RAGHU ALEKH BARLI,HYDERABAD vs. DCIT., CIRCLE-6(1), HYDERABAD

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आयकर अपीलȣय अͬधकरण, हैदराबाद पीठ
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
Hyderabad ‘ B ‘ Bench, Hyderabad

ŵी रिवश सूद,Ɋाियक सद˟ एवं ŵी मधुसूदन साविड़या लेखा सद˟ समƗ |
Before Shri Ravish Sood, Judicial Member
A N D
Shri Madhusudan Sawdia, Accountant Member

Appeal in ITA
Assessee
Revenue
A.Y
1317/Hyd/2025
Smt. Lingamgunta
Adilaxmi, Secunderabad
PAN:AMNPL4940M
Income Tax Officer
Ward 10 (1)
Hyderabad
2015-16
915/Hyd/2025
Shri Raghu Alekh Barli
Hyderabad
PAN:AHJPA1085F
Dy. CIT
Circle 6(1)
Hyderabad
2018-19
1487/Hyd/2025
Sanzyme Private Ltd
Hyderabad
PAN:AAACU2692R
Dy. CIT
Circle 3(1)
Hyderabad
2019-20
1606/Hyd/2025
Shri Bikaram
Pushpender, Hyderabad
PAN: CEBPP4471F
Income Tax Officer
Ward 9(1)
Hyderabad
2018-19

िनधाŊįरती Ȫारा/Assessee by:
Advocates Shri S. Rama Rao &
Sashank Dundu and C.A. Kumar
Pal Tated
राज̾ व Ȫारा/Revenue by::
Shri Waseem UR Rahman, Sr. DR

सुनवाई की तारीख/Date of hearing:
03/12/2025 & 04/12/2025
घोषणा की तारीख/Pronouncement: 24/12/2025

आदेश/ORDER
Per Madhusudan Sawdia, A.M.:

These four appeals are filed by the above assessees feeling aggrieved by the separate orders passed by the Learned
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal
Centre (NFAC), Delhi (“Ld. CIT(A)”) for the A.Ys 2015-16, 2018-19
and 2019-20 respectively. Since common issues are involved in all these four appeals, for the sake of convenience, these were heard

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together and are being disposed of by this common consolidated order.
ITA No.1317/Hyd/2025:
2. At the outset, we observed that there is a delay of 21
days in filing of the appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee has filed a condonation petition accompanied by a copy of affidavit explaining the reasons which led to the delay in filing the appeal.
The Learned Authorized Representative (“Ld. AR”) submitted that the order of the Ld. CIT(A) was passed on 27.05.2025. Accordingly, the assessee was required to file the appeal before this Tribunal on or before 31.07.2025. However, the appeal was filed on 21.08.2025, resulting in a delay of 21 days. The Ld. AR submitted that the assessee was suffering from dengue fever with effect from 25.07.2025. Due to the said illness, the assessee was under continuous medical supervision and was advised three weeks of complete rest. In support of this contention, a medical certificate issued by the treating hospital has been placed on record. It was therefore submitted that the delay was neither intentional nor deliberate, and there was no element of mala fide or negligence on the part of the assessee. The Ld. AR accordingly prayed that the delay be condoned and the appeal be admitted for adjudication on merits.
3. Per contra, the Learned Departmental Representative
(“Ld. DR”) did not raise any serious objection to the condonation of delay.
4. We have carefully considered the submissions of both parties and perused the material placed on record. On perusal of ITA Nos 1317 915 1487 and 1606
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the medical certificate and the affidavit filed by the assessee, we are satisfied that the assessee was prevented by reasonable and sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. In the absence of any mala fide intention or deliberate inaction and keeping in view the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that substantial justice should prevail over technical considerations, we are inclined to condone the delay of 21 days. Accordingly, the delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned, and the appeal is admitted for adjudication on merits.
5. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:

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in law, such notice is void ab initio, and all consequential proceedings stand vitiated. He therefore submitted that the notice issued under section 148 of the Act and the consequent assessment order passed under section 147 read with section 144
of the Act are bad in law and liable to be quashed.
8. Per contra, the Ld. DR submitted that since the assessee had failed to challenge the juri iction of the JAO within the period prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 124 of the Act, i.e., within one month from the date of service of the notice, he is now barred from raising such an objection for the first time before the Tribunal. The Ld. DR, in support of his contention, placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in DCIT vs. Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology 454 ITR 582. It was submitted that the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the said decision, has categorically held that, in view of the mandate of Section 124(3) of the Act, an assessee is precluded from assailing the juri iction of the Ld. AO if such objection is not raised within 30
days from the receipt of notice. The Ld. DR thus contended that, in the present case, the assessee had failed to call in question the juri iction of the JAO, who had issued the notice under Section 148 of the Act within the stipulated period, and therefore, he cannot be permitted to raise such an objection for the first time before the Tribunal.
9. Rebutting the contention of the Ld. DR, the Ld. AR submitted that, in the present case, the assessee is challenging not the territorial or administrative juri iction contemplated under Section 120(3) of the Act, but the very inherent lack of juri iction of the JAO to initiate proceedings under Section 148A

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and issue notice under Section 148 of the Act. It was argued that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in DCIT vs. Kalinga
Institute of Industrial Technology (supra) dealt exclusively with objections relating to juri iction under Section 120(3) of the Act, which is materially different from the question involved herein.
Therefore, the said judgment, being distinguishable both on facts and on the legal issue adjudicated therein, does not advance the case of the Revenue.
10. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record including the case law relied upon. First of all, we will take up the objection raised by the Ld.
DR with regards to the failure on the part of the assessee to challenge the juri iction of the JAO within the period prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 124 of the Act. In this regard, we note that similar issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the case of Venkata
Ramanamma
Sakamuri vs.
ITO in ITA.No.299/Hyd/2025 for the assessment year 2019-20 vide
Order dated 05.12.2025 wherein the Tribunal in para nos. 15 to 24 of its order held as under :
“15. We shall first deal with the Ld. Sr. DR’s contention that as the assessee had within the specified time period contemplated under sub- section (3) of Section 124 of the Act, i.e. within a period of one month from the date on which the said notice was served upon him not called in question the juri iction of the ITO, Ward-1, Nellore i.e., the JAO, who had issued Notice u/s 148 of the Act, dated 31/03/2023, therefore, he was precluded from assailing the same for the first time before the Tribunal.
16. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to cull out Section 124(3) of the Act, which reads as under:
"124 (1) xxxxxxxx

(2) xxxxxxx
(3) No person shall be entitled to call in question the juri iction of an Assessing Officer—

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(a) where he has made a return under sub-section (1) of section 115WD or under sub-section (1) of section 139, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under subsection (1) of section 142 or sub-section (2) of section 115WE or subsection (2) of section 143 or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier;
(b) where he has made no such return, after the expiry of the time allowed by the notice under sub-section (2) of section 115WD or subsection (1) of section 142 or under sub-section (1) of section 115WH or under section 148 for the making of the return or by the notice under the first proviso to section 115WF or under the first proviso to section 144 to show cause why the assessment should not be completed to the best of the judgment of the Assessing Officer, whichever is earlier;
(c) where an action has been taken under section 132 or section 132A, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 153A or sub-section (2) of section 153C or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier.”
17. Having given a thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid claim of the ld. DR in the backdrop of the mandate of Sub-section (3) of Section 124 of the Act, we are unable to fathom that as to how the restriction therein contemplated, which is confined to questioning the juri iction of an Assessing Officer, can have any bearing on the claim of the present assessee before us, who has assailed the validity of the assessment order passed under Section 147 r.w.s 144 r.w.s 144B of the Act, dated 19/02/2024 by the Assessment Unit, Income-Tax
Department, i.e., Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO) based on the Notice u/s 148 of the Act, dated 31/03/2023 issued by the ITO, Ward-1,
Nellore, i.e., JAO who inherently lacked the juri iction for both initiating the proceedings u/s 148A of the Act and issuing Notice u/s 148 of the Act.
18. Before dealing with the subject issue, we deem it apposite to look into the fabric of Section 124 of the Act. On a careful perusal of Section 124 of the Act, it transpires that the same apparently deals with the issue of "territorial juri iction" of an Assessing Officer. Ostensibly, sub-section (1) of Section 124 contemplates vesting with the AO of juri iction over a specified area by virtue of any direction or order issued under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 120 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 124 contemplates the manner in which any controversy regarding the territorial juri iction of an AO is to be resolved. Apropos sub-section (3) of Section 124 of the Act, the same places a restriction upon an assessee to call in question the juri iction of the A.O where he had initially not raised such objection within a period of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 142 or sub-section (2) of Section 143 or Section 148 or sub-section (1) of Section 153A or sub-section (2) of Section 153C. To sum up, the obligation cast upon an assessee to call in question the juri iction of the A.O as per the mandate of sub-

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section (3) of Section 124 is confined to a case where he objects to the assumption of juri iction by the A.O, and not otherwise.
19. At this stage, we may herein refer to certain judicial pronouncements that had in the past held the field on the aforesaid issue. The Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Peter Vaz &
Ors. Vs, CIT & Ors. (2021) 436 ITR 616(Bom) and the Hon'ble High
Court of Gujarat in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ramesh
D. Patel [2014] 42 taxmann.com 540/225 Taxman 411/362 ITR 492
(Gujarat), had held that as Section 124 of the Act pertains to territorial juri iction vested with an AO under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 120, therefore, the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 124 which puts a restriction on an assessee to object to the validity of the juri iction of an A.O would get triggered only in a case where the dispute of the assessee is with respect to the territorial juri iction and have no relevance in so far his inherent juri iction for framing the assessment is concerned. Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Bansilal B. Raisoni & Sons v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [2019] 101 taxmann.com 20/260 Taxman 281 (Bombay) had, inter alia, observed that the time limit for objecting to the juri iction of the Assessing Officer prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 124 has a relation to the Assessing Officer's territorial juri iction. It was further observed that the time limit prescribed would not apply to a case where the assessee contends that the action of the Assessing Officer is without authority of law and, therefore, wholly without juri iction. Also, the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay in the case of Commissioner of Income tax v. Lalitkumar Bardia [2017] 84
taxmann.com 213/[2018] 404 ITR 63 (Bombay) had addressed the contention of the department that where the assessee had not objected to the juri iction within the time prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 124 of the Act, then, having waived its said right, it was barred from raising the issue of juri iction after having participated in the assessment proceedings. The Hon'ble High Court had observed that the waiver can only be of one's right or privilege, but non-exercise of the same will not bestow juri iction on a person who inherently lacks juri iction. Therefore, the principle of waiver cannot be invoked to confer juri iction on an Officer who is acting under the Act when he does not have juri iction. The Hon'ble High Court, while concluding as hereinabove, had relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi (2012) 4 SCC
307. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its aforesaid judgment, had held that it is the settled legal proposition that conferment of juri iction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that if the court passes an order or decree having no juri iction over the matter, it would amount to a nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Also, the Hon'ble Apex Court clarified that an issue can be raised at any belated stage of the proceedings, including in appeal or execution. Elaborating further, it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable and inexecutable once the forum

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is found to have no juri iction. It was further observed by the Hon'ble
Apex Court that the acquiescence of a party equally should not be permitted to defeat the legislative animation, and the court cannot derive juri iction apart from the statute. For the sake of clarity, the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kanwar Singh
Saini (supra) are culled out as under:
"22. There can be no dispute regarding the settled legal proposition that conferment of juri iction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior court, and if the court passes order/decree having no juri iction over the matter, it would amount to a nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any belated stage of the proceedings including in appeal or execution. The finding of a court or tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no juri iction. Acquiescence of a party equally should not be permitted to defeat the legislative animation. The court cannot derive juri iction apart from the statute. (Vide United
Commercial Bank Ltd v. Workmen, Nai Bahu v. Lala
Ramnarayan, Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios,
Sardar Hasan Siddiqui v. STAT, A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
Union of India v.
Deoki
Nandan
Aggarwal,
Karnal
Improvement Trust v. Parkash Wanti, U.P. Rajkiya Nirman
Nigam Ltd. v. Indure (P) Ltd., State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar
Chimanlal Barot, Kesar Singh v. Sadhu, Kondiba Dagadu
Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and CCE v. Flock (India) (P)
Ltd.)"

(emphasis supplied by us)

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Further, when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, then that authority has to exercise its power following the prescribed manner (CIT v.
Anjum M.H. Ghaswala; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara
Singh). Any exercise of power by statutory authorities inconsistent with the statutory prescription is invalid.............
*** ** ***
*** ** ***

*** ** ***
32. A statutory authority may lack juri iction if it does not fulfil the preliminary conditions laid down under the statute, which are necessary to the exercise of its juri iction.
(Chhotobhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. V. Industrial Court,
Maharashtra Nagpur Bench).There cannot be any waiver of a statutory requirement or provision that goes to the root of the juri iction of assessment. (Superintendent of Taxes v.
Onkarmal
Nathmal
Trust).
An order passed without juri iction is a nullity. Any consequential order passed or action taken will also be invalid and without juri iction.
(Dwarka Prasad Agrawal V. B.D. Agrawal). Thus, the power of assessing officers to reassess is limited and based on the fulfilment of certain preconditions. (CIT v. Kelvinator of India
Ltd.)"

(emphasis supplied by us)

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(iii). it was the assessee's case that, as the juri iction to issue notice under Section 143(2) of the Act in its case was with the Jt. CIT
(O )(Exemption), Bhuwaneshwar, therefore, the impugned notice issued u/s. 143(2) of the Act by the ACIT, Corporate Circle-1(2),
Bhuwaneshwar was without juri iction and, thus, liable to be quashed;
(iv).
Hon'ble High Court of Orissa, observing that the juri iction to issue notice u/s. 143(2) of the Act in the case of the assessee remained with the Jt. CIT(O )(Exemption), Bhuwaneshwar, therefore, held the impugned notice issued u/s. 143(2) of the Act by the ACIT, Corporate
Circle-1(2), Bhuwaneshwar, as having been issued without juri iction and quashed the same.

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have also gone through the notice issued under section 148 of the Act, which is to the following effect:

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issue of notice under section 148 as well as the passing of order under section 148A(d) of the Act were conducted by the JAO and not in the Faceless manner as prescribed by the CBDT notification dated 29.03.2022. We note that similar issue has been considered by the Coordinate Bench of ITAT, Hyderabad in the case of Shri
Kotha Kanthaiah vs. ITO in ITA.No.1259/Hyd/2024 for the assessment year 2016-17 vide Order dated 04.09.2025 wherein the Tribunal in para nos. 9 to 16 of its order held as under :
“9. We have considered the rival submissions as well as material on record. In the case of the assessee, notice u/sec.148A(b) was issued on 21.02.2023 by JAO. For ready reference, the same is reproduced as under:

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the High Court would not mean that till the same is set aside in a manner known to law, it would loose its binding force. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd.14, the Court observed that the approach of the officials of Revenue of treating decisions being “not acceptable” was criticized by the Supreme Court. In such decision, following are the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court.
“6. Sri Reddy is perhaps right in saying that the officers were not actuated by any mala fides in passing the impugned orders.
They perhaps genuinely felt that the claim of the assessee was not tenable and that, if it was accepted, the Revenue would suffer. But what Sri Reddy overlooks is that we are not concerned here with the correctness or otherwise of their conclusion or of any factual malafides but with the fact that the officers, in reaching in their conclusion, by-passed two appellate orders in regard to the same issue which were placed before them, one of the Collector (Appeals) and the other of the Tribunal. The High Court has, in our view, rightly criticized this conduct of the Assistant
Collectors and the harassment to the assessee caused by the failure of these officers to give effect to the orders of authorities higher to them in the appellate hierarchy. It cannot be too vehemently emphasized that it is of utmost importance that, in disposing of the quasijudicial issues before them, revenue officers are bound by the decisions of the appellate authorities. The order of the Appellte
Collector is binding on the Assistant Collectors working within his juri iction and the order of the Tribunal is binding upon the Assistant Collectors and the Appellate Collectors who function under the juri iction of the Tribunal. The principles of judicial discipline require that the orders of the higher appellate authorities should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. The mere fact that the order of the appellate authority is not “acceptable” to the department – in itself an objectionable phrase –
and is the subject matter of an appeal can furnish no ground for not following it unless its operation has been suspended by a competent court. If this healthy rule is not followed, the result will only be undue harassment to assesses and chaos in administration of tax laws.
… … …
12. We have dealt with this aspect at some length, because it has been suggested by the learned
Additional Solicitor General that the observations

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made by the High Court, have been harsh on the officers. It is clear that the observations of the High
Court, seemingly vehement, and apparently unpalatable to the Revenue, are only intended to curb a tendency in revenue matters which, if allowed to become widespread, could result in considerable harassment to the assesses-public without any benefit to the Revenue. We would like to say that the department should take these observations in the proper spirit. The observations of the High Court should be kept in mind in future and the utmost regard should be paid by the adjudicating authorities and the appellate authorities to the requirements of judicial discipline and the need for giving effect to the orders of the higher appellate authorities which are binding on them.”
15. What is worrying this Bench more is the fact that an endeavour is being made whole heartedly to ensure not to generate further litigation on issues which have been laid to rest by a large number of High Courts all of whom have taken a consistent stand that the action of the Income Tax Department being violative of the 15 Finance Act, 2020 and Finance Act, 2021. Now, in order to protect the interest of the Revenue as also that of the assessee, it would be trite at this juncture, if we dispose of the writ petition with an observation/direction that the disposal of the instant writ petition in terms of the judgment rendered by this High Court in the case of Kankanala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra) shall however be subject to the outcome of the SLPs which were filed by the Income Tax Department and which is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
16. In the given facts and circumstances, this Bench is of the considered opinion that unless and until we do not timely dispose of matters which are squarely covered by the decision of this Court and which stands fortified by the decisions of the various other
High Courts on the very same issue, the pendency of this High Court would further be burdened which otherwise can be decided and disposed of as a covered matter.
17. So far as the interest of the Revenue is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the interest of the Revenue has already been considered and protected, as has been observed in paragraphs 16
36, 37 and 38 of the order which, for ready reference, is reproduced hereunder:

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“36. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned notices issued and the proceedings drawn by the respondent
Department is neither tenable, nor sustainable. The notices so issued and the procedure adopted being per se illegal, deserves to be and are accordingly set aside/quashed. As a consequence, all the impugned orders getting quashed, the consequential orders passed by the respondent-Department pursuant to the notices issued under Section 147 and 148
would also get quashed and it is ordered accordingly. The reason we are quashing the consequential order is on the principles that when the initiation of the proceedings itself was procedurally wrong, the subsequent orders also gets nullified automatically. 37. The preliminary objection raised by the petitioner is sustained and all these writ petitions stands allowed on this very juri ictional issue. Since the impugned notices and orders are getting quashed on the point of juri iction, we are not inclined to proceed further and decide the other issues raised by the petitioner which stands reserved to be raised and contended in an appropriate proceedings.
38. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court had, in the case of Ashish Agarwal , supra, as a one-time measure exercising the powers under Article
142 of the Constitution of India, permitted the Revenue to proceed under the substituted provisions, and this Court allowing the petitions only on the procedural flaw, the right conferred on the Revenue would remain reserved to proceed further if they so want from the stage of the order of the Supreme Court in the case of Ashish
Agarwal , supra.”
18. We would only further like to make observations that since we are inclined to dispose of the instant writ petition, conscious of the fact that the earlier order of this High Court in the case of Kanakala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra) is subjected to challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP No.3574 of 2024, preferred by the Income Tax
Department, we make it clear that allowing of the instant writ petition is subject to outcome of the aforesaid SLP preferred by the Revenue against the decision of this High Court in the case of Kanakala Ravindra Reddy (1 supra). This, in other

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words, would mean that either of the parties, if they so want, may move an appropriate petition seeking revival of this writ petition in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the pending SLP on the very same issue.
19. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands allowed in favour of the assessee so far as the issue of juri iction is concerned. As a consequence, the impugned notice under challenge under Sections 148-A and 148 stands set aside/quashed. The consequential orders, if any, also stand set aside/quashed in similar terms as have been passed by this High Court in the case of Kankanala Ravindra Reddy (1
supra). There shall be no order as to costs.
Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.”
14. Thus, it is clear that the issue raised by the assessee in the present appeal is now covered by the decision of Hon’ble
Juri ictional High Court in the assessee’s own case for the A.Y.2016-17. As regards the contention of the Ld.DR that no such issue was raised by the assessee before the authorities below, we find from the Grounds of Appeal raised before the CIT(A) that the assessee had raised this issue in ground No.2
to 5 as under :
“2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Juri ictional Assessing Officer erred by initiating proceedings u/s 147of the Act, simply relied on the SFT information shown in the verification module of Insight Portal at the time of reopening, however, either no information gathered or not conducted any inquiry further in order to form an honest and a reasonable belief that certain income had escaped assessment in the case of the appellant, As such, said proceedings and the consequent order ought to be declared null and void-ab-initio.
3. The Notice issued u/s 148 of the I.T. Act, 1961 dated
30.03.2023 is illegal and unsustainable in law since the income alleged to have escaped assessment, actually is far below the threshold limit of Rs. 50 Lacs/-, in the present case, it is actually
Rs. 30,61,000/- only and thereby, barred by limitation under the provisions of section 149(1) (a) of the Act. Since the impugned notice issued u/s 148 of the I.T Act, 1961 dated 30.03.2023, is illegal and unsustainable in law, accordingly, the impugned reassessment order u/s 147 r.w.s 144B of the Act dated
01.03.2024 and the notice of demand dated 01.03.2024 issued u/s 156 of the Act are also bad in law and unsustainable and the same, is hereby, quashed and set aside.
4. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Assessment Unit/NaFAC erred by making the additions without supplying the relevant documents or tangible material to the appellant and without obtaining the bank account statement(s) relied on which the case was reopened by the JAO, as such, said proceedings and the consequent order ought to be declared null and void-ab-initio.

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Juri ictional High Court for the State of Telangana in the case of Kotha Kanthaiah(supra).
17. Further, we find that the issue is pending for adjudication before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the SLP filed by the Revenue in the case of Hexaware Technology Ltd., against the Judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Bombay and the Hon’ble
Juri ictional High Court for the State of Telangana in the case of Kotha Kanthaiah (supra) has given the liberty to the parties to move an appropriate petition seeking revival of the petition in light of Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hexaware
Technology Ltd., (supra) on this issue. Therefore, we grant liberty to the parties to get this appeal revived, if the Judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court on this issue necessitates to modify this Order.
18. As we have allowed the appeal of the assessee on legal ground, we do not propose to adjudicate on the other grounds of appeal, which are kept upon.
19. In the result, the appeal of the assessee in ITA
No.1317/Hyd/2025 is allowed in terms of our above observation.
ITA Nos. 915,1487 & 1606/Hyd/2025 :
20. In all these three appeals, the assessee has filed additional grounds along with petition for admission of such additional grounds. The Ld. ARs have submitted that additional grounds so raised are admissible in view of judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power
Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC). The Ld. DR did not raise any objection for admission of the additional grounds. The prayer for admission of additional grounds are being admitted for adjudication in terms of Rule 11 of the Income Tax (Appellate

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Tribunal) Rules, 1963 owing to the fact that objections raised in additional grounds are legal in nature for which relevant facts are stated to be emanating from the existing records.
21. We observe that in all these three appeals, the assessee has raised additional ground challenging the validity of the notice issued under section 148 of the Act as well as the order passed under section 148A(d) of the Act. The assessee has contended that the notice issued under section 148 and the order passed under section 148A(d) of the Act were by the JAO instead of the FAO, which is contrary to the statutory scheme of Faceless Assessment introduced by the CBDT. It has been argued that, since the notices and orders were issued by the JAO in violation of the mandatory faceless procedure, the proceedings are bad in law, and consequently, the assessment orders passed pursuant thereto are liable to be quashed.
22. On perusal of the respective records, we find that in ITA No. 915/Hyd/2025 for Assessment Year 2018–19, the Ld. AO passed the order under section 148A(d) on 30.03.2022 and issued the notice under section 148 on 31.03.2022. In ITA No.1487/
Hyd/ 2025 for Assessment Year 2019–20, the Ld. AO passed the order under section 148A(d) on 07.04.2023 and issued the notice under section 148 on 10.04.2023. In ITA No. 1606/Hyd/2025 for Assessment Year 2018–19, the Ld. AO issued the notice under section 148 and passed the order under section 148A(d) on 25.04.2022. Thus, in all thsee three appeals, there is no dispute regarding the fact that the Ld. AO passed the order under section 148A(d) and issued the notice under section 148 after 29.03.2022, which is the effective date notified by CBDT for implementation of ITA Nos 1317 915 1487 and 1606
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the Faceless Reassessment Scheme. As per the CBDT Notification, any assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147 of the Act, and any notice issued under section 148 on or after 29.03.2022, shall mandatorily be in accordance with the faceless reassessment scheme and must be carried out by the FAO. Therefore, the issues involved in these three appeals are identical to those arising in ITA No. 1317/Hyd/2025. Hence, our observations and findings recorded therein apply mutatis mutandis to the present appeals as well.
In ITA
No.
1317/Hyd/2025, we have held that a notice issued by the JAO under section 148 of the Act after 29.03.2022 is invalid and bad in law, and accordingly we have set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(A) and quashed the impugned assessment order. Following the same reasoning, all these three appeals filed by the assessee are also allowed in same terms.
23. To sum up, all the four appeals filed by the assessees are allowed in terms of our above observations.
Order pronounced in the Open Court on 24th December 2025. (RAVISH SOOD)
JUDICIAL MEMBER
Hyderabad, dated 24th December 2025
Vinodan/sps

ITA Nos 1317 915 1487 and 1606
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Copy to:

S.No Addresses
1
Smt. Lingamgunta Adilaxmi, H. No. 31/A Indian Airlines Colony
Akashnagar, New Bowenpally Hyderabad 500011
2
Income Tax Officer Ward 10(1) IT Towers, AC Guards, Masab
Tank, Hyderabad
3
Shri Raghu Alekh Barli H.No.6-3-688/1 Flat No.2D Usha
Mansion, Somajiguda, Hyderabad 500082
4
Dy.CIT, Circle 6(1) IT Towers, Professor Elyas Burney Road, AC
Guards, Masab Tank, Hyderabad
5
M/s. Sanzyme (P) Ltd, 8-2-472/1/A/B/SF-3 Sattva Signature
Tower, Road No.1 Banjara Hills, Hyderabad 500034
6
Dy.CIT Circle 3(1) Signature Towers, Hyderabad 500084
7
Shri Bikaram Pushpender, 4-139, 1st Floor, Opp: More Super
Market, Chandanagar, Hyderabad 500050
8
Income Tax Officer Ward 9(1) IT Towers, AC Guards, Masabtank
Hyderabad
9
Pr. CIT - Hyderabad
10
DR, ITAT Hyderabad Benches
11
Guard File

By Order