ATTIVO PROTEZIONE PRIVATE LIMITED,MUMBAI vs. INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD-22(1)(1), LALBAUG

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
“SMC” BENCH MUMBAI

BEFORE HON’BLE SHRI SANDEEP GOSAIN, JUDICIAL MEMBER
Attivo Protezione Pvt Ltd
108, 1st Floor Ashar Enclave
Kolshet Road, Thane – 400
607. Vs.
ITO, Ward – 22(1)(1)
Room No. 319, Piramal
Chambers, Mumbai
PAN/GIR No. AALCA4330M
(Applicant)
(Respondent)

Assessee by None
Revenue by Shri Rajesh Sakhardane, Sr. DR

Date of Hearing
27.10.2025
Date of Pronouncement
31.10.2025

आदेश / ORDER

PER SANDEEP GOSAIN, JM:

The present appeal has been filed by the assessee challenging the impugned order dt. 29.09.2021 passed under section 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’), by the National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) / CIT(A) for the assessment year 2018-19. 2. None appeared on behalf of the assessee either physically or virtually when the case was called repeatedly, however an application for seeking adjournment is on the court file. After having gone through the contents of the 2
Attivo Protezione Pvt Ltd, Mumbai.

said application I find no reasons for further adjournment as the assessee was required to file affidavit along with the application for seeking condonation of delay of 1370 days in filing the appeal, the said affidavit was required to be filed but the same was not filed on 29.08.2025 when the appeal was filed. Thus for this purpose alone no further adjournment can be granted. Even otherwise adjournment is not a right of the party but is discretion of the court therefore application for seeking adjournment stands rejected.
3. Ld. DR present in the court is ready with the arguments, therefore I decided to proceed with the hearing of the appeal ex-parte.
4. Since there is a delay in filing the present appeal of 1370 days and in this regard assessee has only mentioned that after the decision of the appeal by Ld. CIT(A), the Tax consultant of the assessee had not advised any remedial action against the said order passed u/s 250 of the Act, therefore appeal was not filed.
5. To my mind this cannot be a reason for condoning the delay of 1370 days. After having examine the issue in the light of the facts and the circumstances of the case and also in view of the terms of section 5 of the Limitation
Act, whereby discretion is vested in the Court/Appellate
Authority to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the 3
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appellant shows ‘sufficient cause' for not preferring the application within the prescribed time. The expression
'sufficient cause’ commonly appears in the provisions of order 22 Rule 9 (2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. The Court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence which would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5. “Sufficient cause” is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condoning the delay. Courts have time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. The law of Limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim “'Interest ReipublicaeUt Sit Finis Litium” (It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation).
6 To understand the scope of the term “sufficient cause” in matters of delay, reliance is placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Ors vs The Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC
746 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the sufficient cause does not include the negligent manner in which the applicant had acted or/ and there was a want of bona fide, on his/her part. If a party does not act diligently or remains inactive, it cannot qualify as 4
Attivo Protezione Pvt Ltd, Mumbai.

sufficient ground allowing the court to exercise discretion in favour of such a party. Condonation of delay is not an automatic right but requires the person requesting it to provide a valid explanation for each day of delay and demonstrate a reasonable cause.
“Sufficient
Cause” cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. In the case of Anshul Agarwal vs New Okhla
Industrial Development Authority (2011) 14 SCC 578, the hon’ble Apex Court held that the reason provided for the delay must be something beyond the individual's control that prevented them from approaching the Court.
7 It is well established in law that the period of limitation has to be construed somewhat strictly as it has the effect of vesting for one and taking away right from the other. To condone the delay in a mechanical or a routine manner may amount to jeopardizing the legislative intent behind Section 5 of the Act. Where the parties chose to sleep over their rights for prolonged periods without any just cause, can hardly claim equity in justice particularly faced with the statutory provisions of Section 5 .In construing enactments which provide period of limitation for institution of proceedings, the purpose is to intimate people that after lapse of certain time from a certain event,

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a proceeding will not be entertained where a strict grammatical construction is normally the safe guide.

8 The hon’ble Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan
V. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222 held as under:-
"11. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for laundering the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

...........parties must act bonafidely, expeditiously and with due care. A casual or a negligent litigant who has acted with utter irresponsible attitude, cannot claim the condonation of delay in law when the right has accrued to the other side. The expression "sufficient cause" will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The actions which can be condoned by the Court should fall within the realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. It is neither expected nor can it be a normal conduct of a public servant or a litigant that they would keep the files unmoved, unprocessed for months together on their tables.

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"Where the delay is prolonged and the assessee is not able to show that the delay had occurred in spite of exercise of due attention and diligence, the assessee cannot complain, if the delay is not condoned."
11. In the decision rendered in the case of Rankak and Ors. v Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported at AIR 1962 SC
361, the hon’ble Apex Court has held that the party has to show reason for delay on the last day of the limitation period and for each day thereafter. It was further held that condonation is not a matter of right and that the Courts have to exercise discretionary juri iction.
12 The issue of condonation of delay had come up before
Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of Brijbandhu
Nanda (44 ITR 688). The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal and on further appeal, the Hon'ble High Court had held that there is no justification for the delay as under:
"Even assuming that the questions referred are questions of law, I am of opinion that there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in not condoning the delay in Its discretion. In fact, as appears from the assessee's own petition for condonation of delay in I.T.A. Nos. 85, 86 and 87 of 1954-55 dated May 5,

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1955, the assessee does not appear to have explained why he waited for 56 days after he received the order on February 5,
1954, as aforesaid. It further appears from a letter dated April
9, 1954, from the