DANDELAPPA KRISHI PATTINA SAHAKARI BANK LIMITED,DANDELI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD-1(1), HUBLI

Against the appellate order the assessee is in appeal. The ld. CA, Mr. Vishal Rao, submitted a paperbook containing 96 pages relying upon several judicial precedents and also on the facts of the case. He further submitted an application under Rule 29 of the ITAT Rules, 1963 being interest certificate earned on investment made with Karnataka District Co-op. Bank and other co-operative societies. He submits that these evidence were not before the ld. AO as well as the ld. CIT(A) and has also been made available to the assessee recently, therefore the same may be admitted and the issue may be decided.

With respect to other interest income, it was submitted that same is also business income of the assessee. It was further stated that the decision of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in 329 ITR 74 would not apply to the facts of the case.

So far as the Kerala Act and the rules framed thereunder are concerned, the following provisions are relevant: Act "2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (f) "Co-operative Society" or "society" means a Cooperative society registered or deemed to be registered under this Act; ** ** ** (l) "member" means a person joining in the application for the registration of a Co-operative society or a person admitted to membership after such registration in accordance with this Act, the rules and the bye-laws and includes a nominal or associate member; ** ** ** (m) "nominal or associate member" means a member who possess only such privilege and rights of a member who is subject only to such liabilities of a member as may be specified in the bye-laws; ** ** ** (oaa) "Primacy Agricultural Credit Society" means a Service Co-operative Society, a Service Co-operative Bank, a Farmers Service Co-operative Bank and a Rural Bank, the principal object of which is to undertake agricultural credit activities and to provide loans and advances for agricultural purposes, the rate of interest on such loans and advances shall be the rate fixed by the Registrar and having its area of operation confined to a Village, Panchayat or a Municipality; Provided that the restriction regarding the area of operation shall not apply to Societies or Banks in existence at the commencement of the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1999 (1 of 2000). Provided further that if the above principal object is not fulfilled, such societies shall lose all characteristics of a Primary Agricultural Credit Society as specified in the Act, Rules and Bye-laws except the existing staff strength.

Societies which may be registered.— Subject to the provisions of this Act, a co-operative society which has as its object the promotion of the economic interests of its members or of the interests of the public in accordance with co- operative principles, or a society established with the object of facilitating the operations of such a society, may be registered under this Act: Provided that no co-operative society shall be registered if it is likely to be economically unsound, or the registration of which have an adverse effect on development of cooperative movement.

The main aim of this Primary Agricultural Credit Society is to provide financial assistance in the form of loans to members for agricultural purposes, marketing of agricultural produce and promotion of agriculture.

Act as an agent for supply of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, implements for agricultural purposes and an agent for procurement of agricultural produce.

Procurement and supply of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, implements.

Facilitate the sale of fertilizers and industrial products either through marketing societies or directly for the benefit members.

Purchase and maintenance of newly innovated machines and Implements like power tillers, tractors etc for letting out to members or others.

Purchase and distribution of better breeds of cattle, goats, poultry etc to members 12. Formation and functioning of Farmers Club for farmers.

To borrow funds from District Cooperative Banks, Govt and other institutions approved by Registrar.

At this juncture, it is important to refer to some of the decisions of this Court on the provisions contained in section 80P. This Court began on the wrong foot in Assam Co- operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [1993] 69 Taxman 449/201 ITR 338. In this case, the question before the Court was as to whether the Assam Cooperative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. was entitled to exemption under section 81(i)(c) of the IT Act, as it then stood, in respect of income arising out of procurement of paddy and other agricultural produce. Section 81 is set out in paragraph 6 of the judgment as follows: "81. Income of cooperative societies.— Income-tax shall not be payable by a cooperative society — (i) in respect of the profits and gains of business carried on by it, if it is — (a) a society engaged in carrying on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members; or (b) a society engaged in a cottage industry; or (c) a society engaged in the marketing of the agricultural produce of its members; or (d) a society engaged in the purchase of agricultural implements, seeds, livestock or other articles intended for agriculture for the purpose of supplying them to its members; or (e) a society engaged in the processing without the aid of power of the agricultural produce of its members; or (f) a primary society engaged in supplying milk raised by its members to a federal milk cooperative society:

Shortly after this judgment, a three-Judge Bench in Kerala State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. v. CIT [1998] 98 Taxman 313/231 ITR 814 (SC) overruled the aforesaid judgment. The question which arose before the Court in this case was the identical question that arose in Assam Cooperative Apex Marketing Society Ltd. (supra), the avatar of the provision, however, having changed to section 80P(2) (a)(iii) of the Income-tax Act. This Court, after setting out the classes of societies covered by section 80P, then held: "7. We may notice that the provision is introduced with a view to encouraging and promoting growth of cooperative sector in the economic life of the country and in pursuance of the declared policy of the Government. The correct way of reading the different heads of exemption enumerated in the section would be to treat each as a separate and distinct head of exemption. Whenever a question arises as to whether any particular category of an income of a cooperative society is exempt from tax what has to be seen is whether income fell within any of the several heads of exemption. If it fell within any one head of exemption, it would be free from tax notwithstanding that the conditions of another head of exemption are not satisfied and such income is not free from tax under that head of exemption. The expression "marketing" is an expression of wide import. It involves exchange functions such as buying and selling, physical functions such as storage, transportation, processing and other commercial activities such as standardisation, financing, marketing intelligence etc. Such activities can be carried on by an apex society rather than a primary society.

A reading of the provisions of Section 80-P of the Act would indicate the manner in which the exemptions under the said provisions are sought to be extended. Whenever the legislature wanted to restrict the exemption to a primary cooperative society it was so made clear as is evident from clause (f) referred to above with reference to a milk cooperative society that a primary society engaged in supplying milk is entitled to such exemption while denying the same to a federal milk cooperative society, but no such distinction is made with reference to a banking business which provides trade facilities to its members. It is clear, therefore, that the legislature did not intend to limit the scope of exemption only to those which are primary societies. If a small agricultural cooperative society does not have any marketing facilities it can certainly become a member of an apex society which may market the produce of its members. It was submitted on behalf of the Department that the member societies themselves do not raise the agricultural produce. The societies only market the produce raised by their members and do not themselves raise agricultural produce. The language adopted in Section 80-P(2)(a)(iii) with which we are concerned will admit the interpretation that the society engaged in marketing of agricultural produce of its members as agricultural produce "belonging to" its members which is not necessarily raised by such member. Thus, when the provisions of Section 80-P of the Act admit of a wider exemption there is no reason to cut down the scope of the provision as indicated in Assam Coop. Apex Marketing Society case [1994 Supp (2) SCC 96]." 19. It was therefore held that the expression "agricultural produce of its members" would really mean agricultural produce belonging to its members, which would include agricultural produce purchased by members from other agriculturists. Thus, the Court declared: "17. The attention of this Court does not seem to have been drawn to the aforesaid decisions while deciding Assam Coop.

Since we are concerned here with sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub-section (2), it recognises two kinds of cooperative societies, namely: (i) those carrying on the business of banking and; (ii) those providing credit facilities to its members.

In Kerala State Coop. Mktg. Federation Ltd. v. CIT [1998] 5 SCC 48, this Court, while dealing with classes of societies covered by section 80-P of the Act, held as follows: "6. The classes of societies covered by section 80-P of the Act are as follows: (a) engaged in business of banking and providing credit facilities to its members; ** ** ** 7. We may notice that the provision is introduced with a view to encouraging and promoting growth of cooperative sector in the economic life of the country and in pursuance of the declared policy of the Government. The correct way of reading the different heads of exemption enumerated in the section would be to treat each as a separate and distinct head of exemption. Whenever a question arises as to whether any particular category of an income of a cooperative society is exempt from tax what has to be seen is whether income fell within any of the several heads of exemption. If it fell within any one head of exemption, it would be free from tax notwithstanding that the conditions of another head of exemption are not satisfied and such income is not free from tax under that head of exemption."

It is in this background, a specific finding is also rendered that the principle of mutuality is missing in the instant case. Though there is a detailed discussion in this behalf in the order of the assessing officer, our purpose would be served by taking note of the following portion of the discussion:

These are the findings of fact which have remained unshaken till the stage of the High Court. Once we keep the aforesaid aspects in mind, the conclusion is obvious, namely, the appellant cannot be treated as a cooperative society meant only for its members and providing credit facilities to its members. We are afraid such a society cannot claim the benefit of Section 80-P of the Act."

An analysis of this judgment would show that the question of law that was reflected in paragraph 5 of the judgment was answered in favour of the assessee. The following propositions may be culled out from the judgment: (I) That section 80P of the IT Act is a benevolent provision, which was enacted by Parliament in order to encourage and promote the growth of the co-operative sector generally in the economic life of the country and must, therefore, be read liberally and in favour of the assessee; (II) That once the assessee is entitled to avail of deduction, the entire amount of profits and gains of business that are attributable to any one or more activities mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 80P must be given by way of deduction; (III) That this Court in Kerala State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. (supra) has construed section 80P widely and liberally, holding that if a society were to avail of several heads of deduction, and if it fell within any one head of deduction, it would be free from tax notwithstanding that the conditions of another head of deduction are not satisfied; (IV) This is for the reason that when the legislature wanted to restrict the deduction to a particular type of co- operative society, such as is evident from section 80P(2)(b) qua milk co-operative societies, the legislature expressly says so - which is not the case with section 80P(2)(a)(i); (V) That section 80P(4) is in the nature of a proviso to the main provision contained in section 80P(1) and (2). This proviso specifically excludes only co-operative banks, which are cooperative societies who must possess a licence from the RBI to do banking business. Given the fact that the assessee in that case was not so licenced, the assessee would not fall within the mischief of section 80P(4).

However, considering that the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Revenue argued that the concurrent findings of fact in that case were that most of the business of the assessee was conducted illegally with nominal members, who could not be members of such society under the Andhra Pradesh Act, and considering also that, as the assessee engaged in granting loans to the general public, it could not be treated as a co-operative society meant only for its members and providing credit facilities to its members, the appeal by the assessee would fail. It is important to note that no argument was made by the counsel for the assessee in Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra) that the assessing officer and other authorities under the IT Act could not go behind the registration of the co-operative society in order to discover as to whether it was conducting business in accordance with its bye-laws.

It is settled law that it is only the ratio decidendi of a judgment that is binding as a precedent. Thus, in B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory [1967] 2 SCR 650, the majority judgment of Shelat J., speaking for himself and other two learned Judges held: "It is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein." (at page 657) 24. In State of Orissa v. Sudhanshu Sekhar Misra [1968] 2 SCR 154, this Court held: "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C. said in Quinn v. Leathem [[1901] AC 495]: "Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, [1898] AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." (at pages 162-163) 25. An illuminating discussion is to be found in the dissenting judgment of Justice A.P. Sen in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab [1979] 3 SCR 1059. Since the dissenting judgment refers to a principle of general application, not refuted by the majority, it is worth setting out this part of the judgment as follows: "With greatest respect, the majority decision in Rajendra Prasad case does not lay down any legal principle of general applicability. A decision on a question of sentence depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, can never be regarded as a binding precedent, much less "law declared" within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution so as to bind all courts within the territory of India. According to the well-settled theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients: "(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above." For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. [R.J. Walker & M.G. Walker: The English Legal System. Butterworths, 1972, 3rd Edn., pp. 123-24] It is not everything said by a judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a judge's decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. In the leading case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes [LR 1959 AC 743] it was laid down that the ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents. The judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties themselves), nor are the findings of facts. This means that even where the direct facts of an earlier case appear to be identical to those of the case before the court, the judge is not bound to draw the same inference as drawn in the earlier case." (at pages 1073-1074) 26. Applying the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the ratio decidendi in Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra) would not depend upon the conclusion arrived at on facts in that case, the case being an authority for what it actually decides in law and not for what may seem to logically follow from it. Thus, the statement of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts alone is the binding ratio of the case, which as has been stated hereinabove, is contained in paragraphs 18 to 23 of the judgment. Paragraphs 24 to 26, being the judgment based on the combined effect of the statements of the principle of law applicable to the material facts of the case cannot be described as the ratio decidendi of the judgment. Nor can it be said that it would logically follow from the finding on facts that the assessing officer can go behind the registration of a society and arrive at a conclusion that the society in question is carrying on illegal activities. On this score alone, the Full Bench's understanding of this judgment has to be faulted and is set aside.

However, this does not conclude the issue in the present case. We now turn to the proper interpretation of section 80P of the Income-tax Act. Firstly, the marginal note to section 80P which reads "Deduction in respect of income of co- operative societies" is important, in that it indicates the general "drift" of the provision. This was so held by this Court in K.P. Varghese v. ITO [1981] 7 Taxman 13/131 ITR 597 as follows: "9. This interpretation of sub-section (2) is strongly supported by the marginal note to Section 52 which reads "Consideration for transfer in cases of understatement". It is undoubtedly true that the marginal note to a section cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or, to use the words of Collins, M.R. in Bushel v. Hammond [1904] 2 KB 563 to show what the section is dealing with. It cannot control the interpretation of the words of a section particularly when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous but, being part of the statute, it prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the section (vide Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar [1955] 2 SCR 603])."

Secondly, for purposes of eligibility for deduction, the assessee must be a "co-operative society". A co-operative society is defined in Section 2(19) of the IT Act, as being a co-operative society registered either under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 or under any other law for the time being in force in any State for the registration of co-operative societies. This, therefore, refers only to the factum of a co- operative society being registered under the 1912 Act or under the State law. For purposes of eligibility, it is unnecessary to probe any further as to whether the co- operative society is classified as X or Y.

Thirdly, the gross total income must include income that is referred to in sub-section (2).

Fourthly, sub-clause (2)(a)(i) with which we are directly concerned, then speaks of a co-operative society being "engaged in" carrying on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members. What is important qua sub-clause (2)(a)(i) is the fact that the co-operative society must be "engaged in" the providing credit facilities to its members. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General, the expression "engaged in", as has been held in CIT v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. [2008] 174 Taxman 87/306 ITR 392 (SC), would necessarily entail an examination of all the facts of the case. This Court in Ponni Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) held: "20. In order to earn exemption under section 80-P(2) a cooperative society must prove that it had engaged itself in carrying on any of the several businesses referred to in sub- section (2). In that connection, it is important to note that under sub-section (2), in the context of cooperative society, Parliament has stipulated that the society must be engaged in carrying on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members. Therefore, in each case, the Tribunal was required to examine the memorandum of association, the articles of association, the returns of income filed with the Department, the status of business indicated in such returns, etc. This exercise had not been undertaken at all."

The learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon the second proviso to section 2(oaa) of the Kerala Act, and argued that given the fact that the principal object in most, if not all, of the Appellants before us has not been fulfilled, these Appellants have lost all characteristics of being primary agricultural credit societies. In answer to this submission, learned counsel for the Appellants cited the following judgments, namely, Asstt. CIT v. A.K. Menon [1995] 5 SCL 319 (SC) (paragraph 4); Titan Medical Systems (P.) Ltd. v. Collector of Customs 2003 taxmann.com 2027 (SC) (paragraph 12); and Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2006 taxmann.com 2217 (SC) (paragraphs 20 to 23), for the proposition that it is the RBI alone under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and the Registrar alone under the Kerala Act who can look into questions as to whether a primary agricultural credit society is, or is not, a co-operative bank, and whether a society's classification as primary agricultural credit society ought to continue or be re-classified as a co-operative bank. Neither argument applies to the facts of these cases, given that the statutory provision involved does not require the Appellants to be primary agricultural credit societies to claim a deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) in the first place.

Fifthly, as has been held in Udaipur Sahkari Upbhokta Thok Bhandar Ltd. v. CIT [2009] 8 SCC 393 at paragraph 23, the burden is on the assessee to show, by adducing facts, that it is entitled to claim the deduction under section 80P. Therefore, the assessing officer under the Income-tax Act cannot be said to be going behind any registration certificate when he engages in a fact-finding enquiry as to whether the co-operative society concerned is in fact providing credit facilities to its members. Such fact finding enquiry (see section 133(6) of the Income-tax Act) would entail examining all relevant facts of the co-operative society in question to find out whether it is, as a matter of fact, providing credit facilities to its members, whatever be its nomenclature. Once this task is fulfilled by the assessee, by placing reliance on such facts as would show that it is engaged in providing credit facilities to its members, the assessing officer must then scrutinize the same, and arrive at a conclusion as to whether this is, in fact, so.

Sixthly, what is important to note is that, as has been held in Kerala State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. (supra) the expression "providing credit facilities to its members" does not necessarily mean agricultural credit alone. Section 80P being a beneficial provision must be construed with the object of furthering the co-operative movement generally, and section 80P(2)(a)(i) must be contrasted with section 80P(2)(a)(iii) to (v), which expressly speaks of agriculture. It must also further be contrasted with sub-clause (b), which speaks only of a "primary" society engaged in supplying milk etc. thereby defining which kind of society is entitled to deduction, unlike the provisions contained in section 80P(2)(a)(i). Also, the proviso to section 80P(2), when it speaks of sub-clauses (vi) and (vii), further restricts the type of society which can avail of the deductions contained in those two sub-clauses, unlike any such restrictive language in section 80P(2)(a)(i). Once it is clear that the co-operative society in question is providing credit facilities to its members, the fact that it is providing credit facilities to non-members does not disentitle the society in question from availing of the deduction. The distinction between eligibility for deduction and attributability of amount of profits and gains to an activity is a real one. Since profits and gains from credit facilities given to non-members cannot be said to be attributable to the activity of providing credit facilities to its members, such amount cannot be deducted.

Likewise, a Circular dated 28-12-2006, containing explanatory notes on provisions contained in the Finance Act, 2006, is also important, and reads as follows: "Withdrawal of tax benefits available to certain cooperative banks ** ** ** 22.2 The cooperative banks are functioning at par with other commercial banks, which do not enjoy any tax benefit. Therefore section 80P has been amended and a new sub- section (4) has been inserted to provide that the provisions of the said section shall not apply in relation to any cooperative bank other than a primary agricultural credit society or a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank. The expressions 'co-operative bank', 'primary agricultural credit society' and 'primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank' have also been defined to lend clarity to them."

A clarification by the CBDT, in a letter dated 9-5-2008, is also important, and states as follows: "Subject: Clarification regarding admissibility of deduction under section 80P of the Income-tax Act, 1961. ** ** ** 2. In this regard, I have been directed to state that sub- section(4) of section 80P provides that deduction under the said section shall not be allowable to any co-operative bank other than a primary agricultural credit society or a primary co-operative agricultural and rural development bank. For the purpose of the said sub-section, co-operative bank shall have the meaning assigned to it in part V of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949.

Issued with the approval of Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes."

The above material would clearly indicate that the limited object of section 80P(4) is to exclude co-operative banks that function at par with other commercial banks i.e. which lend money to members of the public. Thus, if the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 is now to be seen, what is clear from section 3 read with section 56 is that a primary co-operative bank cannot be a primary agricultural credit society, as such co-operative bank must be engaged in the business of banking as defined by section 5(b) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, which means the accepting, for the purpose of lending or investment, of deposits of money from the public. Likewise, under section 22(1)(b) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 as applicable to co-operative societies, no co-operative society shall carry on banking business in India, unless it is a co-operative bank and holds a licence issued in that behalf by the RBI. As opposed to this, a primary agricultural credit society is a co-operative society, the primary object of which is to provide financial accommodation to its members for agricultural purposes or for purposes connected with agricultural activities.

As a matter of fact, some primary agricultural credit societies applied for a banking licence to the RBI, as their bye-laws also contain as one of the objects of the Society the carrying on of the business of banking. This was turned down by the RBI in a letter dated 25-10-2013 as follows: "Application for license Please refer to your application dated April 10, 2013 requesting for a banking license. On a scrutiny of the application, we observe that you are registered as a Primary Agricultural Credit Society (PACS). In this connection, we have advised RCS vide letter dated UBD (T) No. 401/10.00/16A/2013-14 dated October 18, 2013 that in terms of Section 3 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (AACS), PACS are not entitled for obtaining a banking license. Hence, your society does not come under the purview of Reserve Bank of India. RCS will issue the necessary guidelines in this regard."

A number of judgments have held that a proviso cannot be used to cut down the language of the main enactment where such language is clear, or to exclude by implication what the main enactment clearly states. Thus, in CIT v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. [1959] 36 ITR 1 (SC), this Court held: "The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment. "It is a fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso". Therefore it is to be construed harmoniously with the main enactment. (Per Das, C.J.) in Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of Jammu & Kashmir [1957] SCR 51, 59. Bhagwati, J., in Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax [1955] 2 SCR 483, 493 said: "It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other." Lord Macmillan in Madras & Southern Maharatta Railway Co. v. Bezwada Municipality [1944] LR 71 IA 113, 122 laid down the sphere of a proviso as follows: "The proper function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment, and its effect is confined to that case. Where, as in the present case, the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no repercussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms." The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the enactment clearly says unless the words of the proviso are such that that is its necessary effect. (Vide also Corporation of City of Toronto v. Attorney-General for Canada [1946] AC 32, 37." (at page 266-267) 42. To similar effect, a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Tribhuvandas Haribhai Tamboli v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal [C.A. No. 2378 of 1977, dated 10-5-1991] held:

Another two-Judge Bench in J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories & Boilers [1996] 89 Taxman 321 (SC) then declared: "33. A proviso to a provision in a statute has several functions and while interpreting a provision of the statute, the court is required to carefully scrutinise and find out the real object of the proviso appended to that provision. It is not a proper rule of interpretation of a proviso that the enacting part or the main part of the section be construed first without reference to the proviso and if the same is found to be ambiguous only then recourse may be had to examine the proviso as has been canvassed before us. On the other hand an accepted rule of interpretation is that a section and the proviso thereto must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. A proviso is normally used to remove special cases from the general enactment and provide for them specially.

A proviso qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out from the main provision, a portion, which, but for the proviso would be a part of the main provision. A proviso must, therefore, be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso should not be read as if providing something by way of addition to the main provision which is foreign to the main provision itself.

Indeed, in some cases, a proviso, may be an exception to the main provision though it cannot be inconsistent with what is expressed in the main provision and if it is so, it would be ultra vires of the main provision and struck down. As a general rule in construing an enactment containing a proviso, it is proper to construe the provisions together without making either of them redundant or otiose. Even where the enacting part is clear, it is desirable to make an effort to give meaning to the proviso with a view to justify its necessity.

While dealing with proper function of a proviso, this Court in CIT v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd. [AIR 1959 SC 713: [1959] 36 ITR 1] opined: "The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment." This view has held the field till date."

More recently, in Union of India v. Dileep Kumar Singh [2015] 4 SCC 421, this Court held as follows: "20. Equally, it is settled law that a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. Therefore, the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. This is laid down in Dwarka Prasad v. Dwarka Das Saraf [1976] 1 SCC 128, as follows: "18. We may mention in fairness to counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: CIT v. Indo- Mercantile Bank Ltd. [AIR 1959 SC 713]; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. CST [AIR 1955 SC 765]; Thompson v. Dibdin [1912 AC 533], AC p. 541; R. v. Dibdin [1910 P 57 (CA)], and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR 1959 SC 1012]. The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' (Thompson v. Dibdin [1912 AC 533]). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction."

To sum up, therefore, the ratio decidendi of Citizen Co- operative Society Ltd. (supra), must be given effect to. Section 80P of the IT Act, being a benevolent provision enacted by Parliament to encourage and promote the credit of the co-operative sector in general must be read liberally and reasonably, and if there is ambiguity, in favour of the assessee. A deduction that is given without any reference to any restriction or limitation cannot be restricted or limited by implication, as is sought to be done by the Revenue in the present case by adding the word "agriculture" into section 80P(2)(a)(i) when it is not there. Further, section 80P(4) is to be read as a proviso, which proviso now specifically excludes co-operative banks which are co-operative societies engaged in banking business i.e. engaged in lending money to members of the public, which have a licence in this behalf from the RBI. Judged by this touchstone, it is clear that the impugned Full Bench judgment is wholly incorrect in its reading of Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra). Clearly, therefore, once section 80P(4) is out of harm's way, all the assessees in the present case are entitled to the benefit of the deduction contained in section 80P(2)(a)(i), notwithstanding that they may also be giving loans to their members which are not related to agriculture. Also, in case it is found that there are instances of loans being given to non-members, profits attributable to such loans obviously cannot be deducted.

It must also be mentioned here that unlike the Andhra Act that Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra) considered, 'nominal members' are 'members' as defined under the Kerala Act. This Court in U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions' Federation Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 11 SCC 287 referred to section 80P of the IT Act and then held: "8. The expression "members" is not defined in the Act. Since a cooperative society has to be established under the provisions of the law made by the State Legislature in that regard, the expression "members" in Section 80-P(2)(a)(i) must, therefore, be construed in the context of the provisions of the law enacted by the State Legislature under which the cooperative society claiming exemption has been formed. It is, therefore, necessary to construe the expression "members" in Section 80-P(2)(a)(i) of the Act in the light of the definition of that expression as contained in Section 2(n) of the Cooperative Societies Act. The said provision reads as under: "2. (n) 'Member' means a person who joined in the application for registration of a society or a person admitted to membership after such registration in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the rules and the bye-laws for the time being in force but a reference to 'members' anywhere in this Act in connection with the possession or exercise of any right or power or the existence or discharge of any liability or duty shall not include reference to any class of members who by reason of the provisions of this Act do not possess such right or power or have no such liability or duty;"" Considering the definition of 'member' under the Kerala Act, loans given to such nominal members would qualify for the purpose of deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i).

Further, unlike the facts in Citizen Cooperative Society Ltd. (supra), the Kerala Act expressly permits loans to non- members under section 59(2) and (3), which reads as follows: "59. Restrictions on loans.— (1) A society shall not make a loan to any person or a society other than a member: Provided that the above restriction shall not be applicable to the Kerala State Co-operative Bank. Provided further that, with the general or special sanction of the Registrar, a society may make loans to another society.

In view of this, I direct the ld. AO to grant deduction of interest income earned of Rs.12,05,115 u/s. 80P(2) (a) (i) of the Act. Even otherwise, it is seen that the AO himself has allowed 89.14% of the deduction holding it to be allowable, there is no justification to disallow the balance sum of 10.86% of the total deduction.

The second issue is with respect to disallowance of Gross Profit earned by the assessee of Rs.4,36,689 for the reason that the assessee has earned profit of the above sum from its activities with the non- members. It is specifically held that the case of Mavilayi Service Co- operative Bank in the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court that the activity of non-members would not be eligible for deduction u/s. 80P of the Act. However, what would not be eligible is the profits & gains. It is the claim of assessee that the ld. AO has made addition of Gross Profit of Rs.4,36,689, but has not considered the operative expenditure such as salary to godown employees etc. The assessee has stated that the expenses are Rs.4,60,800 and thus there is a net trading loss. I do not find that this information was available with the lower authorities.

In the result, the appeal by the assessee is partly allowed.