COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS vs. STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, ETC

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10 PETITIONER: COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, MADRAS Vs. RESPONDENT: STANDARD MOTOR PRODUCTS, ETC. DATE OF JUDGMENT24/02/1989 BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J) KANIA, M.H. CITATION: 1989 AIR 1298 1989 SCR (1) 824 1989 SCC (2) 303 JT 1989 (1) 409 1989 SCALE (1)490 ACT: Supreme Court Rules, 1966--Order VI, Rule 2(14)--Appli- cations for condonation of delay--Whether Single Judge in Chambers has juri iction to dismiss--Whether such practice just, fair and reasonable-Whether requires to be disturbed--Exception in favour of applications under Art. 136 of the Constitution--Whether violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution--Whether they form a separate and distinct class-Different procedure for different applications--Wheth- er violative of fundamental rights--Arranging the business of the Court--Whether within the domain of the Court. Constitution of India, 1950: Arts. 136 and 137--Applica- tions for condonation of delay--Whether a separate and distinct class--Longstanding and settled practice of the Court--Whether can be disturbed. HEADNOTE: An application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner-Revenue alongwith statutory appeals against the judgment/order of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. The application was rejected by a Single Judge of this Court under Order VI, Rule 2(14) of the Su- preme Court Rules, 1966. The Revenue filed review petitions on the ground that the application for condonation of delay made in statutory appeals under several Acts should be heard by a bench of at least two Judges. It was contended that the effect of the refusal of condonation of delay was dismissal of the appeal itself, that the exception in favour of Special Leave Peti- tions amounted to hostile discrimination without any basis in that the Special Leave Petitions will be amenable to be dealt with by two Judges, while a Single Judge will dispose of applications for condonation of delay under statutory appeals, which was irrational and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and, therefore, the Court should either hold that as dismissal of application for condonation of delay amounted to dismissal of the appeal itself, it should be heard by not less than two Judges in terms of Order VII Rule 1 subject to other provisions or refer the matter to a larger bench for re-consideration, in view of the decision

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10 825 of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Bombay City versus R.H. Pandi, Managing Trustees of Trust. Bombay, holding that the applications for condonation of filing petitions of appeal were within the Chamber business under Order VI Rule 2(14). On the question whether a Single Judge has juri iction to dismiss applications for condonation of delay in statuto- ry appeals. Dismissing the review petitions, HELD: 1.1 A Single Judge in Chambers is and was always competent to dismiss all applications for condonation of delay in statutory appeals. There is nothing repugnant in the same that it is not violative of Art. 14 of the Consti- tution. [836G] 1.2 Order VI, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that the powers of the court in relation to a certain mat- ters may be exercised by a Single Judge sitting in Chambers. Rule 2(14) deals with applications for enlargement or abridgement of time with some exceptions. Reading the rule simply, it means all applications for enlargement or abridgement of time would be cognizable by the Single Judge in Chambers except those applications, time for which is fixed by the court in terms of Order VII and also applica- tions for condonation of delay in filing Special Leave Petitions. [831E-F] 1.3 On a proper reading, the exception made only in favour of the time fixed by the court means court function- ing judicially in terms of Order VII Rule 1 as well as time fixed by the rules of the court. All other applications for enlargement or abridgement for time could be heard by the Single Judge. [831F-G] 1.4 If a separate and distinct provision is made for application for condonation of delay under Art. 136 of the Constitution, it is not violative of Art. 14 of the Consti- tution. Applications under Art. 136 are a special class and are sui juris. These are and should legitimately be treated separately other than all other applications including applications under statutory appeals. Art. 136 is the resid- uary power of this Court to do justice, where the court is satisfied that there is injustice. These are class part. There is, therefore, no discrimination under Art. 14 of the Constitution or in Order VI Rule 2(14). [836C-D] 2.1 Order VI demarcates the power of the