Facts
The assessee filed appeals against orders from the ld. Addl./JCIT(A)-1 for AYs 2018-19 & 2020-21. These appeals were dismissed by the ld. CIT(A) solely on the ground of limitation due to significant delays (1743 days and 1059 days) in filing. The assessee submitted an affidavit explaining the reasons for the delay and sought condonation.
Held
The Tribunal, relying on judicial precedents regarding condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, found the assessee's explanation plausible and satisfactory. In the interest of substantial justice, the Tribunal condoned the delay and remitted both appeals back to the ld. CIT(A) for fresh consideration and decision on merits after affording due opportunities.
Key Issues
Whether the ld. CIT(A) was justified in dismissing the appeals on limitation without condoning the significant delay, and if there was 'sufficient cause' for the delay in filing the appeals before the CIT(A).
Sections Cited
250, 143(1), Section 5 of the Limitation Act
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “D” BENCH, KOLKATA
Before: SHRI RAJESH KUMAR & SHRI PRADIP KUMAR CHOUBEY
O R D E R
Per Pradip Kumar Choubey, JM :
The assessee has filed both the appeals against the separate orders both dated 14.02.2025, passed by the ld.Addl./JCIT(A)-1, Mumbai for the assessment years 2018-2019 & 2020-2021.
The ld.AR has only prayed that the matter be remitted back to the file of ld.CIT(A) as the ld. CIT(A) has passed the order not on merit rather he dismissed the appeal of the assessee on the point of limitation by not condoning the delay. Ld.AR by filing an affidavit has explained the reason for delay and submitted that the reason explained by the assessee is plausible and satisfactory and in the interest of justice the delay should be condoned and appeal be remitted back to the file of CIT(A) for fresh order on merit.
Contrary to that, ld.Sr. DR supported the impugned order thereby submitting that there is a long delay as in one case the delay was of 1743 days and in another case the delay was about 1059 days and explanation which has been submitted by the assessee cannot be said to be plausible explanation.
Upon hearing the submission of the counsel for the respective parties, we have perused the orders of the lower authorities in both the cases and find that the appeal of the assessee has been dismissed as the ld.CIT(A) did not find the reason for delay being plausible and satisfactory. Ld.AR has filed an affidavit before us which is essential to be produced hereinbelow :-
5. In this context, we have perused the several decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and find that in Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [AIR 1969 SC 575], this Court reiterated the following classic statement from Krishna vs. Chathappan [1890 ILR 13 Mad 269]: "... Section 5 gives the courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words `sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant."
In N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy [1998 (7) SCC 123], this Court held: "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court. The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice...... Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.”
Keeping in view the above affidavit filed by the assessee and considering the judicial pronouncement as discussed above, and in the