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Facts
The assessee, K.N. Gopala Heggade HUF, filed an appeal with a significant delay of 209 days against the order of the CIT(A)/NFAC. The assessee, a 74-year-old senior citizen, claimed to be unfamiliar with computers and emails, leading to the delay as notices were sent via email despite a specific request for physical correspondence.
Held
The Tribunal condoned the delay, citing the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors., emphasizing substantial justice over technicalities. The Tribunal found no malafide intention and noted that the delay was due to circumstances beyond the assessee's control.
Key Issues
Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned, and if so, whether the appeal should be decided on merits or remitted to the lower authority.
Sections Cited
250, 68, 156, 234A, 234B, 234C, 271AAC, 253(5)
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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, “A’’ BENCH: BANGALORE
Before: SHRI WASEEM AHMED & SHRI KESHAV DUBEY
PER KESHAV DUBEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER:
This appeal at the instance of the assessee is directed against the order of the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC dated 29.6.2024 vide DIN & Order No. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2024-25/1066249856(1) passed u/s. 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”) for the assessment year 2020-21.
The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:
K.N. Gopala Heggade HUF, Chikkmagalur Page 3 of 13 3. At the outset, the ld. A.R. of the assessee submitted that there is a delay of 209 days in filing the appeal before this Tribunal. Further, the ld. A.R. of the assessee also drew our attention to an application dated 22/07/2025 for condonation of delay filed along with an affidavit dated 27/03/2025 stating the cause for such delay, which is reproduced below for ease of reference and record:
On going through the above application for condonation, we find that the assessee filed the appeal with a delay of 209 days for the reason that the assessee being kartha of the HUF, is a senior citizen aged 74 years lives in a remote area, a village near Sringeri, Chikkamagaluru Dist. and is entirely unfamiliar with computers and electronic communications, including emails and therefore the assessee was utterly unaware of the notices & order passed u/s 250 of the Act. The ld. A.R. also submitted that the delay is unintentional and no benefit can be attributed to the assessee in filing the appeal
On the contrary, the ld. D.R. vehemently objected for granting the condonation of delay.
We have perused the details filed by the assessee to justify the delay and we are satisfied that there is no malafide intention on the part of the assessee in filing the appeal belatedly before us. It is to be noted that u/s 253(5) of the Act, the Tribunal may admit the appeal filed beyond the period of limitation where it has established that there exists a sufficient cause on the part of the assessee for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed time. The explanation therefore, becomes relevant to determine whether the same reflect sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee in not filing this appeal within the prescribed time.
6.1 While considering a similar issue the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down six principles. For the purpose of convenience, the principles laid down by the Apex Court are reproduced hereunder:
(1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side K.N. Gopala Heggade HUF, Chikkmagalur Page 10 of 13 cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
6.2 When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right for injustice being done because of nondeliberate delay. Therefore, we have to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue. As observed by Apex Court, if the application of the assessee for condoning the delay is rejected, it would amount to legalize injustice on technical ground when the Tribunal is capable of removing injustice and to do justice. Therefore, this Tribunal is bound to remove the injustice by condoning the delay on technicalities. If the delay is not condoned, it would amount to legalizing an illegal order which would result in unjust enrichment on the part of the State by retaining the tax relatable thereto. Under the scheme of Constitution, the Government cannot retain even a single pie of the individual citizen as tax, when it is not authorized by an authority of law. Therefore, if we refuse to condone the delay, that would amount to legalize an illegal and unconstitutional order passed by the lower authority.
6.3 Further, in the case of People Education & Economic Development Society Vs/ ITO reported in 100 ITD 87 (TM) (Chen), wherein held that “when substantial justice and technical consultation are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to 6.4 The next question may arise whether delay was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when the reason stated by the assessee was a reasonable cause for not filing the appeal. We have to see the cause for the delay. When there was a reasonable cause, the period of delay may not be relevant factor. In fact, the Madras High Court in the case of CIT vs. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors. (153 ITR 596) considered the condonation of delay and held that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Accordingly, the Madras High Court condoned nearly 21 years of delay in filing the appeal. When compared to 21 years, 209 days cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive. Furthermore, the Chennai Tribunal by majority opinion in the case of People Education and Economic Development Society (PEEDS) v. ITO (100 ITD 87) (Chennai) (TM) condoned more than six hundred days delay. Therefore, in our opinion, by preferring the substantial justice, the delay of 209 days has to be condoned and accordingly we condone the delay and admit the appeal for adjudication.
Further, on going through the order of ld. CIT(A)/NFAC we take a note of the fact that, despite giving three opportunities, the assessee neither filed any written submissions nor any evidence in support of the grounds of appeal; accordingly, the ld. CIT(A)/NFAC was of the view that the assessee is not interested in pursuing the appeal and therefore constrained to concur with the AO’s finding of fact and decision thereof, more particularly in the absence of any meaningful and worthwhile submission/documentation during the appellate proceedings. Before us, the ld. A.R. of the assessee vehemently K.N. Gopala Heggade HUF, Chikkmagalur Page 12 of 13 submitted that all the notices were sent on the e-mail ID, whereas the assessee in Form No.35 had specifically mentioned that the notices/communications may not be sent on e-mail. Further, the ld. A.R. of the assessee submitted that the assessee is a senior citizen, 74 years old, and not a tech-savvy person. Since all the notices were sent only via e-mail, the assessee was utterly unaware of the said issuance of notices due to his inability to access emails. It is only when the tax consultant on 20.2.2025 logged into the Income Tax portal and found that the order u/s 250 of the Act was already passed on 29.6.2024.
8. Ld. D.R. on the other hand had no objection if the issue in dispute is remitted to the file of ld. CIT(A)/NFAC for fresh consideration. This being so, in the interest of justice and fair play and as requested by ld. A.R. of the assessee, we deem it fit and proper to remit the entire issue in dispute to the file of ld. CIT(A)/NFAC to decide afresh in accordance with law after giving opportunity of being heard to the assessee. It is ordered accordingly.
In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the open court on 25th Sept, 2025