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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, PUNE BENCH “B”, PUNE
आदेश / ORDER PER ANIL CHATURVEDI, AM :
This appeal filed by the assessee is emanating out of the order of 1. Commissioner of Income Tax (A) – 2, Nashik dated 07.03.2014 for the assessment year 2006-07.
The relevant facts as culled out from the material on record are as under :-
Assessee is an individual stated to be carrying on business of weighbridge in the name and style of “Goyal Weighbridge”. Assessee filed his return of income for A.Y. 2006-07 on 31.03.2007 declaring total income of Rs.54,18,350/-. The case was initially taken up for scrutiny and thereafter assessment was framed vide order dated 24.12.2008 u/s
143(3) of the Act. Thereafter, notice u/s 148 of the Act dt.30.03.2011
was issued and served on the assessee. In response to notice u/s 148 of
the Act, assessee vide reply dated 12.04.2011 submitted that the return
of income filed by him on 31.03.2007 for A.Y. 2006-07 be considered as
return of income in response to notice u/s 148 of the Act. Thereafter,
the case was taken up for scrutiny and assessment was framed u/s
143(3) r.w.s. 147 of the Act vide order dt.30.12.2011 and the total
income was determined at Rs.1,05,42,450/-. Aggrieved by the order of
AO, assessee carried the matter before Ld.CIT(A), who vide order dated
07.03.2014 (in appeal Nsk/CIT(A)-2/754/13-14) dismissed the appeal of
assessee. Aggrieved by the order of Ld.CIT(A), assessee is now in appeal
before us and has raised the following grounds :
“1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in the law the lower authorities erred in initiating reassessment proceedings u/s 147 of the Income Tax, 1961 in spite of the fact that all the material facts were available before Assessing Officer at the time of passing of original assessment order therefore, entire proceedings are bad in law. 2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in the law the lower authorities erred in not passing speaking order in reference to objection raised by the appellant therefore, the entire proceedings are bad in law 3. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in the law the lower authorities erred in making the addition of a sum of Rs. 51, 24,097/- on account of cash payments made to parties for claiming alleged fake capital gain. The addition is entirely based on presumption of Assessing Officer and is by disregarding appellant submission in this regard and therefore needs to be struck down.”
All the grounds being inter-connected are considered together.
3.1. Before us, Ld.A.R. submitted that a survey action at the business
premises of the assessee’s wife took place on 29.02.2008 wherein
documents pertaining to the assessee were found in a Diary in which
certain entries relatable to share purchase and share sale transaction of
the assessee were recorded. On the basis of the aforesaid documents,
the reasons were recorded for re-opening and it was concluded that
there was an escapement of income in the case of assessee. He
submitted that during the course of original assessment proceedings for
A.Y. 2006-07 the AO had made a detailed enquiry relating to various
transactions of the assessee including share purchase and sale
transactions to which the assessee also made detailed submissions from
time to time and after taking into consideration of all the submissions,
assessment order was passed u/s 143(3) of the Act on 24.12.2008. In
support of his contentions about the inquiries with respect to share
purchase / sale transactions made during the course of assessment
proceedings and assessee’s reply to it, he pointed to the copy of the
questionnaire placed at Pages 160 and 161 of the Paper Book and the
submission made by the assessee at Page 134 to 159 of the Paper Book.
He submitted that the case of assessee and his wife are assessed by the
same Assessing Officer. He further submitted that survey action on the
business premises of the assessee’s wife was conducted on 29.02.2008
and the assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2006-07 in assessee’s case
were completed on 24.12.2008. He submitted that in between
assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2007-08 were also initiated on
18.09.2008 and in the assessment order passed u/s 143(3) of the Act
dated 23.12.2009 for A.Y. 2007-08, there is a reference about the
documents found during the search. He further submitted that the
addition made in the order u/s 143(3) of the Act for A.Y. 2007-08 on
account of capital gains was subsequently deleted by the AO by suo
moto by passing a rectification order as assessee has offered the same
for taxation. He therefore submitted that the necessary enquiries were
made regarding entire purchase of sale of share transactions and after
application of mind, the AO had passed the assessment order and the
re-opening is on the basis of change of opinion, which is not
permissible. He therefore submitted that the proceedings u/s 147 of the
Act be treated as void and ab initio and for which he placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. CIT Vs. Kelvinator of India Limited reported in (2010) 320 ITR 561 SC. Ld. D.R.
on the other hand, supported the order of AO and Ld.CIT(A).
We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material on
record. Assessee in the present appeal is challenging the re-opening of
the assessment u/s 147 / 148 of the Act. It is an undisputed fact that
assessee had filed original return of income for A.Y. 2006-07 on
31.03.2007 and the original assessment was framed u/s 143(3) of the
Act vide order dt.24.12.2008. Thereafter, notice u/s 148 of the Act was
issued on 30.03.2011 i.e., within four years from the end of the
assessment year A.Y. 2006-07. The law on re-opening of an assessment
under the Act, is fairly settled. The Assessing Officer can re-open an
assessment only in accordance with the express provisions provided in
Section 147/148 of the Act. It is only on the Assessing Officer strictly
satisfying the provisions of Section 147 of the Act that he acquires
jurisdiction to re-open an assessment. Section 147 of the Act, clothes
the Assessing Officer with jurisdiction to reopen an assessment on
satisfaction of the following: (a) The Assessing Officer must have reason
to believe that (b) Income chargeable to tax has escaped the assessment
and (c) In cases where the assessment sought to be reopened is beyond
the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year,
then an additional condition is to be satisfied viz: there must be failure
on the part of the Assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts
necessary for assessment.
In the present case, notice under section 148 of the Act has been
issued on 30.03.2011 in relation to assessment year 2006-07. Hence,
the reopening of assessment is within a period of four years from the
end of the relevant assessment year. In such cases, the Assessing
Officer would be clothed with jurisdiction to issue a notice for reopening
of an assessment if he has reason to believe that income chargeable to
tax has escaped the assessment. The requirement of failure to make
true and full disclosure as provided in the proviso to Section 147 of the
Act is not to be satisfied for issuing of re-opening notice within the
period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Thus,
in the absence of cumulative satisfaction of reason to believe and in the
absence of any income chargeable to tax escaping assessment, the
Assessing Officer is not empowered with jurisdiction to reopen an
assessment.
In the present case it is also a fact that original assessment for the
year under consideration was framed under section 143(3) of the Act.
In such a situation, another aspect that has to be kept in mind is as to
whether the reopening is based upon any tangible material which has
come to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the
framing of the earlier assessment or whether the same is merely a
change of opinion on the part of the Assessing Officer.
When the facts of the present case is seen in the light of the
aforesaid legal position, it is an undisputed fact that during the course
of original assessment proceedings, AO had issued questionnaire and
had sought information of the transactions of sale/purchase of shares
and the assessee had also made available the information and details to
the AO from time to time. Thereafter the assessment was framed u/s
143(3) and the submissions of the assessee in respect of purchase and
sale of shares was accepted by the AO and no addition was made. It is
also a fact that the assessee and his wife are assessed by the same
Assessing Officer. Further, the document found at the place of business
of assessee’s wife was found during the course of survey conducted on
29.2.2008 and the assessment of the assessee u/s 143(3) for A.Y 2006-
07 was finalized on 24.12.2008 meaning thereby that the document
found during the course of the survey and which is the basis of the
present reopening was already before the AO while conducting the
assessment proceedings. In such a situation, the conclusion would be
that the document found during survey was considered while framing
the original proceedings and therefore we find force in the contention of
the Ld AR that the impugned notice have been occasioned by a change
of opinion. It is trite law that a mere change of opinion cannot constitute
a reason for re-opening the assessment. On the issue that change of
opinion cannot constitute a reason for reopening we find that Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of CIT Vs. Kelvinator India (2010) 320 ITR 561
(SC) has held so. The relevant observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court is
as under:
"6. On going through the changes, quoted above, made to section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, reopening could be done under the above two conditions and fulfillment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to make a back assessment, but in section 147 of the Act (with effect from 1st April, 1989), they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained, viz., that where the Assessing Officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post-1st April, 1989, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words "reason to believe" failing which, we are afraid, section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen assessments on the basis of "mere change of opinion", which cannot be per se reason to reopen. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to reassess. The Assessing Officer has no power to review ; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based on fulfillment of certain preconditions and if the concept of "change of opinion" is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would
take place. One must treat the concept of "change of opinion" as an inbuilt test to check abuse of power by the Assessing Officer. Hence, after 1st April, 1989, the Assessing Officer has power to reopen, provided there is "tangible material" to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words "reason to believe" but also inserted the word "opinion" in section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the companies against omission of the words "reason to believe", Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word "opinion" on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the Assessing Officer."
The aforesaid view has been reiterated in several decisions
thereafter. Considering the totality of the aforesaid facts and in view of
the decisions cited hereinabove, we are of the view that in the present
case, the notice of reopening the assessment u/s 148 of the Act is on
account of change of opinion by the AO, which is not permissible as per
law. We are therefore of the view that the impugned notices cannot be
sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. We
therefore quash the impugned reassessment proceedings for A.Y. 2006-
2007 are thus set aside the same. Since we have hereinabove set aside
the assessment framed u/s 143(3) r.w.s 147 of the Act and held it to be
void therefore the issue on merits have been rendered academic and
requires no adjudication. Thus, the grounds of Assessee are allowed.
In the result, the appeal of assessee is allowed.
Order pronounced on 16th day of October, 2019.
Sd/- Sd/- (SUSHMA CHOWLA) (ANIL CHATURVEDI) �या�यक सद�य / JUDICIAL MEMBER लेखा सद�य / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER
पुणे Pune; �दनांक Dated : 16th day of October, 2019. Yamini
आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत/Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथ� / The Appellant 2. ��यथ� / The Respondent 3. CIT(A)-2, Nashik. 4. Pr. CIT-2, Nashik. 5 �वभागीय ��त�न�ध, आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण, “बी” / DR, ITAT, “B” Pune; गाड� फाईल / Guard file. 6.
आदेशानुसार/ BY ORDER
// True Copy // व�र�ठ �नजी स�चव / Sr. Private Secretary आयकर अपील�य अ�धकरण ,पुणे / ITAT, Pune.