidavit was filed by the Revenue denying the allegation made by the assessee. It is not the case of the Revenue that the appeal was not filed deliberately. Therefore, we have to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue. As observed by Apex Court, if the application of the assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalise injustice on technical ground when the Tribunal is capable of removing injustice and to do justice.
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Therefore, this Tribunal is bound to remove the injustice by condoning the delay on technicalities. If the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalising an illegal order which would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the State by retaining the tax relatable thereto. Under the scheme of Constitution, the Government cannot retain even a single pie of the individual citizen as tax, when it is not authorised by an authority of law. Therefore, if we refuse to condone the delay, that would amount to legalise an illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the lower authority. Therefore, in our opinion, by preferring the substantial justice, the delay of 508 days has to be condoned. 10. The next question may arise whether 508 days was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when the reason stated by the assessee was a reasonable cause for not filing the appeal. We have to see the cause for the delay. When there was a reasonable cause, the period of delay may not be relevant factor. 11. In fact, the Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596) considered the delay of condonation and held that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, the Madras High Court condoned nearly 21 years of delay in filing the appeal. 12. When compared to 21 years, 508 days cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive. Furthermore, the Chennai Tribunal by majority opinion in the case of People Education and Economic Development Society (PEEDS) v. ITO (100 ITD 87) (Chennai) (TM ) condoned more than six hundred days delay. It is pertinent to mention herein that the view taken by the present author in that case was overruled by the Third Member.
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The Madras High Court in the case of Sreenivas Charitable Trust (supra) held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter of condonation of delay and the Court should adopt a pragmatic approach and the Court should exercise their discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause” the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance and the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. Therefore, this Judgment of the Madras High Court (supra) clearly says that in order to advance substantial justice which is of prime importance, the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. 14. In this case, the issue on merit regarding granting of deduction u/s. 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 43B of the Act is covered in favour of the assessee by the Judgment of the Madras High Court. Therefore, for the purpose of advancing substantial justice which is of prime importance in the administration of justice, the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. In our opinion, the above Judgment is also squarely applicable to the facts of this case. A similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Venkatadri Traders Ltd. v. CIT (2001) 168 CTR (Mad) 81 : (2001) 118 Taxman 622 (Mad). 15. The Mumbai Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Bajaj Hindusthan Ltd. v. Jt. CIT (AT) (277 ITR 1) has condoned the delay of 180 days when the appeal was filed after the pronouncement of the Judgment of the Apex Court. Furthermore, the Revenue has not filed any counter-affidavit opposing the application of the assessee for condonation of delay. The Apex Court in the case of Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar vs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi (AIR 1978 SC 537) held that non-filing of affidavit in opposition to an application for condonation of delay may be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In this case, the Revenue has not filed any counter- affidavit opposing the application of the assessee, therefore, as held by the
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Apex Court, there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court observed that when the delay was of short duration, a liberal view should be taken. It does not mean that when the delay was for longer period, the delay should not be condoned even though there was sufficient cause. The Apex Court did not say that longer period of delay should not be condoned. Condonation of delay is the discretion of the Court/Tribunal.
Therefore, it would depend upon the facts of each case. In our opinion, when there is sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation, the delay has to be condoned irrespective of the duration/period. In this case, the non-filing of an affidavit by the Revenue for opposing the condonation of delay itself is sufficient for condoning the delay of 508 days.
In case the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalise an illegal and unconstitutional order. The power given to the Tribunal is not to legalise an injustice on technical ground but to do substantial justice by removing the injustice. The Parliament conferred power on this Tribunal with the intention that this Tribunal would deliver justice rather than legalise injustice on technicalities.
Therefore, when this Tribunal is empowered and capable of removing injustice, in our opinion, the delay of 508 days has to be condoned and the appeal of the assessee has to be admitted and disposed of on merits. In view of the above, we condone the delay of 508 days in filing the appeal and admit the appeal for adjudication.
Coming to the merits of the issue, the grievance of the assessee is disallowance of Rs.11,78,481 being PF & ESI contribution of employees paid beyond the due date u/s. 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 43B of the Act. It was
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deposited within the due date of filing return u/s. 139(1) of the Act. This issue came up for consideration before this Tribunal in the case of M/s. Jana Urban Services for Transformation Pvt. Ltd. v. DCIT, ITA No.308/Bang/2021. The Tribunal vide order dated 11.10.2021 held as under:-
“6. We have heard both the parties and perused the material on record. The assessee made contribution to the PF as follows:-
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As seen from the above, the assessee made a sum of Rs.19,04,700/- beyond the time prescribed under the relevant Act. Now the claim of assessee is that the above payment has been made towards PF beyond due date prescribed under the relevant Act, however, the same was made within due date of filing the return of income u/s 139(1) of the Act for the year under consideration. As such the said amount cannot be disallowed u/s 36(1)(va) of the Act and it is not hit by explanation 2 to sec.36(1)(va) of the Act which calls for payment within the due date prescribed under the relevant Act. For this purpose he relied on the judgment in the case of Essac Teraoka (P.) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT 366 ITR 408 (Kar.), wherein it has held as under: “15. From bare perusal of this provision, it is clear that under the provision, for IT Act, an extension is given to the employer to make payment of contribution to provident fund or any other fund till the "due date" applicable for furnishing the return of income under sub- section(1) of section 139 of the IT Act in respect of the previous year in which the liability to pay such sum was incurred and the evidence of such payment is furnished by the assessee along with such return. In short, this provision states, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision contained in this Act, a deduction otherwise allowable in this Act in respect of any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any fund such as provident fund shall be allowed if it is paid on or before the due date as contemplated under Section 139(1) of the IT Act. This provision has nothing to do with the consequences, provided for under the PF Act/PF Scheme/ESI Act, for not depositing the "contribution" on or before the due dates therein. 16. In the present case, admittedly, though the employer did not deposit the contribution, within the stipulated time, as contemplated by paragraph-30 of the PF Scheme or before the due date under the provisions of the PF scheme/Act, he deposited the contribution to the PF/ESI fund before the due date contemplated under Section 139(1) of the Act.
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Section 6 of the PF Act provides for contributions and matters which may be provided for in Schemes. Paragraph-29 of the PF Scheme states what is "Contribution". The expression "contribution" is also defined under the PF Act by Section 2(c) of the PF Act, which means a contribution payable in respect of a member under the Scheme or the contribution payable in respect of an employee to whom the Insurance Scheme applies. If this definition is read with subpara(1) of paragraph-29 in Chapter-V of the PF Scheme, it would mean that the contributions payable by the employer under the Scheme shall be at a particular rate and the contribution payable by the assessee shall be equal to the contribution payable by the employer. 18. Paragraph-30 of the PF Scheme provides for payment of contributions. Sub-para(1) of paragraph30 states that the employer shall, in the first instance, pay both the contribution payable by himself (in this Scheme referred to as the employer's contribution) and also, on behalf of the member employed by him directly or by or through a contractor, the contribution payable by such member (in this Scheme referred to as the member's contribution). 19. From bare perusal of sub-para(1) of paragraph-30, it is clear that the word "contribution" is used not only to mean contribution of the employer but also contribution to be made on behalf of the member employed by the employer directly. 2O. Paragraph-38 of the PF Scheme provides for Mode of payment of contributions. As provided in subpara(1), the employer shall, before paying the member, his wages, deduct his contribution from his wages and deposit the same together with his own contribution and other charges as stipulated therein with the provident fund or the fund under the ESI Act within fifteen days of the closure of every month pay. It is clear that the word “'contribution" used in Clause(b) of Section 43B of the IT Act beans the contribution of the employer and the employee. That being so, if the contribution is made on or before the due date for furnishing the return of income under subsection(1) of Section 139 of the IT Act is made, the employer is entitled for deduction.
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The submission of Mr. Aravind, learned counsel for the revenue that if the employer fails to deduct the employees contribution on or before the due date, contemplated under the provisions of the PF Act and the PF Scheme, that would have to be treated as income within the meaning of Section 2(24)(x) of the IT Act and in which case, the assessee is liable to pay tax on the said amount treating that as his income, deserves to be rejected. 22. With respect, we find it difficult to endorse the view taken by the Gujarat High Court. We agree with the view taken by this Court in W.A.No.407712013. 23. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the substantial question of law framed by us is answered in favour of the appellant-assessee and against the respondent-revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.” 8. Further, he relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of CIT v. Sabari Enterprises [2008] 298 ITR 141 (Kar.) has held as under: “This clause is inserted by the Finance Act with effect from April 1, 1988. The Explanation to this clause is read very carefully. "Due date" has been explained stating that: means the date by which the assessee is required as an employer to credit contribution to the employees' account in the relevant fund under any Act, rule or order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise." Prior to the above clause was inserted to section 36 giving statutory deductions of payment of tax under the provisions of the Act, section 43B(b) was inserted by the Finance Act, 1983, which came into force with effect from April 1, 1984. Therefore, again the provision of section 43B(b) clearly provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the other provisions of the Act including section 36(l) clause (Va) of the Act, even prior to the insertion of that clause the assessee is entitled to get statutory benefit of deduction of payment of tax from the Revenue. If that provision is read along with the first proviso of the said section which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, which came into effect from April 1, 1988, the letters numbered as clause (a), or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (f) are omitted from the
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above proviso and therefore deduction towards the employees contribution paid can be claimed by the assessee. The Explanation to clause (va) of section 36(1) of the Income-tax Act further makes it very clear that the amount actually paid by the assessee on or before the due date applicable in this case at the time of submitting returns of income under section 139 of the Act to the Revenue in respect of the previous year can be claimed by the assessees for deduction out of their gross income. The above said statutory provisions of the Income-tax Act abundantly makes it clear that, the contention urged on behalf of the Revenue that deduction from out of gross income for payment of tax at the time of submission of returns under section 139 is permissible only if the statutory liability of payment of provident fund or other contribution funds referred to in clause (b) are paid within the due date under the respective statutory enactments by the assessees as contended by learned counsel for the Revenue is not tenable in law and therefore the same cannot be accepted by us.
The ld.AR drew our attention to the deletion of the second proviso to section 43B of the Income-tax Act by the Finance Act 2003, which provision has come into force, with effect from April 1, 2004. The reliance placed upon the decision of the apex court in Allied Motors P. Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 224 ITR 677 and also on the decision in General Finance Co. v. CIT (Asst.) [2002] 257 ITR 338 (SC) in respect of applicability of section 43B(b) and also omission of clause (a) or (c) or (d ) or (e) or (B referred to above occurred in the first proviso to section 43B, supports the case of the assessees and also relevant paragraphs extracted from Allied Motor's case [1997] 224 ITR 677 and paragraph 59 referred to supra in this judgment from the Finance Bill with all fours supports the case of the assessee/ respondents. Therefore, we have to answer the substantial question of law No. 1 framed by this court in these appeals at the instance of the Revenue against them, viz., in the negative. Accordingly, we answer the substantial question No. 1 framed in these appeals in the negative.
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Further he relied on the following judgments:- 1. In Re-Cognizance for Extension of Limitation - Supreme Court of India in M.P No.665/2021 in SMW(C) No.3/2020 dt.19/7/2021. 2. Salzgitter Hydraulics Pvt Ltd vs ITO [2021] 128 taxman.com 192 [Hyderabad Tribunal] 3. M/s Crescent Roadways Pvt Ltd vs DyCIT - ITA.No. 1952 Hyderabad/20 18 4. M/s Mahadev Cold Storage vs Jurisdictional AO - ITA.No.41 & 42/Agra/ 2021 5. M/s Essae Teraoka (P.) Ltd vs DCIT - [2014] 43 taxmann.com 33 (Karnataka) 6. Anand Kumar Jain vs ITO - ITA NO 4192/MUM/2012 Value Momentum Software Services Private Limited vs. DCIT I.T.A. No. 2 197/HYD/20 17 [Assessment Year: 2013-14] dated 19.05.2021; 7. Mohan Ram Chaudhary vs. ITO ITA No. 51&54- 55/Jodh/2021 [Assessment Year: 2018-19] dated 28.09.2021; 8. CIT v. Aimil Ltd. [2010] 321 ITR 508 9. CIT v. Nipso Polyfabriks Ltd. [2013] 350 ITR 326 10. CIT vs. Merchem Ltd. 378 ITR 443 (Kerala)) 11. Sagun Foundry (P.) Ltd. vs. CIT [2017] 291 CTR 557 (Allahabad) 12. Bata India Ltd. vs. DCIT [2020] 180 lTD 464 (Kolkata - Trib.) 13. DCIT vs. Eastern Power Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. [2016] 160 lTD 432 (Visakhapatnam - Trib.)
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Nuzivedu Swati Coastal Consortium vs. ITO [2015] 62 taxmann.com 258 (Hyderabad - Trib.) 15. DCIT vs. Teesta Valley Tea Co. Ltd. [2017] 85 taxmann.com 301 (Kolkata - Trib.)
The ld.DR contention is that as per sec.43B(b) of the Income- tax Act and explanatory notes to Finance Act 1983, that Employees’ Contribution was never intended to be covered by sec.43B. This has been reiterated and reinforced through Explanation 5 to sec.43B and Explanation 2 to 36(1)(va) inserted by Finance Act 2021. If it was the intention of the legislature expressly made clear in the Finance Act 2021, through the explanatory notes, it would necessarily to be held that Explanation 5 to sec. 43B and Explanation 2 to sec.36(1)(va) would apply to all pending matters as on date. 12. We find no merit in the argument of the ld.DR since the explanation as provided in Finance Act 2021 prescribes that the amendment in both sec.36(va) as well as 43B by inserting corresponding explanation that although impugned PF comes in the form of provision and the same is applicable from 1/4/2021 onwards only. In the present case we are concerned with the asst. year 2017-18 and the amended provision could not be applied retrospectively as it is only applicable w.e.f 1/4/2021. Being so no disallowance could be made by the AO in respect of PF/ESI paid within the due date of filing return of income. Though, it was beyond the date mentioned in the respective Act. This view of ours is supported by various judgment relied on by the ld.AR. Accordingly the appeal of the assessee is allowed. 13. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.”
Taking a consistent view and following the above order of the Tribunal, we allow this ground taken by the assessee and there cannot be any disallowance by invoking the provisions of section 36(1)(va) r.w.s. 43B of the Act.
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In the result, the appeal by the assessee is allowed. Pronounced in the open court on this 21st day of October, 2021. Sd/- Sd/- ( BEENA PILLAI ) ( CHANDRA POOJARI ) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
Bangalore, Dated, the 21st October, 2021.
/Desai S Murthy /
Copy to:
Appellant 2. Respondent 3. CIT 4. CIT(A) 5. DR, ITAT, Bangalore.
By order
Assistant Registrar ITAT, Bangalore.