DCIT, JAIPUR vs. VIMAL CHAND SURANA HUF, JAIPUR

per law under s. 153C/148 of the Act. Hence, notice issued under s. 148 of the Act and proceedings under s. 147 of the Act by the AO are illegal and void ab initio. In view of the provisions of s. 153C of the Act, s. 147/148 stands ousted. In the instant case, the procedure laid down under s. 153C has not been followed by the AO and, therefore, assessment has become invalid. We also observe that the CIT(A) was justified in following the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manish Maheshwari v. Asstt. CIT [2007] 289 ITR 341 / 159 Taxman 258 wherein it has been held that if the procedure laid down in s. 158BD is not followed, block assessment proceedings would be illegal. The CIT(A) has correctly observed that the provisions of s. 153C are exactly similar to the provisions of s. 158BD of the Act in block assessment proceedings. Thus, considering the entire facts and the circumstances of the present case, we hold that the CIT(A) was fully justified in quashing the reassessment order. We also do not find any merit in the submissions of the learned Departmental Representative that during the course of search, it was found at premises of M/s. Today Homes & Infrastructure (P.) Ltd. pertaining to M/s. P.R. Infrastructure Ltd. and not the assessee. In this regard, we may point out that the contention raised by the learned Departmental Representative is factually incorrect and contrary to the available records of seized documents specifically mentioned in the assessment order dt. 30th Dec, 2008. In view of the above factual discussion, we do not find any merit and substance in the contention of the learned Departmental Representative. Therefore, we uphold the order of the CIT(A) and dismiss the ground Nos. 1 to 4 of the appeal.”

A similar view was taken by the Visakhapatnam Bench of this Tribunal in case of G. Koteswara Rao vs. DCIT (supra) in para 11 to 17 as under:-

“11. A careful study of section 153A to 153C and also the circular issued by the CBDT explaining the procedure of assessment in search cases, it shows that these are separate provisions independent of other provisions relating to reassessment, because of the non abstante clause begins with the said sections. The language used in these sections, i.e. 'notwithstanding anything contained' in section 139, section 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and section 153 made it clear that provisions of these sections are not made applicable to the assessments covered by the provisions of section 153A. Prior to the introduction of these three sections, there was a separate chapter XIV -B of the Act, by section 158BC to 158BE which governs the search assessments which is popularly known as Block assessment. The earlier provisions provides for single assessment to be made in respect of undisclosed income of Block period consisting of 10 assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year in which search took place and the broken period of up to the date of search

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was also included in the block period. After the introduction of new sections, i.e. section 153A to 153C, the single block assessment concept was done way with the new scheme of assessment of search cases where the Assessing Officer is to assess or reassess the total income of each of the assessment years falling within the period of six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year in which the search is conducted. Therefore, under the new scheme, the Assessing Officer is required to exercise the normal assessment powers in respect of the previous year in which the search took place. From these facts, one thing is clearly emerged that both i.e. earlier concept of Block assessment and the new scheme of assessment is separate provisions created for assessment of search cases where the search is conducted u/s 132 or requisition was made u/s 132A of the Act.

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years falling within the period of those six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year in which search is conducted. Under the new provisions of section 153A, the statute is provides wide powers to the Assessing Officer in respect of assessments already completed u/s 143(1) or 143(3). If such orders is already in existence prior to the initiation of search, the Assessing Officer is empowered to reopen those proceedings and reassess the total income taking note of the undisclosed income, if any, found during the course of search. For this purpose, the restrictions imposed on the Assessing Officer by way of sections 148 to 153 to reopen the assessment u/s 147 has been removed by the non abstante clause used in section 153A.

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section 153A, which was inserted in to the Act to deal exclusively with search cases. The legislators in their wisdom clearly spelt out the provisions of law applicable to search cases by using the word shall to begin with section 153A, made it mandatory that the Assessing Officer bound to issue notice u/s 153A or 153C, thereafter proceed to assess or reassess the total income, where search is conducted u/s 132 or requisition is made u/s 132A. Therefore, in our opinion, the AO is not justified in reopening the assessment u/s 147 and his order is illegal and arbitrary.

'52. The provision comes into operation if a search or requisition is initiated after 31.5.2003. On satisfaction of this condition, the AO is under obligation to issue notice to the person requiring him to furnish the return of income of six years immediately preceding the year of search. The word used is "shall" and, thus, there is no option but to issue such a notice. Thereafter he has to assess or reassess total income of these six years. In this respect also, the word used is "shall" and, therefore, the AO has no option but to asses or reassess the total income of these six years. The pending proceedings shall abate. This means that out of six years, if any assessment or reassessment is pending on the date of initiation of the search, it shall abate. In other words pending proceedings will not be proceeded with thereafter. The assessment has now to be made u/s 153A (1)(b) and the first proviso. It also means that only one assessment will be made under the aforesaid provisions as the two proceedings i.e. assessment or reassessment proceedings and proceedings under this provision merged into one. If assessment made under sub-section (1) is annulled in appeal or other legal proceedings, then the abated assessment or reassessment shall revive. This means that the assessment or reassessment, which had abated, shall be made, for which extension of time has been provided under section 153B.

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income under the aforesaid provision. Similar position will obtain in a case where undisclosed income or undisclosed property has been found as a consequence of search. In other words, harmonious interpretation will produce the following results :-

(a) In so far as pending assessments are concerned, the jurisdiction to make original assessment and assessment u/s 153A merge into one and only one assessment for each assessment year shall be made separately on the basis of the findings of the search and any other material existing or brought on the record of the A.O.

(b) in respect of non-abated assessments, the assessment will be made on the basis of books of account or other documents not produced in the course of original assessment but found in the course of search, and undisclosed income or undisclosed property discovered in the course of search."

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clarified by the Explanation below Section 158BA(2). After the introduction of the group of Sections namely, 153A to 153C, the single block assessment concept was given a go-by. Under the new Section 153A, in a case where a search is initiated under Section 132 or requisition of books of account, documents or assets is made under Section 132A after 31.5.2003, the Assessing Officer is obliged to issue notices calling upon the searched person to furnish returns for the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search was conducted or requisition was made. The other difference is that there is no broken period from the first day of April of the financial year in which the search took place or the requisition was made and ending with the date of search/requisition. Under Section 153A and the new scheme provided for, the AO is required to exercise the normal assessment powers in respect of the previous year in which the search took place. 19. Under the provisions of Section 153A, as we have already noticed, the Assessing Officer is bound to issue notice to the assessee to furnish returns for each assessment year falling within the six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search or requisition was made. Another significant feature of this Section is that the Assessing Officer is empowered to assess or reassess the "total income' of the aforesaid years. This is a significant departure from the earlier block assessment scheme in which the block assessment roped in only the undisclosed income and the regular assessment proceedings were preserved, resulting in multiple assessments. Under Section 153A, however, the Assessing Officer has been given the power to assess or reassess the total income of the six assessment years in question in separate assessment orders. This means that there can be only one assessment order in respect of each of the six assessment years, in which both the disclosed and the undisclosed income would be brought to tax. 20. A question may arise as to how this is sought to be achieved where an assessment order had already been passed in respect of all or any of those six assessment years, either under Section 143(1)(a) or Section 143(3) of the Act. If such an order is already in existence, having obviously been passed prior to the initiation of the search/requisition, the Assessing Officer is empowered to reopen those proceedings and reassess the total income, taking note of the undisclosed income, if any, unearthed during the search. For this purpose, the fetters imposed upon the Assessing Officer by the strict procedure to assume jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under Sections 147 and 148, have been removed by the non obstante clause with which sub section (1) of Section 153A opens. The time-limit within which the notice under Section 148 can be issued, as provided in Section 149 has also been made inapplicable by the non obstante

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clause. Section 151 which requires sanction to be obtained by the Assessing Officer by issue of notice to reopen the assessment under Section 148 has also been excluded in a case covered by Section 153A. The time-limit prescribed for completion of an assessment or reassessment by Section 153 has also been done away with in a case covered by Section 153A. With all the stops having been pulled out, the Assessing Officer under Section 153A has been entrusted with the duty of bringing to tax the total income of an assessee whose case is covered by Section 153A, by even making reassessments without any fetters, if need be. 21. Now there can be cases where at the time when the search is initiated or requisition is made, the assessment or reassessment proceedings relating to any assessment year falling within the period of the six assessment years mentioned above, may be pending. In such a case, the second proviso to sub section (1) of Section 153A says that such proceedings "shall abate'. The reason is not far to seek. Under Section 153A, there is no room for multiple assessment orders in respect of any of the 'six assessment years under consideration. That is because the Assessing Officer has to determine not merely the undisclosed income of the assessee, but also the total income of the assessee in whose case a search or requisition has been initiated. Obviously there cannot be several orders for the same assessment year determining the total income of the assessee. In order to ensure this state of affairs namely, that in respect of the six assessment years preceding the assessment year relevant to the year in which the search took place there is only one determination of the total income, it has been provided in the second proviso of sub Section (1) of Section 153A that any proceedings for assessment or reassessment of the assessee which are pending on the date of initiation of the search or making requisition "shall abate". Once those proceedings abate, the decks are cleared, for the Assessing Officer to pass assessment orders for each of those six years determining the total income of the assessee which would include both the income declared in the returns, if any, furnished by the assessee as well as the undisclosed income, if any, unearthed during the search or requisition. The position thus emerging is that where assessment or reassessment proceedings are pending completion when the search is initiated or requisition is made, they will abate making way for the Assessing Officer to determine the total income of the assessee in which the undisclosed income would also be included, but in cases where the assessment or reassessment proceedings have already been completed and assessment orders have been passed determining the assessee s total income and such orders are subsisting at the time when the search or the requisition is made, there is no question of any abatement since no proceedings are pending. In this latter situation, the Assessing Officer will reopen the assessments or reassessments already made (without having the need to follow the strict

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provisions or complying with the strict conditions of Sections 147, 148 and 151) and determine the total income of the assessee. Such determination in the orders passed under Section 153A would be similar to the orders passed in any reassessment, where the total income determined in the original assessment order and the income that escaped assessment are clubbed together and assessed as the total income. In such a case, to reiterate, there is no question of any abatement of the earlier proceedings for the simple reason that no proceedings for assessment or reassessment were pending since they had already culminated in assessment or reassessment orders when the search was initiated or the requisition was made. 20. Applying the ratio of the above decisions to the facts of the present case, we find that there is no dispute that the original assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was completed u/s 143(3) on 13-2-2004 determining the total income at Rs. 26354942360/-. Thereafter, a search and seizure action was initiated in assessee's case by the Department on 2-7-2005 on which date the assessment for the A.Y. 2001-02 was not pending. Therefore, in view of the non- obstinate clause with which sub section (1) of section 153A opens, the A.O. has no jurisdiction to issue notice u/s 148 of the Act in respect of those six assessment years which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of section 153A of the Act and accordingly the A.O. was not justified in issuing notice u/s 148 on 28-8-2006 and in completing the impugned assessment u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act on 31-10-2006. The A.O. instead of complying with the requirement of section 153A proceeded with the provisions of section 147/148 which are not applicable in the assessment u/s 153 A of the Act, therefore, the impugned assessment completed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act is a nullity and as such the assessment order dtd. 31-10-2006 passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act is illegal, arbitrary, wholly without jurisdiction and, hence, the same is quashed." 17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also applying the ratios of the above mentioned decisions, we are of the considered opinion that the Assessing Officer, has no jurisdiction to issue notice u/s 148 of the Act to reopen the assessments in respect of those six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year in which search is conducted or requisition is made. The period under consideration falls within the exclusive domain of section 153A. In the instant case, since the assessment is made consequent to search in another case, the Assessing Officer is bound to issue notice u/s 153C and thereafter proceed to assess or reassess total income under section 153A of the Act. The Assessing Officer, instead of complying with the provisions of section 153C, proceeded with the reassessment under section 147/148 which is not applicable to search cases. Therefore, the impugned assessment order passed u/s 143(3), r.w.s. 147 of the Income tax Act, 1961 is illegal, arbitrary and

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without any jurisdiction. Hence, the assessment order dated 31-12-2010 passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 147 is quashed.” Thus, it is clear that the Tribunal has taken a consistent view on this issue and further the Delhi Benches of this Tribunal in case of Rajat Shubra Chatterji vs. ACIT (supra) has held in para 7 as under:- “7. On having gone through the decisions cited above especially the decision of Amritsar Bench in the case of ITO vs. Arun Kumar Kapoor (supra), we find that in that case as in the present case before us, reassessment was initiated on the basis of incriminating material found in search of third party and the validity of the same was challenged by the assessee before the Learned CIT(Appeals) and the Learned CIT(Appeals) vitiated the proceedings. The same was questioned by the Revenue before the ITAT and the ITAT after discussing the cases of the parties and the relevant provisions in details has come to the conclusion that in the above situation, provisions of sec. 153C were applicable which excludes the application of sections 147 and 148 of the Act. The ITAT held the notice issued under sec. 148 and proceedings under sec. 147 as illegal and void ab initio. It was held that Assessing Officer having not followed procedure under sec. 153C, reassessment order was rightly quashed by the Learned CIT(Appeals). In the present case before us, it is an admitted fact, as also evident from the reasons recorded and the assessment order that the initiation of reopening proceedings was made by the Assessing Officer on the basis of information received from the Directorate of Income-tax (Inv.) on the basis of search & seizure operation conducted at the premises of Rock Land Group of Cases and the documents related to the assessee found during the course of search were made available to the Assessing Officer of the present assessee. We thus respectfully following the decision of Co-ordinate Bench of the ITAT in the case of ACIT vs. Arun Kapur – 140 TTJ 249 (Amritsar) hold that provisions of sec. 153C of the Act were applicable in the present case for framing the assessment, if any, which excludes the application of sec. 147 of the Act, hence, notice issued under sec. 148 of the Act and assessment framed in furtherance thereto under sec. 147 read with section 143(3) of the Act are void ab initio. The reassessment in question is accordingly quashed. The ground No.1 is accordingly allowed.”

Therefore, in conjoint reading of provisions of section 153A, 153C and 147/148 of the Act as well as a consistent view taken by this Tribunal in a series of decision cited (supra) we hold that the assessment or reassessment of income of the person other than search persons based on seized material can be only be made u/s 153C r.w.s. 153A and the provisions of section 147/148 of the Act

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are not applicable in such cases. No contrary decision has been brought to our notice. Accordingly, we hold that initiation of proceedings u/s 147/148 by the AO to reassess the income is illegal being without jurisdiction and consequently the reassessment order passed u/s 147 r.w.s. 143(3) is also illegal and void abinitio and is liable to be quashed.

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said land as belong to M/s Kalyan Buildmart Pvt. Ltd. We find that there is no transaction of sale and purchase of land in question between the assessee and Shri Madan Mohan Gupta. What was transferred by Shri Madan Mohan Gupta and his wife Smt. Shashi Kala Gupta were the shares of M/s Kalyan Buildmart Pvt. Ltd. which owned the land in question. There may be a case of under valuation of shares and understatement of consideration paid by the assessee however, it is not a case of purchase of land. The purchase consideration of shares was accepted by the AO while completing the assessment u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A and therefore, the AO is precluded to reassess the income on the basis of non existing transaction of purchase of land. Further, the AO himself was not sure about the escapement of income and assess the income in the hands of the assessee only on protective basis. The very basis of invoking the provisions of section 147/148 is contrary to the facts and record that it was a transaction of purchase of shares of M/s Kalyan Buildmart Pvt. Ltd. and not purchase of land owned by the said company. Even if the purchase consideration of share is under stated the reasons for reopening do not state so and therefore, the reopening on the basis of non existing transaction is not permitted. Once, the transaction of purchase of shares was revealed during the assessment u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A and the same was considered and accepted by the AO then the AO is not permitted to reopen the assessment to review its order as it would amount to change of opinion. The Hon’ble Madras High court in case of CIT vs. Remedies Ltd. (Supra) has held in paras 10 to 12 as under:- “10. We find from the order of the Tribunal and also on the facts as has been culled out from the assessment order in question that there is no element of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. Therefore, there was no justification for the department for invocation of proceeding under Section 147 r/w 148 of the Income Tax Act. 11. Our stand is further fortified by the decision of this Court in TCA No.217/2015 dated 2.6.2015, wherein in a similar matter, this Court has held as under :—

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'16. Our view is fortified by the decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. reported in [2002] 256 ITR 1 (Del), wherein, the Delhi High Court held as follows: "We are unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Jolly to the effect that the impugned order of reassessment cannot be faulted as the same was based on information derived from the tax audit report. The tax audit report had already been submitted by the assessee. It is one thing to say that the Assessing Officer had received information from an audit report which was not before the Income- tax Officer, but it is another thing to say that such information can be derived by the material which had been supplied by the assessee himself. We also cannot accept the submission of Mr. Jolly to the effect that only because in the assessment order, detailed reasons have not been recorded an analysis of the materials on the record by itself may justify the Assessing Officer to initiate a proceeding under section 147 of the Act. The said submission is fallacious. An order of assessment can be passed either in terms of sub-section (1) of section 143 or sub-section (3) of section 143. When a regular order of assessment is passed in terms of the said sub-section (3) of section 143 a presumption can be raised that such an order has been passed on application of mind. It is well known that a presumption can also be raised to the effect that in terms of clause (e) of section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. If it be held that an order which has been passed purportedly without application of mind would itself confer jurisdiction upon the Assessing Officer to reopen the proceeding with out anything further, the same would amount to giving a premium to an authority exercising quasi-judicial function to take benefit of its own wrong." 17. The above said decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Commissioner of Income- tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd [2010] 320 ITR 561 (SC)., wherein the Supreme Court held that the concept of "change of opinion" on the part of the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment did not stand obliterated after the substitution of Section 147 of the Income Tax Act. The Supreme Court also held that the Assessing Officer has power to reopen the assessment, provided there is "tangible material" to come to a conclusion that there was an escapement of income from assessment. For better appreciation, the relevant portion of the said decision reads as follows: "6. On going through the changes, quoted above, made to section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, reopening could be done under the above two conditions and fulfilment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in section 147 of the Act (with effect from 1st April, 1989),

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they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post-1st April, 1989, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words "reason to believe" failing which, we are afraid, section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen assessments on the basis of "mere change of opinion", which cannot be per se reason to reopen. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to reassess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review ; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain preconditions and if the concept of "change of opinion" is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would take place. One must treat the concept of "change of opinion" as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, the Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is "tangible material" to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words "reason to believe" but also inserted the word "opinion" in section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the companies against omission of the words "reason to believe", Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word "opinion" on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer. We quote hereinbelow the relevant portion of Circular No. 549 dated October 31, 1989 ([1990] 182 ITR (St.) 1,29), which reads as follows : "7.2 Amendment made by the Amending Act, 1989, to reintroduce the expression 'reason to believe' in section 147.—A number of representations were received against the omission of the words 'reason to believe' from section 147 and their substitution by the 'opinion' of the Assessing Officer. It was pointed out that the meaning of the expression, 'reason to believe' had been explained in a number of court rulings in the past and was well settled and its omission from section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessments on mere change of opinion. To allay these fears, the Amending Act, 1989, has again amended section 147 to reintroduce the expression 'has reason to believe' in place of the words 'for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, is of the opinion'. Other provisions of the new section 147, however, remain the same." (emphasis supplied) 18. Similar view has been taken by this Court in the decision reported in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. [2009] 309 ITR 110 , wherein it was held as follows:

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"In those circumstances, it could not be regarded that the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts relevant for the assessment. As the facts revealed that the Assessing Officer who made the original assessment order has called for all the details regarding the case where 100 per cent. depreciation were claimed and the assessee had furnished the invoices for purchase of assets on which 100 per cent. depreciation were claimed, there was no failure on the part of the assessee and if at all there was any failure, according to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), it was on the part of the Assessing Officer, who made the original assessment without going behind the nature of the transactions accepting the details furnished by the assessee. The Tribunal also extracted that portion of the order and found on the fact that there was no fault on the part of the assessee so as to enable the Department to reopen the assessment as the proviso to section 147 of the Income-tax Act would squarely apply to the case of the assessee. We find no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed." 19. In an identical circumstances, a learned single Judge of this Court considered the issue in the decision reported in Fenner (India) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-Tax [2000] 241 ITR 672 (Mad), wherein, it was observed as follows: "The pre-condition for the exercise of the power under section 147 in cases where power is exercised within a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year is the belief reasonably entertained by the Assessing Officer that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that assessment year. However, when the power is invoked after the expiry of the period of four years from the end of the assessment year, a further pre-condition for such exercise is imposed by the proviso namely, that there has been a failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under section 142 or section 148 or failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year. Unless, the condition in the proviso is satisfied, the Assessing Officer does not acquire jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding under section 147 of the Act after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. Thus, in cases where the initiation of the proceedings is beyond the period of four years from the end of the assessment year, the Assessing Officer must necessarily record not only his reasonable belief that income has escaped assessment but also the default or failure committed by the assessee. Failure to do so would vitiate the notice and the entire proceedings. The relevant words in the proviso are, ". . . . unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee ... . ."

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Mere escape of income is insufficient to justify the initiation of action after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. Such escapement must be by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee either to file a return referred to in the proviso or to truly and fully disclose the material facts necessary for the assessment. Whenever a notice is issued by the Assessing Officer beyond a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, such notice being issued without recording the reasons for his belief that income escaped assessment, it cannot be presumed in law that there is also a failure on the part of the assessee to file the returns referred to in the proviso or a failure to fully and truly disclose the material facts. The reasons referred to in the main paragraph of section 147 would, in cases where the proviso is attracted, include reasons referred to in the proviso and it is necessary for the Assessing Officer to record that any one or all the circumstances referred to in the proviso existed before the issue of notice under section 147.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The duty of an assessee is limited to fully and truly disclosing all the material facts. The assessee is not required thereafter to prepare a draft assessment order. If the details placed by the assessee before the Assessing Officer were in conformity with the requirements of all applicable laws and known accounting principles, and material details had been exhibited before the Assessing Officer, it is for the Assessing Officer to reach such conclusions as he considered was warranted from such data and any failure on his part to do so cannot be regarded as the assessee's failure to furnish the material facts truly and fully. Any lack of comprehension on the part of the Assessing Officer in understanding the details placed before him cannot confer a justification for reopening the assessment, long after the period of four years had expired. On the facts of this case, it is clear that the escapement of income, if any, on this account is not on account of any failure on the assessee's part to disclose the material facts fully and truly. The notice issued by the Assessing Officer in exercise of his power under section 147, therefore, cannot be sustained. As the error here is one of jurisdiction it is not necessary for the assessee to have recourse to the remedies by way of appeal, revision, etc. It is well settled that when a jurisdictional error is brought to the notice of this court such errors are capable of being corrected by this court in exercise of the court's powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Progressive Engineering [1993] 200 ITR 231 (sic), held that when all the relevant facts were before the court and the law is clear on the subject, it is the duty of the High Court to interfere. That was also a case where the proceedings were sought to be initiated against the assessee under section 147 of the Act.

ITA 437/JP/2017_ 43 DCIT Vs. Vimal Chand Surana (HUF)

ITA 437/JP/2017_ 44 DCIT Vs. Vimal Chand Surana (HUF)

Diamond (P.) Ltd. vs. DCIT (supra) while considering the validity of notice issue u/s 148 after 4 years has held in para 6 as under:- “6. We have considered the rival submissions. By the impugned notice dated 20 June 2011, the assessment for Assessment Year 2005-06 is sought to be reopened beyond a period of four years of the end of the relevant assessment year. The condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction to reopen an assessment beyond a period of four years as spelt out in the proviso to Section 147 is that there ought to be a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment for that assessment year. In the present case, the sole basis on which the assessment proceedings were sought to be reopened is the order which has been passed on 5 July 2011 for Assessment Year 2007-08. In that order, according to the Revenue, it has been held that the assessee acts as a mere facilitator and is not a manufacturer so as to entitle it to the deduction under Section 10A. The issue, however, before the Court, is as to whether that can form the basis of the reopening of the assessment beyond a period of four years. The reasons which have been disclosed by the Assessing Officer do not set out as to what facts the assessee had failed to fully and truly disclose. Even a prima facie reference to the basis on which it is sought to be inferred that there was a failure to disclose all material facts has not been set out in the reasons. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the primary jurisdictional requirement for reopening the assessment beyond a period of four years has not been fulfilled in this case. Since the order passed by the CIT (Appeals) for Assessment Year 2007-08 has been passed after the assessment for Assessment Year 2005-06 has been sought to be reopened by the notice dated 29 June 2011, we have, for the purposes of this discussion, kept that circumstance out of consideration. We have come to the conclusion that the Assessing Officer having failed to establish that there was a failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts for Assessment Year 2005-06, the reopening beyond a period of four years is clearly not valid. There was a finding of fact by the Assessing Officer in the assessment order for Assessment Year 2005- 06 that the business activity of the assessee is manufacturing of jewellery in a Special Economic Zone. That finding, as the assessment order notes, was based upon a consideration of the facts of the case and upon examining the contentions of the assessee.”

When the AO has failed to set out in the reasons recorded as to what facts the assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly then the reopening after 4 years is invalid being without jurisdiction. We do not wish to multiply the precedent on this issue though relied upon by the ld. AR of the assessee. Accordingly, in the

ITA 437/JP/2017_ 45 DCIT Vs. Vimal Chand Surana (HUF)

facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the various decisions as stated above we hold that the reopening after 4 years from the end of the assessment year is bad in law being without jurisdiction and consequential assessment is invalid, accordingly, the reassessment order is quashed. Since, we have quashed the reassessment order itself, therefore, we do not propose to go into the other grounds raised by the assessee.”

The reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer in reopening the

assessment of the assessee are identical to that of Shri Navrattan

Kothari. Further the Assessing Officer has proceeded in the case of

assessee as well as in the case of Shri Navrattan Kothari on the premises

that the assessee alongwith two other persons have purchased the land

in question by paying on money as found recorded in the seized material,

which was explained by Shri Madan Mohan Gupta. However, as per the

sale deed, the said land was purchased by M/s Shri Kalyan Builmart Pvt.

Ltd. from the owner of the land and therefore, when the purchase

transaction was not in the name of the assessee then the Assessing

Officer has failed to set out in the reasons recorded as to how the

assessee has failed to disclose fully and truly all relevant materials

necessary for assessment particularly when the assessee had already

disclosed the transaction of shares of M/s Shri Kalyan Builmart Pvt. Ltd.

from Shri Madan Mohan Gupta and Smt. Shashi Kala Gupta. Following

the earlier order of this Tribunal in the case of Shri Navrattan Kothari Vs.

ITA 437/JP/2017_ 46 DCIT Vs. Vimal Chand Surana (HUF) ACIT (supra), we hold that the reopening of the assessment after four

years from the end of the assessment year under consideration is not

valid and the same is quashed.

consequential reassessment order, therefore, we do not propose to go

into the other grounds raised by the revenue on the merits of the

addition.

Order pronounced in the open court on 17/05/2018.

Sd/- Sd/- ¼fot; iky jko½ ¼Hkkxpan½ (VIJAY PAL RAO) (BHAGCHAND) U;kf;d lnL;@Judicial Member ys[kk lnL;@Accountant Member Tk;iqj@Jaipur fnukad@Dated:- 17th May, 2018 *Ranjan आदेश की प्रतिलिपि अग्रेf’ात@ब्वचल वf जीम वतकमत वितूंतकमक जवरू vihykFkhZ@The Appellant- The DCIT, Circle-2, Jaipur. 1. izR;FkhZ@ The Respondent- Shri Vimal Chand Surana (HUF), Jaipur. 2. vk;dj vk;qDr@ The CIT 3. vk;dj vk;qDr¼vihy½@The CIT(A) 4. विभागीय प्रतिनिधि] आयकर अपीलीय अधिकरण] जयपुर@क्त्ए प्ज्Aज्ए Jंपचनत 5. xkMZ QkbZy@ Guard File (ITA No. 437/JP/2017) 6. vkns'kkuqlkj@ By order,

सहायक पंजीकार@Aेेज. त्महपेजतंत