COMMISSIONER OF GST AND CENTRAL EXCISE vs. M/S CITIBANK N.A
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OF THE COMMISSIONER [NUMBER TWO];
Another aspect pointed out by the respondent is that in the Show Cause Notice, the Commissioner has proceeded on the basis that payment by the acquiring bank of service tax on the interchange fee, will not exonerate the liability of the respondent to pay the service tax. It is pointed out thereafter to go on to find that the respondent has not produced proof of payment, involves depriving the respondent of the opportunity to meet such a case and also to depart from the admitted position that acquiring bank has paid the tax. In other words, when the Commissioner proceeded on the basis in the Show Cause Notice that the payment, by the acquiring bank, will not detract from the liability of the respondent, it is impermissible to turn around and find that the 100
respondent has not proved that the acquiring bank has paid the tax.
It may be true that the Show Cause Notice contains the statement that the fact of payment of service tax on the interchange fee by the acquiring bank, does not exempt the assessee from payment of service tax, on the consideration received by them towards rendering of service as each person is liable to pay service tax for the service rendered by them. Essentially, it would appear that the Commissioner was referring to the case of the respondent that acquiring bank had paid the tax on the interchange fee. No doubt, it does create the impression that the Commissioner proceeds, as if, there was payment by the acquiring bank, which was the case of the respondent during audit. As noted, there is also the case for the appellant that being a value added tax, even if, payment is made by the acquiring bank, the respondent would remain liable. It is to be noted that when the Order of the Commissioner was challenged before the Tribunal, no material is produced in support of the claim that the acquiring 101
bank had discharged the liability even on the amount of interchange fee.
In this regard, it is apposite to notice that in the Appeal filed before the Tribunal, produced along with the Compilation No. 3, by the respondent, one of the grounds taken, no doubt, is that the impugned Order travelled beyond the scope of the SCNs. Thereunder, however, the complaint, which was sought to be made out was that in the SCN, the case set up by Commissioner was that the service was to the acquiring bank, whereas, the Order passed by the Commissioner was to the effect that service was provided to the Card Association. There is no ground taken in the Appeal, as such, in relation to the SCNs proceeding on the basis of the payment made by the acquiring bank, being accepted, and thereby, a new case being found in the Order. In fact, under the ground of ‘Double Taxation’, being tabooed, in paragraph-74, it is, inter alia, stated as follows:
“74. The Impugned Order finds that the Appellant has not furnished any information in support of their claim of Service Tax being already paid on the interchange Fees by the Acquiring Bank on the Merchant Discount. IN this regard, the Appellant craves leave to refer to 102
and rely on the relevant documents if and when produced. However, the Appellant
contends
that it requires to be appreciated that the Appellant does not have any privity of contact with the Acquiring Bank, and procuring the said
documents
will
be challenging.
While
the Tax Department has the ability to obtain this information directly from the Acquiring Bank. The Tax Department has however not sought it or produced anyinfo4rmation / document or even alleged that the Acquiring Bank is not paying service tax on the Merchant Discount. The Impugned Order, in failing to appreciate this aspect has put the Appellant to hardship, resulted in double taxation, and also is contrary to the settled legal principles as also in the teeth of the cited decisions and is thus,
erroneous
and unsustainable,
and
therefore liable to be set aside.”
I may also further notice that in the Order passed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal notices the complaint about the Commissioner departing from the SCN in terms of the ground in the Appeal, which I have set out. Last but not the least, it is relevant to notice the actual reasoning of the Tribunal, which led to the Order of the Commissioner being set aside, which is as follows: 103
“5.11 Be that as it may, we find that in a very recent decision of the Tribunal in the case of ABN Amro (supra), it has been categorically held that the amount received by the appellant does not qualify as credit card services that when acquiring bank has discharged service tax liability on the entire amount, no service tax is payable by the appellant and that the amount offered by the appellant does not qualify a credit. …”
Thereafter, reference is made to paragraphs-6 to 8 of ABN Amro (supra), which I have already referred to above.
On the basis of the said Order of the Tribunal, and finding no reason to differ from it, on this legal ground, the Order of the Commissioner was set aside. I may notice that in the said case, in paragraph-6, the Department, in fact did not dispute that service tax was being paid by the acquiring bank.
In such circumstances, the argument of the respondent in this regard, does not appeal to me. I must notice that respondent has not produced any material to establish its case. WHETHER THE EXTENDED PERIOD OF LIMITATION IS AVAILABLE IN REGARD TO THE DEMAND UNDER SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 24.04.2013?
104
The said Show Cause Notice relates to the period October, 2007 to June, 2012. The normal period within which the power under Section 73 of the Finance Act is exercised is 18 months from the relevant date. However, under the provisions of Section 73(4) if there is wilful suppression by a person then the period is enlarged to five years. The contention of the respondent was that there was no positive act by it. There was only mere inaction. It was further contended that the department was aware of the receipt of interchange fee by the respondent as issuing bank. There were audits. These arguments have been rejected by the Commissioner by relying on the law laid down by this Court in Association of Leasing & Financial Service Companies (supra). The aforesaid decision was rendered under Section 11 A of the Act. The relevant provisions of Section 11 A in this regard are pari materia with the corresponding provisions in Section 73 of the Act. Suppression is found in both statutes as a ground to extend the period. In the aforesaid judgment of this 105
Court has held that the period begins with knowledge by the department.
While on suppression, I may notice the judgment of this Court again rendered under Section 11A of Central Excise Act and reported in Bajaj Auto Ltd., Waluj, Aurangabad (supra). In the said case, I need to notice the following paragraphs:
“15. Section 11-A of the Act empowers the Central Excise Officer to initiate proceedings where duty has not been levied or short-levied within six months from the relevant date. But the proviso to Section 11-A(1) provides an extended period of limitation provided the duty is not levied or paid or which has been short-levied or short-paid or erroneously refunded, if there is fraud, collusion or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, or contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of the Rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duty. The extended period so provided is of five years instead of six months. Since the proviso extends the period of limitation from six months to five years, it needs to be construed strictly. The initial burden is on the Department to prove that the 106
situation visualised by the proviso existed. But the burden shifts on the assessee once the Department is able to produce material to show that the appellant is guilty of any of those situations visualised in the section.
Interpreting this provision, this Court in CCE v. Chemphar
Drugs
and Liniments [(1989) 2 SCC 127 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 245] held: (when the period prescribed was six months prior to it being made one year by the Finance Act, 2000 with effect from 12-5-2000): (SCC p. 131, para 9) “9. … In order to make the demand for duty sustainable beyond a period of six months and up to a period of 5 years in view of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 11-A of the Act, it has to be established that the duty of excise has not been levied or paid or short-levied or short- paid, or erroneously refunded by reasons of either fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or contravention of any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder, with intent to evade payment of duty. Something positive other than mere inaction or failure on 107
the part of the manufacturer or producer or conscious or deliberate withholding of information when the manufacturer knew otherwise, is required before it is saddled with any liability, before the period of six months. Whether in a particular set of facts and circumstances there was any fraud or collusion or wilful misstatement
or suppression
or contravention of any provision of any Act, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case.” (Emphasis supplied)
In Cosmic Dye Chemical v. CCE [(1995) 6 SCC 117] it is held: (SCC p.119, para 6) “6. Now so far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it is evident that the requisite intent i.e. intent to evade duty is built into these very words. So far as misstatement or suppression of facts are concerned, they are clearly qualified by the word ‘wilful’ preceding the words ‘misstatement or suppression of facts’ which means with intent to evade duty. The next set of words ‘contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or Rules’ are again qualified by the immediately 108
following words ‘with intent to evade payment of duty’. It is, therefore, not correct to say that there can be a suppression or misstatement of fact, which is not wilful and yet constitutes a permissible ground for the purpose of the proviso to Section 11-A. Misstatement or suppression of fact must be wilful.” (Emphasis supplied)
In Anand
Nishikawa
Co. Ltd. v. CCE [(2005) 7 SCC 749] this Court has observed: (SCC p. 759, para 27) “27. … we find that ‘suppression of facts’ can have only one meaning that the correct information was not disclosed deliberately to evade payment of duty. When facts were known to both the parties, the omission by one to do what he might have done and not that he must have done, would not render it suppression. It is settled law that mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression. There must be some positive act from the side of the assessee to find wilful suppression.” (Emphasis supplied) “19. In our view, on a reading of the relevant provision the extended period of 109
limitation as provided by the proviso to Section 11-A(1) of the Act can only be invoked when there is a conscious act of either
fraud,
collusion,
wilful misstatement, suppression of fact, or contravention of the provisions of the Act or any of the Rules made thereunder on the part of the person chargeable with duty or his agent, with the intent to evade payment of duty. In the present case, the Tribunal while considering this issue has not stated whether or not there were any such circumstances which would not allow the Revenue to invoke the extended period of limitation. It only observes in its order that since both the assessees are situated under the juri iction of the same division and as such it cannot be reasonable to conclude that the Revenue was not aware of the transactions. Since this is not what is envisaged under the proviso to Section 11- A(1) of the Act, we cannot agree with the reasoning and the conclusion reached by the Tribunal.”
I further notice that in the said case this Court remanded the matter back to the tribunal observing 110
that the tribunal is the final fact-finding authority.
The Commissioner has rejected the contention of the respondent that there is no positive act by it towards wilful suppression and there was only mere inaction by holding that the factum of receipt of interchange fee being not in dispute and the provisions being clear, the act of non-payment constituted a positive act. In the milieu of self- assessment, it is for the respondent to assess and declare the full details and pay tax. The Commissioner also rejected the case that the department had knowledge based on audit.
It is found by him that the banking industry is ever evolving and with new business models and the Department cannot be faulted not knowing the implications. It was further found that the decisions relied upon by the respondent related to the period when classification lists, valuation lists and gate passes were to be approved. The assessment itself was done by the officers. It was further found that there was no effort made by the respondent at seeking clarification. 111
I must notice that in the impugned order, that tribunal did not deal with the issue relating to the legality of the respondent availing the extended period. It instead has chosen to set aside the impugned order of the Commissioner on merits.
In this case, I would follow the course adopted by this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Aurangabad v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., Waluj, Aurangabad Through Its Vice-President (Materials) and others
I am of the view that as the respondent has also a case that it was not provided with an opportunity to prove that the acquiring bank had discharged the tax` liability on the interchange fee also, an opportunity should be granted to the respondent to establish the same. I have also found that the Tribunal has not returned a finding as regards the question whether there was wilful suppression by the respondent in regard to part of the period covered by Notice dated 24.04.2013. I would 15 (2010) 13 SCC 117 112
think that this is a matter which calls for finding by the Tribunal.
Therefore, the upshot of the above discussion is as follows: I. I find that the respondent, as issuing bank, was providing service, as found by the Commissioner; II. For the period prior to 01.07.2012, the service of the respondent, as issuing bank, squarely fell within Section 65(33a)(iii) of the Act; III. I reject the contention of the respondent that interchange fee is to be treated as interest and, therefore, not taxable under the Act; IV. I hold that the case based on the credit card transaction, being a transaction in money and, therefore, excluded from the definition of “service” in Section 65B(44), is unacceptable; V. The Order of the Tribunal in ABM Amro (supra), dealing with the position of an 113
issuing bank, under the framework of the Act, is patently unsustainable; VI. In the facts of this case, I decline to dismiss the Appeal only on the ground that no Appeal was carried against the Order in ABN Amro (supra); VII. The respondent, as issuing bank, was liable to pay service tax, under Section 68(1), being the service provider. Being liable to pay the tax under Section 68(1), it was also liable to file the Return including the amount of interchange fee; VIII. The acquiring bank was obliged to value the service, which it provided or agreed to provide. The measure of tax, which is found in Section 67(1)(i), is entirely related to the service that the acquiring bank provided and agreed to provide. Likewise, the value of the service provided by the issuing bank, as found by me, and which would be the value of the service, for the purpose of Section 67(1), is relatable to the services it provided. Therefore, the respondent bank was 114
liable to include the interchange fee and file Return and pay the tax on the same; IX. While the service tax may be a value added tax, all that it can mean, is that, for separate services, tax is payable on each separate service. The concept of value added tax cannot mean that if the tax is already paid by the acquiring bank in this case, on the amount of interchange fee, for the service provided by the respondent as issuing bank, the respondent bank should be called upon to pay the service tax all over again. Such an exercise, would undoubtedly constitute double taxation; X. The Tribunal has not considered whether there was suppression within the meaning of Section 73 of the Act by the respondent in relation to part of the period covered by Show Cause Notice dated 24.04.2013. I am also of the view that the respondent should be provided an opportunity to establish that the acquiring bank has discharged the tax liability in regard to interchange fee. 115
As regard, the question of interest and penalty is concerned, no doubt, the case of the respondent is that there was an interpretational issue. The practice in the banking industry, is relied on. In this regard, I would think that if the respondent is able to establish that the acquiring bank, indeed, discharged the tax liability on the interchange fee also, then, the respondent should not be visited with interest and penalty. Should it be otherwise, demand for interest and penalty will stand.
Resultantly, on the basis of the aforesaid findings, I allow the Appeals and remand the matter back to the Tribunal for considering: a.Whether the finding of the Commissioner, which was challenged by the respondent, that there was suppression, in relation to the period covered by the Show Cause Notice dated 24.04.2013, was justified or not? In case it was found that it was not justified, it is for the Tribunal to pass appropriate Orders; b.The Tribunal will provide an opportunity to the respondent to produce material to show 116
that the acquiring bank had discharged the liability of the respondent as issuing bank with regard to the interchange fee for the period covered by the Show Cause Notices. Toward this end, I make it clear that the Tribunal will be free to permit the respondent to produce the material before the Commissioner and to call for a finding from the Commissioner; c.It will be open to the Tribunal to call upon the appellant to call for the records from the acquiring bank to arrive at a proper finding in this regard; d.If the amounts are seen paid by the acquiring bank, then, necessarily, the Orders passed by the Commissioner will stand set aside. Conversely, should it not be proved that payment was made, the Orders of the Commissioner will stand subject to the finding relating to the availability of extended period under Section 73 in relation to the SCN dated 24.04.2013. 117
The Appeals are allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs. …………………………………………J. (K.M JOSEPH) NEW DELHI; DATED; DECEMBER 09, 2021. 118
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURI ICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8228 OF 2019 COMMISSIONER OF GST AND CENTRAL EXCISE ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M/S CITIBANK N.A.
...RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 89 OF 2021 J U D G M E N T S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
Having had the benefit of perusing the judgment authored by Justice Joseph, I find that I am respectfully, unable to agree on some of the reasoning and conclusions arrived at, and am therefore, penning my separate and dissenting judgment with regards to this matter.
The then Union Finance Minister, while first introducing service tax, in 1994 said that the rationale for its introduction, was that though the services sector accounted for 40% of the GDP, it was never taxed. Based on the recommendations of the 119
tax reforms committee16, the Finance Act, 1994 (hereafter ‘the Act’) imposed service tax of 5% initially only on 3 services namely telephone bills, nonlife insurance and tax brokers. From this regime of levy on only 3 services the levy progressively increased to in 1996, 3 more services (namely advertising agencies, courier agencies and radio pager services); and in 1997, to 15 wherein services like air travel agents, mandap keepers, man power recruitment agencies were brought into the tax fold.
In 200317, Parliament inserted Article 268A into the Constitution, which provides that taxes on services shall be charged by the Union of India and be appropriated by the Union and the States. A new Entry 92C too was introduced in the Union List for the levy of taxes on services. The number of services subjected to the levy, burgeoned to 119 in 201112. With effect from 2012, there has been a paradigm shift in the levy of service tax rather than levying tax on enumerated services, tax is imposed on all services except those listed in the negative list.18 The negative list, in 2012 contained 39 different services exempt from service tax. Since then, this list has been modified each year.
Section 65 as it stood originally, contained an almost exhaustive list of definitions, meant to delineate activities that were to be subjected to service tax levy. Each of these definitions were, in turn, also specifically marked as a “taxable service” under various subclauses of Section 65 (105). Service tax was 16 Dr. Raja Chelliah Committee on Tax Reforms 17 By Constitution (Eighty eighth Amendment) Act, 2003 18 Listed in the newly introduced Section 66D 120
made applicable on “banking and other financial services” (hereafter ‘BOFS’) from 16 July 2001. The relevant portions of the definition of BOFS – by Section 65 (10) as it originally stood, is reproduced below: “banking and financial services” means the following services provided by a banking company or a financial institution including a nonbanking financial company, namely: … (ii) credit card services; ****** *****” By Finance Act, 2003 a wide range of activities were covered under the definition of BOFS in Section 65(12) which, when enacted, read as follows: “(12) “banking and other financial services” means (a) the following services provided by a banking company or a financial institution including a nonbanking financial company or any other body corporate or 2[commercial concern], namely :— (i) financial leasing services including equipment leasing and hire purchase; Explanation.—For the purposes of this item, “financial leasing” means a lease transaction where— (i) contract for lease is entered into between two parties for leasing of a specific asset; (ii) such contract is for use and occupation of the asset by the lessee; (iii) the lease payment is calculated so as to cover the full cost of the asset together with the interest charges; and (iv) the lessee is entitled to own, or has the option to own, the asset at the end of the lease period after making the lease payment;] (ii) credit card services; (iii) merchant banking services; (iv) Securities and foreign exchange (forex) broking, and purchase or sale of foreign currency, including money changing; (v) asset management including portfolio management, all forms of fund management, pension fund management, 6[custodial, depository and trust services, (vi) *********** (ix) other financial services, namely, lending, issue of pay order, demand draft, cheque, letter of credit and bill of exchange, transfer of money including telegraphic transfer, mail transfer and electronic transfer, providing bank guarantee, overdraft facility, bill 121
discounting facility, safe deposit locker, safe vaults, operation of bank accounts;”
On 1 May 2006, the entry for credit card services in the Act was omitted [from the definition of “banking and financial services”, i.e. subclause (ii) of Section 65 (12)] and an altogether new taxable service of “credit card services” was introduced [Section 65 (105) (33a)]. Simultaneously, Section 65 (10) was amended. To appreciate the ambit of this new category, the relevant portions of the definition of Section 65 (105) (33a) (‘credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment card service’) are reproduced below: “Section 65 Definitions: In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, (33a) “credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment card service” includes any service provided,— (i) by a banking company, financial institution including nonbanking financial company or any other person (hereinafter referred to as the issuing bank), issuing such card to a card holder; (ii) by any person to an issuing bank in relation to such card business, including receipt and processing of application, transfer of embossing data to issuing bank’s personalisation agency, automated teller machine personal identification number generation, renewal or replacement of card, change of address, enhancement of credit limit, payment updation and statement generation; (iii) by any person, including an issuing bank and an acquiring bank, to any other person in relation to settlement of any amount transacted through such card. Explanation.—For the purposes of this subclause, “acquiring bank” means any banking company, financial institution including nonbanking financial company or any other person, who makes the payment to any person who accepts such card; (iv) in relation to joint promotional cards or affinity cards or co branded cards; (v) in relation to promotion and marketing of goods and services through such card; (vi) by a person, to an issuing bank or the holder of such card, for making use of automated teller machines of such person; and 122
(vii) by the owner of trade marks or brand name to the issuing bank under an agreement, for use of the trade mark or brand name and other services in relation to such card, whether or not such owner is a club or association and the issuing bank is a member of such club or association. Explanation. —For the purposes of this subclause, an issuing bank and the owner of trade marks or brand name shall be treated as separate persons;”
From 01.05.200619 (by the same amendment) credit card services, which were covered under a separate category in Section 65 (33a) became subjected to levy as a separate taxable service, by reason of insertion of Section 65 (105) (zzw). That provision reads as follows: “65**** (105) “taxable service” means any service provided or to be provided “(zzzw) to any person, by any other person, in relation to credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment card service, in any manner;” Credit card service was thus separately included as a taxable service. At the same time, “service” was defined, through Section 65B (44) (which begins with the expression, “for the purposes of this chapter”). The definition of service is as follows: “(44) “service” means any activity carried out by a person for another for consideration, and includes a declared service, but shall not include— (a) an activity which constitutes merely,— (i) a transfer of title in goods or immovable property, by way of sale, gift or in any other manner; or (ii) such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods which is deemed to be a sale within the meaning of clause (29A) of article 366 of the Constitution; or 19 Notification No. 15/2006 dated 25.04.2006. 123
(iii) a transaction in money or actionable claim; (b) a provision of service by an employee to the employer in the course of or in relation to his employment;” Section 65B (7) – defines “assessee” to mean “a person liable to pay tax and includes his agent” and Section 65B (37) defines “person” as follows: “(37) “person” includes,— (i) an individual, (ii) a Hindu Undivided Family, (iii) a company, (iv) a society, (v) A limited liability partnership, (vi) a firm, (vii) an association of persons or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, (viii) Government, (ix) a local authority, or (x) every artificial juridical person, not falling within any of the preceding sub clauses;” “Declared services” are defined under Section 65B (22) to mean “any activity carried out by a person for another person for consideration and declared as such under Section 66E”. A service, therefore, to fall within the category of “declared services”, has to satisfy two basic conditions conjunctively: a. it must be an activity by one person to another for consideration b. it must be specified (i.e. declared) under Sec. 66E
Long ago, in Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax20, this court held that the taxing statute identifies the subject of levy, or the taxing event; it then indicates the person on whom the levy is imposed and who has to pay the tax; the third is the rate of the impost; and the last, is “the measure or value to 20 1985 Supp SCC 205 124
which the rate will be applied for computing the tax liability.”21 It was observed that: “If those components are not clearly and definitely ascertainable, it is difficult to say that the levy exists in point of law. Any uncertainty or vagueness in the legislative scheme defining any of those components of the levy will be fatal to its validity.” The various components that make up the levy of an indirect tax, such as excise duty, were described succinctly by this court in its ninejudge decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd v. Union of India22: “116. The levy under the Excise Act is an indirect tax (duty). A duty of excise is levied on the manufacture or production of goods. Ordinarily, it is levied on the manufacturer or producer of goods. (Since the levy is in relation to or in connection with the manufacture or production of goods, it may be levied even at a point later than manufacture or production of the goods.) The duty levied will form part of the total cost of the manufacturer or producer. The levy being a component of the price for which the goods are sold, is ordinarily passed on to the customer. It is a matter of common knowledge that every prudent businessman will adjust his affairs in his best interests and pass on the duty levied or leviable on the commodity to the consumer. That is the presumption in law.” In the context of service tax, this court had observed in Association of Leasing and Financial Service Companies v. Union of India23 that: “38…Today with technological advancement there is a very thin line which divides a “sale” from “service”. That, applying the principle of equivalence, there is no difference between production or manufacture of saleable goods and production of 21 Similarly, in Commissioner of Income Tax v B.C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 2 SCC 460 this court highlighted that “the charging section and the computation provisions together constitute an integrated code. When there is a case to which the computation provisions cannot apply at all, it is evident that such a case was not intended to fall within the charging section. Otherwise, one would be driven to conclude that while a certain income seems to fall within the charging section there is no scheme of computation for quantifying it.” 22 (1997) 5 SCC 536 23 (2011) 2 SCC 352 125
marketable/saleable services in the form of an activity undertaken by the service provider for consideration, which correspondingly stands consumed by the service receiver. It is this principle of equivalence which is inbuilt into the concept of service tax under the Finance Act, 1994.” The principle that the levy, under the Finance Act, is an indirect tax, is brought home by Section 8324 which make certain provisions of the Central Excise Act applicable to the Finance Act, 1994. Section 12B of the latter Act, raises a presumption that the duty has been passed on to the buyer of goods (in this case, the customer or service recipient).25 Scheme of the Act
Service tax provisions under the Act are based, on the following scheme. Firstly, Section 65 defines and provides for taxable services. Section 66 is the charging provision:
“66. Charge of service tax – There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of twelve per cent. of the value of taxable services referred to in subclauses (a), (d), (e), (f), (g,) (h), (i), (j),(k), (l), (m), (n), (o), (p), (q), (r), (s), (t), (u), (v), (w), (x), (y), (z), (za), (zb), (zc), (zh), (zi), (zj), (zk),(zl), (zm), (zn), (zo), (zq), (zr), (zs), (zt), (zu), (zv), (zw), (zx), (zy), (zz), (zza), (zzb), (zzc), (zzd), (zze), (zzf), (zzg), (zzh), (zzi), (zzk), (zzl), (zzm), (zzn), (zzo), (zzp), (zzq), (zzr), (zzs), (zzt), (zzu), (zzv), (zzw), (zzx), (zzy), (zzz), (zzza), (zzzb), (zzzc), (zzzd), (zzze), (zzzf), (zzzg,) (zzzh), (zzzi), (zzzj), (zzzk), (zzzl), (zzzm), (zzzn), (zzzo), (zzzp), (zzzq), (zzzr), (zzzs), (zzzt), (zzzu), (zzzv), (zzzw), (zzzx), (zzzy), (zzzz), (zzzza), (zzzzb), (zzzzc), 2[(zzzzd), (zzzze), (zzzzf), (zzzzg), (zzzzh), (zzzzi), 3[(zzzzj), (zzzzk), (zzzzl), 4[(zzzzm), (zzzzn), 24“SECTION 83. Application of certain provisions of Act 1 of 1944.— The provisions of the following sections of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as in force from time to time, shall apply, so far as may be, in relation to service tax as they apply in relation to a duty of excise : subsection (2A) of section 5A, subsection(2) of section 9A, 9AA, 9B, 9C, 9D, 9E, 11B, 11BB, 11C, 12, 12A, 12B, 12C, 12D, 12E, 14, 15, 15A, 15B, 31, 32, 32A to 32P, 33A, 35EE, 34A, 35F, 35FF, to 35O (both inclusive), 35Q, 35R, 36, 36A, 36B, 37A, 37B, 37C, 37D, 38A and 40.” 25“SECTION 12B. Presumption that the incidence of duty has been passed on to the buyer.
— Every person who has paid the duty of excise on any goods under this Act shall, unless the contrary is proved by him, be deemed to have passed on the full incidence of such duty to the buyer of such goods.” 126
(zzzzo), (zzzzp),(zzzzq) (zzzzr) (zzzzs) (zzzzt) 5[,(zzzzu), (zzzzv) (zzzzv) and (zzzzw)] of clause (105) of section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.” On and from 01.07.2012, under Section 66B, the tax was levied in the following manner: “66B. Charge of service tax.— There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) at the rate of [fourteen per cent]26 on the value of all services, other than those services specified in the negative list, provided or agreed to be provided in the taxable territory by one person to another and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.” Section 67 provides for the principles for determination of value of taxable service which is to be subjected to service tax. From 18.04.2006 (w.e.f. 01.05.2006) this section reads as follows:
“67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, service tax chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value shall, (i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service provided or to be provided by him; (ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money, with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration; (iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the prescribed manner. (2) Where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided or to be provided is inclusive of service tax payable, the value of such taxable service shall be such amount as, with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged. (3) The gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service. 26 Substituted for “twelve per cent” by Finance Act, 2015 (20 of 2015), dt. 14.05.2014, w.e.f. 01.06.2015 vide Noti. No. 14/2015ST, dt. 19.05.2015. 127
(4) Subject to the provisions of subsections (1), (2) and (3), the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed Explanation.For the purposes of this section, 4[(a) “consideration” includes (i) any amount that is payable for the taxable services provided or to be provided; (ii) any reimbursable expenditure or cost incurred by the service provider and charged, in the course of providing or agreeing to provide a taxable service, except in such circumstances, and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed; (iii) any amount retained by the lottery distributor or selling agent from gross sale amount of lottery ticket in addition to the fee or commission, if any, or, as the case may be, the discount received, that is to say, the difference in the face value of lottery ticket and the price at which the distributor or selling agent gets such ticket.] 3[***] (c) “gross amount charged” includes payment by cheque, credit card, deduction from account and any form of payment by issue of credit notes or debit notes and 2[book adjustment, and any amount credited or debited, as the case may be, to any account, whether called “Suspense account” or by any other name, in the books of account of a person liable to pay service tax, where the transaction of taxable service is with any associated enterprise.]
Section 68 reads as follows:
“68. Payment of service tax.—(1) Every person providing taxable service to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified in Section 66B in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), in respect of such taxable services as may be notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette, the service tax thereon shall be paid by such person and in such manner as may be prescribed at the rate specified in Section 66B and all the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person as if he is the person liable for paying the service tax in relation to such service: Provided that the Central Government may notify the service and the extent of service tax which shall be payable by such person and the provisions of this Chapter shall apply to such person to the extent so specified and the remaining part of the service tax shall be paid by the service provider.” 128
What is noteworthy is that the charge (under Section 66) is on the “value of the taxable service referred….and collected in such manner as may be prescribed”. Clearly, the levy is on the value of taxable service, and, more pointedly, the rate of tax is to be collected in such manner as may be prescribed. For the purposes of the present case, the value of the taxable service is the one enumerated in Section 65 (105) (zzzw). Description of the credit card transaction
The history of the legislation, the position in law, both before and after the 2006 amendments, have all been elaborately and, accurately, discussed by Justice Joseph. I concur with the factual narration. For the sake of completeness of this separate judgment, however, I would – under pain of charge of repetition, describe the underlying transaction. The characters, for a credit card transaction are set out below: a. The cardholder – is the holder of the credit card b. The issuing bank – the “banking company, financial institution including nonbanking financial company or any other person”27 which issues the card to the cardholder after checking their creditworthiness. c. The merchant establishment (“ME”) – is the vendor from whom goods or the provider of services, against payment by credit card rendered by the card holder. 27 Section 65 (33a) (i) of the Act 129
d. The acquiring bank – the bank that acquires the credit card slips from the ME, at whose premises it places its device (‘point of sale’ or “POS” machine) e. The card association – the association providing a platform for the credit card transaction and settlement of dues (such as Visa, MasterCard or RuPay)
The transaction flow involved typically, when a credit card is used (swiped) for procuring goods or services, is described below: (i) The cardholder purchases goods/services from the ME worth ₹100 and makes payment by credit/debit card. The ME receives the consideration for the goods/services from the acquiring bank. However, the acquiring bank deducts their fee (known as the ‘Merchant Discount Rate’ or “MDR”) and remits the net proceeds to the ME (₹ 94.3). (ii) The acquiring bank in turn receives the consideration for goods/services from the issuing bank. The issuing bank retains its share of MDR (known in banking idiom as “interchange income”) and remits the net proceeds (₹ 98/) to the acquiring bank. (iii) The remittance from the issuing bank to the acquiring bank takes place through card associations. The acquiring bank’s share of the MDR is ₹ 3. (iv) The service tax on the entire MDR amount (₹5) signifies ₹ 0.7, which is remitted to the tax authorities. (v) The cardholder remits the gross consideration for the services (₹100) to the issuing bank within the agreed grace 130
period days upon receipt of credit card statement. For debit card transactions, the amount is directly debited from the customer’s account by the issuing bank.
In sum, for transaction that costs the customer ₹ 100/ (towards the goods they purchase or services they avail of) the total MDR is ₹ 5, out of which the issuing bank’s share is ₹ 2 (interchange income) which is retained by it. The balance MDR (₹ 3) is the acquiring bank’s consideration for its role in the transaction.
The issue which this court has to decide is whether the service of settlement of an “amount transacted”, on behalf of the holder of a credit card – which involves several components, or elements of a unified service, are to be taxed as a whole or, in addition to the taxation of the entire transaction, a separate part of that service, i.e., by the issuing bank, in the form of authorization of credit – to be released to the provider of goods or services – is also separately to be valued and subjected to levy. CEGAT’s rulings in Standard Chartered Bank and ABN Amro
A decision of the larger bench of CEGAT Standard Chartered Bank & Ors. v. CST, MumbaiI & Ors.28 interpreted the question of service tax levy, for credit card services. This ruling was necessitated because another decision about the amended definition of credit card services, in its application for the pre amended i.e., pre2006 era was doubted. The previous decision, so doubted, was ABN Amro Bank v. Collector of Central Excise29 28 2015[40] S.T.R.104(Tri. Del) 29 2011 (187) ECR181 (Tri.Delhi) 131
(hereafter “ABNI”). In ABNI, the tribunal observed and held as follows:
“17. 4. Interchange receipt was scrutinized by Revenue and show cause notice was issued making clear in para 1 of the show cause notice that the Appellant bank was engaged in providing credit card service and services "in relation" thereto was provided for the period from 01.06.02 to 31.04.06 and consideration was received for providing such services. Although, the receipts were routed through Master Card by the acquiring bank in the form of interchange fee, that became measure of taxation for levy of service tax in terms of provisions contained in Section 65(72)(zm) read with Section 65(10) of 65(12) of the Act as the case may be.
In the defence reply filed by Appellant bank on 30.12.08, it was pleaded that "Merchant Establishment" from whom the Appellant received interchange fee through the acquiring bank cannot be equated to be Customs of ABN Bank. The Appellant did not rule out its activity of issuing credit card and getting the payment "in relation to" such cards facility provided to its customer and receipt of consideration from "acquiring bank" in terms of MasterCard policy. When the statement recorded as aforesaid was not discarded and modus operandi of the Appellant demonstrated that the Appellant bank had issued credit cards and use of such card by the card holder, customer earned share of interchange fees for the Appellant, there arose incidence of tax. Therefore, taxing gross value of taxable service so provided was rightly taxable in adjudication.
It may be stated that the object of interpretation of a statute is to discover the intention of the Parliament as expressed in the Act. The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute, considering it as a whole and in its context. The charging section using the term "in relation to" extended its wing to embrace all connected and related services touching object of issue of credit card facility. Express statutory grant has taken within its fold all that is required to do, so as to make that grant effective. Accordingly, the charging section brought the service of credit card facility provided and its connected and related activities to fold of taxation. ************** ****************
Findings made by this order as aforesaid arise on the basis of law in force at the material time and out of material facts as well as cogent evidence on record. Statement recorded in the course of investigation provides full proof of providing of taxable service by the Appellant. At no stage or point of time, the chain of evidence bringing the transactions of the customer till that is settled, was delinked. 132
The Appellant bank failed to discard the evidence of Revenue on record without leading any cogent evidence to the contrary. The Appellant bank had contractual obligation to the credit cardholders for the transactions to be made using the credit card who were issued such cards by the Appellant. Law being concerned with taxable events and when material facts and cogent evidence on record including attendant circumstances demonstrated such event, Appellant’s contention that it got its share from "acquiring bank" has no difference to law since the statement recorded from Vice President brought the Appellant to the net of service tax as a card issuing bank providing taxable credit card service. Adjudication cess
therefore be held to be justified and the Appellant is liable to service tax for the taxable service provided.” The threemember bench of the CEGAT in Standard Chartered was constituted to resolve whether the ruling in ABNI was correct. It would be useful to first set out the four questions which the tribunal was required to consider and answer: “3. The order dated 16082013 referred the following questions of law: i) Whether the introduction of the new, comprehensive definition of "credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment care service" vide Section 65(33a) read with Section 65(105) (zzzw) by the Finance Act, 2006, is substantive and seeks to levy all the transactions covered by use of Credit/Debit/Charge Card or is in continuation of the levy under Section 65(10) or (12), as the case may be, as held in ABN Amro decision in so far as credit card services are concerned? ii) Whether the subclause (iii) in the definition of taxable service viz. "credit card, debit card, charge card of other payment card service" in Section 65(33a) can be said to be applicable retrospectively, i.e., from 16 July 2001 when section 65(72)(zm) became effective? iii) Can 'merchants/merchant establishments' be considered 'customer' as envisaged in Section 65(72)(zm) of the Finance Act, 1994 as it stood prior to 152006? iv) Whether Merchant Establishment Discount can be said to be 'received in relation to' credit card services when in fact in a particular transaction, the Acquiring bank receiving ME Discount may not have issued that particular credit card at all?” 133
The tribunal observed that the context of the reference was that:
“5. A Division Bench of CESTAT in ABN Amro Bank v Union of India 2011 STR 529 (TriDel) concluded that the charging section (insofar as credit card services in BOFS brought the service of credit card facility provided and its connected and related activities to fold of taxation (para 17.6)”
Here, it would be noteworthy to point out that the tribunal in Standard Chartered (supra) did not have to decide any dispute which required the application of the post amended definition, i.e. Section 65 (33a). It was merely expounding the law in the context and background of the amendment, and more specifically its role in the interpretation of preamended definition i.e., credit card services as part of the banking and financial services under section 65 (10) of the Act. The tribunal considered several decisions both on the issue of service tax as well as the levy of tax on interchange fee. The tribunal considered decisions of the tax regimes in the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada and United States and noticed that the definition in those legislations on the one hand, as compared with the levy under the Act, on the other was not quite the same. Relevant parts of the tribunal’s
discussion are extracted below: “************* *********** In the series and sequence of interdependent transactions that occur in the use of credit cards, acquiring banks generate reports for merchant settlement which are also forwarded to issuing banks through the card association network. There after issuing banks settle the amounts payable to acquiring banks after retaining an interchange fee, which is shared with the card association. The continuity and regularity of such commercial intercourse between acquiring and issuing banks, in our considered view leads to the position of acquiring banks being customers of issuing banks. 134
Issuing and acquiring banks are recognised participants in the nuanced business of credit card transactions. The interdependent and seamless but distinct transactions that occur between the ME, an acquiring bank and an issuing bank
therefore fall to be considered as a customary relationship amongst these parties. We are fortified in this conclusion by the circumstance that the Act specifies that the provider of credit card services is identified as a banking company, a financial institution including a nonbanking financial company or any other body corporate or a commercial concern as well. In the circumstances, confining the expression "a customer", to an individual or an entity which has a savings or a current account with a bank, is textually inappropriate. Further, banking companies, in the current scenario of expanding commercial transactions undertake a variety of activities which were not conceived as part of ancient or traditional banking activities. It would therefore be appropriate to conclude (in the context of BOFS), that a customer of a bank includes any person or entity having a continuum of relationship or transactional intercourse with a banking company, within the ambit of activities pursued by the later as a part of its authorised business. This is the interpretation we are persuaded to in the context of the definition and enumeration of BOFS as a taxable service. This is not to say that other statutes may not expand or restrict the scope of the expression, customer of a bank. We accordingly conclude that in the context of credit card services in BOFS, as the taxable service is defined and enumerated, acquiring bank and the ME could be considered to be a customer of the issuing bank and an acquiring bank, respectively. WHETHER INTERCHANGE FEE AND ME DISCOUNT FORM PART OF THE TAXABLE VALUE OF BOFS:
Whether interchange fee or ME discount amount to consideration received for rendition of credit card services depends on whether services provided by an acquiring bank to the ME and those provided by an issuing bank to the acquiring bank fall within the ambit of services provided in relation to credit card services. Relying on the Board Circular dated 09.07.2001, RBI Notification dated 12.05.2001 and RBI master circular on credit card operation of banks (referred to in the previous para), assessees contend that irrespective of whether ME or an acquiring bank is a customer of an acquiring bank and the issuing bank respectively, services provided by a bank other than to its card holder fall outside the ambit of services provided in relation to credit card services. 135
The several decisions, of EEC Courts and of the Court of Appeal notice and recognise existence of distinct contractual arrangements between an issuing bank and a card holder; the ME and an acquiring bank; an acquiring bank and the issuing bank; and between issuing and acquiring banks and another entity which provides services such as netting off services, as seen in the facts of FDR Limited. The existence of such distinct agreements and the legal consequences thereof were however considered in the context of the relevant legislation/norms, whether VAT legislation or Directives of EEC Council. In the context of BOFS, in our considered view, these decisions provide if at all, guidance to this limited extent (and that is also the reality of the factual matrix), that reciprocal rights and obligations between an issuing bank and its card holder; between the ME and the acquiring bank; between acquiring and issuing banks; or between banks and the card association are predicated upon distinct contractual arrangements. The fact that services flow between these several players, which are sequential and interdependent for effectuation of credit card transactions, is indisputable. The problematic is however in identifying which among the such distinct but sequential and interdependent transactions amount to services provided in relation to credit card services, in the context of the definition and enumeration of BOFS, in relevant provisions of the Act. SCOPE OF SERVICES PROVIDED IN RELATION TO CREDIT CARD SERVICES:
Under the Act and during the period in issue any service provided or to be provided, by a banking company, a financial institution including a nonbanking financial company or any other body corporate to a customer, in relation to credit card services, is the taxable service we are concerned with. On a textual and grammatical construction, the integers of the taxable service are: (a) The provider should be a banking company etc. and the recipient a customer of the provider; and (b) The taxable rendition should be any service in relation to credit card services. On a grammatical construction of the relevant provisions, since services provided by an acquiring bank to the ME and an issuing 136
bank to the acquiring bank are as essential to conclusion of transactions employing credit cards as are the services provided by an issuing bank to the card holder i.e. in issuing the credit card and the integral credit facility, it could be contended, as has been, that an acquiring bank and an issuing bank receive taxable consideration by way of ME discount and interchange fee. Assessees however contend that services provided by an acquiring bank to the ME and those provided by an issuing bank to the acquiring bank are not credit card services but are bill discounting or settlement of payments services, in contradistinction to services provided by an issuing bank to the card holder, which alone fall within the ambit of the taxable service, since the issuing bank extends credit facility to the card holder. To buttress this line of interpretation assessees refer to the definition of card services w.e.f. 01.05.2006. 22. As noticed earlier, card services were introduced w.e.f. 01.05.2006, defined in Section 65(33a). Section 65(105)(zzzw), the enumerative provision states that services provided to any person (not merely a customer), by any other person in relation to credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment card service in any manner is a taxable service (emphasis added). Clause (33a)(i) defines an "issuing bank" as a banking company, financial institution including a nonbanking financial company or any other person (instead of, any other body corporate), which issues such a card to a card holder. Subclauses (ii) to (vii) of this provision enumerate categories of services which fall within the scope of the taxable service. Subclause (ii) enumerates receipt and processing of applications, transfer of embossing data to issuing bank's personalisation agency, automated teller machine personal identification number generation, renewal or replacement of card, change of address, enhancement of credit limit, payment updation and statement generation. Subclause (iii) enumerates services provided by any person including an issuing bank or an acquiring bank, to any other person in relation to settlements of any amount transacted through such card. The explanation under subclause (iii) defines an acquiring bank as one which makes payments to any person who accepts such card. Subclause (iv) enumerates services provided in relation to joint promotional cards, affinity cards or co branded cards. Subclause (v) enumerates services provided in relation to promotion and marketing of goods and services through such card. Subclause (vi) enumerates services provided to an issuing bank or the holder of such card, for making use of 137
automated teller machines of the provider. Subclause (vii) enumerates services provided by the owner of trademarks or brand name to the issuing bank under an agreement for the use of the trade mark or brand name and other services in relation to such card, whether or not such owner is a club or association and the issuing bank is a member of such club or association. The explanation to this subclause (vii) states that for the purposes of this subclause, an issuing bank and the owner of credit card and brand name shall be treated as separate persons. From the detailed specification of varieties of services defined as falling under card services, it is apparent that w.e.f. 01.05.2006 three significant changes are introduced, in contrast with the scope and definition of credit card services under BOFS. Finance Act, 2006 also deleted "credit card services" from the scope of BOFS in Section 65(12). The changes introduced w.e.f. 01.05.2006 are: (a) Card services include debit card, charge card or other payment card, apart from credit card; (b) The scope of the service provider is expanded. The service provider is now "any other person" as well; (c) The identity of the service recipient also stands expanded in sub clause (zzzw); (d) Any service provided by any person in relation to credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment card, in any manner, is now the taxable service; (e) The nature and variety of services included within the ambit of card services is now specifically enumerated, notwithstanding use of "includes" prefixed in clause (33a) and a comprehensive clause "in any manner" in Section 65(105)(zzzw); and (f) Services enumerated in subclauses (i), (ii), (iii), (vi) and (vii) could well be conceived as those provided in relation to credit card services as well. ******************** *****************
On the basis of the above broad principles guiding interpretation including of taxing statutes we now proceed to analyse the ambit of credit card services in BOFS, the taxable service in issue. The identification of which of the transactions among the several transactions that occur during the use of a credit card, fall within the 138
definition and enumeration of credit card services, appears to be a facially nebulous and substantially interpretive problematic issue.
On a literal construction of the relevant provisions it appears at first blush that any service provided to a customer by a banking company etc. in relation to credit card services, is a taxable service. Acceptance of this construction would lead to infinite expansion of the taxable event. Not only would credit facilities provided by an issuing bank to its card holder fall within the scope of this service but services such as receipt and processing of credit card applications; transferring of embossing data to the issuing bank's personalisation agency; teller machine personal identification number generation; renewal or replacement of a credit card; change of address; payment updation and statement generation; settlement of amounts transacted through credit card; services provided by the owner of trade marks or bank name to an issuing bank for use of the trade mark or brand name; and a host of other services which are interspersed in the sequence of transactions occurring on the use of a credit card, would all be services provided in relation to credit card services. These services are expressly enumerated in sub clauses (ii), (iii), (vi) and (vii) of Section 65(33a), w.e.f. 01.05.2006. On Revenue's interpretation, these services are subsumed within credit card services on account of the "in relation to" phrase. Wherever an issuing bank hives of some of its activities in relation to credit card operations, such as receipt and processing of credit card applications and the like and these services are provided by a outside agency, these would nevertheless fall within the ambit of BOFS, though not statutorily so identified and expressed. The scope of credit card services and BOFS would therefore be perpetually nebulous and its contours indeterminate, assessees contend. Assessees also urge that acceptance of Revenue's interpretation would lead to perpetual ambiguity in ascertaining the range and variety of transactions falling within the ambit of credit card services and such interpretation should therefore be avoided on the principle of doubtful and ambiguous taxation and inchoate specification of the taxable event in a fiscal legislation. ************* **************
While services provided by an issuing bank to an acquiring bank and an acquiring bank to the ME are intermediary, ancillary and interdependent integers for effective use of credit cards, we are persuaded to the conclusion that these services though interdependent are distinct and are not intended to be covered 139
within the purview of credit card services prior to 01.05.2006, notwithstanding the phrase "in relation to" employed in the enumerative provision. We are so persuaded since a contrary interpretation which accords unrestricted scope, locus and amplitude to credit card services would result in introducing a serious element of textual ambiguity, indeterminacy and inchoatness to the scope of the taxable event in BOFS. The formidable precedential authority adverted to in paragraph 23 and decisions in Naveen Chemicals and in Indian National Shipowners Association as well, posit adoption of an interprative principle which leads to clear and definite identification of the taxable event, to avoid doubtful taxation.
In Collector of Central Excise, Guntur v. Andhra Sugar MANU/SC/0079/1988 : (1989) SUPP (1) SCC 144 the Apex Court pointed out that it is a well settled principle that the meaning ascribed by the authority issuing a notification is a good guide and a contemporaneous exposition of the position of law. K.P. Varghese v. I.T.O. Ernakulam MANU/SC/0300/1981 : (1981) 4 SCC 173, reiterated the established principle that the plain meaning of a statute cannot be relied upon where it results in absurdity, injustice or uncertainty (emphasis) and in such circumstances, the Court must construe the text having regard to the object and purpose which the legislature had in view in enacting the provision, the context in which it occurs and with a view to suppress the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation. Contemporaneous administrative exposition of the meaning of the statutory text in the speech by the Minister introducing the bill for enactment of the legislation in question is considered a legitimate aid to construction of a statute when the text is grammatically or contextually ambiguous. It is also a settled principle that a subsequent legislation on the same subject may in certain circumstances serve as a Parliamentary exposition of the former provision vide Precedents referred to in paragraph 29 (supra).
On the basis of the principles and guidance derived from aforementioned authority we are compelled to the conclusion that in the context of BOFS, credit card services cover only such services as are provided by an issuing bank to a card holder. This conclusion is fortified by the clarification issued in Board circular dated 09.07.2001, RBI circular dated 12.12.2003, RBI master circular and the express and specific statutory explication of several services which Parliament has specified to be included in card services, incorporated in the definition of card services, for the subsequent period w.e.f. 01.05.2006, in Section 65(33a). Credit card services is 140
included in card services and stands deleted from BOFS, w.e.f. 01.05.2006. To interpret the several services specifically enumerated in Section 65(33a) and other services like those provided by credit information companies or telephone or internet network providers, which equally contribute to and are essential for effectuation of credit card transactions as also comprehended within BOFS, would lead to perpetual uncertainty and nontemporal inflation of the scope of credit card services in BOFS. Such interpretation must clearly be avoided, is the mandate of established interpretive principles. ************* ************** The following is clear from Section 65(33a) read with Section 65(105) (zzzw) of the Act. (a) The scope of service tax levy is extended to services provided in respect of other cards such as debit card, charge card or other payment card, apart from credit card; (b) The several and intervening services which occur in the use of cards are enumerated in subclauses (i) to (vii) of the definition, clearly conveying the intention to cover these expressly enumerated services as taxable events under the provisions; (c) In Section 65(105)(zzzw) while retaining the phrase "in relation to", the phrase "in any manner" is added. The precision and clarity of the detailed drafting methodology employed in the Finance Act, 2006, compels the inference that Parliament not only expressed the intention to expand the scope of the taxable service to cover services provided "in relation to" other cards as well but has further and expressly expanded the reach of taxation to services which otherwise may not indisputedly fall within the ambit of card services. Section 65(33a) thus excised ambiguity, uncertainty and inchoateness in the statutory text.
For the aforesaid reasons and analyses, we are of the considered view that paragraph 2.2 of the Board circular dated 09.07.2001 accurately captures the scope of credit card services under BOFS during the period 16.07.2001 to 30.04.2006 i.e. as meaning a service where the customer is provided credit facility for purchase of goods and services; whereby cash advances are also permitted upto specified limits; where for rendition of the service, the service provider collects joining fee, additional card fee, annual fee etc; and all these charges, including interest charges for the service rendered, form part of the value of the taxable service, in BOFS.” 141
The conclusions recorded by the tribunal, in Standard Chartered (supra), are extracted below:
“47. CONCLUSIONS: We answer the reference dated 16.08.2013 as under: (a) On point No. (i) in the order of reference, we hold that introduction of a comprehensive definition of "credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment service" in Section 65(33a) read with Section 65(105)(zzzw), by the Finance Act, 2006 is a substantive legislative exertion which enacts levy on the several transactions enumerated in subclauses (i) to (vii) specified in the definition set out in Section 65(33a); and all these transactions are neither impliedly covered nor inherently subsumed within the purview of credit card services defined in Section 65(10) or (12) as part of the BOFS; (b) On point No. (ii) we hold that subclause (iii) in Section 65(33a) is neither intended nor expressed to have a retroactive reach i.e. w.e.f. 16.07.2001. Services enumerated in these subclauses are not implicit in the scope of credit card services; (c) On point No. (iii) of the reference, we hold that a Merchant/Merchant Establishment is "a customer" in the context of credit card services enumerated in Section 65(72)(zm), subsequently Section 65(105)(zm) and a fortiori an acquiring bank is "a customer" of an issuing bank. (d) On point No. (iv), we hold that ME discount, by whatever name called, representing amounts retained by an acquiring bank from out of amounts recovered by such bank for settlement of payments to the ME does not amount to consideration received "in relation to" credit card services.”
The next decision of note is that of ABN Amro Bank (presently known as Royal Bank of Scotland) v. Commissioner of Central Excise30 (hereafter referred to as “ABNII”) which was on the question of whether interchange fee could be subjected to levy of service tax for a period post 2006. In fact, the precise period in question in the ABNII was May, 2006 to February, 30 2018 TIOL2018CESTAT. 142
The tribunal analysed the amended definition and concluded that ABN Amro Bank was not engaged in any activity for the settlement of amounts transacted; that it was not a settlement agency and therefore acted only as an issuing bank. On this brief analysis of the definition clause, and its understanding in ABN AmroII, the CESAT concluded that interchange fee could not be subjected to separate taxation as a service falling under Section 65 (33a) (iii). Facts relating to the present appeals
The respondent, Citibank CA received four show cause notices, issued by the appellant (hereafter “the revenue”) alleging nonpayment of service tax, for various periods, both after 2006, as well as after 2012. The details of the show cause notices, are set out below in tabular form: Case No. SCN Date Period in dispute C.A. No. 8228/201 9 SCN 141/2013 23.04.2013 Oct 2007 – June 2012 SCN 258/2014 23.09.2014 Jul 2012 – Dec 2013 Statement of Demand No. 25/2015 02.03.2015 Jan 2014 – Mar 2014 Statement of Demand No. 97/2015 11.08.2015 April 2014 – May 2015 C.A. No. 89/2021 Statement of Demand No. 6725/2016 04.10.2016 April 201516
For the sake of completeness, extracts of the two show cause notices are reproduced below: Show Cause Notice 1. 143
“2. During the course of audit of accounts of the assessee conducted by Service tax Internal Audit Group of Service tax Commissionerate, Chennai, it was noticed that the assessee was issuing Credit Cards to its customer; that Credit Card transactions typically involve two banks – an issuing bank and an acquiring bank; that issuing bank issues credit cards to its customers; that acquiring banks contract merchant establishments to accept credit card payment for the goods or services sold to the customers and to facilitate such transaction, the acquiring banks provide the required infrastructure like Card Swiping Terminal (Point of Sale Machines), payment gateway etc.; that assessee’s Credit Card customers are using Point of Sale (POS) machines installed by acquiring bank in various merchant establishments service establishments that the acquiring banks make payments to the merchant establishments/service establishments and charge them a pre contracted rate known as Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) to facilitate the Credit card transaction; that acquiring banks submit the transactions settled by merchant establishments to the assessee (Issuing Bank) through Card Association and inturn the assessee makes payments to the acquiring banks through Card Association; that Card Association (Master Card, Visa and Diners Club International) acts as a bridge between the assessee (issuing bank) and acquiring banks; that card Association provides the required network and Platform to the issuing banks and acquiring banks for facilitating the cards transactions; that normally acquiring bank submits transactions (settled by merchants) to the Card Association in a standard file format for onward submission to the assessee (issuing bank); that the standard file format contains details like card number, acquirer reference number, transaction amount, interchange fee, date of transaction', nature of merchant business etc., that based on the transaction details received from the Card Association, the assessee (issuing bank) bills the customer for gross amount and pays the gross amount less interchange fee (which is credited by the banks) by remitting the Same acquiring through the Card Association; that assessee (issuing bank) normally receives the gross amount from their customers based on the monthly billing statement with a duedate by which the payment needs to be made by the customer; In this regard it appears that the interchange fee is nothing but a share of the MDR earned by the assessee and forms part of their service income in relation to Credit Card or other payment card services. xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx
On being pointed out by audit, the assessee vide letter dated 12.04.2013 stated that the gross amount of consideration received 144
for taxable service under the taxing entry of “Credit Card Services”, has already been subjected to service tax, in the hands of acquiring bank; that the interchange fee received by the issuing bank is just a share of the MDR received from acquiring bank; that issuing bank is not rendering any service to acquiring bank and hence no service tax is applicable on the proportionate share of MDR received by issuing bank in the form of interchange; that taxing the interchange as share of MDR, in the Hands of issuing banks would amount to double taxation as the gross MDR has already been subjected to service tax; that since service tax was paid on the entire MDR, their liability, if any should be adjusted accordingly. They also enclosed (1) a Note on Credit card transactions and applicability of Service tax and (2) an excel sheet showing the workings of the Interchange earning and details of MDR. However, on their own accord, the assessee paid an amount of Rs. 15,00,00,000/ towards Service tax vide Challan No. 11046 dated 28.03.2013. 5. The contention of the assessee that they are not rendering any service to the acquiring bank does not appear to be correct. When a credit card holder of the assessee (issuing bank) uses the card at a merchant establishment for making a purchase the account of the merchant establishment is settled directly by the card issuing bank or through an acquiring bank. The fact of issue of Credit card by the assessee as the issuing bank only enables the customer to avail cashless purchase or service from the merchant establishment which is subsequently settled by the acquiring bank and the discount (Interchange fee) so earned is shared with the assessee (card issuing bank). It therefore appears that the assessee have earned service income namely interchange fee in relation to credit card services and the interchange fee earned by the assessee appears to be taxable under Section 65(105) (zzzw) of the Finance Act, 1994 read with Section 65 (33a) ibid; The fact of payment of service tax on the interchange fee by the acquiring bank does not exempt the assessee from the payment of service tax on the consideration received by them towards rendering of service as each person providing service is liable to pay service tax for the services rendered by them. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx” Show Cause Notice 2 “2.0 The issue in brief is that during the course of audit of accounts of the assessee conducted by Service tax Internal Audit Group of Service Tax Commissionerate Chennai, it was noticed that the assessee was issuing Credit Cards to its customers; that credit card transactions typically involve two Banks an issuing Bank and an acquiring bank; that issuing bank issues credit cards to its customers; that acquiring bank Contract merchant establishments 145
to accept credit card payment for the goods & services sold to the customers and to facilitate such transactions, the acquiring banks provide the required infrastructure like card swiping terminal (Point or Sale machines), payment gateway etc.; that assessee's Credit Card customers are using point of sale POS) machines installed by acquiring banks in various merchant establishments/service establishments; that the acquiring banks make payments to the merchant establishments/service establishments and charge them a pre Contracted rate known as Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) to facilitate the credit card transaction; that the acquiring banks submit the transaction settled by merchant establishments to the assessee (issuing bank) through card association and inturn the assessee makes payments to the acquiring banks through Card Association; that. Card Association (MasterCard, Visa Card and Diners Club International) acts as a bridge between the assessee.(issuing bank) and acquiring banks, that Card Association provides then required network and platform to the issuing banks and acquiring banks for facilitating the cards transactions; that normally acquiring bank submits the transactions (settled by merchants) to the card association in a standard file format for onward submission to the assessee (issuing bank); that the standard file format contains details like card number, acquirer reference transaction number, amount, interchange fee, date of transaction nature of merchant business etc., that based on the transaction details received from the card association, the assessee {issuing bank) bills the customer for gross amount and pays the gross amount less interchange fee (which IS credited by the acquiring banks) by remitting the Same through the card association; that assessee (issuing bank) normally receives the gross amount from their Customers based on the monthly billing statement with a duedate by which the payments needs to be made by the customer; In this regard it appears that the interchange fee is nothing but a share of the MDR earned by the assessee and forms part of their service income in relation to credit card or other payment card services and the interchange fee was collected by them from the acquiring banks for the period from October' 2007 to June' 2012 and the Service Tax was not remitted on the same. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx
The contention of the asseseé during the Course of audit of accounts that they are not rendering any service to the acquiring bank does not appear to be correct. When a credit card holder of the assessee (issuing bank) uses the card at a merchant establishment for making a purchase, the account of the merchant establishment is settled directly by the card issuing bank or through an acquiring 146
bank. The fact of issue of credit card by the assessee as the issuing bank only enables the customer to avail cashless purchase or service from the merchant establishment which is subsequently settled by the acquiring bank and the discount (interchange fee) so earned is shared with the assessee (card issuing bank). It therefore appears that the assessee have earned service income namely interchange fee in relation to credit card services and the interchange fee earned by the assessee appears to be taxable as "service" as per Section 65B (44); the fact of the payment of Service tax on the interchange fee by the acquiring. bank does not exempt the assesssee from payment of Service tax on the consideration received by them towards rendering of service as each person providing service is liable to pay service tax for the services rendered by them.” Citibank’s reply, dated 16.09.2013 to the fourth show cause notice, No. 97/2015 reflects its position:
“4. 7. The Notice submits that while making payments to the Merchant Establishments for purchases made on credit by the card holders, the Acquiring Bank deducts the Merchant Discount and pays the balance to the Merchant Establishment. In other words, the Merchant Establishment bears fee for collection and receipt of monies towards the price of goods sold or services rendered. The fee (expense) so borne by the Merchant Establishment results in income, of which there are two beneficiaries/ claimants viz the Acquiring Bank and the Issuing Bank i.e. the Noticee). The share of revenue of the issuing Bank is settled by way of retention. The Association debits the account of the issuing Bank (i.e. the Noticee) and disburses the same to the Acquiring Bank. Payment of Association Fee to the Association is made separately by the issuing Bank and the Acquiring Bank. All the entities coordinate with each other to support the credit card transaction between the credit card holder and the Merchant Establishment. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx
16 As submitted above, the Notice does not provide any services to the Acquiring Bank, and consequently, there is no service provider and a service recipient relationship between them. The Notice submits that the Participants i.e. Acquiring Bank and the Notice do not inter se play the role of role of a service provider and service recipient and any amount which may be exchanged by the inter se are not liable to Service tax. The Acquiring Bank and the Notice as the Issuing Bank do not have any contractual relationship. They are 147
the Participants to the credit card transaction between the credit card holder and the Merchant Establishment and the Interchange Fee is only a portion of the tax paid Merchant Discount which is disbursed to the Notices for such participation. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx
In the present facts all activities are undertaken by the Participants to support a transaction where a Merchant Establishment is able to accept a payment from a credit card holder through the modality of credit cards. The gross amount attributable in relation to such services i.e. Merchant Discount which is made available by the Merchant Establishment to the Acquiring Bank and includes the Interchange Fee which is the share of the Notice. This amount of gross consideration is in the instant case subjected to Service tax in the hands of the Acquiring Bank. There is only one single transaction in the present facts. The Merchant Discount is the consideration which is received in respect of this transaction. The Merchant discount is further distributed amongst the participants (i.e. the Issuing Bank and the Acquiring Bank). The consideration received by the participants in this single transaction is offered to tax in the hands of the Acquiring Bank. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx
It is required to be appreciated that the interchange Fee is only a proportion of the gross of amount of the Merchant Discount which has already been subjected to tax in the hands of the Acquiring Bank. Hence, Service tax cannot be demanded on such interchange Fee. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx
The Notice submits that the Commissioner has failed to appreciate the fact that the Interchange Fee due to the Issuing Bank is partial disbursal from the gross amount which has already suffered tax and is not liable to fresh levy of Service tax. This kind of levy would result in double taxation of the same consideration under the same taxing statute.” In this context, the prevailing understanding within the banking industry is also indicative, which can be gleaned from representations sent by the Indian Bank Association to the 148
Central Board of Excise and Customs seeking clarification (which were filed by Citibank). An extract summarising the position:
“2. It may kindly be noted that when customers of issuing bank make purchases from a merchant establishment by using credit cards, the transaction passes through a payment cycle through the VISA/MasterCard settlement platform. The acquiring bank deducts a fixed predetermined percentage (generally up to 3%) from the amount paid to the merchant, which is thereafter shared between the parties involved in the transactions. As per the industry practice, instead of discharging service tax liability only on its own share of discount, the ‘acquiring bank’ discharges full service tax liability on the entire interchange income on the transaction, including that on ‘interchange’ received by the card issuing bank. Thus, service tax is paid on the entire interchange income by the acquiring bank and there is no leakage of revenue.”31 Interpretation of Section 65(33a)
The preexisting definition of credit card services [Section 65(12)(ii)] merely mentioned “credit card services” as part of banking and financial services – without elaborating what kind of services were comprehended in the definition. The 2006 amendment segregated this, by omitting subclause (ii) of Section 65(12) and enacting a new Section 65(33a).
A plain reading of Section 65 (33a) reveals that seven distinct heads of credit card services are now comprehended within the broad description of “credit card services”. Each category – falling in subclause (i) to (vii) deals with a specific, enumerated service. The controlling expression “credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment card services includes any services provided” broadens the coverage of this species of service, in contrast with the preexisting law. This inclusion – by 31 Letter dated 07.10.2010 sent by the Indian Bank Association to the Joint Secretary – TRU, Central Board of Excise and Customs. 149
specific enumeration of “debit card, charge card or other payment card service” is an expanded class of card service. However, the further use of the term “includes” even while broadening (by enumeration of specific subcategories) “credit card services” – also has the effect of limiting the coverage under Section 65(33)(a) to only the seven enumerated categories. This is apparent from the fact that after subclause (vii), there is no residuary provision authorising similar treatment to nonenumerated activities i.e., those not falling within subclauses (i) to (vii). In other words, the use of the expression “includes” while broadening – by specific enumeration of seven categories of card services – also limits the inclusive nature to those categories, and no more.
The second incontrovertible feature is that each enumerated category falling within a subclause refers only to one kind of service. Thus, by subclause (i), the service referred to is the issuing of a card to a card holder; and by subclause (ii), the service of receipt, processing of applications, transfer of embossing data to the issuing bank’s personal agency, ATM, PIN number generation, renewal or replacement of cards, change of address etc., essentially forming separate and ancillary services to the issuing card. This service largely involves one business entity providing service to another. By subclause (iii) which this case is concerned with the service involved is by any person, [i.e., the issuing bank as defined in subclause (i)] and an acquiring bank, to any other person in relation to settlement of any amount transacted through “such card”. The emphasis here: apart from other related issues, is with the service of settlement 150
of any “amount transacted” through the card. It is significant to notice that the reference to the service provider “by any person” is broad and comprehends all categories of persons and entities mentioned in subclause (i) (bank, financial institution, etc.) having regard to the definition of “person” [in Section 65B (37)]. Such being the case, the reference to issuing bank would fall within the broad description of “any person”. In any case, having defined “issuing bank” widely, per subclause (i), Parliament need not have referred to “any person, including issuing bank”; the meaning would have been the same if subclause (iii) had referred only to an “issuing bank” in place of “any person”. However, having regard to the essential nature of a credit card transaction, the inclusion is not directed as much to an issuing bank as to the specific reference to “an acquiring bank”. That term is not defined elsewhere except in this subclause, and by the explanation wherein the acquiring bank is defined as a bank, company, financial institution, etc. who makes the payment to any person, who accepts such cards.
Crucially, then, only in Section 65(33a) (iii) does service by any person include service by the issuing bank and the acquiring bank. The use of the conjunctive “and” [in Section 65 (33a) (iii)] is to be contrasted with the other subclauses Parliament used the disjunctive “or” in all other subclauses. The clear intention for this difference was that service providers could be business entities providing more than one service under one subclause [such as subclauses (ii), (iv), (vi) and (vii)]. The use of the conjunctive “and” in clause (iii) therefore, is telling and 151
consequently, in my opinion should receive literal interpretation. I, therefore, disagree with the judgment of K.M. Joseph, J on this aspect.
There can be no debate that indisputably, Parliament, has to be attributed with full knowledge of the nature of credit card business models, where the primary objective of the entities that provide service, is to ensure payment for the underlying transaction between the card holder and the provider of goods or services. Parliament would also know that there are three business entities whose joint or concurrent functioning is essential for settlement of each credit card transaction. The three business entities are the issuing bank, the acquiring bank and the network [such as Visa, Mastercard, or RuPay, etc., which has been kept out of the definition under Section 65(33a)]. These are crucial factors and consequently I am of the opinion that the conjunctive “and” should be read literally and be given the meaning conjunctively rather than disjunctively. The result, therefore, is that when a person (i.e., the issuing bank), and an acquiring bank, provide service to another person, in relation to settlement of any credit card transaction, that service, by such person, and the acquiring bank, amounts to a “credit card service” per Section 65 (33a). The unified nature of the service, to another (be it the card holder or the merchant, who are participants in the primary transaction and therefore beneficiaries) is the subject matter of subclause (iii) of Section 65 (33a). I am fortified in this conclusion also in the use of the term “or” in subclauses (iv), (vi) and (vii) which define services capable 152
of being provided to another business entity or service provider, and not a customer.
This court has, in several instances, dealt with what should be the approach, when reading the expression “and”, commending a literal interpretation, rather than one, resulting in its being construed as a disjunctive “or”. In Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products & Anr. v. Union of India32, this Court considered Rule 56A of Central Excise Rules. The Court dealt with interpretation of conjunctive and disjunctive "and", "or". Proviso to Rule 56A uses the conjunctive word "and". The provision permitted the Collector to allow a credit of the duty already paid on such material or component parts or finished product, as the case may be. Crucially, the proviso read as follows: “Provided that no credit of duty shall be allowed in respect of any material or component parts used in the manufacture of finished excisable goods— (i) if such finished excisable goods produced by the manufacturer are exempt from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to nil rate of duty, and (ii) unless— (a) duty has been paid for such material or component parts under the same item or subitem as the finished excisable goods; or (b) remission or adjustment of duty paid for such material or component parts has been specifically sanctioned by the Central Government:” This court held that the language was forthright; so “and” had to be read conjunctively. Long ago, it was held in Green v Premier Glynrhonwy Slate Co.33 that 32 (2000) 1 SCC 426 33 (1928) 1 KB 561, p. 568 153
"You do sometimes read 'or' as 'and' in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are obliged because 'or' does not generally mean 'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or'.” In R v Oxfordshire County Council and Others, Ex Parte Sunningwell Parish Council34, Section 22(1) of the Commons Registration Act 1965 contains a threepart definition of a town or village green, usually called classes (a), (b) and (c). They were: "[a] land which has been allotted by or under any Act for the exercise or recreation of the inhabitants of any locality or [b] on which the inhabitants of any locality have a customary right to indulge in lawful sports and pastimes or [c] on which the inhabitants of any locality have indulged in such sports and pastimes as of right for not less than 20 years." An argument was made that the requirement of having indulged in sports and pastimes, for 20 years, was disjunctive and not conjunctive. The House of Lords rejected this argument, and held that: “The first point concerned the nature of the activities on the glebe. They showed that it had been used for solitary or family pastimes (walking, toboganning, family games) but not for anything which could properly be called a sport. Miss Cameron said that this was insufficient for two reasons. First, because the definition spoke of "sports and pastimes" and therefore, as a matter of language, pastimes were not enough. There had to be at least one sport. Secondly, because the "sports and pastimes" in class c had to be the same sports and pastimes as those in respect of which there could have been customary rights under class b and this meant that there had to be some communal element about them, such as playing cricket, shooting at butts or dancing round the maypole. I do not accept either of these arguments. As a matter of language, I think that "sports and pastimes" is not two classes of activities but a single composite class which uses two words in order to avoid arguments over whether an activity is a sport or a pastime. The law constantly uses pairs of words in this way. As long as the activity can properly be called a sport or a pastime, it falls within the composite class.” 34 1999 (3)All ER 385 154
In Sahara India (Firm), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Central& Ors35 a similar question arose regarding Section 142 (2A) of the Income Tax Act: “A bare perusal of the provisions of Subsection (2A) of the Act would show that the opinion of the Assessing Officer that it is necessary to get the accounts of assessee audited by an Accountant has to be formed only by having regard to: (i) the nature and complexity of the accounts of the assessee; and (ii) the interests of the revenue. The word "and" signifies conjunction and not disjunction. In other words, the twin conditions of "nature and complexity of the accounts" and "the interests of the revenue" are the prerequisites for exercise of power under Section 142(2A) of the Act.”
Justice Joseph in his judgment, relies on the contractual arrangements in question, to conclude that “legally they are separate services as the nature of service rendered by the issuing bank is different from the service rendered by acquiring bank”. In my opinion, the existence or otherwise of a contractual relationship is per se not determinative when a settlement of payment in relation to a credit card is involved. I say so because there is no contractual relationship between the acquiring bank and a card holder who might choose to use the device which is given to a merchant establishment by acquiring bank. Likewise, the merchant establishment need not have any preexisting contractual relationship with the issuing bank. Neither the merchant establishment nor the card holder has any preexisting relationship with the network provider whose role has been kept out of the definition clause. The network service provider (VISA, Master Card, RuPay, etc.) in fact provides the platform for the 35 (2008) 14 SCC 1519 155
completion of the transaction. The nature of the network’s database, the software provided by it and the entire platform forms the entire basis of the credit card system, enabling smooth cashless settlement of the primary transaction – purchase of service or goods by the card holder from the merchant. The entire focus of the Section 65 (33a) – as well as Section 65 (105) (zzzw) which refers to taxable service in respect of credit card service – is settlement of any transaction. It cannot be construed as settlement of more than one transaction by one swipe. In other words, if Parliament had intended that the transaction for the purchase of goods or services permitted dissection of one whole transaction into two one provided by the issuing bank and the other by the acquiring bank, it would have made that intention explicit appropriately, such as for instance, by using words, like “as the case may be”. The absence of such manifest intention in Section 65 (33a) on the one hand, and the use of the conjunctive “and” in Section 65 (33a) (iii), clearly manifesting the intention that the issuing bank (a “person”) and an acquiring bank jointly provide the service, on the other persuades me to hold that a dissection of one single transaction involving the purchase and sale of goods and services, is unwarranted. Therefore, with respect, I do not agree with Joseph, J’s view that Parliament contemplated that apart from an acquiring bank, any other person including an issuing bank, may render a separate service. Equally, the reasoning that activities of a bank – which may be the same one that issues a card and is also an acquiring bank in a transaction – are legally separate services because the nature of 156
service (based on their respective contractual frameworks) rendered by the issuing bank is different from that of the service rendered by the acquiring bank, with respect, would not be accurate. Similarly, I do not agree with the reasons given by Justice Joseph (i.e., that interchange fee does not fall within the service contemplated (i) between issuing bank and card holder; and (ii) it is not a gift) as to why interchange fee is a separate service either.
There are several problems with segregating the components of “service” by the issuing bank and service by the acquiring bank, under Section 65 (33a) (iii); they are elaborated as follows: (a) In the event of segregation of the issuing bank’s component, the service element would no longer be a credit card service, but providing pure advance or credit of one kind, to the customer by the issuing bank which then falls within the broad description of banking and financial services [Section 65 (12)]. (b) The segregation would ignore the reality of the business transaction which is the collection of a single MDR which includes two components i.e. the acquiring bank’s fee, and the issuing bank’s charge/fee. The revenue admits that the MDR comprises both these fees. In these circumstances there is no warrant for discriminating the component which is retained by the issuing bank in the form of interchange fee, by saying that the issuing bank has to pay service tax on that as a separate element of its fee. The other anomaly would be that the data service provided by the card association (enabling use of 157
software which facilitates instantaneous verification of the customer’s credentials, authentication of the transaction and the authorization of payment) is not required to undergo a separate treatment, as is now insisted upon in the case of the segregated transaction with the issuing bank. (c) There are predominantly only two contractual arrangements (as entered into by the card association) which involve interaction of simultaneous or sequential occurrence of four subtransactions, i.e. (i) the swiping of the card by the card holder at the merchant establishment (which does not include any preexisting contractual agreement, but evidences the finalisation of a promise of a contract); (ii) followed by release by the acquiring bank to the merchant establishment of the consideration (which is backed by a preexisting contractual agreement by which the POS machine is kept with the merchant establishment); (iii) the authentication of the customer’s credit by the issuing bank (which has no relationship with the acquiring bank or the merchant establishment, but does so only with the card holder); and (iv) the facilitation of the entire transaction by the card association (which has no contractual relationship with the card holder or the merchant establishment, but does so only with the acquiring bank and issuing bank). (d) If these are the different stages/ limbs/components of the transactions as may be variously described, wherein some are backed by preexisting contractual agreements, while others are not – the singling out of one such service, i.e. the credit 158
provided to the cardholder by the authentication of the transaction by the issuing bank, for separate treatment by insisting that it should once again be subjected to levy on a literal construction of subclauses (33a) and (105) (zzzw), would not be logical. If the revenue were to in fact insist this to be the correct interpretation, it should logically and in the same breath, also insist that the acquiring bank file separate returns for the amounts it receives and the amount it collects and transmits to the network, in the same manner separately, as is insisted upon in relation to the component of service rendered by the issuing bank, which forms a part of the whole service that is provided in this case.
I agree with the reasoning of Justice Joseph, that the amount received by the issuing bank, as interchange income or fee, is not towards interest. However, as previously discussed, I do not agree with the conclusion, that the issuing bank provides a separate service. The role of the issuing bank in the service provided by the acquiring bank to the merchant establishment is part of a single unified service falling under clause (iii) of Section 65 (33a) and it cannot be broken up into its components and classified as separate services for classification. This is a well accepted principle of classification. The relevant clause of Section 65 (33a) is reproduced below: “(iii) by any person, including an issuing bank and an acquiring bank, to any other person in relation to settlement of any amount transacted through such card. Explanation.— For the purposes of this subclause, “acquiring bank” means any banking company, financial institution including 159
nonbanking financial company or any other person, who makes the payment to any person who accepts such card;” There is, in reality, one unified service provided by the acquiring bank to the merchant establishment for which gross value of consideration is the merchant discount rate (MDR). This single MDR includes the interchange fee. Therefore, the issuing bank’s service is subsumed into the service of the acquiring bank to make it a unified service to the merchant establishment. Evidently a merchant establishment does not have any contractual liability to pay interchange fee to the issuing bank.
By way of analogy, a reading of Section 65A which stipulates how classification of taxable services shall be determined, including when it is classifiable under two or more subclauses of Section 65 (105), is indicative: “65A. Classification of taxable services.—(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, classification of taxable services shall be determined according to the terms of the subclauses of clause (105) of Section 65; (2) When for any reason, a taxable service is, prima facie, classifiable under two or more subclauses of clause (105) of Section 65, classification shall be effected as follows:— (a) the subclause which provides the most specific description shall be preferred to subclauses providing a more general description; (b) composite services consisting of a combination of different services which cannot be classified in the manner specified in clause (a), shall be classified as if they consisted of a service which gives them their essential character, insofar as this criterion is applicable; […]” It would also be useful to notice that the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBE&C) clarified by a circular36 regarding service 36 Circular No. 104/7/2008S.T., dated 682008 160
tax levy on goods transport by road service that composite service cannot be broken up into its components. The circular inter alia, states that: “3.Issue :GTA provides service to a person in relation to transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage. The service provided is a single composite service which may include various intermediary and ancillary services such as loading/unloading, packing/unpacking, transshipment, temporary warehousing. For the service provided, GTA issues a consignment note and the invoice issued by the GTA for providing the said service includes the value of intermediary and ancillary services. In such a case, whether the intermediary or ancillary activities is to be treated as part of GTA service and the abatement should be extended to the charges for such intermediary or ancillary service? Clarification: GTA provides a service in relation to transportation of goods by road which is a single composite service. GTA also issues consignment note. The composite service may include various intermediate and ancillary services provided in relation to the principal service of the road transport of goods. Such intermediate and ancillary services may include services like loading/unloading, packing/unpacking, transshipment, temporary warehousing etc., which are provided in the course of transportation by road. These services are not provided as independent activities but are the means for successful provision of the principal service, namely, the transportation of goods by road. The contention that a single composite service should not be broken into its components and classified as separate services is a wellaccepted principle of classification. As clarified earlier vide F. No. 334/4/2006TRU, dated 2822006 (para 3.2 and 3.3) [2006 (4) S.T.R. C30] and F. No. 334/1/2008TRU, dated 2922008 (para 3.2 and 3.3) [2008 (9) S.T.R. C61], a composite service, even if it consists of more than one service, should be treated as a single service based on the main or principal service and accordingly classified. While taking a view, both the form and substance of the transaction are to be taken into account. The guiding principle is to identify the essential features of the transaction. The method of invoicing does not alter the single composite nature of the service and classification in such cases is based on essential character by applying the principle of classification enumerated in section 65A. Thus, if any ancillary/ intermediate service is provided in relation to transportation of goods, and the charges, if any, for such services are included in the invoice issued by the GTA, and not by any other person, such 161
service would form part of GTA service and, therefore, the abatement of 75% would be available on it. 4.Issue 2 :GTA providing service in relation to transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage also undertakes packing as an integral part of the service provided. It may be clarified whether in such cases service provided is to be classified under GTA service. Clarification: Cargo handling service [Section 65(105)(zr)] means loading, unloading, packing or unpacking of cargo and includes the service of packing together with transportation of cargo with or without loading, unloading and unpacking. Transportation is not the essential character of cargo handling service but only incidental to the cargo handling service. Where service is provided by a person who is registered as GTA service provider and issues consignment note for transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage and the amount charged for the service provided is inclusive of packing, then the service shall be treated as GTA service and not cargo handling service. 5.Issue 3 :Whether time sensitive transportation of goods by road in a goods carriage by a GTA shall be classified under courier service and not GTA service? Clarification :On this issue, it is clarified that so long as, (a) the entire transportation of goods is by road; and (b) the person transporting the goods issues a consignment note, it would be classified as ‘GTA Service’.” The above circular supports the view that a composite service cannot be broken up into components and classified as separate services.
The facts of the present case, in my opinion closely reflect the situation envisioned by the CBEC. The service provided by the acquiring bank is similar to the composite service provided by a GTA. The service element provided by an issuing bank is an integral part which gets subsumed in the single unified service provided by the acquiring bank to a merchant establishment. The principle enunciated by CBEC (in the circular) that even if a composite service, consists of more than one service, should nevertheless be treated as a single service based on the main or 162
principal service and accordingly classified, is also applicable in the case of service provided by the acquiring bank and issuing bank. The latter’s role is subsumed into the service of the acquiring bank for which the gross consideration is received from the merchant establishment. The service element provided by the issuing bank in the credit card transaction at the merchant establishment is therefore not subject to service tax as it is incorporated in the service by the acquiring bank as one service provided to the merchant establishment and the gross consideration (MDR) received by the acquiring bank includes the interchange fee shared with the issuing bank, by the acquiring bank. This is identical to the position in GTA service which was clarified by the Board in the above referred circular. This view is also supported by the newly enacted Section 66F (3) (b) which is effective from 1 July 2012, which states that naturally bundled services should be treated as provision of single service. The CBEC’s
circulars
are binding
on the revenue. Therefore, interchange fee earned by the issuing bank which forms an integral part of service of the acquiring bank to the merchant establishment, cannot be subjected to service tax. A credit card transaction towards settlement of payment of a transaction, in sum, is an indestructible integrated service, whose constituent parts are inseparable from each other.
For the reasons outlined above, I am unable to agree with Joseph, J’s reasoning that Citibank had to independently file returns, in respect of the transaction by which interchange fees were collected. 163
Sections 67 and 68
As noted earlier, the charge (under Section 66) is on the “value of the taxable service referred….and collected in such manner as may be prescribed”. Valuation is in terms of the provision of Section 67, and Section 68 provides who has to pay service tax. Section 67 (1) enacts that the measure of tax levied, shall be on the consideration paid for the service, and provides for three contingencies. Section 67 (2) states that where the gross amount charged by a service provider, for the service provided includes service tax payable, the value of the taxable service shall be “such amount as with the addition of tax payable, is equal to the gross amount charged”. Section 67 (3) says that the “gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after provision of such service.” Section 67 (4) – which is subject to the previous subsections enacts that “the value shall be determined in such manner as may be prescribed.” The Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 was framed by the revenue, to assist the task of determining the value of services, to be taxed. Rule 2 (d) (i) defines what is provider of service. Rule 5 prescribes as follows: “Rule 5 Inclusion in or exclusion from value of certain expenditure or costs (1) Where any expenditure or costs are incurred by the service provider in the course of providing taxable service, all such expenditure or costs shall be treated as consideration for the taxable service provided or to be provided and shall be included in 164
the value for the purpose of charging service tax on the said service. Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that for the value of the telecommunication service shall be the gross amount paid by the person to whom telecommunication service is actually provided. (2) Subject to the provisions of subrule (1), the expenditure or costs incurred by the service provider as a pure agent of the recipient of service, shall be excluded from the value of the taxable service if all the following conditions are satisfied, namely: (i) the service provider acts as a pure agent of the recipient of service when he makes payment to third party for the goods or services procured (ii) the recipient of service receives and uses the goods or services so procured by the service provider in his capacity as pure agent of the recipient of service; (iii) the recipient of service is liable to make payment to the third party; (iv) the recipient of service authorises the service provider to make payment on his behalf; (v) the recipient of service knows that the goods and services for which payment has been made by the service provider shall be provided by the third party; (vi) the payment made by the service provider on behalf of the recipient of service has been separately indicated in the invoice issued by the service provider to the recipient of service; (vii) the service provider recovers from the recipient of service only such amount as has been paid by him to the third party; and (viii) the goods or services procured by the service provider from the third party as a pure agent of the recipient of service are in addition to the services he provides on his own account. Explanation1.–For the purposes of sub rule (2), “pure agent” means a person who– (a) enters into a contractual agreement with the recipient of service to act as his pure agent to incur expenditure or costs in the course of providing taxable service; (b) neither intends to hold nor holds any title to the goods or services so procured or provided as pure agent of the recipient of service; (c) does not use such goods or services so procured; and (d) receives only the actual amount incurred to procure such goods or services. Explanation2.– For the removal of doubts it is clarified that the value of the taxable service is the total amount of consideration consisting of all components of the taxable service and it is immaterial that the details of individual components of the total consideration is indicated separately in the invoice. 165
Illustration 1.– X contracts with Y, a real estate agent to sell his house and thereupon Y gives an advertisement in television. Y billed X including charges for Television advertisement and paid service tax on the total consideration billed. In such a case, consideration for the service provided is what X pays to Y. Y does not act as an agent behalf of X when obtaining the television advertisement even if the cost of television advertisement is mentioned separately in the invoice issued by X. Advertising service is an input service for the estate agent in order to enable or facilitate him to perform his services as an estate agent Illustration 2.– In the course of providing a taxable service, a service provider incurs costs such as traveling expenses, postage, telephone, etc., and may indicate these items separately on the invoice issued to the recipient of service. In such a case, the service provider is not acting as an agent of the recipient of service but procures such inputs or input service on his own account for providing the taxable service. Such expenses do not become reimbursable expenditure merely because they are indicated separately in the invoice issued by the service provider to the recipient of service. Illustration 3.– A contracts with B, an architect for building a house. During the course of providing the taxable service, B incurs expenses such as telephone charges, air travel tickets, hotel accommodation, etc., to enable him to effectively perform the provision of services to A. In such a case, in whatever form B recovers such expenditure from A, whether as a separately itemised expense or as part of an inclusive overall fee, service tax is payable on the total amount charged by B. Value of the taxable service for charging service tax is what A pays to B. Illustration 4. – Company X provides a taxable service of rentacab by providing chauffeur driven cars for overseas visitors. The chauffeur is given a lump sum amount to cover his food and overnight accommodation and any other incidental expenses such as parking fees by the Company X during the tour. At the end of the tour, the chauffeur returns the balance of the amount with a statement of his expenses and the relevant bills. Company X charges these amounts from the recipients of service. The cost incurred by the chauffeur and billed to the recipient of service constitutes part of gross amount charged for the provision of services by the company X.” It is evident, from a reading of Rule 5 (1) that all costs and expenditure incurred, for providing the service, are included in the calculation of “gross amount”. Further, per Explanation (2), 166
“the value of the taxable service is the total amount of consideration consisting of all components of the taxable service.”
A cojoint reading of Section 67 and Rule 5 therefore establishes that the value of the entire service to the recipient is the basis of the service tax. Such being the case, if one accepts that the “gross amount” is the entire MDR – inclusive of the interchange fee, there is no mechanism, whereby the latter, i.e. the interchange fee can be brought into the tax net once again.
Section 68, no doubt, enacts that a person providing a taxable service shall pay service tax at the rate prescribed in Section 66B and in the manner prescribed by the rules, and in accordance with the returns filed as may be prescribed under the rules. However, that is not the determinative point – it is the charging provision, i.e. Section 65, which speaks of the levy being upon the value of the service. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with Justice Joseph’s opinion that “every person providing taxable service to any person shall pay service tax at the rate...” which is based on the reasoning that because they are two different entities, they are each separately liable to pay service tax under Section 68 (despite settling the same transaction between the card holder and merchant establishment).
This court, in its ruling in Union of India v. InterContinental Consultants & Technocrats37 observed in this context, as follows:
“24. Section 66 of the Act is the charging section which reads as under:
“66. Charge of service tax.— (1) There shall be levied a tax (hereinafter referred to as the service tax) @ 12% of the value of 37 (2018) 4 SCC 669 167
taxable services referred to in subclauses … of Section 65 and collected in such manner as may be prescribed.”
Obviously, this Section refers to service tax i.e. in respect of those services which are taxable and specifically referred to in various subclauses of Section 65. Further, it also specifically mentions that the service tax will be @ 12% of the “value of taxable services”. Thus, service tax is reference to the value of service. As a necessary corollary, it is the value of the services which are actually rendered, the value whereof is to be ascertained for the purpose of calculating the service tax payable thereupon.
In this hue, the expression “such” occurring in Section 67 of the Act assumes importance. In other words, valuation of taxable services for charging service tax, the authorities are to find what is the gross amount charged for providing “such” taxable services. As a fortiori, any other amount which is calculated not for providing such taxable service cannot be a part of that valuation as that amount is not calculated for providing such “taxable service”. That according to us is the plain meaning which is to be attached to Section 67 (unamended i.e. prior to 152006) or after its amendment, with effect from 152006. Once this interpretation is to be given to Section 67, it hardly needs to be emphasised that Rule 5 of the Rules went much beyond the mandate of Section 67. We, therefore, find that the High Court was right in interpreting Sections 66 and 67 to say that in the valuation of taxable service, the value of taxable service shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider “for such service” and the valuation of tax service cannot be anything more or less than the consideration paid as quid pro qua for rendering such a service.
This position did not change even in the amended Section 67 which was inserted on 152006. Subsection (4) of Section 67 empowers the rulemaking authority to lay down the manner in which value of taxable service is to be determined. However, Section 67(4) is expressly made subject to the provisions of sub section (1). Mandate of subsection (1) of Section 67 is manifest, as noted above viz. the service tax is to be paid only on the services actually provided by the service provider.” Again, in Commissioner of Service Tax & Ors. v. Bhayana Builders Private Limited & Ors38 this court held that the transaction value, i.e., the total value of the service provided, is the gross amount for the purpose of levy of service tax: 38 (2018) 3 SCC 782 168
“A plain reading of Explanation (c) which makes the “gross amount charges” inclusive of certain other payments would make it clear that the purpose is to include other modes of payments, in whatever form received; be it through cheque, credit card, deduction from account, etc. It is in that hue, the provisions mentions that any form of payment by issue of credit notes or debit notes and book adjustment is also to be included. Therefore, the words “in any form of payment” are by means of issue of credit notes or debit notes and book adjustment. With the supply of free goods/materials by the service recipient, no case is made out that any credit notes or debit notes were issued or any book adjustments were made. Likewise, the words, “any amount credited or debited, as the case may be”, to any account whether called “suspense account or by any other name, in the books of accounts of a person liable to pay service tax” would not include the value of the goods supplied free as no amount was credited or debited in any account. In fact, this last portion is related to the debit or credit of the account of an associate enterprise and, therefore, takes care of those amounts which are received by the associated enterprise for the services rendered by the service provider.
In fact, the definition of “gross amount charged” given in Explanation (c) to Section 67 only provides for the modes of the payment or book adjustments by which the consideration can be discharged by the service recipient to the service provider. It does not expand the meaning of the term “gross amount charged” to enable the Department to ignore the contract value or the amount actually charged by the service provider to the service recipient for the service rendered. The fact that it is an inclusive definition and may not be exhaustive also does not lead to the conclusion that the contract value can be ignored and the value of free supply goods can be added over and above the contract value to arrive at the value of taxable services. The value of taxable services cannot be dependent on the value of goods supplied free of cost by the service recipient. The service recipient can use any quality of goods and the value of such goods can vary significantly. Such a value, has no bearing on the value of services provided by the service recipient. Thus, on first principle itself, a value which is not part of the contract between the service provider and the service recipient has no relevance in the determination of the value of taxable services provided by the service provider.”
These decisions – though rendered in different contexts, in my opinion, serve to highlight that the basis for levying service 169
tax, is the total or “gross” value of the amount charged from the service recipient. In the present case, the MDR is thus the “gross value”; it includes the interchange fee. In the circumstances, since the collection of service tax is by the acquiring bank, which remits it to the revenue, the insistence that both elements should be segregated and separate returns filed reflecting the interchange fee, with respect, serves no purpose other than increasing paperwork, and burdening both banks and revenue officials with more work. If it is the aggregate amount (of which the interchange fee, is one part, and the acquiring bank’s amount, another part), the levy is satisfied. In such circumstances, the segregation of the whole MDR (which includes the interchange fee) by slicing it into two portions, i.e. the interchange fee and the acquiring bank’s charge, solely for the purpose of obliging all parties to reflect these in separate returns, only complicates issues. The other interpretation, would lead to a different aggregate, whereby service tax is levied on the entire MDR and once again, on the interchange fee, the issuing bank separately collecting service tax, results in an amount exceeding 14% towards tax. Both interpretations, in my opinion, cannot support separate levies, which would be contrary to Section 65. 36. I am also unable to agree with Joseph, J. about the true construction of the notification exempting transactions below ₹2000/ from payment of service tax. I base this, on a plain and textual reading of the terms of the Notification 25/201239, which, inter alia, reads as follows: 39https://www.cbic.gov.in/resources//htdocsservicetax/stnotifications/stnotifications 2012/Mega_Exemption_Notification_22022018.pdf 170
"
Services by an acquiring bank, to any person in relation to settlement of an amount upto two thousand rupees in a single transaction transacted through credit card, debit card, charge card or other payment card service. Explanation. — For the purposes of this entry, “acquiring bank” means any banking company, financial institution including nonbanking financial company or any other person, who makes the payment to any person who accepts such card.] inserted by Notification No.52/2016ST, dated 8.12.2016." It reflects that legislative intent/understanding is also limited to only the acquiring bank paying service tax, on an aggregate amount. If it were otherwise, the object of granting exemption would be defeated because the acquiring bank would then be collecting (or, correspondingly, the issuing bank would be deducting) the proportion of tax leviable on the interchange fee, thus resulting in a partial levy of service tax on the quantum of transactions (₹ 2000/ and below) which are clearly exempt. In my opinion, therefore, Joseph, J’s opinion that by the exemption, the issuing bank cannot claim exemption on the ground that acquiring bank is exempted, therefore, is not accurate. It is also important to remember that what is taxed, is the value of the transaction and it is the transaction that is exempt, not the service provider. Therefore, the express use of only ‘acquiring bank’ is indicative that Parliament was well aware of how credit card transactions are conducted.
I am therefore, not in agreement with the reasoning of Joseph, J. that “service provider” under Section 67(1)(i) imply that both the acquiring bank and issuing bank are service providers, and the gross amount on which the tax is collected, is not the aggregate of the value of the services provided by the 171
different service holders. The judgement of Joseph, J. with respect, is mainly concerned by the fact that Citibank retains ₹ 2 before crediting the rest of the money towards settlement of the transaction; and therefore, in the absence of proof that acquiring bank has paid service tax on amount including the interchange fee, it is liable to pay for the specific service provided by it, as a distinct service provider. As explained in the earlier portion of this judgment, the activity or part played by the issuing bank is undoubtedly a service. However, it is part of the service; by itself, and without the role of the acquiring bank, it becomes a pure advance or loan transaction. However, the provision of service by the issuing bank and the acquiring bank together, triggers the levy. In other words, the component of service by the issuing bank is just that – a part of a single unified service, which for business convenience is structured in a manner, that the issuing bank retains ₹ 2, and tax is paid on the overall service, in the hands of the acquiring bank. There is no revenue leakage. The manner in which the credit card transaction, particularly the inter se transaction between the issuing bank and the acquiring bank is fashioned is such that instead of releasing the entire amount, in the first instance, and claiming the interchange fee later, the issuing bank retains the component of interchange fee.
Conclusion 172
For the sake of clarity and completeness, I have briefly summarised my position in relation to each of the conclusions drawn by Joseph, J. in his judgment (paragraph 109): (A) On Conclusion I: I am in agreement that the respondent Citibank, as issuing bank was providing service, as found by the Commissioner. However, this service was a part of a single unified service – of settling transactions – which is provided by both the acquiring and issuing bank (which in some circumstances may well be the same bank). (B) On Conclusions II, III, and IV: I am in agreement with J. Joseph that prior to 01.07.2012, the service of issuing bank fell within Section 65 (33a) (iii); interchange fee cannot be treated as interest, as argued by Citibank; and lastly the case that credit card transaction, being a transaction in money and therefore excluded from the definition of “service” in Section 65B (44) is unacceptable. (C) On Conclusion VI: I agree that the plea to dismiss the appeals solely on the ground that no appeal was carried against the Order in ABN Amro (supra) has no merit. (D) On Conclusion V, VIIX: Service tax is undoubtedly a value added tax. However, having characterised the service to be a single unified service – wherein service tax, by way of business convenience, is collected from/remitted by the acquiring bank on the value (whole MDR which includes the interchange fee that is retained by the issuing bank) taxable for the single service rendered by both the acquiring and issuing bank – Citibank 173
cannot be called upon to pay the service tax again as this would
result in double taxation. In view of my previous discussion, I do not agree with the reasoning in ABN Amro (supra). For the same reasons, I am of the opinion that the question of remand to the tribunal does not arise. The only point of contention seems to be whether they were reflecting the payment of service tax separately in their ledgers, as issuing and acquiring bank. However, as a result of the reasons already elaborated, this is rendered to be a purely academic question. A question of returns should not detain this Court, because the business reality is that every bank is both an issuing bank and an acquiring bank, and it is nobody’s case that the banks are not filing their returns on service tax. As regards the revenue’s allegation of wilful suppression, the settled view of this court, is best explained from the following extract of a previous three judge ruling, in Cosmic Dye Chemical v. Collector Of Central Excise40 where it was observed – in relation to Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, (which is in pari materia with Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994) that: “Now so far as fraud and collusion are concerned, it is evident that the requisite intent, i.e., intent to evade duty is built into these very words. So far as misstatement or suppression of facts are concerned, they are clearly qualified by the word "wilful" preceding the words "misstatement or suppression of facts" which means with intent to evade duty. The next set of words "contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or rules" are again qualified by the immediately following words "with intent to evade payment of duty". It is, therefore, not correct to say that there can be a suppression or misstatement of fact, which is not wilful and yet 40 (1995) 6 SCC 117 174
constitute a permissible ground for the purpose of the proviso to Section 11A. Misstatement or suppression of fact must be wilful.” This decision was followed in M/s Uniworth Textiles v. Commissioner of Central Excise41 where it was stated that: “The conclusion that mere nonpayment of duties is equivalent to collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of facts is, in our opinion, untenable. If that were to be true, we fail to understand which form of nonpayment would amount to ordinary default? Construing mere nonpayment as any of the three categories contemplated by the proviso would leave no situation for which, a limitation period of six months may apply. In our opinion, the main body of the Section, in fact, contemplates ordinary default in payment of duties and leaves cases of collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of facts, a smaller, specific and more serious niche, to the proviso. Therefore, something more must be shown to construe the acts of the appellant as fit for the applicability of the proviso.”42 Therefore, with regards to the revenue’s allegation of wilful suppression, I find no merit given that this was not the allegation or scope of the ShowCause Notices issued. Moreover, the representations sent by the Indian Bank Association to the Joint Secretary, TRU, Central Board of Excise and Customs confirm that there was a lack of clarity with regards to the method of payment of this tax, for which there was an ongoing dialogue between the banking institutions and Central Government, negating any claims of “wilful suppression”. One cannot also be oblivious of the fact that the position of law, was in a state of flux, at the relevant period. Hence, and in view of the reasons given above, the present case does not warrant remand to the 41 (2013) 9 SCC 753 42 Other decisions – i.e. Padmini Products v. CCE [(1989) 4 SCC 275], Tamil Nadu Housing Board v Collector Central Excise [1995] Supp (1) SCC 50, etc. have given similar reasoning. 175
Tribunal, and this dispute should, in my opinion, stand finally concluded at this stage.
Therefore, for the reasons already elaborated above – I am of the opinion that these appeals by Revenue ought to be dismissed. …....................................J [S. RAVINDRA BHAT] New Delhi; December 9, 2021. 176
