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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, RAJKOT BENCH, RAJKOT
Before: Shri Waseem Ahmad & Ms. Madhumita Roy
आदेश/ORDER PER BENCH:-
This assessee’s appeal for A.Y. 2010-11, arises from order of the CIT(A)-2, Rajkot dated 14-08-2015, in proceedings under section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961; in short “the Act”.
The assessee has raised as many as 9 grounds of appeal but the effective issue is that the learned CIT (A) erred in confirming the order of the AO by
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disallowing the interest expenses amounting to Rs. 3,51,251/- on account of non-deduction of TDS under section 194A read with section 40(a)(ia) of the Act. The facts in brief are that the assessee in the present case is an individual and engaged in the business of Saree Printing job work. The assessee during the year claimed to have paid interest on the money borrowed without deducting the TDS under section 194A of the Act. The details of such parties to whom the interest was paid stand as under: 1. India Bulls Finance Rs. 2,73,895/- 2. Kotak Mahindra Prime Ltd. Rs. 48,056/- 3. G.E. Monely Rs. 29,300/- 4. Tata Motors Rs. 2,626/- ------------- Rs. 3,53,877/-
The AO accordingly made the disallowance of the expenses and added to the total income of the assessee.
Aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal to the learned CIT (A) who has confirmed the order of the AO.
Being aggrieved by the order of the learned CIT (A), the assessee is in appeal before us.
The learned AR before us filed a written submission contending that as per the amendment under section 40(a)(ia) of the Act, by inserting the 2nd proviso, there cannot be any disallowance if the payee has included the impugned income in its income tax return.
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On the other and the learner DR vehemently supported the order of the authorities below. 8. We have heard the learned DR and perused the materials available on record. From the preceding discussion, we find force in the argument advanced in written submission filed by the Learned AR that if the recipient of the amount has paid the taxes on the amount received from the assessee, then there will be no disallowance. Indeed the said provision though inserted by the Finance Act 2012 w.e.f. 1-4-2013 but the same has been held to be retrospective in operation by recent judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT v. Ansal Land Mark Township (P) Ltd. (2015) 61 taxmann.com 45 (Del) wherein the question raised before the court and the decision rendered thereon is reproduced herein below for the sake of clarity:- “Question: Whether the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) (inserted by the Finance Act, 2012), which states that TDS shall be deemed to be deducted and paid by a deductor if resident recipient has disclosed the amount in his return of income and paid tax thereon, is retrospective in nature or not?” Held: Section 40(a)(ia) was introduced by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 to ensure that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation where income embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee. Hence, section 40(a)(ia) is not a penalty provision for tax withholding lapse but it is a provision introduced to compensate any loss to the revenue in cases where deductor hasn’t deducted TDS an amount paid to deductee and, in turn, deductee also hasn’t offered to tax income embedded in such amount The penalty for tax withholding lapse per se is separately provided under section 271C and, therefore, section 40(a)(i) isn’t attracted to the same. Hence, an assessee could not be penalized under section 40(a)(ia) when there was no loss to revenue. The Agra Tribunal in the case of Rajiv Kumar Agarwal-vs-ACIT [2014] 45 taxmann.com 555 (Agra – Trib) had held that the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and has retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of section 40(8) was inserted by the Finance No.(2) Act, 2004, even though the Finance Act, 2012 had not specifically stated that proviso is retrospective in nature. The High Court affirmed the ratio laid down by the Agra Tribunal and held that said provisos is declaratory and curative in nature and ha retrospective effect from 1stApril, 2005.”
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In view of above, we are inclined to set aside the order of the ld. CIT (A) to the AO for fresh adjudication in the light of the above discussion. The AO will verify the facts whether the recipient of the amount from the assessee have offered the amount to tax in their respective returns/disclosed in the books accounts. It is needless to mention that the assessee shall extend full co- operation during the proceedings. Hence, the ground of appeal of the assessee is allowed for the statistical purposes.
Before we part with the issue/appeal as discussed above, it is pertinent to note that the clause (c) of rule 34 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules 1963 requires the bench to make endeavour to pronounce the order within 60 days from the conclusion of the hearing. However the period of 60 days can be extended under exceptional circumstances but the same should not ordinarily be further extended beyond another 30 days. In simple words the total time available to the Bench is of 90 days upon the conclusion of the hearing.
However, during the prevailing circumstances where the entire world is facing the unprecedented challenge of Covid 2019 outbreak, resulting the lockdown in the country, the orders though substantially prepared but could not be pronounced for the unavoidable reasons within the maximum period of 90 days. In such circumstances we find that the Hon’ble Mumbai Tribunal in the case of JSW Limited Vs Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax in ITA No. 6103/MUM/2018 vide order dated 14-5-2020 extended the time for pronouncing the order within 90 days of time by observing as under:
Let us in this light revert to the prevailing situation in the country. On 24th March, 2020, Hon’ble Prime Minister of India took the bold step of imposing a nationwide lockdown, for 21 days, to prevent the spread of Covid 19 epidemic, and this lockdown was extended from time to time. As a matter of fact, even before this formal nationwide lockdown, the functioning of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal at Mumbai was severely restricted on account of lockdown by the Maharashtra Government, and on account of strict enforcement of health advisories with a view of checking spread of Covid 19. The
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epidemic situation in Mumbai being grave, there was not much of a relaxation in subsequent lockdowns also. In any case, there was unprecedented disruption of judicial wok all over the country. As a matter of fact, it has been such an unprecedented situation, causing disruption in the functioning of judicial machinery, that Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in an unprecedented order in the history of India and vide order dated 6.5.2020 read with order dated 23.3.2020, extended the limitation to exclude not only this lockdown period but also a few more days prior to, and after, the lockdown by observing that “In case the limitation has expired after 15.03.2020 then the period from 15.03.2020 till the date on which the lockdown is lifted in the jurisdictional area where the dispute lies or where the cause of action arises shall be extended for a period of 15 days after the lifting of lockdown”. Hon’ble Bombay High Court, in an order dated 15th April 2020, has, besides extending the validity of all interim orders, has also observed that, “It is also clarified that while calculating time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly”, and also observed that “arrangement continued by an order dated 26th March 2020 till 30th April 2020 shall continue further till 15th June 2020”. It has been an unprecedented situation not only in India but all over the world. Government of India has, vide notification dated 19th February 2020, taken the stand that, the coronavirus “should be considered a case of natural calamity and FMC (i.e. force majeure clause) maybe invoked, wherever considered appropriate, following the due procedure…”. The term ‘force majeure’ has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, as ‘an event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled’ When such is the position, and it is officially so notified by the Government of India and the Covid-19 epidemic has been notified as a disaster under the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, and also in the light of the discussions above, the period during which lockdown was in force can be anything but an “ordinary” period. 10. In the light of the above discussions, we are of the considered view that rather than taking a pedantic view of the rule requiring pronouncement of orders within 90 days, disregarding the important fact that the entire country was in lockdown, we should compute the period of 90 days by excluding at least the period during which the lockdown was in force. We must factor ground realities in mind while interpreting the time limit for the pronouncement of the order. Law is not brooding omnipotence in the sky. It is a pragmatic tool of the social order. The tenets of law being enacted on the basis of pragmatism, and that is how the law is required to interpreted. The interpretation so assigned by us is not only in consonance with the letter and spirit of rule 34(5) but is also a pragmatic approach at a time when a disaster, notified under the Disaster Management Act 2005, is causing unprecedented disruption in the functioning of our justice delivery system. Undoubtedly, in the case of Otters Club Vs DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (Bom)], Hon’ble Bombay High Court did not approve an order being passed by the Tribunal beyond a period of 90 days, but then in the present situation Hon’ble Bombay High Court itself has, vide judgment dated 15th April 2020, held that directed “while calculating the time for disposal of matters made time-bound by this Court, the period for which the order dated 26th March 2020 continues to operate shall be added and time shall stand extended accordingly”. The extraordinary steps taken suo motu by Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court also indicate that this period of lockdown cannot be treated as an ordinary period during which the normal time limits are to remain in force. In our considered view, even without the words “ordinarily”, in the light of the above analysis of the legal position, the period during which lockout was in force is to excluded for the purpose of time limits set out in rule 34(5) of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963. Viewed
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thus, the exception, to 90-day time-limit for pronouncement of orders, inherent in rule 34(5)(c), with respect to the pronouncement of orders within ninety days, clearly comes into play in the present case. Of course, there is no, and there cannot be any, bar on the discretion of the benches to refix the matters for clarifications because of considerable time lag between the point of time when the hearing is concluded and the point of time when the order thereon is being finalized, but then, in our considered view, no such exercise was required to be carried out on the facts of this case. 11. To sum up, the appeal of the assessee is allowed, and appeal of the Assessing Officer is dismissed. Order pronounced under rule 34(4) of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1962, by placing the details on the notice board.
Considering the above, we express to pronounce the order beyond the period of 90 days. Accordingly, we proceed to pronounce the order as on date.
In the result, the appeal of the Assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced in the open court on 02-06-2020
Sd/- Sd/- (MADHUMITA ROY) (WASEEM AHMAD) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Ahmedabad : Dated 02/06/2020 आदेश क� ��त�ल�प अ�े�षत / Copy of Order Forwarded to:- 1. Assessee 2. Revenue 3. Concerned CIT 4. CIT (A) 5. DR, ITAT, Ahmedabad 6. Guard file. By order, Assistant Registrar, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Rajkot