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Facts
The assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal with a delay of 62 days, explaining it as a failure of the previous consultant to track the order. There was also a delay in filing the appeal before the CIT(A). The CIT(A) dismissed the appeal on technical grounds.
Held
The Tribunal condoned both delays, holding that procedural technicalities should not impede substantial justice. The CIT(A)'s order was set aside, and the matter was restored for re-adjudication on merits.
Key Issues
Whether the delays in filing the appeals before the CIT(A) and ITAT should be condoned? Whether the CIT(A) was justified in dismissing the appeal on technical grounds without adjudicating the merits of the double addition claim?
Sections Cited
143(1), 250(6)
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, ‘SMC’ BENCH, BANGALORE
Before: SHRI WASEEM AHMED & SHRI KESHAV DUBEY
PER WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER:
This is an appeal filed by the assessee against the order passed by the Addl/JCIT(A)-11, Delhi dated 23/10/2024 in DIN No. ITBA/APL/S/ 250/2024-25/1069869869(1) for the assessment year 2021-22.
At the outset, it is observed that there is a delay of 62 days in filing the present appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee has filed an affidavit explaining the delay, stating that the earlier tax consultant failed to track the passing of the order by the learned CIT(A), due to which no timely action could be taken. Subsequently, the assessee appointed a new consultant who, upon becoming aware of the situation, took immediate steps to file the appeal. The explanation is supported by a sworn affidavit and reflects bona fide conduct without any element of negligence or malafide intention.
It is a settled position in law that procedural technicalities should not come in the way of substantial justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [(1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC)] emphasized that a liberal approach should be adopted while condoning delays, especially when no gross negligence or deliberate inaction is established.
We further note that there was also a delay of 51 days in filing the appeal before the learned CIT(A). The assessee explained that he was not well-versed with digital procedures required for e-filing of appeals and therefore missed the statutory deadline. It is also noted that the appeal involves a substantive issue concerning double addition made in the intimation under section 143(1) of the Act. In such a scenario, where a prima facie meritorious case is made out, the delay should not lead to denial of justice.
The learned CIT(A), however, dismissed the appeal on technical grounds without rendering a finding on the merits of the case, particularly the allegation of double addition. This is contrary to the mandate of section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which requires the appellate order to state clearly the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision. An order that lacks . reasoned findings and does not address material contentions cannot be sustained.
Furthermore, it is judicially well-accepted that if an assessee has a substantive claim, it should be examined on merits, and not rejected solely on account of procedural default. If the assessee’s contention regarding double addition is found to be valid, it would amount to a clear case of undue taxation, which must be corrected.
In light of the above facts and legal principles, we hold that both the delays—before the CIT(A) and the ITAT—deserve to be condoned in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and restore the issue to the file of the of the learned CIT(A) with a direction to re-adjudicate the matter de novo, after granting a proper opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The ld. CIT-A shall specifically examine the assessee's claim regarding double addition and pass a speaking order in accordance with law. It is not out of the place to mention that the assessee shall cooperate during the appellate proceedings and avoid unwarranted adjournments. Hence, the ground of appeal
of the assessee is hereby allowed for statistical purposes.